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NTERESTS    OF   THE     TWO    POWERS    MEET 


'THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE 
CONFLICT  * 

ITS  CAUSES  AND  ISSUES 


BY 


TV1 


K.  ASAKAWA,  Ph.  D.       '  r  ^^  • 

Lecturer  on  the  Civilization  and  History  of  East  Asia  at  Dartmouth  College; 
author  of  the  "  Early  Institutional  Life  of  Japan,"  etc. 


WITH  AN  INTRODUCTION  BY 
FREDERICK  WELLS  WILLIAMS 

Assistant  Professor  of  Modern  Oriental  History  in  Yale  University 


ILLUSTRATED 


BOSTON  AND  NEW  YORK 

HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  AND  COMPANY 

($&e  tttoeriJibe  pre#$,  Cambri&jje 

1904 


BEESE 


COPYRIGHT,  1904,  BY  HOUGHTON,  MIFFLIN  *  CO. 
ALL   RIGHTS   RESERVED 

Published  November,  IQ04 


tblf6^ 


•." »  •  •• .    •  ••■ 


•  ••  •••  •     • 


*  •  •  ■ 


INTRODUCTION 

The  issues  of  the  conflict  that  forms  the  topic  of 
this  little  volume  are  bound  inevitably  to  influence 
the  future  of  the  civilized  world  for  many  years. 
Dr.  Asakawa  presents  them  with  a  logical  thorough- 
ness that  reminds  us  of  the  military  operations  of 
his  countrymen  now  in  evidence  elsewhere,  and  re- 
calls very  pleasantly  to  my  own  mind  the  sane  and 
accurate  character  of  his  scholastic  work  while  a 
student  at  Yale.  It  is  the  sort  of  presentation  which 
a  great  subject  needs.  It  is  content  with  a  simple 
statement  of  fact  and  inference.  It  is  convincing 
because  of  its  brevity  and  restraint. 

The  generous  and  almost  passionate  sympathy  of 
our  countrymen  for  Japan  in  this  crisis  of  her  ca- 
reer has  aroused  some  speculation  and  surprise  even 
amongst  ourselves.  The  emotion  is,  doubtless,  the 
outcome  of  complex  causes,  but  this  much  is  obvious 
at  present :  the  past  half -century  has  brought  both 
America  and  Japan  through  experiences  strikingly 
similar,  and  their  establishment  at  the  same  moment 
as  new  world  Powers  has  afforded  both  the  same 
view  of  their  older  competitors  for  first  rank  among 
nations.  Both  have  earned  their  centralized  and 
effective  governments  after  the  throes  of  civil  war ; 
both  have  built  navies  and  expanded  their  foreign 


INTRODUCTION 

both  have  arrested  the  belated  and 
rather  contemptuous  attention  of  Europe  by  success 
in  foreign  wars.  No  state  of  Christendom  can  ap- 
preciate so  well  as  America  the  vexation  of  enduring 
for  generations  the  presumption  or  the  patronage 
of  those  European  courts  who  have  themselves 
been  free  for  less  than  a  century  from  the  bonds 
that  Napoleon  put  upon  the  entire  Continental 
group ;  and  Japan  has  suffered  under  the  same  ob- 
servance. With  the  acknowledgment  of  the  exist- 
ence of  these  two  Powers  of  the  first  class  on  either 
shore  of  the  Pacific,  the  bottom  drops  out  of  that 
system  whereon  was  based  the  diplomacy  of  nine- 
teenth-century Europe,  and  the  jealousy  with  which 
they  are  both  regarded  establishes  a  certain  rap- 
prochement between  the  two  newly  arrived  nations. 
The  attitude  of  the  American  people  does  not 
appear  to  me  to  be  greatly  influenced  by  prejudice 
against  Russia.  It  is  likely,  indeed,  that  we  had 
less  to  fear  directly  from  the  ambition  of  the  Great 
Colossus  than  any  other  state.  Yet  we  have  been 
among  the  first  to  discern  that  Japan  is  doing  the 
world's  work  if,  by  reducing  the  pressure  of  Rus- 
sia's assault  upon  Eastern  Asia,  she  removes  China 
in  the  crisis  of  her  awakening  from  the  list  of  those 
derelict  states  whose  present  decrepitude  offers 
such  deplorable  temptation  to  the  military  nations 
of  the  West.  There  would  seem  to  be  fresh  need, 
moreover,  of  convincing  modern  statesmen  that  a 
policy  of  conducting  diplomatic  intercourse  by  means 
of  tergiversation  and  lies  is  unprofitable  in  the  long 


INTRODUCTION  vii 

run,  and  therefore  unjustified  by  the  most  cynical_ 
school  of  political  ethics.  Without  debating  the 
righteousness  of  her  pretensions,  it  is  obvious  that 
Russia  cannot  proceed  further  in  her  headway  with- 
out materially  affecting  the  legitimate  ambitions  of 
other  peoples  of  proved  vitality,  nor  can  her  char- 
acteristic diplomacy  secure  success  without  debauch 
ing  the  political  morality  of  Christendom.  While 
apprehension  of  Russian  aims  need  not  involve  dis- 
like of  the  Russian  people,  we  have  an  abiding  idea 
in  this  country  that  both  alike  lie  under  a  necessity 
of  chastisement,  and  that  Japan,  as  the  only  nation 
now  really  at  home  on  the  Pacific,  is  the  hand  to 
hold  the  rod. 

In  conclusion  —  if  I  may  be  allowed  to  extend 
these  reflections  a  little  further  —  the  situation 
before  us  suggests  the  possibility  that  Asia  may  at 
this  moment  be  passing  the  threshold  of  a  renas- 
cence similar  to  that  which  awakened  Europe  at 
the  opening  of  the  sixteenth  century  from  the  leth- 
argy of  her  dark  ages.  As  the  able  editor  of  the 
North  China  Herald  has  observed,  native  Asia  from 
Korea  to  Siam  is  to-day  no  more  deeply  immersed 
in  the  mire  of  poverty,  ignorance,  and  superstition 
than  was  Europe  in  the  Middle  Ages,  nor  was  the 
task  of  relief  and  enlightenment  less  hopeless  to 
human  agencies  then  than  now.  Yet  with  the  Age 
of  Discoveries  came  not  only  new  worlds  and  new 
paths  of  commerce,  but  the  end  of  the  tyrannies  of 
scholasticism,  the  church,  and  the  despot.  Within 
a  century  were   laid  all  the  foundations  of  these 


< 
< 


viii  INTRODUCTION 

political  and  intellectual  institutions  that  distinguish 
Europe  and  her  children  to-day.  A  like  recon- 
struction may  be  effected  in  Asia  during  the  century 
just  begun.  The  parallel  is  not  altogether  inadmis- 
sible, and  it  may  be  pushed  even  further.  For  as 
the  newly  awakened  Europe  of  the  sixteenth  cen- 
tury developed  one  monster  Power  whose  aggran- 
dizement threatened  the  liberties  of  all  the  rest,  so 
has  the  present  era  brought  forth  a  monster  fearful 
in  the  same  fashion  to  Asia.  It  was  England,  a 
naval  folk  and  a  new  Power,  that  struck  at  Spain 
three  centuries  ago,  and  by  that  brave  adventure 
not  only  won  wealth  and  prestige  for  herself,  but 
rid  Europe  of  a  great  menace.  It  is  Japan,  also  a 
naval  race  and  a  new  —  so  far  as  Continental  history 
is  concerned  — ;  that  strikes  at  Russia  and  hopes  by 
her  success  both  to  avert  the  undoing  of  the  ancient 
states  about  her  and  to  establish  herself  as  mistress 
in  her  own  waters.  Confident  in  their  understanding 
of  their  great  mission,  we  of  America  may  rightfully 
bid  the  dazed  Asiatic  seek  his  salvation  from  the 
children  of  the  Rising  Sun,  and  declare  in  the 
Sibylline  utterance  of  the  Psalmist,  "  The  dew  of 
thy  birth  is  of  the  womb  of  the  morning.' ' 

Frederick  Wells  Williams. 

New  Haven,  Connecticut, 
November,  1904. 


PREFACE 

This  is  an  attempt  to  present  in  a  verifiable  form 
some  of  the  issues  and  the  historical  causes  of  the 
war  now  waged  between  Russia  and  Japan.  Power- 
fully as  it  appeals  to  me,  I  would  not  have  dis- 
cussed a  subject  so  strange  to  the  proper  sphere  of 
my  investigation,  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that 
no  one  else  has,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  undertaken 
the  task  in  the  same  spirit  in  which  I  have  endea- 
vored to  write  these  pages.  Although  I  deeply  re- 
gret that  I  do  not  read  the  Russian  language  and 
cannot  do  full  justice  to  the  Russian  side  of  the 
question,  the  impartial  reader  will  observe,  I  trust, 
that  this  work  is  neither  a  plea  for  the  one  side  nor 
a  condemnation  of  the  other,  but  a  mere  exposition 
of  the  subject-matter  as  I  comprehend  it.  When  the 
author  offers  what  he  considers  a  natural  explana- 
tion of  a  question,  the  reader  should  not  read  into 
it  a  moral  judgment.  Indeed,  I  earnestly  wish  that 
the  kind  reader  would  thrash  out  of  these  pages 
every  grain  of  real  prejudice.  Nor  can  I  welcome 
a  greater  favor  from  any  person  than  a  more  com- 
plete and  just  statement  of  Russia's  case  than  I 
have  been  able  to  make.  After  having  said  so 
much,  it  is  unnecessary  to  tell  the  reader  how,  when 
the  substance  of  the  introductory  chapter  to  this 


x  PREFACE 

volume  was  published  last  May  in  the  Tale 
Review,  some  of  its  critics  ascribed  to  the  writer 
motives  utterly  foreign  to  himself.  One  of  those 
alleged  motives  was  that  I  had  sought  to  prove 
that  the  American  trading  interest  in  Manchuria 
and  Korea  would  be  better  served  by  a  final  victory 
of  Japan  than  by  that  of  Russia.  I  neither  proved 
nor  disproved  such  a  theme,  but  I  did  state  that 
Japan's  interest  demanded  the  maintenance  in  those 
regions  of  the  principle  of  the  impartial  opportunity 
for  all  nations.  Whether  the  result  of  this  policy 
would  prove  better  or  worse  for  the  interest  of  any 
one  nation  than  the  effect  of  an  exclusive  policy,  did 
not  concern  me.  It  did  not  and  does  not  belong 
to  me  to  appeal  teethe  commercial  instinct  of  the 
reader,  or  even  to  his  sympathy  with,  or  antipathy 
to,  either  of  the  present  belligerents.  My  only  plea 
is  that  for  truth. 

The  substance  of  the  introductory  chapter,  as  has 
been  said,  and  also  a  brief  summary  of  the  body 
of  the  volume  have  been  published  in  the  Tale 
Review  for  May  and  August  of  the  present  year. 
I  am  greatly  indebted  to  the  editors  of  the  Re- 
view for  allowing  me  to  use  the  material  in  the 
preparation  of  this  work.  I  also  wish  to  express 
my  sincere  thanks  to  my  friends  who  have  encour- 
aged me  in  the  publication  of  this  volume. 

Asakawa. 

Hanover,  New  Hampshire, 
August  30,  1904. 


CONTENTS 

PAGB 

Introductory 1 

Economic  issues  :  (1)  Japan's  side  ;  transition  from  an 
agricultural  to  an  industrial  stage,  pp.  1-10  ;  community  of 
interest  between  Japan  and  Korea  and  Manchuria,  10-32. 
(2)  Russia's  side,  32-47  ;  comparison,  47-48  ;  political  is- 
sues, 48-51  ;  summary,  51-53  ;  conclusion,  53-61. 
Supplementary  Note 61 

Chapter  I.     Retrocession  of  the  Liao-tung  Peninsula    ...    65 
Primorsk  and  Sakhalien,  65-67  ;  intervention  of  1895,  68- 
77  ;  its  historical  significance,  77-78  ;  its  effects  on  Japan, 
78-82. 

Chapter  II.     The  "Cassini  Convention"  and  the  Railway 

Agreement 83 

The  Russo-French  loan  and  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank,  83- 
85  ;  the  agreement  of  alliance,  85-87  ;  the  "  Cassini  Con- 
vention," 87-95  ;  the  railway  agreement  of  September  8, 
and  statutes  of  December  23,  1896,  95-100. 

Chapter  III.   Kiac-chau 101 

The  seizure  of  Kiao-chau,  and  the  Agreement  of  March  6, 
1898,  101-105  ;  the  conduct  of  Great  Britain,  106-109. 

Chapter  IV!  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan 110 

Russian  warships  at  Port  Arthur,  111-112  ;  British  demand 
for  the  opening  of  Talien-wan,  113-118  ;  Port  Arthur  and 
Talien-wan,  the  British  and  Russian  Governments,  118-125 ; 
Wei-hai-Wei,  125-129  ;  the  Agreement  of  March  27,  1898, 
and  supplementary  agreements,  129-132  ;  the  administra- 
tion of  the  leased  territory,  and  Dalny,  132-134. 

Chapter  V.   Secretary  Hay's  Circular  Note 135 

The  circular  of  September,  1899,  135  ;  the  Powers'  re- 
plies, 136-138. 


xii  CONTENTS 

Chapter  VI.   The  Occupation  of  Manchuria 139 

Russia's  attitude  toward  the  Boxer  trouble  in  North  China, 
139-143 ;  the  Manchurian  campaign,  143-146. 

Chapter  VII.   North  China  and  Manchuria 147 

Characteristics  of  Russia's  diplomacy  regarding  Manchu- 
ria, 147-148;  the  distinction  made  between  North  China 
and  Manchuria;  the  circular  note  of  August  25, 1900, 148- 
155. 

Chapter  VIII.   The  Anglo-German  Agreement 156 

The  Northern  Railway  affair,  156-157;  the  Anglo-Ger- 
man Agreement  of  October  16, 1900,  157-158 ;  the  Powers' 
views,  158-160;  Germany's  view,  160-161. 

Chapter  IX.   A  Modus  Vivendi :  the  Alexieff-Tseng  Agree- 
ment   162 

Peace  negotiations  at  Peking,  and  Russia's  Manchurian 
policy,  162-165;  the  Alexieff-Tseng  Agreement  of  Novem- 
ber, 1900,  165-168;  the  protests  of  the  Powers,  168-169; 
Count  Lamsdorff's  explanation,  169-172. 

Chapter  X.   A  "  Starting-Point "  —  the   Lamsdorff-Yang-yu 

Convention 173 

The  Lamsdorff-Yang-yu  Convention,  173-176  ;  China's  ap- 
peal, and  the  Powers'  protests,  176-178  ;  Russia  detached 
herself  from  the  allies,  178-181 ;  the  amendments  of  March, 
1901,  181-182;  the  British  and  Japanese  remonstrances, 
and  withdrawal  of  Russian  demands,  182-188. 

Chapter  XI.   Further  Demands 189 

M.  Lessar's  demands  in  August,  189-190;  in  October, 
190-193;  protests,  replies,  and  delays,  193-196. 

Chapter  XII.    The    Anglo-Japanese    Agreement    and    the 

Russo-French  Declaration 197 

A  growing  sympathy  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan 
prior  to  the  conclusion  of  the  agreement,  197,  198;  diplo- 
matic steps  toward  the  conclusion,  199-202;  the  Agree- 
ment of  January  30,  1902,  202-209;  the  Russo-French 
declaration  of  March  16,  209-213. 

Chapter  XIII.   The  Convention  of  Evacuation 214 

The  Russo-Chinese  convention  of  April  8,  1902,  214-226:; 
an  analysis  of  the  document,  226-232. 


CO"  TTENTS  xiii 

Chapter  XIV.  The  Evacuj*  ion 233 

The  first  evacuation,  October  8,  1902,  233  ;  the  nominal 
character  of  the  evacuation,  234-237  ;  Niu-chwang,  237- 
238. 

Chapter  XV.   Demands  in  Seven  Articles 239 

The  second  evacuation,  239-241  ;  new  Russian  demands, 
April  5,  1903,  241-244  ;  the  opposition  of  three  Powers  to 
the  demands,  244-246  ;  Count  Lamsdorff's  disclaimer,  246- 
248  ;  Count  Cassini's  statement,  248-251  ;  diplomacy  at 
Peking,  251-25P. 

Chapter  XVI.   Tiplomatic  Struggle  in  Korea,  I 257 

Japan's  failure  and  Russia's  success  at  Seul,  the  murder  of 
the  Queen,  257-261 ;  the  flight  of  the  King,  262-263 ;  the 
Yamagata-Lobanoff  Protocol,  June  6,  and  the  Komura- 
Waeber  Memorandum,  May  14,  1896,  263-268  ;  a  decline 
of  Russian  influence,  268-271  ;  the  Nishi-Rosen  Protocol, 
April  25, 1898,  271-272. 

Chapter  XVII.  Diplomatic  Struggle  in  Korea,  II  ...  .  273 
Pavloff  and  Hayashi,  273  ;  the  Masampo  affair,  274-278  ; 
abortive  loans,  278-280  ;  Russians  and  pro-Russian  Kore- 
ans at  Seul,  280 ;  the  bank-note  trouble,  281-282  ;  the 
Keyserling  whaling  concession,  282-283  ;  the  Tumen 
River  telegraph  lines,  283-285  ;  the  Seul-Wiju  Railway, 
285-289  ;  the  Yong-am-po  affair,  289-295. 

Chapter  XVIII.  The  Russo-Japanese  Negotiations,  I  .  .  296 
Japan's  invitation  to  negotiate,  July  28,  1903,  296-299  ; 
Russia's  assent,  299  ;  political  changes  in  Russia,  and  the 
Viceroy  of  the  Far  East,  299-302  ;  Japan's  first  proposals, 
August  12,  302-307  ;  negotiations  transferred  to  Tokio, 
307-308  ;  Russia's  first  counter-proposals,  October  3,  308- 
311  ;  Russian  diplomacy  at  Peking,  311-318  ;  the  develop- 
ment of  the  Yang-am-po  affair,  318-323. 

Chapter  XIX.  The  Russo-Japanese  Negotiations,  II  .  .  .  324 
Japan's  second  proposals,  October  30,  324-328  ;  Russia's 
second  counter-proposals,  December  11,  328-329  ;  Japan's 
third  proposals,  December  23,  329-331  ;  pacific  declara- 
tions of  Russia,  331-332  ;  Russia's  third  counter-proposals, 
January  6,  1904,  332-335  ;  new  ports  opened  in  Manchu- 
ria, 335  ;  Japan's  fourth  proposals,  January  13,  335-339  ; 


xiv  CONTI OTS 

military  activity  of  the  Russia,  s,  339-341  ;  the  termina- 
tion of  the  negotiations  and  the  rapture  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, February  5-6,  341-344  ;  ihe  first  acts  of  war,  345  ; 
the  Russian  Manifesto  and  tbi  Japanese  Declaration  of 
War,  January  10,  345-348. 

Supplementary  Note  to  Chapter  XlA 348 

The  Russian  communique,  February  18,  348-349;  the  Rus- 
sian statement  of  February  20,  349-351 ;  Japan's  reply  to 
the  above,  March  3,  352-354;  the  Russian  note  to  the 
Powers  regarding  Korean  neutrality,  February  22,  355- 
356;  Japan's  reply,  March  9,  357-360;  Hussia's  counter- 
reply,  March  12,  360-362. 

Chapter  XX.   Chinese  Neutrality  and  Korean  Integrity    .     .  363 
Japan's  advice  to  China  to  be  neutral,  363,  364;  Secre- 
tary Hay's  note,  364-365;  China's  own  declaration,  365; 
Japan's  pledge  to  China,  366;  the  Korean-Japanese  alli- 
ance, 366-368;  its  nature  analyzed,  368-372. 

Index 373 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Map  showing  "  the  regions  where  the  interests  of  the 
two  Powers  meet  ' ' Frontispiece 

Count  Cassini,  Russian  Minister  at  Washington,  and 
formerly  at  peking 88 

Count  Lamsdorff,  Russian  Foreign  Minister   ....  144 

Li  Hung-Chang 192 

Count  Katsura,  Premier  of  Japan        200 

M.  Lessar,  Russian  Minister  at  Peking 254 

M.  Pavloff,  Late  Russian  Minister  at  Seul    ....  274 

Copyright,  1902,  by  George  Grantham  Bain 

Baron  Komura,  Japanese  Foreign  Minister     ....  296 

Admiral  Alexieff,  Viceroy  of  the  Far  East  ....  302 

Mr.  Kurino,  Late  Japanese  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg  330 

Baron  de  Rosen,  Late  Russian  Minister  at  Tokio       .  346 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

INTRODUCTORY  ' 

SOME  OF  THE  ISSUES  OF  THE  CONFLICT 

The  deeper  significance  of  the  present  dramatic 
struggle  between  Russia  and  Japan  over  territories 
belonging  to  neither  of  the  contestants  cannot 
perhaps  be  understood,  until  we  examine  some  of 
the  issues  at  stake  between  them.  The  more  funda- 
mental of  these  issues,  however,  as  in  many  another 
international  crisis,  seem  to  be  oftener  understood 
than  expressed,  and  hence  understood  only  vaguely, 
although  it  may  fairly  be  said  that  they  constitute 
the  very  foTces  which  have  with  irresistible  cer- 
tainty brought  the  belligerents  into  collision.  For 
Japan,  the  issues  appear  to  be  only  partly  political, 
but  mainly  economical;  and  perhaps  no  better  clue 
to  the  understanding,  not  only  of  the  present  situ- 
ation, but  also,  in  general,  of  the  activities  at  home 
and  abroad  of  the  Japanese  people,  could  be  found 
than  in  the  study  of  these  profound  material 
interests. 

J  Among  the  most  remarkable  tendencies  of  Ja- 
pan's economic  life  of  recent  years  has  been  the 
enormous  increase  of  her  population,  along  with  an 
immense  growth  of  her  trade  and  industries.    The 


2  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

number  of  her  inhabitants  increased  from  27,200,- 
000,  as  estimated  in  1828,  to  only  34,000,000  in 
1875,  but  since  that  year  it  has  risen  so  fast  that  it  is 
to-day  AQ^ftOO1  —  exclusive  of  the  3,082,404 x 
in  Formosa  and  $e  Pescadores  —  and  is  increasing 
now  at  the  annual  rate  of  nearly  600,000.  At  the 
same  time,  the  foreign  trade  of  Japan  has  grown 
from  49,742,831  yen  in  1873  to  606,637,959  yen 
in  1903.  Up  to  the  end  of  May,  1904,  the  total 
amount  showed  274,012, 437  yen,  as  compared  with 
the  248,506,103  yen  of  the  same  period  of  1903.2 
The  significance  of  these  figures  must  be  seen  in  the 
light  of  the  important  fact  that  the  bulk  of  the 
increase  in  population  and  trade  has  been  due 
to  the  decisive  change  of  the  economic  life  of  the 
nation  from  an  agricultural  to  an  industrial  stage. 
The  new  population  seems  to  increase  far  more 
rapidly  in  the  urban  than  in  the  rural  districts,  for 
if  we  consider  as  urban  the  inhabitants  of  com- 
munities containing  each  more  than  three  thousand 
people,  the  ratio  of  the  urban  population  to  the 
rural  may  be  estimated  as  1  to  3.  If  only  towns 
of  more  than  10,000  inhabitants  each  are  included 
in  the  urban  class,  it  is  seen  that  their  population 

1  Official  figures  for  December  31, 1903.  The  Fourth  Finan- 
cial and  Economical  Annual  of  Japan,  1904  (hereafter  abbre- 
viated as  the  Fourth  Annual) ,  published  by  the  Department  of 
Finance,  Imperial  Government  of  Tokio,  p.  5.  The  actual  num- 
bers may  be  even  higher. 

2  The  Monthly  Return  of  the  Foreign  Trade  of  the  Empire  of 
Japan  for  May,  1904,  published  by  the  Department  of  Finance, 
pp.  91-95. 


INTRODUCTORY  3 

increases  annually  5  or  6  per  cent.,  while  the  cor- 
responding rate  with  the  rural  communities  never 
rises  above  3  per  cent,  and  is  usually  much  lower.1 
This  comparatively  rapid  growth  of  the  cities  also 
.indicates  that  the  new  population  must  be  mainly 
(supported  by  commerce  and  manufacture. 

In  1903,  84.6  per  cent,  of  the  total  export  trade 
of  Japan  consisted  of  either  wholly  or  partly 
manufactured  articles.2  On  the  other  hand,  agri- 
culture has  progressed  only  slowly,3  and  is  no 
longer  able  either  to  support  the  increased  popula- 
tion or  to  produce  enough  raw  articles  for  the 
manufactures.  The  average  annual  crop  >  of  rice 
may  be  put  at  210  million  bushels,  and  that  of 

1  Japan  in  the  Beginning  of  the  20th  Century  (hereafter  abbre- 
viated as  the  20th  Century),  compiled  by  the  Department  of 
Agriculture  and  Commerce,  Tokio,  1903,  pp.  53-58. 

2  Or,  241,891,946  out  of  285,971,623  yen.  As  the  term  manu- 
facture is  expansive,  the  articles  herein  included  should  be  enu- 
merated. They  are:  clothing,  chemicals  and  drugs,  metal  wares, 
oil  and  wax,  paper,  cotton  yarn  and  fabrics,  raw  and  woven  silks, 
tobacco,  and  sundries.  Teas,  grain,  marine  products  and  other 
food-stuffs,  and  furs,  as  well  as  reexported  articles,  are  excluded. 
See  the  Kwampo  (Official  Gazette  of  Japan),  No.  6199  (March 
4,  1904),  p.  77,  table  7. 

8  The  crop  of  rice  has  increased  since  1877  from  26.6  million 
to  about  42,000,000  koku  ;  that  of  barley,  rye,  and  wheat  from 
9.6  million  to  19  million  koku.  But  the  increase  has  been  due 
more  to  an  improved  cultivation  than  to  an  extension  of  acreage. 
Although  the  wheat,  barley,  and  rye  land  has  grown  from  2.35 
million  in  1877  to  4.43  million  acres  in  1901,  the  rice  land  has  in- 
creased from  6,517,000  to  only  6,982,000  acres.  The  crops  of 
hemp  and  rape  are  stationary,  while  those  of  sugar,  cotton,  and 
indigo  have  largely  fallen  off.  (These  figures  have  been  con- 
verted from  those  in  the  20th  Century,  pp.  119  ff.  One  koku  dry 
is  equivalent  to  4.9629  bushels.) 


4  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT    * 

barley,  rye,  and  wheat,  collectively  called  mugi,  at 
94.3  million  bushels,  while  the  average  annual  con- 
sumption of  these  cereals  may  safely  be  estimated, 
respectively,  at  228.3  and  106.7  million  bushels. 
In  years  of  poor  crops,  the  importation  of  rice, 
wheat,  and  flour  amounts  to  large  figures ;  as,  for 
instance,  in  1903,  they  together  were  imported  to 
the  value  of  about  67  million  yen}  Raw  material 
and  food-stuffs,  consisting  of  cotton,  wool,  rice, 
flour  and  starch,  beans  and  oil-cakes,  the  importa- 
tion of  all  of  which  was  next  to  nothing  twenty 
years  ago,  were  in  1903  supplied  from  abroad  to 
the  value  of  169,600,000  yen,  or  53.5  per  cent,  of 
the  total  imports  of  Japan.2  Japan  will  not  only 
always  have  to  rely  upon  foreign  countries  for  the 
supply  of  these  articles,  but  also  have  to  import 
them  in  ever  increasing  quantities.  Nor  does  agri- 
culture occupy  in  the  national  finances  the  position 
it  once  did,  for  in  1875  the  land  tax,  the  incidence 
of  which  fell,  as  it  still  falls,  very  largely  on  the 
farmer,  supplied  78  per  cent,  of  the  total  revenue 
of  the  state,  while  the  percentage  fell,  in  the  esti- 
mated budget  for  the  fiscal  year  1902-3,  to  16, 
the  actual  amount  also  decreasing  during  the  in- 
terval from   67.7  to   37  million  yen,  and  the  ex- 

1  These  figures  have  been  worked  out  from  the  Kokumin 
Shimbun  (National  News,  hereafter  abbreviated  as  the  Ko- 
kumin) of  February  5, 10,  and  19,  1904.  Also  see  a  table  and 
comment  in  the  Tbyo  Keizai  Shimpo  ("Oriental  Economist"), 
for  May  5, 1903,  pp.  17-19. 

2  If  sugar  is  added  to  the  list,  the  figures  will  go  up  to  more 
than  190  million  yen,  or  60  per  cent,  of  the  entire  import  trade. 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

penditures  of  the  government,  on  the  other  hand, 
increasing  from  73.4  million  in  1874,  to  the  enor- 
mous figure  of  223.18  million  yen  in  1904-5.1 

No  one  can  say  a  cheerful  word  about  agricul- 
ture in  Japan  or  the  life  of  her  farmer.  Exclusive 
of  Formosa,  the  development  of  which  seems  to  lie 
in  the  direction  of  industry  and  trade  rather  than 
agriculture,  less  than  13,000,000  acres  are  under 
cultivation,2  or,  about  13  per  cent,  of  the  extent  of 
the  country,  while  the  arable  area  of  the  land 
cannot  possibly  be  increased  by  more  than  10,500,- 
000  acres,3  so  that  the  per  capita  share  of  arable 
land  is  less  than  one  half  of  an  acre,4  which  is  even 
below  the  corresponding  rate  in  England  and  less 

1  289.2  million  yen  in  1902-3.  The  Fourth  Annual,  pp.  4 
and  9,  and  plate  3.  Also  see  the  Toy 5  Keizai  Shimpo  ("  Oriental 
Economist")  for  December  5,  1902,  pp.  19-21  and  chart. 

2  Or,  less  than  7,000,000  acres  of  wet  fields  and  less  than 
6,000,000  of  upland  fields,  the  latter  including  mulberry  and  tea 
gardens,  besides  fields  for  mugi,  beans,  and  vegetables.  Based  on 
the  20th  Century,  pp.  95  ff. 

8  This  figure  includes,  however,  all  the  land  inclined  at  angles 
less  than  15°,  so  that,  from  the  practical  point  of  view,  it  may  be 
considered  as  highly  exaggerated.  The  actual  extent  of  the  recla- 
mation of  wild  land  advances  at  a  slow  pace  outside  of  the  still 
largely  undeveloped  island  of  Hokkaido.  See  ibid.,  pp.  95-96, 
104. 

4  Or,about  23,000,000  acres  for  nearly  47,000,000  people.  If 
we  take  only  the  land  under  cultivation,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
only  the  farming  population,  on  the  other,  the  ratio  still  remains 
the  same,  for  then  we  have  13,000,000  acres  for  28,000,000 
people.  The  aggregate  of  the  capital  involved  in  the  agriculture 
of  Japan,  including  the  value  of  land,  buildings,  implements,  and 
live  stock,  is  estimated  at  7,400,000,000  yen,  while  the  annual 
crops  return  about  1,000,000,000  yen.  See  the  20th  Century, 
pp.  105-106. 


6  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

than  one  half  of  that  in  China.  Japan's  agricul- 
tural life  can,  however,  be  no  more  intensively  im- 
proved than  extensively  enlarged.  The  sedimentary 
soil  so  well  adapted  to  the  rice  cultivation  and  so 
abundantly  blessed  with  moisture 1  is  too  minutely 
and  carefully  tilled,  the  climate  conditions  are  too 
cleverly  made  use  of,2  and,  above  all,  the  lots  of 
land  are  too  diminutive,3  to  make  the  importation 
of  new  machinery  and  methods  always  profitable 
or  desirable.4  The  day-laborers  on  the  farm  receive 

1  The  annual  rainfall  of  Japan  proper  averages  between  1300 
mm.  at  Awomori  and  2040  mm.  at  Kagoshima.  A  fairly  rich  sedi- 
mentary formation  of  soil  is  found  everywhere,  owing  to  the  hilly 
nature  of  the  country  and  the  short  and  rapid  current  of  the 
rivers. 

2  Wherever  possible,  the  farmer  contrives  to  raise  more  than 
one  crop  on  his  land  in  different  seasons  during  the  year.  In  fact, 
more  than  30  per  cent,  of  rice  land  yields  other  crops  besides  rice, 
at  places  mugi,  indigo,  beans,  and  rape  being  cultivated  on  the 
same  piece  of  land. 

8  More  than  half  of  the  wet  fields  of  the  country  consist  of  lots 
smaller  than  one-eighth  acre,  and  nearly  three  fourths  are  each 
less  than  one-quarter  acre.  The  average  size  of  the  lots  outside 
of  Formosa  and  Hokkaido  is  put  down  as.l  acre  for  wet  fields 
and  .12  acre  for  upland  fields. 

4  Compare  the  report  of  the  U.  S.  Consul-General  Bellows  at 
Yokohama  in  the  U.  S.  Consular  Reports,  advance  sheets,  No. 
1757  (September  24,  1903).  In  addition  to  the  conditions  here 
enumerated,  it  must  be  remembered  that  there  exists  little  or  no 
pasture  land  in  Japan,  and  that  nearly  all  the  labor  is  done  by 
hand,  there  being  only  1,500,000  horses  and  1,300,000  horned 
animals  in  the  country.  See  the  20th  Century,  chapters  on  agri- 
culture; the  Annual,  No.  Ill,  tables  x-xiii;  J.  J.  Rein's  Indus- 
tries of  Japan,  English  translation,  New  York,  1889,  chapters 
on  agriculture;  and  H.  Dumolard's  Le  Japon  politique,  econo- 
mique  et  social,  Paris,  1903,  pp.  109-121. 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

wages  ranging  between  nine  and  fifteen  cents, 
though  the  latter  have  risen  more  than  100  per 
cent,  during  the  last  fifteen  years.1  With  this 
meagre  income,  some  of  the  laborers  have  to  sup- 
port their  aged  parents,  wives,  and  children.  The 
tenants,  whose  number  bears  the  ratio  of  about  two 
to  one 2  to  that  of  the  proprietors,  live  literally  from 
hand  to  mouth,  and  cannot  always  afford  even  the 
necessary  manure,  and  the  proprietor's  profit  hardly 
rises  above  5  per  cent.,  while  the  capital  he  em- 
ploys pays  an  interest  of  15  to  30  per  cent.3  and 
his  local  and  central  taxes  further  reduce  his  in- 
come. The  farmer  would  in  many  cases  be  unable 
to  subsist,  were  it  not  possible  for  him,  as  it  fortu- 
nately is,  to  try  his  hand  at  silk-culture  or  some 
other  subsidiary  occupation. 

Japan's  agriculture,  then,  can  neither  be  much  ex- 
tended nor  be  greatly  improved,  can  neither  satisfy 
the  old  population  nor  support  the  new,  and,  above 
all,  can  only  produce  smaller  and  smaller  portion 
of  the  necessary  raw  material  for  her  growing  in- 

1  The  20th  Century,  p.  117;  Dumolard,  pp.  112-113. 

2  This  ratio  includes,  however,  in  the  tenant  class  those  farm- 
ers who  are  partly  lessees  and  partly  proprietors  of  small  lots.  In 
1888,  the  ratio  between  (1)  independent  farmers,  (2)  partly 
lessees,  and  (3)  entirely  lessees,  was  147 :  200 :  95.  Since  that  time 
the  ratio  must  have  grown  in  favor  of  the  tenants.  See  the  20th 
Century,  p.  90. 

8  See  the  U.  S.  Consular  Reports,  advance  sheets,  No.  1529 
(December  26,  1902).  In  1902  the  total  debts  of  the  farming 
classes  of  Japan  were  estimated  at  400  million  yen.  Mr.  S. 
Nakayama,  in  the  Tbyb  Keizai  Shimpo  ("Oriental  Econo- 
mist") for  July  15,  1902,  p.  14. 


m 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

tries.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  is  becoming 
^more  evident  every  year  that  the  time  is  forever 
past  when  the  nation  could  rely  solely  upon  agri- 
cj  culture  for  subsistence.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to 
v  r^  repeat  the  well-known  law  of  population  —  which 
is  at  the  root  of  our  subject —  that  every  advance 
in  the  economic  life  of  a  nation  creates  a  situation 
which  is  capable  of  supporting  a  larger  population 
than  in  the  preceding  stage.  What  agriculture 
cannot  support,  industry  and  trade  may.  Japan's 
growing  population  may  only  be  supported,  as  it 
has  already  begun  to  be,  by  an  increased  impor- 
tation of  raw  material  and  food-stuffs  and  an 
increased  exportation  of  manufactures.  ^Irade 
statistics  unmistakably  show  that  such  markets  for 
her  manufactures  and  such  supply  regions  of  her 
raw  and  food  articles  are  found  primarily  in  East 
Asia,  with  which  the  commercial  relations  of  Japan 
have  grown  543  per  cent,  since  1890,  as  compared 
with  the  161  per  cent.1  increase  of  Jhe  American 
and  the  190  per  cent,  increase  of  the  European 
trade,2  until  the  East  Asiatic  trade  amounted  in 
1903  to  295,940,000  yen  in  value,  or  48.7  per 
cent,  of  the  entire  foreign  trade  of  Japan.3    The 

1  In  1903,  Japan's  American  trade  was  much  below  that  of 
1902.  The  latter  showed  an  increase  of  362  per  cent,  over  1890. 

2  The  actual  figures  were:  — 


European 

American 

Japanese 

1890.... 

. . .  57,200,000  yen 

36,700,000  yen 

45,700,000  yen 

1903.... 

...166,900,000  yen 

95,900,000  yen 

295,900,000  yen 

8  In   East   Asia   are   included   Korea,  China,  Hong-kong, 
British  India,  French  Indo-China,  Dutch  East  Indies,  the  Straits 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

following  table  gives  a  comparison  of  the  importa- 
tion in  the  years  1882,  1902,  and  1903,  of  what 
may  be  considered  as  primarily  East  Asiatic  pro- 
ducts : '  — 

1882  1902                                   1903 

Cotton 467,249  yen  79,784,772  yen  69,517,894  yen 

Wool 3,397,564  4,811,811 

Rice 134,838  17,750,817  51,960,033 

Wheat 240,050  4,767,832 

Flour 3,278,324  10,324,415 

Beans 4,956,000  7,993,411 

Oil-cakes 44,468  10,121,712  10,739,359 

FxQm^these  eloquent  facts,  the  conclusion  would 

seem  tenable  that,  should  the 


markets  of  East  Asia 
be  closed,  Japan's  national  life  would  be  paralyzed, 
as  her  growing  population  would  be  largely  deprived 

Settlements,  Siam,  the  Philippines,  and  Russian  Eastern  Asia. 
If  Hong-kong,  an  essentially  transit-trade  port,  is  excluded,  the 
East  Asiatic  trade  of  Japan  amounts  to  264,476,239  yen,  or 
43.6  per  cent,  of  the  entire  foreign  trade  of  Japan.  See  the 
Kwampo  (Official  Gazette  of  Japan),  No.  6199  (March  4, 1904), 
p.  74,  table  4. 

Of  the  three  great  divisions  of  Japan's  markets,  Europe  sells 
her  machineries  and  articles  of  general  consumption,  and  buys 
in  return  such  peculiar  products  of  her  soil  as  silks  and  teas. 
East  Asia,  including  India  and  the  southern  islands,  takes  coal 
and  manufactured  goods  in  general  and  furnishes  cotton,  food- 
stuffs, and  other  articles  of  more  direct  need  than  the  European 
goods.  America  occupies  a  unique  position  in  regard  to  Japan, 
as  it  combines  to  a  large  extent  the  peculiarities  of  both  Europe 
and  East  Asia:  it  exports  to  Japan  cotton  and  flour,  besides 
machinery  and  goods  of  general  consumption,  and  imports  from 
her,  not  only  raw  silk  and  tea,  but  also  smaller  manufactured 
articles. 

1  Oil-cakes  are  used  as  manure.  As  to  rice,  wheat,  and  flour, 
it  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  their  importation  depends  largely 
upon  the  conditions  of  the  crop  at  home. 


10  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

of  its  food  and  occupation.  These  markets,  then, 
must  be  left  as  open  as  the  circumstances  permit,  if 
Japan  would  exist  as  a  growing  nation.  Observe 
here  the  tremendous  significance  for  Japan  of  the 
principle  of  the  "  openjloor "  as  applied  to  East 
Asia  —  the  principle,  in  a  more  accurate  language, 
of  the  equal  opportunity  in  East  Asia  for  the  eco- 
nomic enterprise  of  all  foreign  nations.1 

In  this  great  problem  Manchuria  and  Korea  oc- 
cupy, perhaps,  the  most  important  position,  for  they 
together  receive  a  large  portion  of  the  cotton  yarn 
and  cotton  textiles  exported  from  Japan,  besides 
several  other  manufactured  goods  and  coal,  and  in 
return  supply  Japan  with  much  of  the  wheat  and 
rice,  and  practically  all  of  the  millet,  beans,  and  oil- 
cakes, imported  into  the  country.  Let  us  briefly 
demonstrate  these  statements  by  figures.  First,  con- 
sider the  exportation  of  cotton  yarns  and  textiles 
from  Japan  to  Manchuria  and  Korea.  It  is  rather 
difficult  from  the  material  on  hand  to^stimate  the 
exact  ratio  which  the  import  of  these  articles  from 
Japan  into  Korea  and  Manchuria  bears  to  the  total 
import  of  the  same  articles  from  all  nations.  In  the 
case  of  Korea,  we  can  make  an  approximate  estimate, 
as  we  possess  both  the  export  values  in  Japan  and 

1  The  present  author  has  often  met  persons  who  misinter- 
preted the  "open  door"  to  mean  the  complete  throwing  open  of 
a  country  to  the  ruthless  exploitation  of  the  foreigner.  The 
"open  door,"  it  is  needless  to  say,  merely  negatives  a  differential 
treatment  in  favor  of  one  or  more  foreign  nations  at  the  expense 
of  all  the  others.  It  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  wide  opening, 
but  an  impartial,  even  if  narrow,  opening  for  all  nations. 


INTRODUCTORY  11 

import  values  in  Korea,  but  with  regard  to  Man- 
churia, we  know  only  the  quantities,  but  not  the 
values,  of  the  cotton  goods  imported.  By  assuming, 
however,  that  40  per  cent,  of  these  goods  imported 
by  the  Chinese  Empire  from  Japan  go  to  North 
China  (of  which  Manchuria  is  here  considered  by 
far  the  most  important  part),  it  may  be  said,  roughly, 
that  in  1903  about  6  per  cent,  of  the  cotton  yarn 
exported  from  Japan  went  to  Korea  and  perhaps  40 
per  cent,  to  North  China.  The  average  import  of 
this  article  during  the  past  two  years  was  probably 
1,200,000  yen  in  Korea  and  8,000,000  yen  in  North 
China,  making  the  total  about  36  per  cent,  of  the 
export  value  in  Japan.  On  the  same  basis  of  cal- 
culation, the  average  importation  of  cotton  textiles 
from  Japan  during  the  past  three  years  was  3,190,- 
000  yen  in  Korea  and  765,000  yen  in  North  China, 
or  about  69.5  per  cent,  of  the  entire  export  of  these 
articles  from  Japan.  These  figures  are  only  tenta- 
tive, but  mayerve  to  show  that  Manchuria  receives 
comparatively  much  yarn  and  Korea  much  textiles, 
and  that  they  together  receive  at  least  a  large  per- 
centage of  those  articles  exported  by  Japan,  where 
their  manufacture  occupies  an  increasingly  impor- 
tant jplace  in  her  economic  life.1  As  to  the  exporta- 
tion of  agricultural  products  from  Manchuria  and 

1  Consult  the  British  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Reports,  An- 
nual Series,  Nos.  2995  and  2999;  the  U.  S.  Monthly  Summary 
of  Commerce  and  Finance,  January,  1904,  pp.  2410-1;  the 
Kokumin,  September  19-21,  1901;  Minister  Kiyoura's  address 
before  the  Osaka  Chamber  of  Commerce,  February,  1904. 


12  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Korea,  it  is  seen  that  wheat  is  only  beginning  to  be 
cultivated  in  Manchuria,  while  the  rice  cultivation 
is  there  practically  unknown  except  in  a  few  places 
near  the  Korean  border,  where  during  the  campaign 
of  1894-5  the  Japanese  troops  introduced  it.  The 
position  which  Korea  occupies  in  the  importation 
of  wheat  into  Japan  will  be  seen  from  the  following4 
table :  — 


Wheat  imported  into  Japan,  1898-1902,1  j  Jjj 

=1.325  lhs.  j 
=49.8  cents. 

IV. 

From                      1898 

1899                 1900 

1901 

1902 

Australia. . .  < 

4,339,845 

5,554,513 

18,423 

143,260 

185,274 

721 

v                   i    2,770,755 
Korea 1        72,698 

1,668,207    5,182,533 

1,644,577 

8,556,813 

71,764       132,734 

43,875 

237,217 

Great               i 
Britain. . .  { 

457,450 

15,502 

The  United    i    2,039,371 
States I         71,173 

395,009  12,370,022 

1,388,372 

864 

14,697       400,829 

43,720 

43 

Other               (           1,560 
countries  .  (                41 

990             547 

77,343 

27               14 

2,069 

rr,  .  ,  (    4,811,686    2,064,206  22,350,397      8,587,462      8,653,443 

lotal 1      143,913         86,489       692,341         272,869         240,050 

A  glance  at  these  figures  will  sho^that  the  im- 
port trade  of  wheat,  like  that  of  rice,  is  dependent 
on  many  fluctuating  conditions  at  home  and  abroad. 
The  poor  crop  in  Japan  caused  an  enormous  impor- 
tation of  wheat  in  1903  to  the  value  of  4,767,000 
yen.  From  the  above  table^  it  is  seen  that  Korea 
supplied  miring  the  five  years,  respectively,  57.5, 
80.7,  23.1,  19.1,  and  98.8  per  cent.,  in  weight,  of 
the  wheat  imported  into  Japan.    As  regards  rice,  the 

1  The  figures  were  taken  from  the  Monthly  Summary  of 
Commerce  and  Finance  of  the  United  States  for  February,  1904, 
p.  3006. 


Introductory  13 

following  table  will  show  that  in  the  five  years  be- 
tween~I598  amTTJ^LKoimjiJL^p 
5.5,  26.5,  49.4,  46.8,  and  19.8  per  cent,  in  weight 
of  the  cereal  imported  into  Japan  :  — 


lbs.  av. 
cents. 


Rice  imported  into  Japan,  1898-1902,1  j  ^^M=  49  g  ^ 

From                      1898                  1899                  1900                    1901  1902 

British           j    2,663,087         53,827       249,344         220,650  1,793,362 

India ....}  11,642,416       174,507       973,747         876,057  7,530,356 

rii.                 (      967.216         60,323         83,998         227,234  90,401 

^mna \    3,989,422       231,625       327,673         867,272  341,689 

^                   (      649,570       436,716    1,131,787      1,456,661  891,186 

^orea )    2,704,887     1,689,909    4,694,166      6,009,641  3,961,312 

Dutch  (  403 

Indies  . . .  "j  1,816 

French           (    6,445,390       956,142       726,859         919,774  1,324,789 

India  ....]  25,762,726    3,354,095    2,739,752      3,199,420'  4,651,395 

~.                   {      969,413       143,575         94,530         287,594  409,307 

&iam t    4,114,065       510,007       284,178         926,486  1,265,970 

Other              j           1,576                  9                58                  25  27 

countries     j           6,290                 21              200                  82  94 

4,509,072 

958  17,750,817 


rp  ,  ,  \  11,696,252     1,650,592    2,286,979      3,111, 

iotal 148,219,810    5,960,166    9,021,536    11,878, 


As  will  be  seen  in  this  table,  much  rice  comes  also 
from  Saigon  and  Bangkok,  to  which,  however,  Japan 
hardly  exports  anything.  In  Korea,  on  the  contrary, 
the  greater  her  exportation  of  rice,  the  larger  her 
purchasing  power  of  the  goods  fromjne  country 
to  which  the  rice  goes.  In  the  case  of  beans  and 
oil-cakes,  Manchuria  and  Korea  occupy  in  the  list 
of  the  importation  of  these  articles  into  Japan  an 
even  more  important  place  than  is  the  case  with 
wheat  or  rice,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  following 
table :  — 

1  From  ibid.,  p.  3006.     In  1903,  rice  imported  amounted  to 
51,960,000  yen  in  value.    The  Fourth  Annual,  p.  77. 


14 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 


Beans  and  oil-cakes  imported  into  Japan  in  1902,1  \pt^l~}^}^r' 


From 

China , 

Korea 

Russian  Asia 

French  India 

The  United  States. 
Other  countries 


Total 


and  pulse 

1,306,103 

3,524,138 

777,151 

2,254,899 

545 

1,505 

742 

2,178 

281 

2,405 

545 

1,582 

2,086,367 
5,786,707 


49.8  cents. 
Oil-cakes 

4,064,198 

8,656,775 

5,671 

12,331 

345,022 

1,448,868 


846 
3,738 


4,415,737 
10,121,712 


1 


An  explanation  is  necessary  that,  to  all  probabil- 
ity, much  of  the  oil-cakes  from  Russian  Asia  was  re- 
exported from  Manchuria.  In  1903,  beans  and  oil- 
cakes were  imported  to  the  value  of,  respectively, 
^,993,000  and  10,739,000  yen.  In  considering  all 
these  facts  asa  whole,  attention  is  called  to  a  "point 
of  immense  importance,  that  Manchuria  and  Korea 
supply  Japan  with  necessaries  of  life,  and  receive 
in  return,  in  the  main,  useful  goods,  instead  of 
wares  of  luxury.  We  shall  have  occasion  further 
to  develop  this  point. 

Let  us  now  take  a  general  survey  of  the  position 
Japan  holds  in  the  trade  relations  of  Korea  and 
Manchuria.  In  Korea,  whence  the  Chinese  mer- 
chants withdrew  during  the  China-Japan  war  of 
1894-5  and  were  replaced  by  the  Japanese  traders,2 

1  See  the  U.  S.  Monthly  Summary,  February,  1904,  pp.  3006 
and  3013. 

2  At  present,  Chinese  merchants  in  Korea  compete  with  the 


INTRODUCTORY  15 

it  is  Japan  alone  of  all  trading  nations  which  enjoys 
a  large  share  both  in  the  import  and  export  trade, 
as  is  suggested  in  the  following  table  :  —    » 

Japan's  export  Total  import  Japan's  import  Total  export 

to  Korea  of  Korea  from  Korea  of  Korea 

1902...  10, 554,000  yen  (13,823,000  yen)  7,958.000  yen  (8,460,000  yen) 
1903...  11,764, 000  (18,207,000)  8,912,000  (9,472,000) 

while  the  grains  exported  from  Korea  go  almost 
entirely  to  Japan.  Qifferent  ports  of  Korea  present 
of  course  different  characteristics  in  their  trade  with 
Japan :  as,  for  instance,  at  Chemulpo  the  Chinese 
merchants  still  enjoy  a  considerable  share  in  the 
import  trade  \  at  Seul  nearly  all  the  export  consists 
of  gold  bullion,  which  is  almost  exclusively  bought 
by  the  branch  of  the  First  Bank  of  Japan ;  while 
at  Fusan  and  Mokpo  the  Japanese  monopoly  of 
trade  is  almost  complete.  With  these  variations, 
however,  the  Japanese  merchants  control  the  major 
part  of  the  trade  of  each  port,  and  consequently  o£ 
the  entire  trade  of  Korea.  They  also  carry  a  large 
amount  of  foreign  goods  to  Korea,  as  seen  in  the 
following  table :  — 

Japanese  goods       Foreign  goods 

1902 9,344,859  yen  1,209,332  yen 

1901 10,410,563         961,897 

1900 9,423,821         529,450 1 

The  shipping  also  is  largely  in  the  hands  of  the 
Japanese.  In  1903,  their  share  in  the  Korean  ship- 
ping was  as  follows  : 2  — 

Japanese  only  at  the  ports  on  the  western  coast,  principally  in 
the  import  trade  of  silk.  The  number  of  the  Chinese  residents 
in  Korea  is  one  tenth  that  of  the  Japanese,  or  about  4000. 

1  The  Kokumin,  January  30,  1904. 

2  Based  on  the  figures  in  the  British  Diplomatic  and  Consular 
Report:  Trade  of  Corea  for  the  Year  1903,  pp.  11-13. 


16  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Vessels  Tonnage 

Korean 25      per  cent.  9  -f-  per  cent. 

Japanese 61  -f-  78  -j- 

Russian 2-j-  9  + 

Others 11+  4  — 

Turning  to  Manchuria,  it  is  found  that  Japan  con- 
trolled in  1902  more  than  44  per  cent,  of  the  ship- 
ping tonnage,1  besides  40  per  cent,  of  the  direct 
import  trade  and  over  90  per  cent,  of  the  export 
trade,  as  is  shown  below  : 2  — 

Exports  (Japan)  Imports  (Japan) 

1901 1,080,345 /.      (   970,663/.)      635,085/.      (247,624/.) 

1902 1,130,429  (1,041,395)  695,020         (280,843) 

Average  five  years, 

1896-99  and  1891..    965,553         (   880,917)         433,811         (131,143) 

at  Niu-chwang,  which  was  then  the  only  important 
port  in  Manchuria  open  to  foreign  trade  under  the 
ordinary  customs  rules.3 

1  Of  the  1430  vessels,  aggregating  1,104,000  tons,  entered  at 
and  cleared  from  Niu-chwang  in  1902,  the  Japanese  had  710  ves- 
sels and  491,000  tons,  the  British,  374  vessels  and  350,000  tons, 
the  Germans,  88  vessels  and  73,000  tons,  and  so  forth.  —  The 
Kokumin,  April  29, 1904,  from  the  Tai  Shin-Kan  Bbyeki  Chosa 
Hokoku  (report  on  the  trade  with  China  and  Korea) ,  compiled 
by  the  Department  of  Agriculture  and  Commerce,  Tokio,  1904. 
The  Russians  could  show  only  3  vessels  and  1,223  tons,  which 
was  below  their  record  for  1901  and  less  than  one  half  of  the 
average  of  the  five  years  1886, 1897, 1898, 1899,  and  1901.  — The 
British  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Reports,  Annual  Series,  No. 
2999  (on  Niu-chwang),  p.  9. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  8. 

The  direct  import  trade  of  any  trading  nation  at  Niu-chwang 
does  not  represent  the  actual  amount  of  the  articles  imported 
from  the  country  of  that  nation,  for  most  of  the  foreign  goods 
come  to  Niu-chwang  through  some  other  distributing  centres  in 
China,  such  as  Hong-kong  or  Shanghai.  The  Japanese  goods, 
however,  are  nearly  all  carried  by  Japanese  vessels.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  American  imports, besides  jeans, drills, sheetings, kero- 


INTRODUCTORY  17 

In  this  connection,  it  should  be  remembered  that 
both  the  Korean  and  Manchurian  trade  are  of  recent 
origin.  Niu-chwang  was  opened  as  a  treaty  port  in 
1858,  but  its  commercial  importance  may  be  said  to 
date  from  1899.  Korea's  foreign  trade  did  not 
begin  till  1884,  and  it  exceeded  10,000,000  yen 
for  the  first  time  in  1895.  The  rapid  growth  of 
the  trade  of  these  places  has  been  largely  due  to  the 
increasing  trade  activity  of  Japan.  In  the  case  of 
Niu-chwang,  it  is  tnip1  faq  rloTftlftpmrnt  of  its  im- 
port trade  has  been  as  much  owing  to  the  energy 
of  the  Americans  as  to  that  of  the  Japanese,  but 
its  export  business  would  be  meagre,  and  would  con- 
sequently reduce  the  imports  also,  but  for  Japanese 
activity.  The  recent  increase  in  the  production  of 
milleJuuiManchuria, for  instance, may  be  said  to  be 
entirely  due  to  Japalle^y  4w*^Lji-^LtJ^jn-f>h^ ri"™  Of 
the  three  staple  products  of  Western  Manchuria,  tall 
millet  is  consumed  by  the  natives,  and^  beans  are 
partly  consumed  and  partly  exported,  while  millet 
is  cultivated  purely  for  the  purpose  of  exportation. 

senes,  and  flour,  are  not  specified  in  the  customs  returns  of  Niu- 
chwang,  and  consequently  their  nominal  figures  are  insignificant 
(7396 /.in  1901  and  4089  I.  in  1902),  while  Hong-kong,  through 
which  most  of  the  American  goods  are  imported  into  Niu-chwang, 
showed,  in  1902,  385,302  /.,  or  55  per  cent,  of  the  entire  direct 
trade.  On  the  other  hand,  the  estimate  made  by  the  Bureau  of 
Statistics,  Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  Washington, 
showing  18,000,000  haikwan  taels  for  the  real  import  of  American 
goods  into  Niu-chwang,  seems  to  be  pretty  liberal.  See  British 
D.  and  C.  Reports,  annual  series,  No.  2999,  p.  8,  and  the  U.  S. 
Monthly  Summary  o)  Commerce  and  Finance,  January,  1904,  p. 
2328. 


18  THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

It  began  to  be  exported  to  Korea  in  August,  1901, 
and  to  Japan  in  1902.  Since  the  latter  year,  Ja- 
pan's demand  for  millet  has  steadily  increased,  and 
has  caused  a  considerable  rise  in  its  price  at  Niu- 
chwang.  The  cultivation  of  millet,  therefore,  is  a 
pure  gain  that  has  been  created  by  the  trade  rela- 
tions of  Manchuria  with  Japan.1  Far  more  impor- 
tant than  millet  as  articles  for  exportation  are  beans 
and  bean-cakes.  The  entire  trade  conditions  at  Niu- 
chwang  may  be  said  to  depend  upon  the  amount  of 
the  sale  of  these  articles.  The  more  they  are  sold, 
the  greater  is  the  importing  capacity  of  the  people 
of  Manchuria.  The  nation  which  buys  beans  and 
bean-cakes  in  the  largest  quantities  naturally  com- 
mands the  greatest  facility  in  pushing  their  imports 
into  Niu-chwang.  The  exportation  of  these  goods 
doubled  during  the  ten  years  between  1889  and 
1898,  while  the  amount  of  the  bean  production  in 
Manchuria  for  1900  was  estimated  at  between 
1,930,000  and  2,450,000  kohu.  Both  the  produc- 
tion and  the  exportation  must  now  be  much  greater. 
The  increase  was  due  in  the  main  to  the  growing 
demand  in  Japan  for  beans  and  bean-cakes,  as  wit- 
ness the  following  ratios  of  exports  to  China  and 
Japan  from  Niu-chwang :  — 

Beans  Bean-cakes 

To  China  To  Japan  To  China                To  Japan 

1889....  98.0%  2.0%                   95.8%                 4.2% 

1893....  67.5  32.5  68.3                    31.7 

1897....  60.7  39.3  50.2                   49.8 

In  1903,  the  ratios  must  have  been  much  greater 
1  See  the  Tsusho  Isan  for  January  22,  1903,  pp.  10-11. 


/ 

/ 
INTRODUCTORY  19 

for  Japan  than  for  China.  The  increasing  demand 
for  these  products  has  induced  many  Chinese  to 
migrate  from  Shantung  to  Southern  and  Western 
Manchuria  and  cultivate  beans.1  As  regards  the 
Korean  trade,  the  following  table  will  speak  for 
itself :  — 


Korean  trade 

Korean  export 

Japan-Korea 

in  merchandise 

of  gold 

Total 

trade 

1897. 

..19,041,000  yen 

2,034,000  yen 

21 ,075,000  yen 

14,061,000  yen 

1898. 

..17,527,000 

2,375,000 

19,902,000 

10,641,000 

1899. 

...15,225,000 

2,933,000 

18,158,000 

11,972,000 

1900. 

..20,380,000 

3,633,000 

24,013,000 

18,759,000 

1901. 

..23,158,000 

4,993,000 

28,151,000 

21,425,000 

1902. 

. .  (22,280,000) 

5,064,000 

(27,344,000) 

18,512,000 

1903. 

...27,679,000 

5,456,000 

33,135,000 

20,676,000 

If  we  examine  the  causes  of  the  growth  of  indi- 
vidual open  ports  in  Korea,  nothing  can  be  plainer 
than  that  it  has  almost  entirely  resulted  from  the 
increasing  trade  relations  between  Korea  and  Japan. 
It  is  needless  to  mention  Fusan,  for  its  trade  is 
nearly  synonymous  with  its  Japanese  trade.  Kunsan 
was  opened  on  May  1, 1899,  and  its  population  was 
only  300  till  two  years  ago,  but  the  great  demand 
by  Japan  for  the  rice  coming  through  this  port  has 
already  tended  to  enlarge  the  number  of  its  inhab- 
itants up  to  2000  or  more.2  Similar  remarks  may 
be  made  of  Mokpo,  Chinnampo,  and  other  ports.3 
Most  conspicuous,  however,  isHhe  case  of  Chemulpo. 
In  1883,  when  it  was  opened  as  a  treaty  port,  it 
contained  only  a  few  fishers'  houses,  but  now  it  holds 
a  population  of  15,000,  and  occupies  a  position  in 

1  See  the  Tbyb  Keizai  Shimpo  ("Oriental  Economist"),  No. 
165  (July  15,  1900),  and  No.  244  (September  25,  1902). 

2  The  Kokumin,  November  26,  1903. 
8  The  Annai,  pp.  58-61. 


20  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Korea  similar  to  that  of  Shanghai  in  China.  Of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  ports,  8000,  or  more  than  a  half, 
are  Japanese.  Streams  of  Koreans  also  have  flowed 
hither  from  inland  towns,  for  there  the  officials 
oppress  people,  while  here  they  are  so  constantly 
viewed  by  the  foreigners  that  undue  exactions  are 
impossible.1  We  have  already  noted  the  important 
K.  fact  that  Korea  and  Manchuria  on  the  one  hand  and 
'  Japan  on  the  other  exchange,  not  wares  of  luxury, 
but  useful  and  necessary  articles.  ^eJaav-ejipw  come 
to  another  equally  important  fact,  that  the  growth 
of  the  Manchuxian  and JLorealTtrade  depends  largely 
upon  the  commej^iai-aT5trvity  of  Japaij.  ]  From  these 
considerations,  it  would  seem  safe  to  say  that  the 
trade  interests  of  the^  three  countries  are  largely 
common,  for  the  more  Korea  and  Manchuria  export 
to  Japan,  the  greater  will  be  their  purchasing  power 
of  Japanese  goods,  and,  also,  the  larger  the  exporta- 
tion from  Japan  to  Manchuria  and  Korea,  the  more 
readily  they  will  dispose  of  their  products  to  her. 
On  the  one  hand,  Korea  and  Manchuria  encourage 
the  growth  of  Japan's  manufacture,  and  supply 
her  with  food  and  manure ;  on  the  other  hand,  the 
economic  development  and  prosperity  of  Korea  and 
Manchuria  must  be  largely  determined  by  the  in- 
creasing demand  for  their  products  by  Japan,  and 
the  easy  supply  of  their  wants  from  Japan.  The 
future  growth  of  the  three  nations,  then,  must  in 
a  large  measure  depend  upofi~the  intimate  progress 
of  their  trade  Interests,  which,  therefore,  not  only 


INTRODUCTORY  21 

are  common,  but  should  be  increasingly  common. 
If  the  history  of  the  past  suggests  the  probable  de- 
velopment in  tKe  future,  there  is  every  reason  to 
believe  that,  with  reformed  systems  of  currency  and 
improved  and  extended  cultivation  of  land  and 
means  of  transportation,  the  trade  of  Manchuria 
and  Korea  will  show  a  tremendous  increase,  and 
then  the  community  of  interest  between  them  and 
Japan  will  be  most  profound. 

This  theme  of  the  community  of  interest  may 
further  be  elaborated.  Korea  and  Manchuria  may ' 
with  profit  remain  open,  not  only  for  the  trade,  but 
also  for  the  emigration  and  industrial  enterprise,  of 
the  Japanese  people.  Since  1902  no  passports  have 
been  required  for  travelers  from  Japan  to  Korea, 
whither,  in  spite  of  the  occasional  obstacles  placed 
in  their  way  by  Korean  officials,  the  emigrants  have 
proceeded,  now  for  years,  in'  increasing  numbers, 
until  there  resided  in  1903  nearly  thirty  thousand 
Japanese  in  the  Peninsula.1  It  takes  only  thirteen 
hours  on  sea  from  Bakan  in  Japan  to  Fusan  in 
Korea,  and  the  cost  is  even  less  than  that  of  sailing 
to  the  Japanese  colony  of  Formosa,  the  former  being 

1  In  July,  1903,  there  were,  besides  soldiers,  26,705  Japanese 
in  the  eight  treaty  ports  and  Seul  and  Pingyang.  To  these  must 
be  added  about  4000  who  lived  on  some  islands  and  places  out- 
side of  the  treaty  ports.  See  the  Dobun-kwai  Hokohu  (Report  of 
the  Dobun  Association),  No.  41,  pp.  95-96,  and  the  Tsusho  Isan 
for  October  18, 1903,  pp.  29-47;  April  8,  1904,  pp.  28-52.  Mr. 
Yamamoto  places  the  number  of  the  Japanese  residents  in  Korea 
at  40,000.  See  his  Saishin  Chosen  Iju  Annai  (latest  guide  for 
emigration  to  Korea ;  hereafter  abbreviated  as  the  Annai) ,  Tokio, 
1904,  p.  14. 


22  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

fifteen  yen  and  the  latter  twenty.  It  seems  easier  to 
go  from  Bakan  to  Fusan  than  it  is  from  Osaka  to  the 
Hokkaido  within  Japan  proper.1  The  expense  of 
living  in  Korea  is  also  as  low  as  one  third  The  corre^ 
sponding  figure  in  Japan,  a  monthly  income  of  ten  or 
thirteen  yen  being  considered  sufficient  to  support  a 
family  of  three  persons  in  a  rented  house.2  It  is  not 
strange,  under  these  conditions,  that  the  Japanese 
migrate  to  Korea,  not  always  singly,  like  the  Chinese, 
but  often  in  families,3  so  that  their  settlements 
assume  there  a  normal  and  permanent  character 
unseen  even  in  Japan's  own  island  of  Formosa.  Nor 
are  all  these  colonists  mere  laborers  like  their 
brethren  in  Manchuria  and  the  Hawaiian  Islands, 
but  many  are  independent  men  of  business.  They 
also  naturally  manifest  a  stronger  sense  of  kinship 
and  cooperation  in  Korea  than  the  merchants  and 
capitalists  do  in  Japan.  In  several  Korean  towns 
these  Japanese  settlersnave  established  their  own 
municipalities,  with  modern  improvements,  cham- 
bers of  commerce,  police,  and  public  schools,  all  of 
which  compare  favorably  with  those  of  the  larger 
cities  in  Japan,  and  the  advantages  of  which  are 

1  The  Annai,  pp.  8-9,  19-20. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  81. 

8  In  July,  1903,  of  the  26,645  Japanese  in  Korea,  15,442  were 
men  and  1 1 ,263  women.  It  may  be  noted,  in  passing,  that,  in  the 
case  of  Manchuria,  a  great  majority  of  the  Japanese  women 
residing  there  are  not  the  wives  of  the  male  settlers,  and  hence 
the  comparative  numbers  of  men  and  women  there  should  not 
lead  us  to  a  similar  conclusion  as  to  Korea.  This  part  of  the 
problem  of  Japanese  emigration  opens  up  an  interesting  social 
question,  which  it  is  hardly  necessary  for  us  to  discuss  here. 


INTRODUCTORY  23 

enjoyed_^y_jQaliye~JCQreans  and  resident  Chmese. 
It  is  said  that  in  some  places  the  influx  of  the  Jap- 

anpgp    tmrl    ^hfijf    iTwnotrYinn+n    Tiovp    caused  a  rise  in 

the  price  of  land  and  house  rent.1  In  Fusan,  the 
port  nearest  to  Japan,  the  10,000  Japanese  who  live 
there  own  large  tracts  of  land  and  occup/  the  main 
sections  of  the  city.  Here  and  everywhere  else  the 
Japanese  colonists  seem  to  hold  a  position  similar  to 
that  of  the  foreigners  living  in  the  so-called  settle- 
ments in  the  larger  treaty  ports  of  China.  Tourists 
are  wont  to  contrast  the  clean  and  well-ordered 
streets  and  the  general  energetic  appearance  of  the 
Japanese  quarters  in  Korean  cities  with  the  com- 
paratively filthy  and  slothful  Korean  quarters~_The_ 
branches  of  the  First  Bankof  Japan  have  been 
issuing^ecently  un^-,"Cve:7and  ten-yen  banknotes,2 
which  iiay^Peen  of  immense  viilim  In  (In  fniiii^n 
trade  in  Korea,  the  native  currency  of  which  is  in  a 
deplorable  condition.*  The  coasting  and  river  navi- 
gation, so  far  as  it  concerns  foreign  trade,  is  largely 
controlled  by  the  Japanese,  who,  besides,  own  the 

1  From  the  legal  standpoint,  the  Japanese  had  no  right,  out- 
side of  the  treaty  settlements,  to  live  or  buy  land. 

2  On  March  31,  1904,  there  were  about  1,234,000  yen  of 
these  notes  in  circulation  against  a  reserve  of  944,000  yen.  From 
the  British  C.  and  D.  Reports  ;  Trade  of  Korea  for  the  Year  1903, 
pp.  7-8. 

The  Russians  and  their  sympathizers  at  Seul  have  more  than 
once  tried,  though  unsuccessfully,  to  induce  the  Korean  Govern- 
ment to  suppress  the  issue  of  the  notes.  See  pp.  281-284,  below. 
The  nickel  coins  of  Korea  have  been  so  debased  and  so  much 
counterfeited  that  they  are  at  a  discount  of  much  more  than 
100  per  cent. 


24  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

only  railway  line  in  operation  in  Korea,  twenty-six 
miles  long,  running  between  the  capital,  Seul,  and 
its  port  Chemulpo.1  They  are  also  building,2  under 
the  management  of  substantially  the  same  company, 
another  and  longer  line  —  two  hundred  and  eighty- 
seven  miles  —  between  Seul  and  the  port  o£  Fusan, 
which  passes  through  the  richer  and  economically  by 
far  the  more  important  half  of  the  Peninsula.3    It  is 

1  The  right  of  building  this  line  was  originally  granted  by  the 
Korean  Government  to  Mr.  Morse,  an  American  citizen,  in 
March,  1896,  who,  however,  sold  it  to  a  Japanese  syndicate  in 
November,  1898,  and  handed  the  line  over  to  the  latter  before 
it  was  completed.  The  whole  line  was  in  working  order  in  July, 
1899.    See  p.  286  (Article  3),  below. 

2  Actual  work  was  begun  in  August,  1901,  but  Japan's  want 
of  capital  was  such  that  by  the  first  of  December,  1903,  only 
thirty-one  miles  from  both  ends  had  been  built.  In  view  of  the 
immense  economic  and  strategic  importance  of  the  line,  the 
Japanese  Government,  which  had  for  a  certain  period  of  time 
guaranteed  6  per  cent,  annual  interest  on  25,000,000  yen,  which 
was  fixed  as  the  minimum  capital  of  the  company,  now  further 
promoted  its  work  by  liberal  measures,  so  as  to  make  it  possible 
for  the  company  to  complete  the  line  before  the  end  of  the  pre- 
sent year.  Both  the  Korean  and  Japanese  Imperial  Houses  own 
shares  of  the  company. 

8  The  line  passes  through  the  richest  and  most  populous  four 
provinces  of  Korea,  which  comprise  nearly  seven  tenths  of  all 
the  houses  in  the  Empire,  and  cover  more  than  five  sevenths  of 
the  cultivated  area  of  the  country,  with  considerable  capacity 
for  future  cultivation  and  improvement.  The  road  also  connects 
places  to  which  the  Koreans  flock  from  neighboring  regions  for 
the  periodical  fairs  held  there.  These  fairs  occur  six  times  each 
month,  held  alternately  in  different  places,  besides  great  annual 
fairs  in  large  cities.  Among  the  thirty-nine  stations  of  this  rail- 
road, six  will  be  daily  seen  holding  fairs,  for  which  the  traffic  of 
passengers  and  merchandise  through  the  road  will  be  consider- 
able.   It  is  safe  to  say  that  five  sevenths  of  the  entire  Korean 


INTRODUCTORY  25 

not  impossible  to  suppose  that  the  Japanese  people 
will  succeed  in  their  efforts  to  secure  the  right  of 
extending  this  line  beyond  Seul  up  to  Wiju  on  the 
northern  border/  and  thence  ultimately  connecting 
it  with  the  Eastern  Chinese  and  the  Peking-Shang- 
haikwan-Sinminting  Railways,  so  as  to  render  the 
connection  by  rail  between  Fusan  and  China  and 
Europe  complete.2  The  Mitsui  Produce  Company, 
another  Japanese  concern,  monopolized  the  export 
of  Korean  ginseng,  and,  in  1903,  despite  the  com- 
petition of  the  Russian  Baron  Gunzburg,3  succeeded 

foreign  trade  belong  to  the  sphere  controlled  by  this  line,  and 
also  that  nearly  all  of  this  trade  is  in  reality  the  fast  growing 
Japan-Korea  trade.  The  effect  of  the  completion  of  the  line  upon 
this  trade  will  be  tremendous.  See  Mr.  J.  Shinobu's  Kan  Hanto 
("The  Korean  Peninsula"),  Tokio,  1901. 

1  The  French  have  an  agreement  with  the  Korean  Govern- 
ment regarding  a  Seul-Fusan  railway.  The  Seul  Government 
is  to  build  it  with  its  own  money,  and  the  French  to  furnish 
engineers  and  material.  Not  a  mile  of  rail  has  been  laid  by  the 
impecunious  Government,  and  the  present  war  is  rapidly  chan- 
ging the  entire  situation.  A  Japanese  railway  for  strategic  pur- 
poses has  already  been  started  from  Seul  northward.  Another 
line,  between  Seul  and  Wonsan  (Gensan),  will  also  be  built  by 
the  Japanese  in  the  near  future. 

2  It  was  one  of  the  first  propositions  from  Japan  to  Russia 
during  the  long  negotiations  between  them  which  have  ended 
in  the  present  war,  that  Russia  should  not  impede  Japan's  pos- 
sible attempt  in  the  future  to  extend  the  Fusan-Seul  Railway  in 
the  manner  above  described.   See  p.  286  (Article  3),  below. 

3  A  promoter  of  Russian  interests  in  Korea,  and  to  all  intents 
and  purposes  a  semi-official  diplomat  for  Russia,  living  at  Seul 
and  observing  the  political  barometer  of  the  Court  at  close  range. 
Another  person,  perhaps  less  known  to  the  outside  world,  but 
far  more  influential  at  Court,  is  a  woman,  Fraulein  Sonntag,  a 
relative  of  the  wife  of  the  ex-Russian  Minister  Waeber  at  Seul. 
See  p.  280,  below. 


26  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

in  extending  the  term  of  the  monopoly  for  five  years. 
Twenty  to  forty  thousand  Japanese  fishermen  along 
the  Korean  coast  report  an  annual  catch  amounting 
sometimes  to  large  figures. 

No  part  of  Korea's  economic  life,  however,  would 
seem  to  he  of  greater  importance  to  her  own  fu- 
ture, or  to  depend  more  closely  upon  the  enterprise 
of  the  Japanese  settlers,  than  her  agriculture.  If 
it  is  remembered  that  nearly  all  her  exports  consist 
of  agricultural  products,  and  also  that  they  largely 
supply  the  needs  of  Japan,  we  can  readily  compre- 
hend the  great  community  of  interest  felt  by  both 
countries  in  the  agriculture  of  the  Peninsula.  It  is 
remarkable  to  note,  to  take  a  single  instance,  that  the 
production  of  cereals  and  beans  (respectively  about 
eight  and  four  million  koku)  in  Korea  has  grown 
to  its  present  dimensions  largely  owing  to  the  stim- 
ulus given  to  it  by  the  increased  demand  for  these 
articles  in  Japan.1  We  shall  presently  note  also  that, 
owing  to  the  peculiar  circumstances  prevailing  in 
Korea,  her  purchasing  power  and  general  com- 
mercial activity  are  so  completely  ruled  by  the  con- 
ditions of  her  weather  and  crops  as  is  seldom  the 
case  with  other  agricultural  nations.  The  Koreans 
are  comparatively  happy  in  good  years,  while  in  bad 
years  they  are  reduced  to  great  miseries  and  ban- 
dits infest  all  parts  of  the  country.  Upon  the  state 
of  her  agriculture,  then,  must  depend  the  trade  con- 
ditions of  Korea,  as  well  as  most  of  her  material 
strength  and  much  of  that  of  Japan.  From  this  it 
1  The  Kokumin,  January  15,  1904. 


INTRODUCTORY  27 

is  plain  that  the  profound  community  of  interest  of 
the  two  nations  calls  for  both  the  extension  and  the 
improvement  of  the  agriculture  of  Korea.  It  is  es- 
timated that  the  extent  of  her  land  under  cultiva- 
tion is  hardly  more  than  3,185,000  acres,  or  about 
6.3  per  cent,  of  the  82,000  square  miles  known  as 
the  total  area  of  the  country,1  and  that  there  exist 
at  least  3,500,000  more  acres  of  arable  land,  which 
would  be  fully  capable  of  sustaining  five  or  six 
millions  of  new  population,  and  of  increasing  the 
annual  crops  of  the  land  by  not  less  than  150,000,- 
000  yen?  Unfortunately,  however,  the  Koreans 
lack  energy  to  cultivate  those  three  and  a  half  mil- 
lion acres  of  waste  land.  For  it  is  well  known  that 
the  irregular  but  exhaustive  exactions  of  the  Korean 
officials  have  bred  a  conviction  in  the  mincToT  the 
peasant  that  it  is  unwise^  to~hestir  Jmnself  and  earn 
surplus  wealth  only  to  be  fleeced  by  the  officials. 
His  idleness  has  now  for  centuries  been  forced, 
until  it  has  become  an  agreeable  habit.  It  is  in  this 
state  of  things  that  itnas  otelHreen  suggested  that 
the  cultivation  of  the  waste  lands  may  most  naturally 

t  x  From  an  address  by  Mr.  Suero  Kato,  of  the  Department  of 
Agriculture  and  Commerce,  who  had  studied  the  agriculture  of 
Korea  on  the  ground  three  times  in  succession.  —  Ibid.,  May 
27,  1904. 

»  2  Calculated  from  the  data  given  in  the  KoJcumin  for  January 
j  8, 1904.  The  official  census  of  Korea  for  1902  gives  a  population 
,'  of  5,782,806,  but  assuming  that  there  live  145  people  per  square 
|  mile,  which  is  one  half  the  density  of  the  population  in  China, 
j  the  Korean  population  cannot  be  much  below  12,000,000.  The 
\  official  record  of  the  land  under  cultivation  is  also  untrustworthy 
I  for  institutional  reasons  not  necesary  to  mention  here. 


28  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

be  begun  by  the  superior  energy  of  the  Japanese  set- 
tlers.1 Not  less  important  than  the  cultivation  of  new 
land  is  the  improvement  of  old  land  in  Korea,  where 
the  art  of  husbandry  is  far  less  advanced  than  in 
either  China  or  Japan.  Lots  are  marked  out  care- 
lessly, improvements  are  crude,  and  the  manure 
most  universally  used  is  dried  grass.  The  great 
rivers^  with  all  their  numerous  ramifications  are 
hardly  utilized  for  the  purpose  of  irrigation,  and  the 
forests  have  been  mercilessly  denuded  for  fuel  and 
in  order  to  forestall  the  requisition  of  the  govern- 
ment, —  which  formerly  used  to  order  without  com- 
pensation the  cutting  and  transporting  of  trees  by 
their  owners,  —  so  that  a  slight  drought  or  excess 
of  rain  works  frightful  disasters  upon  agriculture. 
Another  serious  effect  of  the  absence  of  a  good  sys- 
tem of  irrigation  is  the  comparative  want  of  rice 
land,  which  always  requires  a  most  careful  use  of 
water.2  These  conditions  are  all  the  more  to  be  re- 
gretted, when  it  is  seen  that  the  soil  is  generally 
fair  and  the  climate  favorable.  The  cultivation  of 
rice  is  said  to  have  been  first  taught  by  the  Japanese 
invaders  toward  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
and  yet,  with  all  their  primitive  method,  the  Kore- 

1  The  question  of  cultivating  the  waste  land  in  Korea  by 
Japanese  enterprise,  however,  has  called  forth  a  very  delicate 
situation  which  still  awaits  the  most  careful  solution.  The 
progress  of  this  situation  will  be  a  matter  of  great  interest,  but 
it  is  still  too  early  to  discuss  it.  Cf.  the  Korea  Review  for  July 
and  August,  1904,  and  follow  its  subsequent  numbers. 

2  See  the  Tsusho  Isan  for  August  3,  1903,  and  the  Kokumin 
for  January  7,  15,  and  16,  1904. 


INTRODUCTORY  29 

ans  are  already  exporting  rice  to  the  value  of  four 
million  yen  or  more.  Sericulture  is  still  in  its  in- 
fancy, while  tea,  cotton,  hemp,  sugar,  and  various 
fruits  are  all  declared  to  be  tolerably  well  suited  to 
the  soil.  The  Japanese  farmer  finds  here,  particu- 
larly in  the  south,  a  climate  and  general  surround- 
ings very  similar  to  his  own,  and  otherwise  eminently 
agreeable  to  his  habits,  and,  along  with  the  appli- 
cation of  his  superior  methods  of  cultivation,  irri- 
gation, and  forestry,  the  common  interests  of  his 
country  and  Korea  are  bound  to  develop  with  great 
rapidity.  The  progress  of  agriculture  would  also 
gradually  lead  the  Koreans  into  the  beginnings  of 
an  industrial  life,  while  the  expanding  systems  of 
railways  and  banking  would  be  at  once  cause  and 
effect  of  the  industrial  growth  of  the  nation.  An- 
other inevitable  result  would  be  the  development  of 
the  economic  sense  and  the  saving  capacity  of  the 
Korean,  the  latter  of  which  has  had  little  oppor- 
tunity to  grow,  not  so  much  because  of  his  small 
wage  and  high  rent  and  interest,  as  because  of  the 
onerous,  irregular  local  dues  and  the  systematic  exac- 
tions in  various  forms  by  the  official.1  An  advanced 

1  The  rent  is  of  two  kinds :  either  to  be  decided  anew  each 
year  after  the  harvest,  or  to  deliver  to  the  proprietor  50  per  cent, 
of  the  crop.  It  should  always  be  remembered  that  a  large  major- 
ity of  actual  cultivators  are  tenants,  the  proprietors  being  limited 
to  a  small  class  of  rich  men,  officers,  and  nobles.  The  daily  wage 
of  the  laborer  on  the  farm  averages  20  sen,  but  it  is  usually  paid 
in  kind,  as  are  debts  and  repayments  in  many  cases.  The  stan- 
dard of  life  of  the  Korean  farmer  is  perhaps  lower  than  that  of 
the  Japanese,  but  apparently  not  less  comfortable.  The  national 
land  tax  is  said  to  be  mild  and  largely  discarded,  but  the  house 


30  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

economic  life,  itself  necessitating  a  reform  of  the 
official  organization,  would  at  least  make  it  possible 
for  the  peasant  to  work,  earn,  and  save.  Simultane- 
ously and  in  increasing  degree  would  his  wants,  as 
well  as  his  purchasing  power,  increase.  Around  the 
progress  of  Korea's  agriculture,  then,  must  be  built 
all  other  measures  of  her  growth  and  power,  as, 
for  instance, %  transportation,  industries,  trade  and 
commerce,  finance,  political  reform,  and  mili- 
tary strength.  In  no  other  way  can  we  conceive  of 
the  possibility  of  her  effective  independence,  the 
cause  of  which  has  cost  Japan,  and  is  now  costing 
her,  so  dearly.  In  no  other  light  can  we  interpret 
the  Korean  sovereignty  under  the  assistance  of 
Japan. 

In  regard  to  Manchuria,  where  the  chances  for 
development  are  far  vaster,  the  Japanese  people  do 
not  possess  there  as  large  vested  interests,  but  en- 
tertain as  great  expectations  for  its  future  settle- 
ment and  industry  as  in  Korea.  It  was  estimated 
before  the  present  war  that  there  resided  more  than 
ten  thousand  Japanese  in  Manchuria,  who  were 
either  under  the  employment  of  Russian  authorities 

tax,  special  tax,  local  tax,  and  the  like,  bring  up  the  dues  of  the 
farmer  sometimes  to  an  unendurable  extent.  The  tenant,  after 
paying  his  rent  and  other  charges,  is  obliged  to  sell  what  little 
rice  is  left  to  him  at  the  earliest  opportunity,  so  that  he  hence- 
forth becomes  a  buyer  of  rice,  and  consequently  has  little  to  buy 
other  articles  with,  and  still  less  to  save,  until  his  spring  harvest 
of  wheat  comes  in.  Woe  betide  him  when  both  the  rice  and  the 
wheat  crops  fail!  See  the  Kokumin,  January  13  and  14,  1904, 
and  the  Tsusho  Isan  for  August  3,  1903,  p.  21. 


INTRODUCTORY  31 

in  public  works  along  *the  railway,  or  engaged  in 
such  small  occupations  as  laundry  work,  carpentry, 
restaurant-keeping,  photographing,  and  hair-dress- 
ing,1 while  many  of  the  Japanese  women,  whose 
numbers  in  many  a  town  preponderated  over  those 
of  men,  had  been  allured  by  unscrupulous  parties, 
who  consigned  them  to  disreputable  occupations. 
Merchants  and  business  men  of  greater  capital  and 
resources  would  be,  as  they  often  have  been,  at- 
tracted^feo  Manohuria^  were  it  not  for  the  exclusive, 
and  in  the  hands  of  some  of  their  officials,  arbitrary, 
measures  of  the  Russians.2  Under  normal  condi- 
tions of  peace  and  "  open  door,"  the  immensely 
greater  resources  of  Manchuria  and  the  much/ N, 
greater  productiveness  of  its  people  3  would  seen/ 
to  promise  even  a  more  important  economic  future 
than  in  Korea. 


1  An  address  by  Mr.  G.  Hirose,  a  competent  eye-witness,  in 
the  Dobun-kwai  Hokoku,  No.  48,  November,  1903,  pp.  15  ff. 
Official  census,  however,  gives  only  2806  Japanese  in  Manchuria 
(December  30, 1903).  See  the  Tsusho  Isan  for  April  13, 1904, 
pp.  33-38. 

2  Mr.  Hirose,  already  mentioned,  refers  to  a  Japanese  capital- 
ist who  started  a  lumber  business  in  Kirin  Province  and  another 
who  discovered  coal  deposits  near  Harbin  and  began  to  mine 
them,  both  of  whom,  in  spite  of  the  permits  they  had  received 
from  the  Chinese  authorities  by  regular  process,  were  driven 
away  arbitrarily  under  threats  of  the  Russian  military.  The 
Dobun-kwai,  No.  48,  pp.  21-22. 

8  The  so-called  Manchus,  the  original  inhabitants  of  Man- 
churia, have  migrated  to  China  proper,  which  they  conquered 
during  the  seventeenth  century.  The  present  inhabitants  of  Man- 
churia are  immigrant  Chinese,  whose  greater  economic  capacity 
has  been  rapidly  developing  this  immensely  rich  territory. 


rvvA32  jj    ,<*>THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

/\fr|  In  summing  up  our  preceding  discussion,  it  may 

be  stated  that  the  natural  growth    or   unnatural 

decay  of  the  Japanese  nation  will  greatly  depend  — 

4^ever  more  greatly  than  it  now  does —  upon  whether 

Jy  /f  Manchuria  and  Korea  remain  open  or  are  closed  to 
its  trade,  colonization,  and  economic  enterprise;  and 
that,  in  her  imperative  desire  for  the  open  door, 
Japan's  wish  largely  coincides  with  that  of  the 
European  and  American  countries,  except  Russia, 
whose  over-production  calls  for  an  open  market  in 
the  East. 

Thus  far  we  have  discussed  only  Japan's  side  of 
'  the  economic  problem  in  Manchuria  and  Korea. 
Passing  to  Russia's  side,  it  is  seen  that  her  vested 

jA  {  interests  in  Manchuria  are  as  enormous  as  her  com- 
mercial success  there  has  been  small.  The  building 
of  the  Eastern  Chinese  Railway  has  cost  the  incred- 
ible sum  of  270,000,000  rubles,  making  the  average 
cost  per  verst  more  than  113,000  rubles,1  or  over 
$87,000  per  mile,  besides  70,000,000  rubles  lost 
and  expended  during  the  Boxer  outrages  and  Man- 

1  An  official  report  of  the  Province  of  Amur,  dated  June  22, 
1903,  denies  that  the  actual  cost  of  construction  per  verst  was, 
as  had  been  alleged,  150,000  rubles,  but  113,183  rubles.  The 
Tsusho  Isan  for  August  8, 1903,  p.  46.  A  ruble  is  equivalent 
to  about  51.5  cents. 

In  this  connection,  it  is  interesting  to  note  in  M.  Witte's  report 
to  the  Czar  after  the  former's  tour  in  the  Far  East  in  1902,  that 
the  Siberian  Railway  had  cost  758,955,907  rubles,  but,  with  the 
Circum-Baikal  section,  would  cost  not  less  than  1,000,000,000 
rubles,  excluding  the  salaries  of  officers,  expenses  for  soldiers, 
the  Pacific  fleet,  harbor  work,  and  the  like.  The  Dobun-kwai 
Hokofai,  No.  42,  p.  30. 


IP 


INTRODUCTORY  33 

churia  campaign  of  1900/  to  say  nothing  of  the 
normal  annual  cost  of  guarding  the  railway  by 
soldiers,  estimated  at  24,000,000  rubles.2  The  in- 
vestments in  permanent  properties  alone,  besides 
the  railway,  are  moderately  valued  at  500,000,000 
rubles.3  In  return  for  these  heavy  outlays,  the  trade 
relations  between  Russia  and  Manchuria  have  been 
most  disappointing.  Though  it  is  not  possible  to  ob- 
tain the  exact  figures  of  the  actual  trade  between 
Manchuria  and  European  Russia,  we  can  establish 
approximate  estimates  in  the  following  manner. 
According  to  official  returns,  exports  from  Russia  to 
her  Far  Eastern  Possessions  were  as  follows :  — 

1900  56,000,000  rubles 

1901  51,000,000 

1902  38,000,000 

The  decline  must  be  largely  due  to  the  decreased 
demand  fo ^military  and  railway  supplies,  for  it  is 
seen  that  the  falling-off  has  been  most  conspicuous 
in  iron  and  steel  wares  and  machinery.4  At  the 
same  time  there  was  little  or  no  import  trade  frohi 
the  Russian  possessions  in  the  East  into -Russia, 
for  the  native  products  sent  out  from  the  fqrmer 
never  passed  beyond  Eastern  Siberia.    It  would  be 

1  According  to  the  "Fast  and  Present  of  the  Siberian  Rail- 
way," compiled  in  1903  by  the  government  committee  in  charge 
of  the  railway,  as  quoted  in  the  Dobun-kwai  Hbkoku,  No.  51, 
pp.  58-60. 

2  M.  Witte's  report  of  September,  1901,  quoted  in  the  Koku- 
min  for  October  1,  1904. 

8  Consul  Miller  at  Niu-chwang,  in  the  U.  S.  daily  Consular 
Reports,  February  15,  1904  (No.  1877),  p.  8. 

4  The  Tsushd  Isan,  November  25,  1903,  pp.  16-18. 


34  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

interesting  if  we  could  find  out  how  much  of  these 
Russian  exports  went  to  Manchuria.  The  figures 
for  the  Pacific  ports  are  given  as  follows : 1  — 

1900  51,157,000  rubles 

1901  49,827,000 

1902  37,704,000 

If  these  figures  are  reliable,  the  difference  between 
them  and  those  given  above,  namely :  — 

1900  less  than  5,000,000  rubles 

1901   more  than  1,000,000 

1902   less  than      300,000 

might  be  considered  an  approximate  amount  of 
the  export  trade  from  Russia  to  Manchuria  (and 
Mongolia,  which  imports  very  little  from  Russia), 
for,  of  the  Pacific  ports,  no  other  port  but  Vladi- 
vostok reexports  Russian  goods  into  Manchuria, 
which  reexportation  seems  to  be  slight  enough  to 
be  ignored.  The  approximate  correctness  of  the 
figures  is  further  seen  from  the  fact  that  of  the 
total  8,193,000  rubles  of  the  Manchurian  trade  at 
Blagovestchensk,  Habarovsk,  and  the  South  Ussuri 
region  —  the  three  main  points  of  transit  trade 
with  Manchuria  —  only  one  half  showed  exports  to 
Manchuria,  and  again,  of  this  one  half,  only  a 
portion  consisted  of  reexported  Russian  goods.  The 
South  Ussuri  district,  for  instance,  sent  only  130,- 
800  and  206,000  rubles'  worth  of  Russian  and 
foreign  goods  to  Manchuria,  out  of  the  total  export 
trade  of  799,500  and  2,221,300  rubles,  respectively, 
in  1898  and  1899.2   On  the  other  hand,  before  the 

1  The  U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports,  July  30,  1903. 
See  the  Shiberiya  oyobi  Manshu  ("  Siberia  and  Manchuria  ") 


INTRODUCTORY  35 

opening  of  the  Manchurian  Eailway  (which  took 
place  in  February,  1903),  the  direct  trade  between 
Russia  and  the  interior  of  Manchuria  must  have 
been  so  slight  as  not  to  materially  affect  the  sum- 
total  of  the  Russian-Manchurian  trade. 

This  remarkably  unfavorable  trade  between  Man- 
churia and  Russia  was  probably  due  to  a  decreased 
demand  for  military  supplies  since  1900  (for  Russia 
has  little  to  export  from  Manchuria,  and  Chinese  teas 
have  largely  gone  through  Kiakhta  or  by  the  Amur, 
rather  than  by  the  Manchurian  Railway),  and  also 
to  the  difficulty  of  further  reducing  the  freight 
rates  on  the  railway,1  and  of  competing  successfully 
with  the  American  and  Japanese  traders  in  certain 
articles  for  importation.2   In  spite  of  all  the  effort 

Tokio,  1904,  compiled  by  T.  Kawakami,  special  agent  of  the 
Foreign  Office  of  Japan,  who  was  sent  to  Siberia  and  Northern 
Manchuria  to  investigate  economic  and  military  conditions 
there,  pp.  94,  119-121,  124,  138. 

1  For  the  relative  advantages  of  the  Manchurian  Railway  and 
the  Amur  River,  see  the  U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports,  August  5 
and  October  5,  1903,  and  January  19,  1904. 

2  The  Russia-China  trade  began  more  than  250  years  ago. 
Before  1860,  it  was  carried  wholly  on  land,  and  its  balance  was 
nearly  even.  Since  1860,  when  sea  trade  from  Odessa  was 
opened,  the  progress  of  this  trade  has  been  slower  than  the  gen- 
eral foreign  trade  of  China,  and  its  balance  has  been  heavily 
against  Russia  (6,702,000  against  45,945,000  rubles  in  1900). 
More  than  half  of  the  Russian  imports  into  China  consists  of 
cotton  fabrics,  and  over  80  per  cent,  of  the  exports  from  China 
to  Russia  are  teas.  Russia's  share  in  the  entire  foreign  trade  of 
China  has  also  fallen  from  4.6  per  cent,  in  1899  to  4.4  per  cent, 
in  1900,  2.6  per  cent,  in  1901,  and  2.3  per  cent,  in  1902,  as  com- 
pared with  the  growing,  share  of  the  trade  by  Japan  amounting 
to  14.2  per  cent.,  15.9  per  cent.,  15.7  per  cent.,  and  18.4  per  cent., 


■V 

^3 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 


made  by  the  late  Finance  Minister,  M.  Witte,  Rus- 
sia is  not  yet  primarily  a  manufacturing  country, 
her  exportation  of  manufactured  goods  forming  in 

>  fact  only  2.5  per  cent,  of  her  entire  export  trade, 
i  and  at  best  remaining  stationary  during  the  three 

>  years  1900-2,  as  will  be  seen  below :  - 


1900 
Rubles 
Total  exports  from  Russia. .. 688,435,000 
Exports  of  manufacturers  . . .   19,553,000 


1901 
Rubles 
729,815,000 
21,039,000 


1902 
Rubles 
825,277,000 
19,263,000  i 


Russia's  commercial  failure  in  Manchuria  in  the 
past  would,  however,  in  no  way  justify  the  infer- 
ence that  the  future  will  be  as  disappointing.  All 
competent  observers  seem  to  agree  that  the  un- 
developed resources  of  the  364,000  square  miles  of 
I  Manchuria  are  enormous.2  Its  unknown  mineral 
wealth,  its  thousands  of  square  miles  of  land  now 

in  those  respective  years.  Of  the  Russian  share  of  2.6  per  cent, 
in  1901,  Russian  Manchuria  occupied  only  0.6  per  cent.  See  the 
TsusKo  Isan,  July  8,  1903,  pp.  1-4;  T.  Yoshida's  Shina  Bbyehi 
Jijo  (Trade  Conditions  in  China),  Tokio,  1902,  pp.  128-129, 
etc.  For  the  gold  values  of  the  figures  up  to  1903,  see  the 
British  D.  and  C.  Reports,  annual  series,  No.  3280. 

1  From  Russian  official  figures  quoted  in  the  Tsilsho  Isan, 
November  25,  1903. 

3  The  reader  is  recommended  to  the  reports  of  the  United 
States  Consul  Miller  at  Niu-chwang,  particularly  those  which 
appeared  in  the  daily  Consular  Reports  for  January  21  and  24, 
and  February  5,  1904  (Nos.  1856,  1858,  and  1869).  Reference 
should  also  be  made  to  the  ex-British  Consul  at  Niu-chwang, 
Alexander  Hosie's  Manchuria,  London,  1901  (new  edition, .New 
York,  1904). 

The  resources  of  Eastern  Manchuria  are  well  described  in  the 
Tsusko  Isan,  October  13, 1903,  and  those  of  Northern  Manchu- 
ria in  the  Shiberiya  oyobi  Manshu,  Tokio,  1904, compiled  by  the 
Foreign  Office  of  Japan,  pp.  427-485. 


INTRODUCTORY  37 

under  the  bean  and  millet  cultivation,  but  begin- 
ning to  yield  to  the  wheat  culture  and  producing 
wheat  at  a  market  price  of  not  more  than  forty 
cents  per  bushel,  and  its  extensive  lumber  districts, 
as  well  as  its  millions  of  cheap  and  most  reliable 
Chinese  laborers,1  would  before  long  enable  the 
Russians  successfully  to  convert  Manchuria  into 
one  of  the  richest  parts  of  China  and  one  of  the 
richest  countries  in  the  world.  A  success  of  such 
magnitude  must,  however,  largely  depend  upon  a 
systematically  protective  and  exclusive  policy  on 
the  part  of  Russia,  or,  in  other  words,  upon  the 
completeness  with  which  Russia  transfers  the  bulk 
of  the  Manchurian  trade  from  the  treaty  port  of 
Niu-chwang,  and,  so  far  as  the  Russian  import 
from  China  is  concerned,  even  from  the  once  im- 
portant Russian  port  of  Vladivostok,  to  the  com- 
mercial terminus  of  the  Manchurian  Railway  — 
Dalny.  Particularly  in  order  to  capture  the  import 
trade  into  Manchuria  of  cotton  goods  and  kerosene 
oil,  in  the  face  of  the  great  advantages  enjoyed  by 
American  and  Japanese  competitors,  Russia  must 
at  all  costs  make  Dalny  overshadow  Niu-chwang, 

1  The  present  population  of  Manchuria  is  differently  esti- 
mated between  the  limits  of  6.5  and  15  millions.  Probably  there 
are  more  than  10  millions.  Immigration  was  said  to  have  been 
progressing  rapidly  under  the  Chinese  rule. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  Siberia,  with  a  larger  area  than  Man- 
churia, contains  only  about  8,000,000  inhabitants.  The  pro- 
ductive capacity  of  the  Manchurian  population  must  be  mea- 
sured, however,  not  only  by  their  larger  numbers,  but  also  by 
their  far  superior  economic  training. 


38  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

so  as  to  bring  the  trade  under  her  complete  con- 
trol. Nothing  but  a  highly  artificial  system  could 
accomplish  such  wonders,  for,  under  normal  condi- 
tions, teas  for  Russia  would  go  by  the  less  costly 
routes  through  Kiakhta,  or  up  the  Amur,  or  by 
sea  to  Odessa;  the  native  products  of  Manchuria 
for  exportation  to  Japan  would  be  sent  to  Niu- 
chwang  by  the  nearest,  cheapest,  and  most  natural 
channel,  the  Liao  River,  and,  when  the  latter  freezes 
between  the  end  of  November  and  March,  by  the 
Shan-hai-kwan  Railway  ;  and,  finally,  the  smaller 
cost  of  production  and  lower  rates  of  freight  of  the 
American  and  Japanese  cotton  fabrics  would  com- 
pletely outdistance  the  Russian.  Let  us  observe 
with  what  artificial  measures  the  Russians  have  been 
meeting  this  situation.  With  a  view  to  diverting 
the  tea  trade  from  Vladivostok  to  Dalny,  Russia 
imposed  an  import  duty  of  3  rubles  per  pood  from 
August,  1902,  and  increased  it  in  May,  1903,  to 
25.50  rubles,1  which  with  other  measures  dealt  a 
crushing  blow  to  the  prosperity  of  Vladivostok.2 
This  must  at  least  have  stifled  the  transportation 
of  tea  up  the  Amur,  without,  perhaps,  affecting 
the  inroad  of  teas  through  the  old  Kiakhta  and  by 

1  The  Tsusho  Isan  for  June  23,  1903,  pp.  34-35.  Pood  = 
36.112  lbs.;  ruble  =  51.5  cents. 

2  Under  this  and  other  differential  measures  the  commercial 
importance  of  Vladivostok  is  said  to  be  fast  passing  away.  Local 
merchants  made  a  strong  plea  of  their  case  before  M.  Witte 
when  he  traveled  in  the  East  in  1902,  but  on  his  return  he  re- 
ported to  the  Czar  that  the  interests  of  the  Empire  demanded  a 
large  sacrifice  at  Vladivostok  for  the  sake  of  Dalny. 


INTRODUCTORY  39 

sea.1  As  regards  the  export  trade  at  Niu-chwang, 
the  Russians  took  advantage  of  the  important  fact 
that  the  Shan-hai-kwan  Railway  did  not  penetrate 
sufficiently  north  to  reach  some  producing  centres 
of  Western  Manchuria,  while  the  waters  of  the  Liao 
were  navigable  only  200  miles  from  the  mouth,  and 
were,  together  with  the  harbor  itself,  ice-bound  from 
November  till  March.  Dalny  was  nearly  ice-free, 
and  the  Manchurian  Railway  was  available  through 
all  seasons.  The  only  competitors  of  the  railroad 
would  seem  to  be  the  small  bean-carrying  junks 
plying  down  the  Liao,  which  were  both  owned  and 
loaded  by  the  same  Chinese  merchants.  This  com- 
petition the  Russians  met  by  greatly  reduced  freight 
rates  of  the  railway,  which  made  it   possible  for 

1  The  effect  of  the  new  duties  levied  on  tea  at  other  places  than 
Dalny  is  seen  in  the  following  comparative  table.  The  figures 
for  1902  are  taken  from  the  U.  S.  Monthly  Summary  for  January, 
1904,  p.  2420,  and  those  for  1903  have  been  converted  from  data 
given  in  the  British  D.  and  C.  Reports,  Annual  Series  No.  3280. 

In  1902,  the  Russian  Empire  took  882,893  out  of  the  1,519,211 
piculs  of  tea  exported  from  China,  while  in  1903  the  correspond- 
ing amounts  were  1,010,580  out  of  1,677,530.  The  distribution 
of  the  imported  teas  to  the  Russian  Empire,  according  to  the 
routes,  was  as  follows :  — 

1902  1903 

Via  Odessa  and  Batum 206,699  piculs         200,391  piculs 

Via  Kiakhta 403,648  244,668 

To  Russian  Manchuria 272,546  191 ,679 

To  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny   373,842 

We  presume  that  most  of  the  teas  exported  to  Russian  Manchuria 
went  through  Niu-chwang.  The  table  plainly  shows  an  increased 
importation  at  Dalny  at  the  expense  of  all  other  points.  It  is  not 
known  how  much  of  the  373,842  piculs  imported  at  Dalny  and 
Port  Arthur  was  reshipped  to  other  ports  not  mentioned  here. 
(Picul  =  133j  lbs.  av.) 


40  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

every  100  poods  of  Manchurian  grain  and  beans 
to  be  carried  600  miles  between  Harbin  and  Dalny 
for  about  fifty-seven  cents  gold,  or  $10  per  ton.1 
From  Dalny,  heavily  subsidized  Russian  boats  trans- 
ported Manchurian  exports  to  Japan  at  a  freight  rate 
which,  in  conjunction  with  railway  rates,  amounted 
to  the  saving  by  the  shipper  of  4.50  yen  per  ton,  as 
compared  with  the  railway-rates  plus  the  freight- 
rates  of  non-Russian  vessels.2  When  the  flour  in- 
dustry of  the  Russian  towns  in  Manchuria  is  devel- 
oped, Russian  steamers  may  be  seen  carrying  flour 
from  Dalny,  not  only  to  Japan,  but  to  Chinese  and 
Eastern  Siberian  ports.  As  for  the  import  trade  of 
Manchuria,  the  Russians,  who  have  ousted  American 
importers  of  kerosene  oil  at  Vladivostok,  seem  to 
be  now  by  energetic  methods  slowly  driving  away 
the  same  rivals  from  Chemulpo  and  from  Dalny.3 

1  See  the  Tsushb  Isan,  April  18  and  August  3,  1903,  and  the 
U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports,  January  21,  1904  (No.  1856). 
Reduction  apparently  had  not  reached  its  minimum  point.  It 
was  unknown  whether  Dalny  handled  much  of  the  Manchurian 
export  trade. 

2  The  Kokumin,  March  7,  1903.  The  ex-Japanese  Consul  at 
Niu-chwang,  Mr.  K.  Tanabe,  doubts  that  Dalny  will  completely 
displace  Niu-chwang  as  an  exporting  centre.  The  latter  is  geo- 
graphically the  nature  outlet  for  the  grain  from  the  Liao  Valley, 
and,  in  winter,  the  handling  of  this  product  is  apt  to  be  done 
more  at  Mukden  than  at  Dalny,  the  latter  becoming  in  that  case 
a  mere  port  of  transit.  Moreover,  mercantile  customs  differ  so 
much  at  Niu-chwang  and  Dalny  that  it  is  not  possible  that  the 
conservative  Chinese  merchants  should  readily  transfer  their 
business  from  the  one  place  to  the  other.  See  Tanabe's  conversa- 
tion in  the  Toyo  Keizai  Zasshi  ("Oriental  Economist"),  No. 
244  (September  25,  1902),  p.  16. 

8  The  central  distributing  station  at  Vladivostok  has  a  capa- 


INTRODUCTORY  41 

Vastly  more  important  as  articles  for  importation 
than  kerosene  oil  are  cotton  yarn  and  textiles,  which 
are  annually  supplied  from  abroad  to  the  value  of 
over  12,000,000  taels.  By  far  the  greater  part  of 
sheetings,  drills,  and  jeans  comes  from  America. 
The  Russians  were  not  unable  to  produce  cotton 
fabrics  almost  as  good  as  the  American  goods,  but 
the  trans-Siberian  freight  was  twice  as  expensive 
as  the  Pacific  transportation,  and  could  not  be  ex- 
pected to  be  further  reduced  without  great  diffi- 
culty.1 It  was  not  impossible  to  suppose  that  the 
Russian  Government  might  ultimately  apply  to 
Manchuria  the  system  of  granting  a  premium  and 
an  additional  drawback  on  textiles  made  from  im- 
ported cotton,  which  had  been  in  successful  opera- 
tion in  Persia.  There  was  no  question  but  that, 
together  with  the  development  of  Manchuria  under 
Russian  control,  foreigners  would  lose  most  of  their 
import  trade  in  lumber,  butter,  and  flour,  and  here 
again  the  Russian  success  must  depend  on  the 
exclusiveness  of  their  policy.2    Mr.  H.  B.  Miller, 

city  of  600,000  poods,  and  the  one  to  be  built  at  Dalny  will  hold 
1,500,000  poods,  to  which  a  special  tank  steamer  will  bring  oil 
from  Batum.  —  The  Tsusho  Isan,  May  3,  1903.  Americans 
tried  to  build  warehouses  at  Dalny,  but  were  opposed  by  Rus- 
sians. The  importation  of  American  kerosenes  at  Niu-chwang 
decreased  from  3,172,000  gallons  ($410,500)  in  1901  to  603,000 
gallons  ($77,000)  in  1902,  and  the  decrease  was  in  no  small 
measure  due  to  the  Russian  competition  at  Dalny. 

1  The  Tsusho  Isan,  October  23,  1903,  pp.  1-21;  the  U.  S. 
daily  Consular  Reports,  May  7,  July  16,  and  August  28,  1903, 
and  February  23,  1904. 

2  See  Mr.  Miller's  reports  in  the  U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports 


42  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  United  States  Consul  at  Niu-chwang,  seems 
to  have  made  a  delicate  reference  to  this  point 
when  he  said,  in  his  report  dated  December  5, 
1903  :  "  The  United  States  trade  in  Manchuria 
with  the  Chinese  amounted  to  several  millions  of 
dollars  per  year,  and  was  almost  entirely  imports. 
It  had  grown  very  fast,  and  would  have  had  an 
extended  and  most  substantial  increase  without  the 
Kussian  development,  for  the  country  was  being 
improved  and  extensively  developed  with  a  contin- 
ual immigration  from  other  provinces  in  China, 
before  the  railway  construction  began."  *  Much  has 
been  said  regarding  the  oft-reiterated  wish  of  Kussia 
to  keep  Dalny  as  a  free  port,  but  it  is  well  known 
that  it  has  recently  been  placed  under  a  protective 

for  January  21  and  24,  and  February  5  and  6, 1904  (Nos.  1856 
1858,  1859,  and  1870). 

Mr.  James  J.  Hill,  in  a  recent  speech  at  Minneapolis,  said 
that  his  great  system  of  transportation,  by  taking  advantage  of 
all  conditions,  and  by  carrying  full  loads  both  ways,  had  been 
able  to  make  a  freight  rate  of  forty  cents  a  hundred  pounds  of 
flour  to  the  Orient,  or  one  mill  per  ton-mile.  According  to  him, 
the  effect  of  the  growing  exportation  of  wheat  from  the  Pacific 
coast  to  the  East  seems  to  have  caused  an  advance  in  its  price 
at  Minneapolis  of  five  to  seven  cents  per  bushel.  In  view  of  these 
facts,  the  possible  exclusion  of  American  flour  from  Manchuria 
would  not  be  without  serious  effects,  especially  if  we  consider 
Mr.  Hill's  opinion  that  the  success  of  Mr.  Chamberlain's  finan- 
cial scheme  would  result  in  enabling  Manitoba  to  supply  all  the 
wheat  needed  in  Great  Britain,  thus  leaving  in  the  United  States 
a  large  surplus  of  grain,  for  which  other  markets  would  have  to 
be  developed.  See  the  American  Review  of  Reviews  for  Febru- 
ary, 1904. 

1  The  U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports,  February  15, 1904  (No. 
877),  p.  11. 


INTRODUCTORY  43 

tariff.1  We  are  not  in  possession  of  the  details  of 
this  tariff,  but  its  general  significance  can  hardly  be 
mistaken  when  we  see  how  the  Russians  have  been 
reducing  freight  rates  to  the  utmost,  subsidizing 
their  own  steamers,  and  pooling  together  their  great 
banking  and  railway  facilities,  all  for  the  purpose, 
on  the  one  hand,  of  developing  Russian  industries 
in  Manchuria,  and  on  the  other,  of  monopolizing 
the  bulk  of  its  trade. 

Not  only  in  trade,  but  in  colonization  also,  the 
Russians  have  been  building  up  new  cities  and  de- 
veloping old  ones  under  their  exclusive  policy  with 
an  unheard-of  rapidity.  Dalny  is  a  good  example 
of  the  former  class.  Still  more  conspicuous  is  the 
city  of  Harbin,  the  so-called  Moscow  of  Asia,  the 
geographical  and  commercial  centre  and  head- 
quarters of  the  railway  work  in  Manchuria,  which 
is  said  to  have  consisted  of  a  single  Chinese  house 
in  1898,2  but  now  contains  50,000  people.3  Well 
might  Count  Cassini,  as  he  did,  refer,  not  only  to 
the  colonization,  but  to  the  general  civilizing  in- 
fluence of  the  Russians  in  Manchuria  in  the  fol- 
lowing language  : 4  "  Through  the  pacific  channels 
of  diplomacy  my  government  acquired  privileges 
which,    accepted  in  good  faith,  have  been  exer- 

1  The  U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports,  January  19,  1904  (No. 
1854).    Also  see  ibid.,  April  4,  1903. 

2  British  Consul  Hosie's  report,  the  British  Parliamentary 
Papers  ("Blue  Books"),  China,  No.  1  (1900),  p.  154. 

8  See  U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports,  February   15,  1904  (No. 
1877),  and  the  Tsusho  Isan,  October  8,  1903,  pp.  42-43. 
4  The  North  American  Review  for  May,  1904,  pp.  683-684. 


44  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

cised  in  a  spirit  of  true  modern  progressiveness, 
until  now  the  flower  of  enlightened  civilization 
blooms  throughout  a  land  that  a  few  years  ago 
was  a  wild,  and  in  many  parts  a  desolate,  seem- 
ingly unproductive  waste.  Before  the  signing  of 
the  treaty  which  I  had  the  honor  to  negotiate  in 
behalf  of  my  Sovereign,  giving  to  Russia  rail- 
road and  other  concessions  in  Manchuria,  no  white 
man  could  have  ventured  into  that  province  with- 
out danger  to  his  life.  .  .  .  Upon  the  basis  of 
the  rights  to  commercial  exploitation  thus  peace- 
ably obtained,  Russia  built  a  railway  into  and 
through  Manchuria.  She  built  bridges,  roads,  and 
canals.  She  has  built  cities  whose  rapid  construc- 
tion and  wonderful  strides  in  population  and  in- 
dustry have  no  parallel,  certainly  in  Europe  and 
Asia,  perhaps  even  in  America.  Harbin  and  Dalny 
are  monuments  to  Russian  progressiveness  and  civ- 
ilization. These  great  undertakings,  wonderful  even 
in  a  day  of  marvelous  human  accomplishment, 
have  cost  Russia  more  than  ^00,000,000  dollars." 
Without  stopping  either  to  dispute  the  historical 
accuracy  of  Count  Cassini's  statement  or  to  deny 
the  wonderful  work  the  Russians  have  accomplished 
in  Manchurian  cities,  it  seems  pertinent  to  call  our 
attention  to  the  exclusive  side  of  the  Russian  en- 
terprise in  this  vast  territory.  Harbin  is  one  of 
the  so-called  "  depots,"  over  eighty  in  number, 
which  are  found  along  the  whole  length  of  the 
Manchurian  Railway,  each  one  of  which  extends 
over  several  square  miles,  within  which  none  but 


INTRODUCTORY  45 

the  Russians  and  Chinese  have  the  right  of  per- 
manent settlement.1  Russia  would  not  consent  to 
the  opening  of  Harbin  (and,  presumably,  all  other 
cities  within  the  u  depots  "  of  the  Manchurian  Rail- 
way) to  foreign  trade.  Even  outside  of  these  cities, 
the  Russian  Government  appeared  to  be  opposed 
to  the  opening  of  new  ports,  and  when  it  was  no 
longer  politic  to  continue  the  opposition,  Russia 
informed  other  Powers  in  1903  that  she  had  no 
intention  of  objecting  to  the  opening  of  new  treaty 
ports  "  without  foreign  settlements "  in  Man- 
churia.2 

The  meaning  of  all  these  protective  and  exclu- 
sive measures  becomes  plain,  when  it  is  seen  that 
the  complete  control  of  the  economic  resources  of 
Manchuria  would  give   Russia,  not  only  sufficient 

1  For  the  laborious  process  of  obtaining  permits  to  carry  on 
business  only  for  short  terms  in  these  great  sites  for  future  cities, 
see  the  Tsusho  Isan,  September  18  (pp.  40-41)  and  November 
23  (pp.  39-40),  1903. 

At  Dalny,  however,  Russia  has  welcomed  the  cooperation  of 
all  nationalities  in  its  development,  and  has  been  rather  disap- 
pointed at  their  comparative  indifference.  See  Mr.  F.  Nakasa- 
wa's  conversation  in  the  Tbyo  Keizai  Zasshi  ("  Oriental  Econo- 
mist"), No.  262  (March  15,  1903),  p.  13.  The  reasons  for  this 
modification  at  Dalny  of  the  customary  Russian  policy  are  plain, 
for  the  port  must  be  developed  as  rapidly  as  possible  before  the 
Russians  can  absolutely  control  its  trade.  Thus  the  importance 
of  Dalny  as  a  trading  port  brings  to  conspicuous  prominence  the 
universal  contradiction  of  the  Russian  commercial  policy  in 
East  Asia.  Russia  would  exclude  other  trading  nations  from 
her  possessions  in  order  to  control  the  trade,  but  is  at  the  same 
time  unable  to  develop  it  without  either  the  cooperation  of  other 
people  or  some  unnatural  devices. 

8  See  pp.  313  ff.,  below. 


46  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

means  to  support  Eastern  Siberia,  but  also  a  great 
command  over  the  trade  of  China  and  Japan.  The 
latter  country  Russia  might  be  able  to  reduce  to  dire 
distress,  when  necessary,  by  closing  the  supplies 
coming  from  Manchuria,  upon  which  Japan  will  have 
to  depend  every  year  more  closely  than  before.1  The 
success  of  these  great  designs  on  the  part  of  Russia 
would  depend  upon  how  completely  protective  and 
exclusive  her  Manchurian  policy  can  be  made. 

Coming  from  Manchuria  to  Korea,  we  find  the 
economic  position  of  the  Russians  in  a  totally  dif- 
ferent situation,  for  either  their  vested  or  even  their 
potential  interests  in  the  Peninsula  were  slight,  ex- 
cepting, perhaps,  their  already  acquired  timber  con- 
cessions 2  on  the  northern  frontier  and  the  Kaiser- 
ling  whale  fishery  on  the  northeastern  coast. 3  It  has 

1  On  March  27,  1904,  Russia  declared  that  Niu-chwang  was 
under  her  martial  law.  This  eventuality  had  been  fully  expected 
by  Japan.  The  gravity  of  the  situation,  however,  may  be  under- 
stood, when  we  remember  that  the  Russian  law  of  neutrality  con- 
siders food  as  among  contraband  goods,  so  that  the  supply  of 
millet,  beans,  and  bean-cakes  from  Manchuria  to  Japan  was 
henceforth  completely  closed,  until  the  Russians  evacuated  Niu- 
chwang  in  July. 

2  These  concessions  were  acquired  by  the  Russians  in  1896 
when  the  Korean  King  was  still  living  in  the  Russian  Legation  in 
Seul.  About  May,  1903,  after  more  than  seven  years'  inactivity, 
the  Russians  began  to  cut  timber  on  a  large  scale  along  the  Yalu 
River,  and  subsequently  made  extensive  improvements  at  Yon- 
gampu  at  the  mouth  of  the  river.  The  political  features  of  this 
event  do  not  concern  us  here.  See  pp.  263,  289  ff.,  318  ff.,  below. 

8  Kaiserling  is  a  successor  to  the  two  other  Russians  who,  one 
after  the  other,  had  been  engaged  in  the  whale  fishery  on  the 
Japan  Sea  for  a  long  period  of  time.  It  was  Kaiserling,  however, 
who  extended  the  work,  made  an  agreement  with  the  Korean 


INTRODUCTORY  47 

been  pointed  out,  however,  that  the  fact  that  Dalny 
was  not  altogether  ice-free  made  Russia  covet  Che- 
mulpo or  some  other  trade  port  on  the  western  coast 
of  Korea.1  However  that  may  be,  it  is  safe  to  say 
that  Russia's  interests  in  Korea  are  slightly  econo- 
mic, but  almost  wholly  strategic  and  political.         *S 

Let  us  sum  up  our  discussion  at  this  point,  and 
compare  the  economic  interests  of  Russia  and  Japan 
in  Manchuria  and  Korea.  In  Manchuria,  both 
Powers  seek  trade  and  colonization,  with  the  impor- 
tant difference  that  Japan's  interests  are  actually 
great  and  potentially  greater,  while  those  of  Russia 
are  both  actually  and  potentially  preponderant.  A 
difference  of  greater  moment  lies,  however,  in  the 
fact  that,  so  far  as  her  trade  and  industry  are  con- 
cerned, Japan's  interests  call  for  an  equal  opportu- 
nity there  for  all  industrial  nations,  while  Russia's 
interests  may  be  maintained  and  developed  only 
by  a  highly  exclusive  policy.  In  Korea,  its  open- 
ing for  the  trade,  settlement,  and  enterprise  of 
the  Japanese  is  not  only  the  most  natural  method 
of  strengthening  Korea  herself,  but  also  a  primary 
condition  for  the  life  and  growth  of  Japan.  Russia's 

Government,  and  was  turning  the  business  into  an  apparently 
successful  enterprise.  In  1901,  his  two  vessels  caught  abouf 
eighty  whales,  which  number  was  in  1902  increased  to  300.  *— 
The  Tsiisho  Isan,  September  28,  1903,  p.  34. 

1  Mr.  J.  Sloat  Fassett's  article  in  the  American  Review  of  Re- 
views, for  February,  1904,  p.  174. 

In  the  winter  of  1902-3,  ice  at  Dalny  was  six  inches  thick. 
—  Mr.  F.  Nakasawain  the  Tbyb  Keizai  Zasshi  ("Oriental  Eco- 
nomist"), No.  262  (March  15,  1903),  p.  13. 


\ 

( 

48  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLlL- 

economic  interests  there,  on  the  other  hand,  may  be 
measured  by  the  number  of  her  resident  subjects  and 
the  extent  of  their  enterprise,  which  are,  outside  of 
Yongampo,  next  to  nothing.  Her  interests,  being, 
as  we  shall  soon  see,  mainly  strategic  and  political, 
demand  here  also  a  policy  directly  opposed  to  the 
open  door.  If  we  now  consider  Manchuria  and 
Korea  together,  it  may  be  said  that  Russia's  eco- 
nomic interests  are,  even  in  Manchuria,  rather  for 
her  glory  as  a  great,  expanding  empire  than  for  any 
imperative  need  of  trade  and  emigration  in  that 
particular  part  of  her  Asiatic  dominion,  while  simi- 
lar interests  of  Japan,  primarily  in  Korea  and  secon- 
darily in  Manchuria,  are  vital,  as  they  are  essential 
for  her  own  life  and  development  as  a  nation.  The 
case  for  Russia  can,  perhaps,  never  be  understood 
until  her  political  issues  are  examined. 

Politically,  also,  the  interests  of  the  two  Powers 
are  found  to  be  directly  opposed  to  one  another. 
It  has  been  rightly  said  that  Manchuria  is  the  key- 
note of  the  Eastern  policy  of  Russia.  Besides  its 
immense  wealth  still  unexploited,  Manchuria  pos- 
sesses the  great  Port  Arthur,  which  is  the  only 
nearly  ice-free  naval  outlet  for  Russia  in  her  vast 
dominion  in  Asia,  while  the  1500  miles  of  the 
Manchurian  Railway,  together  with  the  Great  Sibe- 
rian Railway,  connect  this  important  naval  station 
with  the  army  bases  in  Siberia  and  European  Russia, 
so  that  Manchuria  alone  would  seem  to  be  politi- 
cally more  valuable  for  Russia  than  the  rest  of  her 
Asiatic    territories.    Without    Manchuria,    Russia 


INTRODUCTORY  49 

would  be  left  inclosed  in  the  ice-bound  Siberia, 
with  no  naval  or  commercial  outlet  during  nearly 
five  months  of  each  year.  With  Manchuria,  Russia's 
traditional  policy,  which  has  repeatedly  failed  since 
Peter  the^GreaL  onJtheJBaltic  Sea  and  other  Euro- 
pean waters,  as  also  on  the  Persian  Gulf,  —  the 
policy  of  becoming  the  dominant  naval  power  of 
the  world,  —  would  atjas^e^injbo  be  realized.  The 
very  importance  of  Manchuria  for  Russia,  however, 
constitutes  a  serious_  menace  to  Japan  and  to  the 
general  peace  j)f_ihe  Far  East.  In  the  first  place, 
the  Russian  control  of  Port  Arthur  gives  her  a  large 
measure  of  control  over  the  water  approaches  to 
Peking,  while  the  Mongolian  Railway  now  reported 
to  bean  contemplation  would  bring  Russian  land 
forces  directly  upon  the  capital  of  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire. The  very  integrity,  of  China  is  threatened, 
and  a  more  serious  disturbance  of  the  peace  of  the 
world  could  hardly  be  imagined  than  the  general 
partition  and  internal  outbreaks  in  China  which 
would  follow  the  fall  of  Peking  under  the  pressure 
of  Russia  from  Manchuria  and  Mongolia.  Not  less 
grave  is  the  fact  that  Manchuria  is  geographically 
and  historically  connected  with  the  Peninsula  of 
Korea,1  which  makes  Russia's  occupation  of  Korea 
a  necessary  adjunct  of  her  possession  of  Manchuria. 
Geographically  considered,  there  exists  no  abrupt 
change  from  the  eastern  part  of  Manchuria  to  the 

1  It  is  well  known  that  at  several  times  in  history  kingdoms 
have  been  built  which  extended  over  both  sides  of  the  present 
boundaries  between  Korea  and  Manchuria. 


50  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

northern  half  of  Korea/  which  fact  goes  far  to  ex- 
plain the  Russian  solicitude  to  obtain  railway  and 
other  concessions  between  the  frontier  and  Seul. 
Even  more  serious  conditions  exist  on  the  southern 
coast  of  Korea,  which  contains  the  magnificent  har- 
bor of  Masampo,  which  constitutes  the  Gibraltar 
between  the  Russian  fleets  at  the  ice-bound  and  re- 
mote Vladivostok  and  the  incommodious  and  not 
altogether  ice-free  Port  Arthur,  with  no  effective 
means  of  connecting  them.  By  controlling  this 
coast,  Russia  would  not  merely  possess  a  truly  ice- 
free,  and  the  best  naval  port  to  be  found  in  East 
Asia,2  but  also  at  last  feel  secure  in  Manchuria  and 

1  It  is  noticeable  that  the  Russian  diplomatic  historian  already 
referred  to  gives  as  a  reason  for  the  desirability  of  placing  Korea 
under  Russian  protection  the  need  of  safe-guarding  the  frontiers 
of  Russian  territories  adjacent  to  Korea.  — *  The  Dobun-kwai 
Hokoku,  No.  49,  p.  8. 

2  The  Bay  of  Masampo,  generally  so-called,  which  lies  be- 
tween the  Island  of  Koji  and  the  Korean  coast,  is  said  to  be  deep 
and  broad  enough  to  hold  the  largest  fleet,  sheltered  from  winds 
from  all  directions.  Several  islands  with  sufficiently  wide  pas- 
sages between  them  form  a  splendid  gate  to  the  bay,  while  the 
western  extremity  of  the  latter  may  be  walked  across,  when  the 
tide  is  low,  from  the  Koji  to  the  coast. 

As  to  the  Masampo  reach  or  inlet,  specifically,  which  is  the 
head  of  the  gulf,  "its  entrance,  five  cables  wide,  named  the  Gate, 
is  perfectly  free  from  dangers,  and  is  available  for  all  classes  of 
vessels.  On  either  side  are  treeless  hills,  bare  in  winter,  but  in 
summer  covered  with  grass;  these  hills,  near  the  entrance,  slope 
steeply  to  the  water's  edge.  The  general  depth  over  the  reach  is 
seven  fathoms,  but  it  shallows  gradually  as  the  town  of  Ma- 
sampo is  neared,  until  at  one  mile  from  the  town  the  depth  is 
four  fathoms.  .  .  .  Anchorage  may  be  had  anywhere  in  Ma- 
sampo reach,  according  to  draught;  a  depth  of  three  fathoms 
being  found  at  half  a  mile  from  the  town,  and  six  to  seven  fathoms 


INTRODUCTORY  51 

complete  her  Far  Eastern  design  of  absorbing  Korea 
and  China  and  pressing  down  toward  India.  If,  on 
the  contrary,  another  Power  should  control  Ma- 
sampo,  it  would  be  able  to  watch  the  movement  of  the 
Russian  fleets  in  their  attempts  to  unite  with  one  an- 
other, and  also  seriously  impede  the  greatest  hopes 
of  Russia's  Eastern  expansion.  Frt)m  Japan's  stand- 
point, the  Russian  occupation  of  this  section  of 
Korea  would  not  only  possibly  close  Korea  against 
her  trade  and  enterprise,  but  also  threaten  her  own 
integrity.  Only  fifty  miles  away  lie  the  Japanese 
islands  of  Tsushima,  which  Russia  has  always  cov- 
eted, and  which  would  have  been  hers  had  it  not 
been  for  the  shrewd  diplomacy  of  the  late  Count 
Katsu.1  From  Tsushima  the  mainland  of  Japan  is 
visible  on  the  eastern  horizon,  so  that  the  presence 
of  Russia  at  Masampo  would  arouse  in  the  heart  of 
Japan  the  most  profound  feeling  of  unrest.  Rus- 
sia must  have  Masampo,  and  Japan  must  not  lethejc 
have  it. 

In  concluding  our  discussion  of  the  vital  issues, 

at  two  miles  below  it."  —  The  Sailing  Directions  for  Japan, 
Korea,  and  Adjacent  Seas,  published  by  the  British  Admiralty, 
London,  1904,  pp.  114-115.  Masampo  is  the  best  but  not  the 
only  good  naval  harbor  on  the  southern  coast  of  Korea. 

1  In  1861,  when  some  Russian  marines  landed  here  and  took 
virtual  possession  of  the  islands,  Awa  Katsu,  who  was  then  one 
of  the  officers  appointed  by  the  Yedo  government  to  study  the 
possibility  of  organizing  military  forces  after  the  Western  model, 
succeeded  in  setting  the  British  Minister  against  the  Russian 
Minister  about  the  Tsushima  affair.  Russia  was  obliged  to  aban- 
don the  islands.  See  the  Katsu  Kaishu  (a life  of  Katsu),  Tokio, 
1899,  iii.  pp.  57-59. 


52  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

both  economical  and  political,  which  are  at  stake, 
it  would  seem  that  Manchuria  is  for  Japan  a  great 
market  as  well  as  an  increasingly  important  supply 
region  of  raw  and  food  products  and  a  field  for 
emigration,  while  for  Russia  it  is  the  keynote  of  her 
Eastern  policy,  and  economically  the  most  promising 
of  all  her  Asiatic  possessions.  On  the  other  hand, 
Korea  is  essential  for  Russia  for  the  completion  of 
her  Manchurian  policy,1  and  for  strengthening 
enormously  her  general  position  in  the  East.  For 
Japan,  Korea  is  nothing  short  of  one  half  of  her 
vitality.  By  the  opening  or  closing,  strength  or 
weakness,  independence  or  fall,  of  Korea,  would 
Japan's  fate  as  a  nation  be  decided.  On  the  con- 
trary, Russia,  with  Manchuria  and  ultimately  Korea 
in  her  hands,  would  be  able,  on  the  one  hand,  to 
build  up  under  her  exclusive  policy  a  naval  and 
commercial  influence  strong  enough  to  enable  her 
to  dominate  the  East,  and,  on  the  other,  to  cripple 
forever  Japan's  ambition  as  a  nation,  slowly  drive 
her  to  starvation  and  decay,  and  even  politically 
annex  her.  From  Japan's  point  of  view,  Korea  and 
China  must  be  left  open  freely  to  the  economic  en- 
terprise of  herself  and  others  alike,  and,  in  order 
to  effect  that  end,  they  must  remain  independent 
and  become  stronger  by  their  internal  development 
and  reform.2  Russia's  interests  are  intelligible,  as 

1  It  is  interesting  to  hear  that  Russian  school  text-books  enu- 
merate Korea  and  Manchuria  among  the  Russian  spheres  of 
influence.  —  A  letter  from  Tosuisei,  dated  St.  Petersburg,  Feb- 
ruary 13,  1900,  in  the  Kokumin,  April  1,  1900. 

a  It  is  remarkable  how  little  the  spirit  of  Japan's  policy,  which 


INTRODUCTORY  53 

are  Japan's,  but  unfortunately  their  desires  are  an- 
tagonistic to  each  other,  so  that  a  conflict  between 
an  open  and  an  exclusive  policy  is  rendered  inevita- 
ble. The  series  of  events  during  the  past  decades, 
particularly  since  1895,  which  we  shall  narrate  in 
this  volume,  has  only  served  to  bring  this  conflict 
into  a  sharp  clash  in  arms. 

In  closing,  it  may  not  be  entirely  out  of  place  to 
attempt  a  speculation  upon  the  significance  of  the 
conflict,  not  to  the  belligerents,  but  to  the  world 
at  large.  From  the  latter' s  point  of  view,  the  con- 
test may  fairly  be  regarded  as  a  dramatic  struggle 
between  two  civilizations,  old  and  new,  Russia  re- 
presenting the  old  civilization  and  Japan  the  new. 

the  writer  has  attempted  to  express  in  this  sentence,  is  under- 
stood among  the  people  here.  A  vast  majority  of  people,  not 
excluding  recognized  writers  and  speakers  on  the  East,  seem 
to  ascribe  to  Japan  certain  territorial  designs,  particularly  in 
Korea.  It  is  not  remembered  that  Japan  was  the  first  country  to 
recognize  the  independence  of  Korea,  the  cause  of  which  also 
cost  Japan  a  war  with  China.  The  present  war  with  Russia  is 
waged  largely  on  the  same  issue,  for  it  is  to  Japan's  vital  interest 
to  keep  Korea  independent.  From  this  it  hardly  follows  that 
Japan  should  occupy  Korea  in  order  not  to  allow  her  to  fall  into 
the  hands  of  another  Power.  If  Korea  is  really  unable  to  stand 
on  her  feet,  the  solution  of  the  difficulty  does  not,  in  Japan's 
view,  consist  in  possessing  her,  but  in  making  her  independence 
real  by  developing  her  resources  and  reorganizing  and  strength- 
ening her  national  institutions.  It  is  in  this  work  that  Japan's 
assistance  was  offered  and  accepted.  It  would  be  as  difficult  for 
any  impartial  student  not  to  see  the  need  of  such  assistance  as  to 
confuse  it  with  annexation.  It  would,  however,  be  entirely  legiti- 
mate to  regard  the  task  as  extremely  difficult  and  dangerously 
prone  to  abuse.    Further,  see  pp.  366  ff.,  below. 


64  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Two  dominant  features,  among  others,  seem  to 
characterize  the  opposition  of  the  contending  na- 
tions: namely,  first,  that  Russia's  economics  are 
essentially  agricultural,  while  those  of  Japan  are 
largely  and  increasingly  industrial ;  and,  secondly, 
that  Japan's  strength  lies  more  on  sea  than  on  land, 
while  Russia  represents  an  enormous  contiguous 
expansion  on  land.  It  is  evident  that  the  wealth  of 
a  nation  and  its  earning  capacity  cannot  grow  fast 
under  a  trade  system  under  which  it  imports  many 
and  exports  few  manufactures.1  The  commercial 
prosperity  of  Russia  depended  formerly  upon  its 
nearness,  first  to  the  trade  route  with  the  Levant, 

1  Russian  exports  for  1900-2  are  classified  as  follows  (1000 
rubles  as  unit) :  — 

Food-stuffs  Raw  material  Animals  Manufactures  Total 

1900....  381,174  269,806  17,902           19,553  688,435 

1901....  430,955  256,697  20,224            21,939  729,815 

1902....  526,189  258,267  21,558           19,263  825,277 

It  is  seen  that  the  exportation  of  food-stuffs  was  the  largest  in 
value  and  increasing,  while  that  of  manufactured  articles  was  the 
smallest  (2.5  per  cent.)  and,  to  say  the  least,  stationary.  Imports 
were  as  follows :  — 


Food-stuffs 

Raw  material 

Animals 

Manufactures 

Total 

1900....  79,844 
1901....  84,349 
1902....  81,409 

307,402 
288,107 
295,483 

1,136 
1,495 
1,403 

183,682 
158,993 
148,800 

572,064 
532,944 
527,095 

The  importation  of  manufactures  decreased,  but  also  that  of 
raw  material  did  not  increase,  while,  as  shown  above,  the  expor- 
tation of  manufactures  was  slight  and  stationary.  Figures  have 
been  taken  from  the  Tsusho  Isan  for  November  25, 1903,  which 
drew  them  from  Russian  official  sources. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  unfavorable  conditions  of  the  for- 
eign trade  of  Russia's  ally,  France,  in  U.  S.  Consul  AtwelPs 
report  in  the  daily  Consular  Reports  for  February  24, 1904  (No. 
1884),  who  quotes  from  Georges  Blondel. 


INTRODUCTORY  55 

and  then  to  the  free  cities  of  Germany,  bnt  with 
the  fall  of  Constantinople  and  the  decline  of  the 
Hansa  towns  the  business  activity  of  Southern  and 
Baltic  Russia  has  in  turn  passed  away.  Then,  from 
the  time  of  Ivan  the  Terrible,  she  unified  her  Euro- 
pean territory,  and  expanded  eastward  on  land, 
until  she  had  embraced  within  her  dominion  much 
of  Central  and  all  of  Northern  Asia.  For  such  an 
expansion  Russia  seems  to  have  been  particularly 
fitted,  for  her  primitive  economic  organization  suf- 
fers little  from  external  disturbances,  while  the  au- 
tocratic form  of  her  government  enables  her  to 
maintain  and  execute  her  traditional  policy  of  ex- 
pansion. But  the  real  importance  of  her  expansion 
appears  to  be  more  territorial  than  commercial,  for 
the  days  of  the  land  trade  with  the  Orient  are  num- 
bered. Even  the  great  Siberian  Railway  would  not 
successfully  divert  the  Eastern  trade  landward.1  If 
Russia  would  .be  prosperous,  she  must  control  the 
Eastern  sea  by  occupying  northeast  China  and 
Korea.  Here  she  comes  in  conflict  with  Japan,  the 
champion  in  the  East  of  the  rising  civilization. 
The  economic  centre  of  the  world  has  been  fast 
passing  to  America,  where  cotton,  wheat,  coal,  and 
iron  abound,  the  people  excel  in  energy  and  intelli- 
gence, and  the  government  is  servant  to  the  welfare 
and  progress  of  the  people.  Japan  has  joined  the 
circle  of  this  civilization,  ever  since  the  influence 
of  the  youthful  nation  of  America  was  extended 

1  See  the  Supplementary  Note  to  this  chapter  on  pages  61- 
64. 


66  THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

to  her  through  Commodore  Perry 1  and  TWnsend 
Harris,  and  the  spirit  of  national  progress  through 
industry  and  education  was  eagerly  adopted  by  her. 
To-day,  Japan  stands  within  the  range  of  the  inter- 
ests of  the  British  and  American  sea-power  over 
the  Pacific,  Atlantic,  and  Indian  oceans,  while  Rus- 
sia, on  the  other  hand,  represents  a  vast  expansion 
on  land. 

The  historical  bearing  of  the  effects  of  the  old 
civilization  to  the  world  may,  perhaps,  be  best  char- 
acterized by  the  one  word  —  unnatural.  Observe, 
first,  the  effect  of  the  policy  of  land  aggression  on 
the  internal  affairs  of  Russia.  The  policy  is  costly. 
Hence  the  great  incongruity  between  the  economics 
of  the  people,  which  are  agricultural,  and  the  finance 
of  her  government,  which  would  be  too  expensive 
even  for  the  most  highly  advanced  industrial  nation. 
Hence,  also,  it  is,  perhaps,  that  the  richer  and  more 
powerful  her  government  becomes,  the  poorer  and 
more  discontented  her  people  seem  to  grow.  Her 
administration  must  naturally  be  maintained  by  the 
suspicion  of  her  people  and  the  suppression  of  their 
freedom,2  and  the  suspicion  and  suppression  must 

1  Documents  of  that  time  clearly  indicate  that  the  discovery 
of  gold  in  California  and  the  westward  expansion  of  the  Ameri- 
can nation,  as  well  as  the  growing  prospects  of  the  China  trade 
and  the  increasing  application  of  steam  in  navigation,  were  the 
motives  which  prompted  the  United  States  Government  to  open 
negotiations  with  Japan  in  1853. 

2  To-day  there  seem  to  be  about  84,500  public  schools  in  Rus- 
sia, of  which  40,000  are  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Ministry  of 
Education  [compared  with  30,157  public  and  private  schools  in 
Japan  in  1902].  Toward  the  maintenance  of  the  40,000  schools, 


INTRODUCTORY  57 

become  more  exhaustive  as  the  disparity  widens 
between  rulers  and  ruled.1  Under  these  circum- 
stances, a  constitutional  regime  would  not  be  pos- 
sible, for  a  free  expression  of  the  popular  will 
would  be  hardly  compatible  with  a  form  of  govern- 
ment which  seeks  to  strengthen  the  state  at  the 
expense  of  the  nation.  Again,  consider  the  un- 
natural situation  of  an  agricultural  nation  competing 
in  the  world's  market  with  industrial,  trading  nations 
which  command  a  higher  and  more  effective  eco- 
nomic organization.  If  Russia  would  sell  her  goods, 
her  markets  abroad  must  be  created  and  maintained 
by  artificial  means : 2  protective  and  exclusive  mea- 

the  ministry  appropriates  only  about  $2,000,000,  or  a  little  over 
one  eighth  of  the  annual  cost.  The  teachers  number  172,000  [in 
Japan,  126,703,  in  1902],  and  pupils  and  students,  4,568,763  [in 
Japan  in  1902,  5,469,419].  7,250,000  children  of  school  age  are 
without  any  education  [while  in  Japan,  in  1902,  the  ratio  of  attend- 
ance to  the  number  of  children  of  school  age  was  95.80  per  cent, 
for  boys  and  87.00  per  cent,  for  girls,  or,  on  the  average,  91.57 
per  cent.].  See  the  U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports  for  February  8 
and  March  4,  1902  (Nos.  1871  and  1892),  [and  the  Kwampo, 
April  8,  1904]. 

1  As  an  evidence  for  this  striking  state  of  things  the  reader 
is  referred  to  Dr.  E.  J.  Dillon's  article  in  the  American  Review 
of  Reviews  for  October,  1904,  pp.  449-454.  The  whole  subject 
should  be  more  carefully  studied  than  it  seems  to  have  been 
thus  far. 

2  "  The  whole  northern  part  of  Asia  Minor,  according  to  the 
treaty  between  Russia  and  Turkey,  is  now  placed  under  such 
conditions  that  Russian  capitalists  have  the  area  open  to  them, 
to  the  exclusion  of  foreign  enterprise.  A  situation  analogous  is 
found  in  Persia,  where  the  entire  northern  portion  is  acknow- 
ledged to  be  under  the  exclusive  economic  influence  of  Russia." 
—  Consul  Greener  at  Vladivostok,  in  the  U.  S.  daily  Consular 
Reports,  April  22,  1903  (No.  1627). 


68  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

sures  must  be  pushed  to  such  an  extent  as  to  dis- 
tance all  foreign  competition,  the  interests  of  the 
consumer  must  be  disregarded/  and  those  of  the 
growing  industrial  nations  must  be  sacrificed,2  all 
for  the  sake  of  artificially  promoting  the  belated 
manufactures  in  Russia.3  From  this  unnatural  state 
of  things  would  seem  to  follow  the  Russian  policy 
of  territorial  occupation  and  commercial  exclusion 
in  the  East,  and  also  her  free  use  of  the  old-time 
intrigue  in  diplomacy ;  for  it  is  Russia's  fortune 
that  she  would  not  be  able  to  compete  freely  with 
the  new,  growing  civilization,  whose  open  arts  she 
cannot  employ  to  her  advantage,  but  to  whose  ad- 
vanced standard  of  international  morals  she  must 
appear  to  conform.    Her  position  forbids  her  to 

1  For  example,  the  normal  freight  per  ton  from  Russia  to 
Eastern  Siberia  would  be  about  twenty-one  rubles,  while  that 
from  Japan  or  Shanghai  is  three  or  four  rubles.  If  Russian 
goods  were  sold  to  the  artificial  exclusion  of  articles  exported 
from  nearer  countries,  the  consumer's  burden  would  be  greatly 
increased. 

2  Count  Cassini,  the  present  Russian  Ambassador  at  Wash- 
ington, wrote,  in  the  North  American  Review  for  May,  1904: 
"...  But  let  us  suppose  for  argument's  sake  that  Russia,  tri- 
umphant in  this  war,  finds  herself  dominant  in  Manchuria. 
Japan,  her  enemy,  could  look  for  no  favors;  she  could  not  ex- 
pect to  find  encouragement  for  the  importation  of  her  manufac- 
tures "  (p.  688). 

8  Continuing,  the  Count  stated :  "  But  Manchuria  would  re- 
quire many  things  that  Russia  could  not  supply,  or  supply  at 
figures  reasonable  enough  to  create  a  market.  In  Russia,  agricul- 
ture is,  comparatively  speaking,  more  important  than  manufac- 
turing, and  those  goods  which  are  made  in  my  country  are  not 
such  as  Manchuria  would  need.  Russia,  too,  would  be  obliged 
to  use  the  railway  with  its  high  freight  tariffs.  .  .  . "  —  Ibid. 


INTRODUCTORY  59 

have  recourse  to  an  open  policy  and  fair  play,  and 
yet  she  cannot  afford  to  overtly  uphold  the  opposite 
principles.1  On  the  other  hand,  the  new  civiliza- 
tion, represented  in  the  present  contest  by  Japan, 
relies  more  largely  upon  the  energy  and  resources 
of  the  individual  person,  whose  rights  it  respects, 
and  upon  an  upright  treatment  by  the  nations  of 
one  another. 

What  is  the  goal  of  the  warfare  of  these  two 
civilizations  ?  It  is,  it  may  be  said,  the  immensely 
rich  and  yet  undeveloped  North  China,  of  which 
Manchuria  is  a  part,  and  to  which  Korea  is  an  ap- 
pendix. Over  this  territory,  the  interests  of  Russia 
and  Japan  have  come  to  a  clear  and  sharp  clash, 
those  of  the  former  demanding  the  subjection  and 
closure  of  this  great  portion  of  the  earth's  surface, 
and  those  of  the  latter  imperatively  calling  for  its 
independence  and  progress. 

Whoever  wins,  the  issues  are  momentous.  If 
Russia  should  win,  not  only  Korea  and  Manchuria, 
but  also  Mongolia  would  be  either  annexed  by  Russia 
or  placed  under  her  protection,  and  Japan's  pro- 
gress would  be  checked  and  her  life  would  begin  to 
fail.  Russia  would  assume  a  commanding  position 
over  all  the  Powers  in  the  East,  while  the  trading 
nations  of  the  world  would  be  either  largely  or  com- 

1  One  can  seldom  find  a  more  outspoken  confession  of  a  di- 
plomacy consisting  of  a  series  of  deliberate  falsehoods  than  the 
chapters  on  the  Russian  relations  with  China,  Korea,  and  Japan, 
in  a  diplomatic  history  by  a  Russian  writer,  as  translated  in 
the  Dobun-kwai  Hokoku,  Nos.  45,  46,  48,  49,  and  50  (August, 
September,  November,  and  December,  1903,  and  January,  1904). 


60  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

pletely  excluded  from  an  important  economic  sec- 
tion of  Asia.  The  Siberian  railway  system  might  at 
last  be  made  to  pay,  and  Russia's  exclusive  policy 
would  enable  her  and  her  ally  France  to  divide 
the  profit  of  the  Eastern  trade  with  the  more 
active  industrial  nations.  The  old  civilization  would 
enjoy  an  artificial  revival,  under  the  influence  of 
which  China  and  Korea  would  be  exploited  by 
the  victors  and,  for  the  most  part/  closed  against 
reformatory  influences  from  abroad.  All  these  mo- 
mentous results  would  be  in  the  interest  of  an  ex- 
clusive policy  incorporating  principles  which  are 
generally  regarded  as  inimical  to  freedom  and  pro- 
gress. If,  on  the  contrary,  Japan  should  win,  the 
doubtful  importance  of  the  Siberian  Railroad  as  a 
carrier  of  the  Eastern  trade  would  in  the  mean  time 
be  further  overshadowed  by  the  Panama  Canal,  and 
it  would  be  compelled  to  perform  its  perhaps  proper 
function  of  developing  the  vast  resources  of  Siberia 
and  Manchuria.  The  Oriental  commerce  would  be 
equally  free  and  open  to  all ;  the  Empires  of  China 
and  Korea  would  not  only  remain  independent, 
but,  under  the  influence  of  the  new  civilization,  their 
enormous  resources  would  be  developed  and  their 
national  institutions  reformed,  the  immense  advan- 
tages of  which  would  be  enjoyed  by  all  the  nations 

1  The  Russian  diplomatic  historian  to  whom  frequent  refer- 
ence has  been  made  frankly  says  that  the  feebleness  and  internal 
disorder  of  China  are  welcome  conditions  for  the  expansion  of 
Russian  influence  in  the  Far  East,  and  that  it  would  be  the  height 
of  folly  to  displace  the  weak  China  with  a  colonial  possession  of  a 
European  power.  —  The  Dobun-lcwai  Hokoku,  No.  48,  p.  36. 


INTRODUCTORY  61 

which  are  interested  in  the  East.    There  would  nat- 
urally result  a  lasting  peace  in  the  East  and  the 
general  uplifting  of  one  third  of  the  human  race,  fa      / 
Japan's  growth  and  progress  after  the  war  would    ; 
be  even  more  remarkable  than  in  the  past.    In  short,   /.jLtjhi 
East  Asia  would  be  forcibly  brought  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  new  civilization,  the  effect  of  which  would 
not  be  without  a  profound  reaction  upon  Russia  ct/*l*L** 
herself.  Humanity  at  large,  including  the  Russians,  4M  Ol*\ 
would  thereby  be  the  gainer.    The  difference  in  the  v  JU 
effects  of  the  outcome  of  the  war,  according  to  who  \^ 
is  the  victor,  would  be  tremendous.    Which  will   * 
win,  the  old  civilization  or  the  new  ?   The  world  at 
this  moment  stands  at  the  parting  of  the  ways.  ^, 


SUPPLEMENTARY  NOTE 

ON  THE   SIBERIAN  RAILWAY1 


According  to  an  estimate  made  by  a  Russian  expert  of 
the  carrying  capacity  of  the  great  Siberian  railway  sys- 
tem,2 the  Siberian  section  alone  will  carry  at  least  190 
million  poods,  and  the  Manchurian  section  from  100  to 
150  million  poods,  making  a  total  of  300  to  350  million 
poods,  approximately.  It  is  contended,  however,  that, 
while  the  present  conditions  of  the  inhabitants  of  Siberia 
and  Manchuria  make  it  possible  for  the  railway  to  carry 
only  raw  and  crudely  manufactured  goods,  these  are  the 
very  articles  whose  cost  would  easily  be  raised  by  the 
long  distance  over  which  they  have  to  be  carried  by  rail. 
In  Europe,  it  never  pays  to  carry  these  articles  for  a 

1  See  p.  55,  note  1,  above. 

2  The  Shiberiya  oyobi  Manshu,  pp.  221-223. 


62  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

longer  distance  than  2000  miles.  Nor  would  it  in  Siberia, 
unless  abnormal  reductions  are  made  in  freight  rates,  or 
unless  commerce  and  manufacture  are  artificially  fostered 
in  Siberia  and  Manchuria.  It  is  supposed,  therefore,  that 
it  would  always  be  unprofitable  to  carry  bulky,  cheap 
goods  between  Europe  and  the  East  on  the  Siberian  Rail- 
way. China's  exports  to  Russia  consist  of  such  costly 
goods  as  teas  and  silks,  which  may  be  profitably  trans- 
ported by  rail,  but  thus  far  even  teas  have  only  begun  to 
be  so  transported  under  more  or  less  artificial  measures 
in  favor  of  the  railway  traffic  at  the  expense  of  the  routes 
through  Kiakhta,  up  the  Amur,  and  by  sea  to  Odessa. 
As  to  Russian  imports  into  China,  cotton  and  woolen 
goods  and  metals  would  never  be  carried  by  rail  under 
normal  circumstances.1  The  benefit  of  the  eight  thou- 
sand versts  of  the  railway  from  Moscow  to  Dalny  may 
be  safely  said  to  be  as  slight  to  the  carrying  trade  as  it  is 
great  to  the  travelers  and  postal  service  between  Europe 
and  the  East. 

The  statistics  for  1899  and  1900  show  that  the  bulk  of 
the  Russian  trade  with  China  was  carried  on  land,  but 
that  the  land  trade  was  decreasing  and  sea  trade  increas- 
ing.  See  the  following  table  (unit  1000  rubles) : 2  — 

Export  Import  Total  Ratio 

189g  jLand  7,522  30,007  37,520  74% 


looo: 


4  13,508  13,512  26 
(Land  6,678  29,779  36,457  69 
]Sea        24     16,166     16,190     31 


It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  period  covered 
by  the  table  is  not  only  too  short,  but  also  precedes  the 
opening  of  the  Manchurian  Railroad  to  trade,  which  took 
place  only  in  1903.  Nor  should  it  be  overlooked  that  the 
figures  indicate  the  China  trade  of  Russia  alone. 

1  The  Shiberiya  oijobi  Manshu,  pp.  223-225,  490-495. 

2  The  Tsusho  Isan,  July  8,  1903,  p.  4. 


INTRODUCTORY  63 

Regarding  the  European  trade  with  China  in  general, 
M.  Sorokin,  Assistant  Director  of  Customs  at  Niu-chwang, 
is  reported  to  have  remarked  that  the  freight  per  pood 
from  Europe  to  the  East  was  five  rubles  on  land  and  1.50 
on  sea.1  Certain  articles,  such  as  glassware,  tobacco,  and 
the  like,  seem  to  be  carried  from  Russia  to  China  at  two 
rubles  by  rail  and  one  ruble  by  ships.2  The  sea  route  con- 
sumes nearly  two  months,  but,  for  bulky  merchandise, 
it  would  be  impossible  for  the  railway  to  compete  with  it. 

It  is  interesting,  in  this  connection,  to  remember  that, 
from  America,  the  freight  between  San  Francisco  and  the 
Eastern  ports  has  been  reduced  repeatedly  during  the 
last  year,  owing  to  the  competition  among  the  shipping 
companies,  so  that  the  charge  for  flour  does  not  seem  to 
be  more  than  one  mill  per  ton-mile,  or  forty  cents  a 
hundred  pounds  for  8000  miles. 

During  1901,  according  to  the  latest  statistics  available, 
the  deficit  of  the  Ussuri  branch  of  the  Siberian  Railway 
is  said  to  have  amounted  to  $435,162,  and  that  of  the 
entire  railway  to  $11,330,000.8 

In  this  connection,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  this 
view  is  further  confirmed  by  no  less  authority  than 
Count  Cassini,  the  present  Russian  Minister  at  Wash- 
ington, who,  in  his  statement  given  on  April  9,  and  pub- 
lished in  the  North  American  Review  for  May,  1904,  said : 

"...  Consider  Russia's  position  commercially  toward 
Manchuria  with  that  of  the  United  States.  In  this  coun- 
try [the  United  States]  are  made  not  only  the  very  ma- 
terials that  would  find  a  sale  among  the  people  of  the 

1  The  New  York  Evening  Post,  January  20,  1903. 

2  The  U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports,  April  22,  1903  (No. 
1627). 

8  The  U.  S.  daily  Consular  Reports,  February  24,  1904  (No. 
1884). 


64  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

province,  but  with  American  goods  shipped  by  an  all- 
water  route,  the  cost  of  transportation  would  be  much 
lower  than  the  cost  of  carrying  on  the  all-land  routes  to 
which  Russia  would  be  confined.  Should  Russia  ship 
by  water  to  Manchuria  from  Odessa,  the  distance  would 
still  be  too  great  to  make  competition  with  the  United 
States  successful.  From  Moscow  to  Port  Arthur  the  dis- 
tance by  rail  is  5000  miles.  It  is  therefore  easy  to  realize 
the  privileged  position  of  the  United  States  in  competing 
over  an  all- water  route  from  the  Pacific  coast,  with 
Russia  over  an  all-rail  route."  * 

1  The  North  American  Review,  May,  1904,  p.  688. 


CHAPTER  I 

RETROCESSION  OF  THE  LIAO-TUNG  PENINSULA 

The  way  in  which  the  momentous  issues  already  dis- 
cussed in  the  introductory  chapter  have  been  at  work 
and  have  steadily  culminated  in  the  present  conflict 
is  with  unusual  clearness  and  in  the  most  instructive 
manner  illustrated  by  the  historic  events  which  led 
up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  study  of  these 
events  also  appears  essential  for  an  intelligent  un- 
derstanding of  the  situation,  for,  in  this  crisis,  as  in 
many  another  in  history,  the  contestants  do  not  seem 
to  be  always  conscious  of  even  the  more  important 
issues  at  stake,  while  the  events,  in  their  main  out- 
lines, are  patent  to  every  one.  The  former  may  be 
found  only  by  an  analysis  of  facts,  some  of  which 
are  obscure,  but  the  latter  are  narrated  dramatically, 
from  time  to  time  as  they  occur  or  are  published,  in 
the  press  and  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence,  so 
that  it  is  little  wonder  that  the  events  are  often 
taken  for  the  causes,  even  the  significance,  of  the 
supreme  fact  to  which  they  seem  to  point.  The  stu- 
dent should  investigate  the  issues  if  he  would  know 
the  meaning  of  the  war,  but,  if  he  wishes  to  see 
something  of  the  conscious  attitude  which  the  bel- 
ligerents take  toward  the  situation,  perhaps  no  more 
profitable  way  can  be  found  than  in  a  study  of  the 


66  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

events  through  which  the  issues  have  been  writing 
history. 

The  conflict  of  Russia  and  Japan  was  foreshad- 
owed already  in  the  middle  of  the  past  century, 
when  the  former  began  to  claim  some  of  the  Kurile 
Islands  and  the  whole  of  Sakhalien,  upon  parts  of 
which  Japan  had  long  exercised  vague  sovereign 
rights.1  Presently,  in  1858,  Muravieff  "  Amurski " 
succeeded  in  creating  a  common  proprietary  right 
with  China  over  the  vast  territory  lying  between  the 
Ussuri  River  and  the  sea.2  The  same  territory  was, 
only  two  years  later,  definitively  annexed 3  to  Russia 
through  the  skillful  diplomacy  of  Ignatieff,  Russian 
Minister  at  Peking,  who,  taking  advantage  of  China's 
defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  allied  forces  of  England 
and  France,  had  won  the  favor  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment by  acting  as  mediator  between  it  and  the 
allies.    The  Eastern  naval  headquarters  of  Russia, 

1  See  the  negotiations  of  1852, 1859,  and  1862,  and  the  treaties 
of  1855  and  1867,  between  Russia  and  Japan,  regarding  the  Ku- 
riles  and  Sakhalien.  The  To-A  Kwankei  Tokushu  Joyaku  Isan 
(a  collection  of  special  treaties  relating  to  Eastern  Asia,  compiled 
by  the  To-A  Dobun-kivai,  Tokio,  1904.  Cloth,  4°,  xiv  +  xii-f 
812  +  70;  hereafter  abbreviated  as  Tokushu  Joyaku),  pp.  1-8. 
This  work,  which  is  in  Japanese  and  Chinese,  is  by  far  the 
most  complete  collection  of  the  treaties  and  conventions  con- 
cluded between  Japan,  China,  and  Korea,  and  other  Powers. 
It  also  contains  historical  notes  explaining  the  origin  and 
nature  of  many  important  agreements. 

2  Treaty  of  Aigun,  May  16,  1858,  Article  I.— J6i&,  pp.  200- 
202  (Chinese)  ;  W.  F.  Mayers 's  Treaties  between  the  Empire  of 
China  and  Foreign  Powers,  3d  edition,  Shanghai,  1901,  p.  100 
(French). 

*  Treaty  of  Peking, November  14, 1860,  Article  I.— Tokushu 
Joyaku,  pp.  202-203  (Japanese)  ;  Mayers,  p.  105  (French). 


THE  LIAO-TUNG  PENINSULA  67 

which  had  been  transferred  from  Peterpavlofsk 
in  Kamchatka  to  Nicolaiefsk  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Amur,  was  now  again  moved  further  south  to  Vla- 
divostok, founded  in  1860,  at  the  southern  end  of 
the  new  territory.  No  sooner  did  the  remote  but 
certain  pressure  from  the  expanding  northern  Power 
begin  to  be  felt  in  Japan  than,  in  1861,  a  Russian 
man-of-war  took  possession  of  the  Japanese  islands 
of  Tsushima  in  the  Korean  straits,  from  which  it 
withdrew  only  at  the  instance  of  the  British  Min- 
ister, Sir  Rutherford  Alcock.1  Half  a  dozen  years 
after,  the  island  of  Sakhalien  was  placed  under 
a  common  possession  between  Russia  and  Japan, 
while,  in  1875,  the  island  was  surrendered  to  Rus- 
sia, Japan  receiving  in  return  the  chain  of  sterile 
Chishima  Islands  (the  Kuriles).2  This  brought  the 
presence  of  Russia  still  nearer  home  to  Japan  than 
before.  On  the  other  hand,  Russia  seemed  to  have 
only  begun  her  ambitious  career  in  Eastern  Asia, 
for  she  could  hardly  be  expected  to  be  forever  sat- 
isfied with  her  naval  headquarters  at  Vladivostok, 
a  station  which,  situated  as  it  was  at  the  southern 
extremity  of  her  Oriental  dominion,  was  so  com- 
pletely ice-bound  during  a  large  part  of  each  year 
that  her  fleet  was  obliged  to  winter  in  Japanese 
harbors. 

1  See  p.  51,  note  1,  above. 

2  See  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  5-14.  See  a  Russian  view  of  these 
affairs  in  the  Dobun-kwai,  No.  50  (January,  1904),  pp.  25-30. 
See  also  Z.  Nakamura,  Chishima  Karafuto  Shinryaku-shi  (his- 
tory of  Russian  aggression  in  the  Kuriles  and  Sakhalien), 
Tokio,  1904. 


68  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Then  followed  a  comparatively  long  period  of 
inactivity  on  the  part  of  Russia.  When,  however, 
in  1891,  she  finally  resolved  to  build  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway,  the  inadequacy  of  Vladivostok, 
not  only  as  the  Pacific  naval  harbor  of  the  Rus- 
sian Empire,  but  also  as  the  terminus  of  the  great 
railroad,  became  evident.  To  Russia  a  southern 
expansion  toward  an  ice-free  outlet  seemed  now  a 
necessity.  For  the  realization  of  this  desire,  an  op- 
portunity presented  itself  in  a  striking  form,  in 
1895,  at  the  end  of  the  Chinese- Japanese  war. 

In  order  to  obtain  a  clear  understanding  of  this 
situation,  it  is  necessary  to  return  to  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  and  thence  trace  the  evolution  of  Chi- 
nese diplomacy  up  to  their  close.  At  the  unex- 
pected dispatch  of  large  forces  by  Japan  to  Korea, 
in  June,  1894,  the  Chinese  Government  appealed 
to  some  foreign  Ministers  at  Peking  to  bring  pres- 
sure to  bear  upon  Japan  to  withdraw  her  troops 
from  the  Peninsula.  The  Russian  Minister  is  said 
to  have  observed  that  Russia  would  not  be  prepared 
to  organize  an  armed  coercion  until  Japan  endeav- 
ored to  exercise  actual  control  over  the  Korean 
Kingdom,  but  might  undertake  to  tender  friendly 
advice  to  Japan  to  withdraw.  England  was  reluc- 
tant, but  as  an  appeal  was  again  made  to  the  Powers, 
she  took  the  lead  in  persuading  others  to  join  in  a 
concert  to  stay  Japan's  hand  in  Korea,  The  plan 
was,  however,  frustrated  by  the  emphatic  refusal  of 
Germany  to  consider  it.  An  ineffectual  counsel  was 
then  made  to  Japan  by  a  few  of  the  Powers  indi- 


THE  LIAO-TUNG  PENINSULA  69 

vidually,  not  to  embark  upon  a  war  against  China.1 
A  war,  nevertheless,  ensued,  with  a  rare  success 
on  the  part  of  Japan.  During  the  course  of  hostili- 
ties, China  seems  to  have  more  than  once 2  avowed 
her  impotence  and  requested  the  Powers  to  inter- 
vene, until  her  repeated  reverses  on*  land  and  the 
well-nigh  complete  annihilation  of  her  northern 
squadron  brought  her  to  such  straits  that  the 
friendly  Powers  could  no  longer  remain  inactive. 
Japan  also  intimated  her  willingness  to  negotiate 
for  peace.  After  the  envoys  whom  China  had  sent 
with  insufficient  powers  had  been  twice  refused  by 
Japan,  Li  Hung-chang,  later  to  be  joined  by  his 
son-in-law,  Li  Ching-fang,  arriyed  with  plenary 
powers  at  Shimonoseki,  on  March  19,  1895,  where 
he  was  received  by  the  Japanese  Plenipotentiaries, 
Count  Ito,  Premier,  and  Viscount  Mutsu,  Foreign 
Minister.  It  appears,  however,  that  China  had  al- 
ready signified  to  certain  Powers  her  suspicion  that 
Japan  desired  the  cession  of  a  territory  on  the  Chi- 
nese mainland.  Before,  therefore,  Li  Hung-chang 
left  the  Chinese  shores,  the  German  Minister  at 
Tokio  was  instructed  by  his  government  to  warn 
the  Japanese  Foreign  Office  that  certain  Powers 
had  been  contemplating  assent  to  China's  appeal 
to  interfere,  and  that  the  demand  for  a  cession  of 
territory  on  the  continent  would  be  particularly 
calculated  to  provoke  such  an  intervention.3 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  78-79,  719. 

2  See,  for  instance,  the  London  Times,  November  7, 1894,  p.  5. 
8  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  79-80. 


70  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  negotia- 
tions were  opened  between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese 
Plenipotentiaries  on  March  20.  It  is  unnecessary 
here  to  recount  the  story  of  an  abortive  attempt 
made  on  Li's  life  by  a  fanatic,  and  of  the  conse- 
quent armistice  for  twenty  days.  At  Li's  recovery, 
the  Japanese  terms  for  peace  were  proposed  on 
April  1,  which  with  amendments  became  the  basis 
of  the  final  Treaty 1  signed  at  Shimonoseki  on 
April  17.  It  provided,  among  other  things,  for  the 
absolute  independence  of  Korea,  the  cession  to 
Japan  of  the  Liao-tung  Peninsula,  Formosa,  and 
the  Pescadores,  and  an  indemnity  of  two  hundred 
million  taels.  Of  the  ceded  territories,  the  Liao- 
tung  being  situated,  as  it  were,  in  a  position  to  hold 
a  key  at  once  to  Peking,  Manchuria,  and  Korea,  its 
cession  to  Japan  was  probably  calculated,  from  the 
latter's  point  of  view,  first,  to  render  any  renewed 
attempt  of  China  to  dominate  Korea  impossible, 
and,  secondly,  to  establish  an  effective  barrier^* 
against  the  southern  expansion  of  Russia.2 

Naturally,  the  progress  of  the  peace  negotiations 
had  been  watched  with  keen  interest  by  the  Euro- 
pean Powers.  Particularly  alert  was  Russia,  whose 
press  deprecated  so  early  as  March  31  the  alleged 
intention  of  Japan  to  secure  territory  on  the  main- 

1  For  the  text  of  this  treaty,  see  the  Treaties  and  Conventions 
between  the  Empire  o)  Japan  and  Other  Powers,  compiled  by  the 
Foreign  Office,  Tokio,  1899,  pp.  377  ff.;  Mayers,  pp.  181-184; 
U.  S.  54th  Congress,  1st  Session,  House  Documents,  vol.  i.  pp. 
200-203;  etc. 

2  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  43-45,  80. 


.       THE  LIAO-TUNG  PENINSULA  71 

land,  and  which,  as  soon  as  Li  Hung-chang  com- 
municated to  her  early  in  April  the  terms  proposed 
by  Japan  and  appealed  to  her  to  interfere,  discerned 
in  those  terms  a  great  turning-point  of  her  own 
career  in  the  East.  She  must  at  once  have  realized 
the  grave  danger  to  the  entire  future  of  her  Eastern 
policy  from  Japan's  occupation  of  the  Liao-tung 
Peninsula,  as  well  as  the  immense  advantages  which 
her  own  possession  of  the  same  territory  would  con- 
fer upon  herself.  Nor  did  the  Korean  independence, 
which  the  new  treaty  secured,  fail  to  be  interpreted 
by  the  Russian  press  as  an  exclusive  protectorate 
to  be  exercised  by  Japan  over  the  Kingdom.  "  Rus- 
sia," wrote  the  Novoe  Vremya  about  April  20, 
"  cannot  permit  the  protectorate  over  Korea  which 
Japan  has  secured  for  herself  by  the  conditions 
of  the  treaty.  If  the  single  port  of  Port  Arthur 
remain  in  possession  of  Japan,  Russia  will  severely 
suffer  in  the  material  interest  and  in  the  prestige  of 
a  Great  Power."  *  It  was  just  the  time  to  intervene. 
China  had  shown  herself  impotent,  and  had  appealed 
for  intervention,  and  Japan  was  an  exhausted  vic- 
tor. By  one  clever  stroke  Russia  might  coerce  the 
latter  and  ingratiate  herself  with  the  former.  She 
would,  however,  perhaps  have  thought  twice  before 
she  acted,  had  it  not  been  for  the  active  assist- 
ance rendered  to  her  by  France  and  Germany. 
At  a  council,  it  is  said,  Russian  naval  and  military 
authorities  concluded  that  Russia  alone  could  not 
successfully  combat  Japan,  which,  however,  might 
1  The  London  Times,  April  22,  1895,  p.  5. 


72  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

be  coerced  if  Kussia  cooperated  with  France.  An 
active  communication  of  views  now  ensued  between 
the  Foreign  Offices  of  St.  Petersburg,  Berlin,  Paris, 
and  London.  The  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the 
day  is  still  withheld  from  the  public  view,  but  it 
is  well-known  that  France  readily  acceded  to  the 
Russian  desire  for  a  joint  intervention,  and  Ger- 
many suddenly  changed  her  former  attitude  toward 
Japan  and  allied  herself  with  the  two  intervening 
Powers  ;  while  Great  Britain,  which  had  more  than 
once  acted  in  favor  of  China,  altered  her  course  to 
the  opposite  direction  by  declining  to  admit  that 
Japan's  terms  of  peace  were  prejudicial  to  her  own 
interests.  The  reasons  avowed  by  Germany  and 
France  for  their  assistance  to  Russia  would  seem  to 
be  rather  unconvincing,  unless  one  takes  for  granted 
the  existence  of  certain  unexpressed  motives  for  the 
act.  Germany  claimed  to  have  found  in  the  terms 
of  peace  a  future  menace  to  the  political  and  eco- 
nomical interests  of  Europe,  for  those  terms  "  would 
constitute  a  political  preponderance  of  Japan  over 
China,"  to  use  the  language  of  "  an  evidently  in- 
spired article  "  of  the  Cologne  Gazette,  "  and  would 
exercise  a  determining  influence  on  the  develop- 
ment of  China's  economic  condition,  and  of  the 
sway  of  Japan  in  that  country.  From  this  it  is  con- 
cluded that  Japan  is  endeavoring  to  post  herself  as 
a  sentry,  as  it  were,  before  all  the  chief  important 
routes  of  China.  As  Japan  commands,  by  Port 
Arthur  and  Wei-hai-Wei,  the  approach  to  the  Yel- 
low Sea,  and,  by  Formosa  and  the  Pescadores,  the 


THE  LIAO-TUNG  PENINSULA  73 

chief  commercial  route  to  China,  it  is  taken  to  be 
desirous  of  encircling  her  with  a  firm  girdle,  in 
order,  if  necessary,  to  seclude  her  completely 
from  the  world.  The  European  Powers,  therefore, 
wish  to  ward  off  in  time  any  steps  prejudicial  to 
their  interests." *  Nor  did  the  reasons  brought  for- 
ward by  France  seem  to  be  more  germane  to  her 
own  interests  than  those  of  Germany  were  to  hers. 
The  Debats  wrote,  on  April  31,  that  all  the  clauses 
on  the  occupation  of  continental  territory  were  im- 
possible for  Europe  to  recognize.  Moreover,  Port 
Arthur,  with  a  strip  of  territory  round  it  in  the 
hands  of  the  Japanese,  would  be  a  menace  for 
the  independence  of  Korea,  as  much  as  for  the 
security  of  Peking.  The  Temps  also  said  that 
Japan's  predominance  over  China,  which  would  be 
the  ultimate  result  of  the  arrangement,  was  "  a  con- 
stant menace  for  the  interests  of  Europe.  It  was  a 
serious  blow  dealt  at  the  rights  of  the  immediate 
adjacent  Powers.  ...  A  European  concert  was 
now  a  duty  toward  civilization.' '  Perhaps  it  is  safe 
to  say  that,  so  far  as  France  was  concerned,  her 
desire  to  oblige  her  political  ally  was  a  more  real 
ground  for  her  cooperation  with  the  latter  than  any 
other  presented  in  her  press.  As  for  Germany,  her 
Foreign  Minister  then  remarked,  it  is  said,  that 
Japan  had  never  requited  the  favors  Germany  had 
done  her  during  the  war,  but  had,  on  the  contrary, 
deliberately  concluded  with  China  a  treaty  contain- 
ing provisions  not  only  excessively  favorable  to 
1  The  London  Times,  April  22,  1895,  p.  5. 


74  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Japan,  but  also  prejudicial  to  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic interests  of  Europe.  This  remark,  again, 
hardly  explains  the  suddenly  changed  attitude  of 
Germany.  Perhaps  it  is  well  to  surmise  that  there 
existed  deeper  and  more  complex  diplomatic  reasons, 
upon  which  it  would  be  idle  here  to  speculate.  The 
declination  of  Great  Britain  to  join  in  the  concert 
may  more  easily  be  accounted  for.  China,  which 
she  had  at  first  favored,  had  not  only  been  inclin- 
ing toward  Russia,  but  had  shown  herself  by  her 
incompetency  less  worthy  of  trust  than  the  ambi- 
tious Japan.  The  latter  had  also  secured  in  the 
treaty  certain  commercial  and  industrial  privileges 
in  South  China  which  would  be  even  more  advan- 
tageous to  Great  Britain  than  to  Japan,  while,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  former  had  little  reason  to  sup- 
pose that  Japan's  retention  of  the  Liao-tung  was 
designed  to  imperil  China  and  Korea.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  presence  of  Japan  at  the  strategic  position 
on  the  mainland  might  prove  an  effective  check 
upon  Russia,  whose  cause  Great  Britain  was  the 
least  inclined  to  advocate.  She  therefore  stood 
aloof  from  the  joint  intervention,  and  her  conduct 
provoked  a  bitter  resentment  in  the  Russian  and 
French  press.1 

The  plan  of  intervention  seems  to  have  matured 
between  Russia,  France,  and  Germany  by  April  20, 
and,  on  April  23,  their  representatives  at  Tokio  sepa- 
rately presented  brief  notes  at  the  Foreign  Office. 
These  notes,  accompanied  as  they  were  by  the  verbal 
1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  81-82. 


THE  LIAO-TUNG  PENINSULA  75 

profession  of  each  of  the  Governments,  particularly 
the  German,  of  its  friendly  motive  in  the  act, 
intimated  that  Japan's  retention  of  the  territory  was 
considered  by  them  as  not  only  imperiling  the 
Chinese  Capital,  but  also  making  the  Korean  inde- 
pendence illusory,  and,  consequently,  prejudicial  to 
the  permanent  peace  of  the  Far  East.1  The  treaty 
of  Shimonoseki  had  been  signed  on  April  17,  and 
the  exchange  of  its  ratifications  fixed  for  May  8. 
The  Japanese  Government  had  to  answer  the  three 
Powers  within  the  fifteen  days  between  April  23 
and  May  8,  for,  whatever  its  decision  regarding  the 
Liao-tung,  it  would  be  unwise  to  postpone  the  rat- 
ification of  the  treaty  with  China.2  In  the  mean  time, 
the  Eastern  fleets  of  the  three  Powers  were  aug- 
mented and  concentrated,  and  made  ready,  if  need 
be,  for  an  immediate  and  concerted  action,  Russia 
going  even  so  far  as  to  prepare  the  army  contingents 
in  the  Amur  region  for  quick  mobilization.  Un- 
known as  it  was  how  thoroughly  the  Powers  were 
determined,  in  case  Japan  should  refuse  to  consider 
their  counsel,  to  appeal  to  force  of  arms,  none  the 
less  real  was  their  idea  of  coercion,  as  well  as  the 

1  The  German  note,  which  was  accompanied  by  a  Romanized 
translation  into  Japanese,  is  said  to  have  contained  a  statement 
to  the  effect  that  Japan  was  weak,  Germany  was  powerful,  and 
Japan  would  surely  be  defeated  in  case  she  should  go  to  war  with 
Germany.  This  peculiar  sentence  was,  at  the  protest  of  the 
Japanese  Foreign  Office,  expunged  from  the  note.  —  Tokushu 
Joyaku,  p.  86. 

1  To  the  last  moment  Russia,  it  is  said,  persisted  in  advising 
China  to  postpone  the  ratification. 


76  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

exhaustion  of  Japan's  resources.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  common  interests  of  Japan,  Great  Britain,  and 
the  United  States  had  not  developed  to  such  an 
extent  as  to  justify  their  united  resistance  against 
the  intervening  Powers.  Japan  seems  to  have  com- 
plied with  the  Powers'  wishes  so  far  as  to  agree  to 
retrocede  the  Liao-tung  save  the  small  peninsula  of 
Kin  chow  containing  Port  Arthur,  but  the  Powers 
declined  for  evident  reasons  to  accede  to  the  pro- 
posed compromise.  The  British  Foreign  Minister 
also  urged  Japan  to  make  to  the  susceptibilities  of 
Europe  all  concessions  compatible  with  her  dignity 
and  her  permanent  interests.1  The  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, after  holding  repeated  conference  before  the 
Throne  and  with  military  councilors,2  definitely 
resolved,  on  May  4,  to  relinquish,  for  an  additional 
monetary  consideration  from  China,3  all  of  the  Liao- 
tung.  Evidently  time  was  too  limited  and  the  oc- 
casion too  inopportune  for  Japan  successfully  to 
induce  China  to  pledge  not  to  alienate  in  the  future 
any  part  of  the  retroceded  territory  to  another 
Power.  On  May  10,  the  entire  nation  of  Japan  be- 
held with  deep  emotions  the  simultaneous  publica- 

1  The  London  Times,  May  3, 1895,  p.  5;  M.  de  Blowitz's  cor- 
respondence, dated  Paris,  May  2. 

2  The  declaration  made  in  November,  1903,  by  a  person  inti- 
mately associated  with  Marquis  Ito,  who  was  the  Premier  dur- 
ing the  war.  —  The  Kokumin  Shimbun,  November  10,  1903. 

8  Germany  is  said  to  have  undertaken,  when  her  note  was  pre- 
sented, to  guarantee  a  monetary  consideration  from  China.  By 
the  treaty  between  Japan  and  China,  concluded  on  September 
22,  the  sum  was  fixed  at  30,000,000  taels. 


THE  LIAO-TUNG  PENINSULA  77 

tion  of  the  treaty  of  Shimonoseki,  which  had  been 
ratified  in  its  original  form,  and  of  a  special  Impe- 
rial decree  countersigned  by  all  the  Ministers  of  the 
Cabinet,  announcing  that  a  desire  to  insure  a  per- 
manent repose  of  the  Orient  had  compelled  Japan 
to  •  go  to  war,  and  that  the  same  desire  had  now 
prompted  the  three  Powers  to  tender  to  Japan  their 
present  friendly  counsel,  which  the  Emperor,  for 

the  sake  of  peace,  had  accepted.1  

The  historical  significance  of  this  memorable  in- 
cident deserves  special  emphasis.  It  is  not  too  much 
to  say  that  with  it  Eastern  Asiatic  history  radically 
changedr4ts_£haracter,  for  it  marks  the  beginning 
of  a  new  era,  in  which  the  struggle  is  waged  no 
longer  among  the  Oriental  nations  themselves,  but 
between  sets  of  interests  and  principles  which  char- 
acterize human  progress  at  its  present  stage,  and 
which  are  represented  by  the  greatest  Powers  of  the 
world.  China's  position  as  a  dominant  exclusive 
force  was  no  sooner  overthrown  in  Korea  than  it 
was  replaced  by  that  of  another  power  of  a  like 
policy  and  with  aggressive  tendencies.  Moreover, 
the  area  opened  to  the  advance  of  Russia  covered 

1  Tokushu  JdyaJcu,  pp.  81-87.  As  has  been  said,  the  diplo- 
matic correspondence  of  the  day  has  not  been  published  by  any 
of  the  Powers  concerned.  The  information  briefly  given  in  the 
text  has  been  culled  from,  besides  Tokushu  Joyaku,  the  leading 
articles  of  the  Tokio  Nichi-Nichi  Shimbun  (Tokio  Daily  News) , 
a  semi-official  organ  of  the  Japanese  Government  at  the  time, 
as  quoted  in  the  Nisshin  Sen  Shi  (history  of  the  Japan-China 
war,  Tokio,  1894-5,  8  vols.),  vol.  viii.  pp.  141-171.  These  arti- 
cles give  a  minute  and  careful  account  of  the  diplomacy  of  the 
day,  and  may  largely  be  relied  upon  as  authentic. 


78  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

not  only  Korea,  but  also  Northern  China  and  be- 
yond, and  the  new  aggressor  was  the  very  power 
which  had  thirty  years  before  created  a  restless 
feeling  among  the  Japanese,  by  extending  toward 
them  through  Primorsk  and  Sakhalien  its  already 
enormous  contiguous  dominion.  The  influence  of 
Russia  was  now  brought  face  to  face  with  that  of 
Japan,  each  with  a  promise  to  extend  against,  and 
perhaps  to  clash  with,  the  other.  With  the  move- 
ment of  Russia  there  traveled  from  Europe  to  East 
Asia  her  sympathetic  relations  with  France,  while 
against  this  practical  alliance  stood  the  increasing 
common  interests  and  sympathies  of  Japan,  Great 
Britain,  and  the  United  States ;  Germany  remaining 
as  a  free  lance  between  the  two  groups  of  Powers. 
This  remarkable  accession,  in  both  area  and  agents, 
of  the  new  activity  in  the  East  was  heralded  in, 
to  all  appearance,  not  gradually,  but  with  a  sud- 
den sweep.  And  gravely  ominous  was  its  opening 
scene,  representing  at  once  a  pretended  good-will 
toward  a  feeble  empire  and  an  armed  coercion  of  a 
proud  nation  whom  coercion  would  only  stimulate 
to  greater  ambition. 

It  now  remains  for  us  to  interpret  the  effects 
wrought  upon  Japan  by  the  intervention  of  the 
three  Powers,  for  the  sentiment  of  the  nation  seems 
to  be  so  universally  and  persistently  misunderstood 
as  to  have  caused  even  some  of  the  natives  to  mis- 
construe their  own  feelings.  It  is  generally  supposed 
that  the  conduct  of  the  Powers  in  depriving  Japan 
of  her  prize  of  victory  excited  in  her  breast  a  deep 


THE  LIAO-TUNG  PENINSULA  79 

feeling  of  revenge,  but  this  view  seems  to  evince 
too  slight  an  understanding  of  the  characteristics 
of  the  nation.  Also,  the  prevailing  sense  of  pity 
manifested  by  friendly  foreigners  toward  Japan  for 
her  alleged  misfortune  appears  entirely  misplaced, 
for,  on  the  contrary,  she  has  derived  an  inestimable 
benefit  from  the  experience.  Let  us  explain.  The 
most  obvious  lesson  drawn  by  the  best  minds  of 
Japan,  and  unconsciously  but  deeply  shared  by  / 
the  entire  nation,  was  neither  that  the  Powers  were  \j 
acting  upon  a  principle  altogether  different  from 
their  professed  motive,  for  that  was  too  plain  to 
every  one ;  nor  that  she  must  some  day  humiliate 
the  very  Powers  which  had  brought  coercion  upon 
her,  because  it  was  well  known  that  their  self-in- 
terest had  demanded  it,  as  hers  would,  were  she  in^ 
their  place.  Japan  suddenly  awoke  to  an  absorbing 
desire  which  left  little  room  for  the  question  of 
national  revenge.  It  became  to  her  as  clear  as  day- 
light that  the  new  position  she  had  acquired  in  the 
Orient  by  her  victory  over  China  could  be  main- 
tained, and  even  her  independence  must  be  guarded, 
only  by  an  armament  powerful  enough  to  give  her 
a  voice  among  the  first  Powers  of  the  wrorld.  If 
she  would  not  retire  into  herself,  and  finally  cease 
to  exist,  she  must  compete  with  the  greatest  nations, 
not  only  in  the  arts  of  peace,1  but  also  in  those  of 

1  It  will  be  remembered  that  Japan  had  in  1894  revised  her 
treaties  with  the  Powers,  and  thereby  freed  herself  from  the  yoke 
of  consular  jurisdiction  and  placed  the  foreign  residents  within 
her  domain  under  the  jurisdiction  of  her  own  law,  and  also 
largely  restored  her  tariff  autonomy. 


80  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

war.  Moreover,  a  far  vaster  conflict  than  she  had 
ever  known  in  her  history,  excepting  the  Mongol 
invasion  of  the  thirteenth  century,  was  seen  to  be 
awaiting  her.  It  is  perhaps  characteristic  of  modern 
Japan  that  she  scarcely  has  time  to  breathe.  The 
only  course  to  save  her  seemed  to  be,  now  as  at  any 
other  recent  crisis  of  her  life,  to  go  forward  and 
become  equal  to  the  new,  expanding  situation.  As 
soon  as  her  supremacy  in  the  East  was  assured, 
Japan  thus  found  herself  confronted  with '  a  task 
hitherto  almost  unpremeditated,  and  henceforth  be- 
gan an  enormous  extension  of  her  military  forces,1 
as  Avell  as  a  redoubled  activity  in  all  other  lines  of 
national  progress.2 

1  The  position  which  the  military  and  naval  expenditures 
have  occupied  in  the  finance  of  the  Japanese  Government 
since  the  war  of  1894-5  may  be  gathered  from  the  following 
table  (unit,  1000  yen;  yen  =  49.8  cents) : — 

Total  revenue  Total  expendi-     *-™,,  „„«i  „« t>  <..    nt  t-u 

of  the  Govern-  tures  of  the       Army  and  navy    Ratio  of  the 

ment  Government       expenditures  last  two 

1894-51  ....  98,170  78,128  20,662  26.4% 

1895-6 1  ....118,432  85,317  23,536  27.6 

1896-7 *  ....187,019  168,856  73,248  43.4 

1897-8 1  ....226,390  223.678  110,542  49.3 

189S-91  ....220,054  219,757  112,427  51.1 

1899-19001....  254,254  254,165  114,212  44.9 

1900-1 1  ....295,854  292,750  133,113  45.4 

1901-2 1  ....274,359  266,856  102,360  38.3 

1902-3 2  ....297,341  289,226  85,768  29.7 

1903-48  ....251,681  244,752  71,368  31.7 

1904-5 3  ....229,855  223,181  69,433  31.1 

1  Settled  accounts.  2  Actual  account  on  October  31,  1903. 

3  Estimates  in  the  budget.     All  based  on  the  Fourth  Annual. 

2  To  take  only  a  few  tangible  instances,  Japan's  national 
budget  grew  more  than  three-fold  during  the  ten  years  before 
1903,  her  foreign  trade  in  1903  was  263^)  as  large  as  it  was  in 
1894,  her  private  companies  increased  from  less  than  3000 
in  1894  to  8600  in  1902,  with  a  corresponding  growth  of  their 


THE  LIAO-TUNG  PENINSULA  81 

What  is  less  obvious,  but  still  more  important, 
is  —  it  is  questionable  if  there  is  in  the  entire 
range  of  Japan's  national  life  another  point  less 
understood  abroad  but  more  essential  for  an  insight 
into  the  present  and  future  of  the  Extreme  Orient 
than  this — the  increased  enthusiasm  of  Japan  in 
her  ardent  effort  to  strengthen  her  position  in  the 
world  by  basing  her  international  conduct  upon 
the  fairest  and  best-tried  principles  of  human  pro- 
gress. The  effort  is  not  free  from  occasional  errors, 
but  the  large  issue  grows  ever  clearer  in  Japan's 
mind.  A  study  of  her  past  would  seem  to  convince 
one  with  overwhelming  evidence  that  her  historic  / 
training  has  produced  in  Japan  moral  and  material 
characteristics  eminently  fit  for  the  pursuit  of  such 
a  policy.  However  that  may  be,  the  subsequent 
evolution  of  her  interests  at  home  and  abroad 
seems,  by  a  fortunate  combination  of  circumstances, 
to  have  irrevocably  committed  her  to  this  course ; 
for  not  only  does  a  common  policy  along  these  lines 
draw  her  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations  closer  to- 
gether, but  it  is  therein  also  that  the  vital  promise 
of  her  future  seems  to  lie.1  And  it  may  be  added, 
the  consciousness  of  this  powerful  unity  of  moral 
and  material  life  seems  to  have  infused  a  thrilling 
new  force  into  that  historic  love  of  country  of  the 


authorized  capital  from  less  than  200  million  to  1,226.7  million 
yen,  and  her  population  itself  has  increased  perhaps  by  12$fe. 
A  decisive  development  has  also  taken  place  in  both  the  internal 
politics  and  the  international  relations  of  Japan. 
1  See  our  Introduction. 


82  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Japanese  nation.1  It  is  to  the  intervention  of  1895 
and  the  situation  that  ensued  that  Japan  owes  the 
hastening  of  all  these  results. 

1  An  attempt  has  been  universally  made  during  the  present 
war  to  explain  the  apparent  contempt  of  death  of  the  Japanese 
soldier  as  due  to  his  low  estimate  of  human  life,  or  else  to  his 
fatalistic  view  of  the  world.  It  may  be  seriously  doubted  whether 
these  explanations  are  tenable.  At  least  it  may  be  said  that  in  no 
other  case  would  the  sons  of  Japan  so  fearlessly  and  cheerfully 
face  death.  It  is  impossible  to  discover  in  them  a  less  fear  of 
death  than  in  other  nations.  Life  is  dear,  but  it  is  sacrificed  to  a 
cause  which  is  considered  higher  than  life.  It  was  the  primary 
lesson  in  the  education  of  the  samurai  to  choose  death  when  it 
saved  honor  and  when  life  was  selfish.  This  view  of  life  has  now 
been  transferred  from  the  narrow  sphere  of  the  individual  person 
or  fief  to  the  large  field  of  the  entire  nation,  whose  cause,  it  is 
believed,  represents  the  best  postulates  of  human  progress.  It 
would,  perhaps,  be  legitimate  to  criticise  the  incidental  abuse  of 
this  feeling,  or  to  question  whether  the  same  loyalty  might  not  be 
transferred  to  a  still  higher  region  than  the  state,  but  the  subject 
must  first  be  understood  by  the  critic. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  "CASSINI  CONVENTION"  AND  THE  RAILWAY 
AGREEMENT 

Regarded,  however,  from  a  broader  point  of  view, 
no  one  could  predict  a  happy  consequence  of  so 
ominous  a  beginning,  as  has  been  described,  of  the 
new  Eastern  situation.  By  her  successful  interven- 
tion, Russia  had  conferred  upon  China  a  signal 
favor,  for  which  a  reward  was  expected ;  but  the 
reward,  again,  assumed  such  a  form  that  it  at  the 
same  time  served  as  a  new  favor  looking  toward  a 
fresh  reward,  so  that  the  final  resultant  of  the 
repeated  process  proved  altogether  out  of  propor- 
tion to  the  initial  deed  of  patronage.  The  first 
step  of  this  process  was  a  4  per  cent,  loan l  to 
China  of  400,000,000  francs  at  94|,  and  pay- 
able in  thirty-six  years,  beginning  with  1896. 
Not  only  were  these  liberal  terms  attended  by  no 
security,  but  also  the  interest  was  guaranteed  by  a 
special  edict  of  the  Czar.2  The  loan  was  issued 
principally  from  Paris  in  July,  1895,3  and  the  in- 

1  See  Henri  Cordier,  Histoire  des  relations  de  la  Chine  avec 
les  puissances  occidentales,  1860-1902  (3  vols.),  vol.  iii  (Paris, 
1902),  pp.  305-306.  The  loan  contract,  dated  June  24,  1895, 
appears  in  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  660-667. 

2  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  667-668. 
8  Cf.  Art.  15  of  the  contract. 


84  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

come  was  intended  to  cover  one  half1  of  China's 
indemnity  to  Japan.2  In  order  to  facilitate  the  trans- 
actions in  connection  with  this  loan,  as  well  as  to 
promote  the  commercial  relations  between  Russia 
and  Eastern  Asia,  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  was 
organized  late  in  1895.  In  August,  1896,3  the 
Chinese  Government  was  induced  to  contribute 
5,000,000  taels  toward  the  capital  of  the  Bank, 
which  seem  to  have  been  paid  out  of  the  new  loan.4 
Later  in  the  same  year,  Prince  Ukhtomsky,  presi- 
dent of  the  Bank,  who  had  come  to  Peking  with  an 
immense  number  of  costly  presents  to  be  distributed 
among  the  members  of  the  Court,  succeeded  in 
securing  the  consent  of  the  Chinese  Government  to 
the  Statutes  of  the  Bank,  which  were  subsequently 
published  on  December  8.5    The  privileges  of  the 

1  The  other  half,  £16,000,000,  was  supplied  by  some 
British  and  German  subjects  by  the  contract  of  March  11, 1896, 
at  5J&  interest,  and  repayable  in  thirty-six  years.  Another 
.£16,000,000  loan  was  later  supplied  by  the  same  parties. —  To- 
kushu  Joyaku,  pp.  668-673. 

2  5,000,000  taels  were,  however,  as  will  be  seen  below,  used 
for  another  purpose. 

8  The  contract  dated  August  25,  1896. —  Tokushu  Joyaku, 
pp.  640-641. 

4  According  to  a  Peking  correspondent  to  the  Kokumin  (May 
30,  1904),  the  Chinese  Government  had  been  paying  the  stipu- 
lated 4>fo  interest  for  this  sum  to  the  French  creditors,  but  the 
Bank  had  never  repaid  the  interest  to  China.  Moreover,  the 
Niu-chwang  branch  of  the  Bank* since  the  Russians  occupied 
the  port  in  August,  1900,  had  been  receiving  the  returns  of  the 
Chinese  maritime  customs  there,  which  finally  amounted  to 
about  5,000,000  taels.  Neither  the  principal  nor  the  interest  of 
this  sum  had  been  paid  by  the  Bank  to  the  Chinese  Government. 

5  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  642-660. 


THE  CASSINI  CONVENTION  85 

institution  as  enumerated  in  these  Statutes  included 
the  receiving  of  tax  returns,  management  of  local 
finances,  coining,  payment  of  the  interests  of  the 
public  bonds,  and  construction  of  railways  and 
telegraph  lines  in  China,  in  so  far  as  concessions 
should  be  made  by  her  Government  to  the  Bank. 
The  latter  now  has  more  than  thirty  branches  and 
agencies  in  East  Asia,  and  this  professedly  private 
corporation  has  since  proved  to  be  a  great  instru- 
ment through  which  the  Russian  Government  has 
obtained  from  China  enormous  concessions  in 
Manchuria. 

Before  we  examine  the  nature  of  these  conces- 
sions, it  is  important  to  observe  what  took  place 
between  Russia  and  China  through  the  official 
channels.  On  March  27,  1896,  the  Eastern  world 
was  startled  to  see  the  publication  in  the  North 
China  Daily  News  of  a  treaty  of  defensive  alliance 
concluded  earlier  in  the  same  year  between  Russia 
and  China.  The  Japanese  Government  had  already, 
on  March  16,  been  assured  by  the  Foreign  Office 
at  St.  Petersburg  that  the  treaty  did  not  exist.1  It 
is  not  clear  whether  the  denial  referred  to  the  partic- 
ular treaty  in  question  or  to  any  treaty  of  alliance 
whatsoever.  However  that  may  be,  the  reported 
agreement 2  was  of  the  most  serious  character,  as  will 
be  gathered  from  the  following  abstract.  In  recog- 
nition of  the  service  rendered  by  Russia  regarding 
the  matter  of  the  Liao-tung  Peninsula  and  of  the 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  p.  231. 

2  The  Japanese  text  appears  in  ibid.,  pp.  231-234 


86  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

loan,  the  Chinese  Emperor  desired  to  conclude  with 
Russia  a  treaty  of  alliance ;  and,  consequently,  it 
was  agreed,  in  secrecy,  that,  if  Russia  should  come 
in  conflict  with  other  Asiatic  Powers,  she  should  be 
allowed  to  make  free  use  of  any  port  or  harbor  on 
the  Chinese  coast,  and,  in  case  of  urgent  need,  levy 
troops  from  among  the  Chinese  people.  If  a  protest 
should  be  made  by  other  Powers,  China  should 
answer  that  she  was  powerless  to  resist  Russian 
demands.  If  she  should  desire  even  to  render  active 
assistance  to  Russia  against  the  common  enemy,  she 
might  do  so,  but  this  point  required  further  discus- 
sion. In  view  of  the  great  disadvantages  of  the  ice- 
bound naval  harbors  of  Russia,  China  agreed  to 
allow  her  in  time  of  peace  a  free  use  of  Port  Arthur, 
or,  if  the  other  Powers  should  object,  of  Kiao-chau. 
If  the  latter  should  be  found  inadequate,  Russia 
might  choose  any  harbor  on  the  coast  of  Kiang-su 
and  Che-kiang.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  China  should 
be  at  war  with  another  Power,  Russia  should  en- 
deavor to  effect  a  compromise  between  the  belliger- 
ents, and,  if  the  effort  should  fail,  it  should  be  the 
duty  of  Russia  openly  to  assist  China  and  thereby 
strengthen  the  alliance  between  the  two  Powers.  In 
regard  to  Manchuria,  Russian  military  officers  should 
be  free  to  travel  along  the  eastern  frontiers  of  the 
Sheng-king  and  Kirin  Provinces  and  to  navigate 
the  Yalu  and  other  rivers,  the  object  being  either  to 
further  trade  or  to  patrol  the  frontiers.  When  the 
Siberian  Railway  was  completed,  a  branch  line  might 
be  constructed  under  the  joint  control  of  China  and 


THE  CASSINI  CONVENTION  87 

Russia,  passing  through  the  Provinces  of  Heilung 
and  Kirin,  and  reaching  Ta-lien  or  some  other  place 
selected  by  Kussia.  In  order  to  protect  this  line, 
Russia  might  possess  near  Talien-wan  an  island  and 
the  opposite  shore,  fortify  them,  and  station  there 
her  squadron  and  military  forces.  If  a  war  should 
arise  between  Russia  and  Japan  concerning  Korea, 
China  should  allow  Russia  to  send  her  troops  toward 
the  Yalu,  so  as  to  enable  them  to  attack  the  west- 
ern boundary  of  Korea. 

No  matter  whether  any  treaty  of  alliance  had 
been  signed  between  China  and  Russia  early  in 
1896,  significant  events  soon  followed  which  gave 
rise  to  rumors  of  grave  import.  When  it  was  re- 
solved by  China  to  send  Wang  Tsz-chun  to  St. 
Petersburg  as  special  envoy  to  attencTtEe  corona- 
tion of  the  Czar,  which  was  to  take  place  in  May 
of  the  same  year,  M.  Cassini,  Russian  Minister  at 
Peking,  is  said  to  have  intimated  that  no  one  but 
Li  Hung-chang  was  acceptable  to  Russia  as  the 
representative  of  the  Chinese  Emperor.  Li's  pro- 
Russian  proclivities  had  been  well  known,  but  he 
had  up  to  this  time  been  in  disgrace  for  having 
concluded  the  treaty  of  Shimonoseki  so  unfavora- 
ble to  China.  He  now  regained  his  favor  with  the 
Court,  and  started  on  his  mission  to  Russia,  pre- 
sumably taking  with  him  the  draft  of  the  Russo- 
Chinese  convention  which  M.  Cassini  had  framed. 
The  convention  is  reported  to  have  been  signed, 
to  avoid  suspicion  of  other  Powers,  not  at  St. 
Petersburg,  but  at  Moscow,  and,  on  the  Russian 


88  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

side,  not  by  M.  Lobanoff,  Foreign  Minister,  but  by 
M.  Witte,  Minister  of  Finance.  When,  however, 
the  agreement  was  referred  to  the  Yamen  at  Pe- 
king for  ratification,  a  large  majority  of  the  Chinese 
Ministers  are  said  to  have  disapproved  the  terms  of 
Li's  treaty,  until  the  strenuous  efforts  of  M.  Cassini 
turned  the  tide  and  the  convention  was  ratified  by 
the  Emperor  on  September  30,  1896.  This  is  the 
celebrated  "  Cassini  Convention." 1  Let  us  now  ex- 
amine the  more  important  of  its  contents.  The  pre- 
amble explicitly  referred,  as  also  did  the  treaty  of 
alliance  already  summarized,  to  the  favors  done  to 
China  by  Russia  at  the  close  of  the  recent  war. 
The  body  of  the  convention  falls,  in  its  substance, 
into  two  large  divisions,  namely,  the  Articles  (1-6) 
relating  to  railway  concessions  in  Manchuria,  and 
those  (8-11)  in  regard  to  the  disposition  of  certain 
ports  on  the  Chinese  littoral.  Russia  was  allowed 
to  extend  the  Siberian  Railway  to  Vladivostok 
across  Manchuria  via  Aigun,  Tsitsihar,  Petuna, 
Kirin,  and  Kun-chun  (Art.  1).  As  regards  the  pro- 
jected Chinese  railroad  between  Shan-hai-kwan  and 
Mukden,  if  China  should  find  it  inconvenient  to 
build  it,  Russia  might  furnish  capital  and  construct 
the  line,  China  reserving  to  herself  the  option  of 
buying  it  after  ten  years  of  Russian  management 
(Art.  2).  Another  Chinese  line  in  contemplation 
between  Shan-hai-kwan  and  Port  Arthur  and  Ta- 
lien-wan  via  Niu-chwang,  and  its  appurtenances, 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  234-236.   A   French   translation   is 
found  in  Cordier,  Histoire,  vol.  iii.  pp.  343-347. 


COUNT  CASSINI 
Russian  Minister  at  Washington,  and  formerly  at  Peking 


THE   CASSINI  CONVENTION  89 

should  be  built  in  accordance  with  the  general  rail- 
way regulations  of  Russia  (Art.  4).  The  fifth  Ar- 
ticle was  striking  :  All  the  railways  built  by  Kussia 
in  the  Chinese  territory  were  to  be  protected  by 
the  local  Chinese  authorities,  but  in  the  more  re- 
mote regions,  where  the  necessary  protection  was 
not  available,  Russia  was  allowed,  in  order  to  afford 
a  better  protection  to  her  railroad  and  property,  to 
station  special  battalions  of  Russian  infantry  and 
cavalry.  Regarding  the  ports,  it  was  agreed  that 
Russia  might  lease  Kiao-chau  for  fifteen  years  for 
the  use  of  her  squadron,  but,  in  order  to  avoid  sus- 
picion by  other  Powers,  she  should  not  immediately 
occupy  the  harbor  or  seize  the  points  commanding 
it  (Art.  9).  In  view  of  the  strategic  importance  of 
Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan  and  their  adjacent  ter- 
ritories, China  should  in  haste  provide  for  their 
adequate  defense  and  repair  their  fortification,  and 
Russia  should  render  all  necessary  aid  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  two  harbors,  and  should  not  allow 
any  other  Power  to  attack  them;  if,  for  urgent 
necessity,  Russia  should  engage  in  a  war,  China 
should  allow  her,  to  enable  her  to  attack  the  en- 
emy and  defend  her  own  position  with  greater 
ease,  temporarily  to  concentrate  her  military  and 
naval  forces  in  those  harbors  (Art.  10).  So  long, 
however,  as  Russia  was  not  involved  in  hostilities, 
China  should  retain  all  rights  in  the  control  of 
Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan,  and  Russia  should 
not  interfere  with  them  in  any  manner  (Art.  11). 
In  addition  to  these  Articles,  it  was  provided  that, 


v 


90  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

if  China  should  desire  to  reorganize  the  entire 
army  of  Manchuria  on  the  European  basis,  she 
should  engage  the  services  of  Russian  military  in- 
structors (Art.  8).  In  the  matter  of  mining,  Rus- 
sian and  Chinese  subjects  might,  with  the  consent 
of  local  authorities,  work  all  kinds  of  minerals  in 
the  Heilung  and  Kirin  Provinces,  and  in  the  Long 
White  Mountains  (Art.  7). 

Such  are  the  contents,  in  brief,  of  the  much  de- 
bated "  Cassini  Convention,"  the  existence  of  which 
has  been  as  often  alleged  as  denied.  The  reported 
document  may  well  be  unauthentic,  at  any  rate  in 
several  important  particulars.  Its  main  interest  con- 
sists, however,  not  so  much  in  the  question  of  its 
literal  authenticity,  as  in  the  important  facts,  (1) 
that  the  subsequent  course  of  events  is  largely  fore- 
shadowed in  its  contents,  and  (2)  that  high  Russian 
authorities  have  obtained,  or  at  least  claimed,  cer- 
tain privileges  which  cannot  be  found  in  all  the 
other  Russo-Chinese  contracts  that  are  known  to 
us,  but  are  in  one  way  or  another  reflected  in  the 
present  convention.  The  universal  belief  in  the 
diplomatic  world  appears  to  be  that,  if  the  published 
text  of  the  Cassini  Convention  is  untrustworthy, 
some  of  its  substance  must  have  been  contained  in 
an  agreement  which  Li  Hung-chang  signed  in  Rus- 
sia in  1895,  and  in  some  later  secret  agreements. 
Nor  is  it  impossible  to  substantiate  this  belief  from 
evidence  of  undoubted  authenticity.  Thus  M.  Pav- 
loff,  the  Russian  Charge  tf  Affaires  at  Peking, 
said,  on  October  8,  1897,  to  Sir  Claude  MacDonald, 


THE  CASSINI  CONVENTION  91 

the  British  Minister,  that  "  shortly  after  the  return 
of  Li  Hung-chang  from  his  mission  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, the  Chinese  Government  had  informed  the 
Russian  Minister  that  they  had  no  intention  of 
continuing  the  Northern  line  [beyond  Shan-hai- 
kwan  toward  Kirin],  but  if  at  any  time  they  did 
continue  it,  owing  to  the  particularly  friendly  rela- 
tions existing  between  the  Russian  and  Chinese  Gov- 
ernments, they  would  in  the  first  instance  address 
themselves  to  Russian  engineers  and  employ,  if 
necessary,  Russian  capital.' ' *  It  will  at  once  be  ob- 
served that  this  closely  corresponds  to  Article  3  of 
the  Cassini  Convention.  On  this  ground,  M.  Pav- 
loff  considered  it  a  "contravention  of  the  agree- 
ment " 2  on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  Government 
that  the  latter  allowed  British  subjects,  on  June  7, 
1898,  to  furnish  capital  and  the  chief  engineer  for 
the  extension  of  the  Northern  line,  and,  repeatedly 
and  in  a  manner  highly  irritating  to  the  British  and 
Chinese  Governments,  demanded  the  replacement 
of  Mr.  Kinder  and  his  staff  with  Russian  engi- 
neers.3 It  was  again  in  the  same  spirit  that  Russia 
succeeded  in  inducing  England  to  insert  in  the  ad- 

1  The  British  Parliamentary  Papers,  China,  No.  1  (1898), 
Dispatch  No.  14,  pp.  5-6.  Cf.  China,  No.  2  (1899),  No.  2,  in 
which  M.  Pavloff  claims  to  have  secured  in  December,  1897,  a 
repetition  of  this  pledge. 

2  See  China,  No.  2  (1904),  Nos.  28-29,  modified  Article  12. 
Sir  Ernest  Satow,  however,  denied  that  any  such  agreement 
existed.  See  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  30,  March  19, 1901. 

8  See  China,  No.  1  (1898),  Nos.  13,  38,  26,  43,  111,  113, 115, 
117,  121;  China,  No.  2  (1899),  Nos.  2,  9,  10,  52,  65;  China, 
No.  1  (1900),  No.  321. 


92  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

ditional  clauses  of  the  Anglo-Russian  railway  agree- 
ment of  April  28,  1899,  a  statement  to  the  effect 
that  the  Russians  might  extend  the  Manchurian 
Railway  in  a  southwesterly  direction  through  the 
region  traversed  by  the  Northern  Chinese  line  built 
with  British  capital,1  Count  Muravieff  explaining 
that  M.  Witte  attached  importance  to  the  inser- 
tion of  this  clause.2  Well  he  might,  for  no  sooner 
was  the  Agreement  concluded  than  Russia  pressed 
China,  though  without  success,  for,  the  concession 
for  a  railway  reaching  directly  to  Peking  itself.3 
Again,  if  the  provision  in  the  Cassini  Convention 
that  China  should  with  all  haste  repair  the  fortifica- 
tion of  Port  Arthur,  with  the  assistance  of  Russia, 
and,  in  case  of  necessity,  turn  it  over  to  the  use  of 
the  latter' s  fleet  (Art.  10),  was  false,  it  was  not  long 
before  Count  Muravieff  could  declare,  in  December, 
1897,  that  an  "  offer  "  had  been  made  by  the  Chinese 
Government  to  allow  the  Russian  squadron  to  winter 
at  the  port.4  More  significant  still  was  M.  Pavloff's 
remark  to  Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  that "  he  must  tell 
him  frankly  that  the  Russian  Government  intended 
that  the  provinces  of  China  bordering  on  the  Rus- 
sian frontier  must  not  come  under  the  influence  of 
any  nation  except  Russia." 5   Sir  Claude  pointed  out 


1  China,  No.  2  (1899),  No.  138. 

2  China,  No.  1  (1900),  No.  148. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  112,  116,  120,  132,  160,  180,  214-215. 

4  China,  No.  1  (1898),  Dispatch  No.  37,  pp.  12-13,  Goschen 
to  Salisbury. 

6  China,  No.  1  (1896),  p.  6,  Conversation  on  October  18, 
1897. 


THE  CASSINI  CONVENTION  93 

that  Kirin,  the  probable  terminus  of  the  extension 
line,  to  which  M.  Pavloff  had  objected,  was  more 
than  two  hundred  miles  from  the  Russian  frontier, 
but  the  Charge  had  evidently  marked  out  the  entire 
Manchurian  provinces  as  a  Russian  sphere  of  influ- 
ence. It  may  be  said  that  this  claim  even  exceeded 
the  Cassini  Convention  and  verged  to  the  less  trust- 
worthy treaty  of  alliance.  The  attention  of  the 
reader  may,  however,  be  called  to  a  still  more  direct 
evidence  than  the  veiled  remarks  of  M.  Pavloff.  In 
the  official  statement  accompanying  the  text  of  the 
Russo-Chinese  Convention  of  April  8,  1902,  which 
was  published  in  the  Official  Messenger  of  April 
12,  occur  the  following  words  :  "  The  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment, on  their  side,  confirm  all  the  obligations 
they  have  previously  undertaken  toward  Russia, 
and  particularly  the  provisions  of  the  1896  agree- 
ment, which  must  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  friendly 
relations  of  the  neighboring  Empires.  By  this 
defensive  agreement,  Russia  undertook  in  1896 
to  maintain  the  principle  of  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  China,  who,  on  her  side,  gave  Russia 
the  right  to  construct  a  line  through  Manchuria, 
and  to  enjoy  the  material  privileges  which  are  di- 
rectly connected  with  the  above  undertaking."  1  It 
is  impossible  to  find  any  one  contract  concluded  in 
1896  which  either  might  be  considered  a  "  defensive 
agreement "  or  contains  the  points  enumerated  in 
the  quoted  passage.  The  so-called  Cassini  Conven- 
tion alone  contains  the  provisions  about  the  railway, 
1  See  Tohushu  Joyaku,  pp.  274-275. 


94  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

as  well  as  Articles  9  and  10,  which  may  be  said  to 
"  maintain  the  principle  of  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  China."  f  The  coincidence  becomes 
even  more  striking  when  we  consider,  together  with 
the  Convention,  the  reported  treaty  of  defensive 
alliance  of  1896,  which  may  be  regarded,  if  any, 
the  preliminary  plan  of  the  Convention.  It  is  also 
interesting  to  note  that  when  Dr.  George  Morrison, 
the  noted  Peking  correspondent  of  the  Times,  had 
an  interview  with  Prince  Ching  on  March  19, 1901, 
and  directly  referred  to  the  supposed  existence  of 
a  series  of  secret  agreements  between  Russia  and 
China,  beginning  with  the  one  which  Li  Hung- 
chang  negotiated  during  his  mission  in  St.  Peters- 
burg, the  Prince  "  assented  without  the  slightest 
demur."  2  Finally,  we  are  in  possession  of  a  vague 
statement  made  by  Count  Cassini  himself,  who,  in 
1904,  referred  to  the  treaty  "  giving  to  Russia  rail- 
road and  other  concessions  in  Manchuria,"  which, 
said  he,  "  I  had  the  honor  to  negotiate  [at  Peking] 

1  See  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  274-275. 

2  The  Times,  March  20,  1901,  p.  5.  This  evidence,  however, 
cannot  for  a  moment  be  considered  equivalent  to  the  others 
which  have  been  cited.  Not  only  is  it  silent  about  the  contents  of 
the  agreements,  but  also  the  "assent"  of  the  Prince  may  be  due 
to  some  misunderstanding.  In  the  same  article,  Dr.  Morrison 
goes  on  to  say :  "I  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  original  Rus- 
sian draft  promised  China  protection  only  against  Japan,  but 
was  modified  at  the  request  of  the  Chinese  to  include  protec- 
tion against  aggression  by  all  foreign  Powers.  China  invoked  its 
provisions  after  Germany  seized  Kiao-chau,  but  Russia  turned  a 
deaf  ear."  This  statement  is  again  as  vague  as  the  reported  text 
of  the  treaty  of  alliance  of  1896.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the 
writer  did  not  explicitly  state  his  "reason." 


THE  CASSINI  CONVENTION  95 

in  behalf  of  my  Sovereign." *  The  agreement  of 
September  8,  1896,  to  which  we  shall  presently 
turn,  "giving  railway  and  other  concessions  in 
Manchuria,"  was  concluded  between  the  Chinese 
Minister  at  St.  Petersburg  and  the  Russo-Chinese 
Bank,  and,  unless  Count  Cassini  negotiated  it  at 
Peking  at  the  same  time  that  the  Chinese  Minister 
did  at  the  Russian  capital,  it  may  be  inferred  that 
the  former,  in  his  quoted  statement,  referred  to  a 
"  Cassini  Convention."  It  is  not  at  all  impossible, 
however,  that  both  he  in  China  and  Mr.  Hu  in  Rus- 
sia took  part  in  the  negotiations  which  resulted  in 
the  conclusion  of  the  agreement  of  September  8, 
1896. 

Taking  all  these  indications  together,  it  seems 
almost  safe  to  aver  that  at  least  two  important 
items  of  concessions  —  namely,  railway  grants  and 
the  use  of  some  ports  for  strategic  purposes  —  must 
in  some  form  have  been  secured  by  Russia  after 
1896,  and  before  the  actual  lease  of  Port  Arthur 
and  Talien-wan  in  1898.  It  is  needless  to  say  that 
these  two  objects,  railways  and  ports,  possessed  a 
political  meaning  of  the  greatest  moment,  the  ports 
affording  the  Russian  navy  a  commanding  point  on 
the  Pacific  coast,  and  the  railways  ultimately  con- 
necting that  point  with  the  army  bases  in  Siberia 
and  European  Russia. 

Of  these  two  items,  it  was  the  railways  that  first 
emerged  from  the  state  of  a  preliminary  to  that  of 
a  final  agreement  between  Russia  and  China.  And 
1  The  North  American  Review  for  May,  1904,  p.  683. 


* 


96  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

it  was  here  that  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  played  a 
great  role  for  the  Russian  Government,  for  the 
Agreement  of  August  27  (September  8),  1896,1  pro- 
viding for  the  construction  by  the  Russians  of  a 
railway  through  Manchuria  connecting  the  Trans- 
Baikal  and  South  Ussuri  lines  of  the  Siberian  rail- 
way system,  was  concluded  between  the  Chinese 
Minister  at  St.  Petersburg  and  the  Bank.  The  lat- 
ter undertook  to  organize  the  Eastern  Chinese2 
Railway  Company  with  its  accounts  separate  from 
those  of  the  Bank  (Art.  1).  It  is  instructive  to  note 
that  it  is  stated  in  the  preamble  of  this  Agreement 
that  the  Chinese  Government  "intrusted"3  the 
Bank  to  undertake  the  construction  of  the  line,  and 
that  the  government  agreed  to  contribute  5,000,000 
taels  toward  the  capital  of  the  Company.4    The 

1  Tokushu  Jbyalcu,  pp.  495-498  (a  Japanese  translation).  The 
present  writer  is  also  in  possession  of  the  Chinese  text.  He  is  not 
aware  that  its  European  translation  has  ever  been  published.  Its 
contents  are  found  in  Alexander  Hosie,  Manchuria,  pp.  43-44. 

2  The  Manchurian  provinces  are  called  "the  Chinese  Eastern 
Three  Provinces,"  and  hence  the  name  of  this  railway  and  of  the 
Company.  It  is  essential  to  keep  this  line  in  mind  apart  from  the 
Chinese  Northern  railway  system  referred  to  on  pages  156-157. 

8  "Of  her  own  volition,"  as  Cassini  added.  See  the  North 
American  Review  for  May,  1904,  p.  683. 

4  According  to  Art.  12,  these  5,000,000  taels  were  to  be  re- 
turned to  the  Chinese  Government  as  soon  as  the  line  was  in 
running  order.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the  government  was 
responsible  for  the  contribution  of  an  equal  amount  of  money  to 
the  capital  of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank.  It  is  probable  that  the 
money  has  been  transferred  from  the  Company  to  the  Bank,  so  as 
to  make  it  pay  two  bills,  the  one  after  the  other.  It  has  already 
been  reported  that  the  money  was  originally  paid  out  of  the 
Russo-French  loan  of  1895.   If  this  report  is  true,  the  whole  ar- 


THE  CASSINI  CONVENTION  97 

Eussian  troops  should  be  transported  by  the  rail- 
way without  obstruction  and  at  half-fare  (Arts.  8 
and  9).  Upon  the  basis  of  this  Agreement  were  pro- 
mulgated by  the  Government  of  the  Czar  Statutes * 
providing  for  the  construction  and  operation  of  the 
railway.  Nothing  can  better  betray  than  these  two 
documents,  the  Agreement  and  the  Statutes,  that 
the  enterprise  was  only  in  a  very  limited  sense  an 
undertaking  of  a  private  company.  In  the  first 
place,  the  capital  of  the  Company  was  divided  into 
share-capital  and  bond-capital,  the  former,  not  guar- 
anteed by  the  Russian  Government,  being  limited 
to  only  5,000,000  rubles,  while  the  latter,  which 
was  officially  guaranteed,  could  be  indefinitely 
expanded  according  to  necessity.2  It  in  fact  had 
already  before  the  present  war  swollen  to  the  enor- 
mous sum  of  over  270,000,000  rubles.3  In  the  sec- 
ond place,  the  operation  of  the  railroad  was  placed 
upon  the  uniform  basis  of  the  Siberian  system,  and 
under  the  management  of  a  board  whose  nominal 


rangement  may  be  characterized  as  extremely  clever  on  the  part 
of  Russia.    Cf.  p.  84,  note  4,  above. 

1  Confirmed  by  the  Czar  on  December  4/ 16,  presented  to  the 
Ruling  Senate  on  December  8/20,  and  finally  published  in  the 
Bulletins  des  Lois  on  December  11/23, 1896.  See  an  English 
translation  of  their  text  in  the  British  Parliamentary  Papers, 
Russia,  No.  1  (1898),  and  China,  No.  1  (1900),  pp.  57-61;  a 
Japanese  translation  in  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  495-500.  At  the 
further  extension  of  the  railway  by  the  agreement  of  March  27, 

1898,  supplementary  statutes  were  promulgated  on  February  5, 

1899.  See  ibid.,  pp.  516-520. 

2  Articles  10-16. 
8  Page  32,  above. 


98  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

president  was  a  Chinese,1  but  whose  vice-presi- 
dent, who  was  to  assume  the  actual  direction,  was 
under  the  supervision  of  the  Minister  of  Finance.2 
Finally,  but  not  the  least  in  importance,  was  the 
provision  regarding  the  protection  of  the  railway 
and  its  employees  and  the  policing  of  the  lands 
assigned  to  the  road  and  its  appurtenances.  The 
former  duty  was  to  be  performed  by  the  Chinese 
Government,  but  the  latter  "  was  confined  to  police 
agents  appointed  by  the  Company.  The  Company 
shall  for  this  purpose  draw  up  and  establish  police 
regulations.,,  3  In  these  police  agents,  ostensibly  to 
be  employed  by  the  Company,  one  may  discern  the 
origin  of  the  famous  "  railway  guards,"  later  called 
the  "  frontier  guards,"  whose  existence  has  become 
an  important  problem  since  1902  in  connection  with 
the  Russian  evacuation  of  Manchuria.  It  should 
also  be  noted  that  this  provision  concerning  the 
police  agents  does  not  appear  in  the  corresponding 
Article  in  the  text  of  the  Agreement  between 
China  and  the  Bank,  upon  which  the  Statutes  were 
based,  so  that  one  is  at  a  loss  to  know  what  was  the 
conventional  ground  for  this  Russian  law,  unless, 
indeed,  it  was  the  so-called  Cassini  Convention, 
which  was  alleged  to  have  provided  for  the  organi- 
zation of  Russian  infantry  and  cavalry  battalions 

1  The  Chinese  Minister  to  St.  Petersburg  at  that  time  was 
appointed  the  first  president. 

2  Articles  18-27 ;  Agreement,  Article  1. 

8  Article  8.  Compare  Art.  5  of  the  Agreement,  which  contains 
merely  the  former  part  of  this  arrangement,  i.  e.,  the  protection  of 
the  railway  and  its  appurtenances  by  the  Chinese  Government. 


THE  CASSINI  CONVENTION  99 

in  order  to  protect  Russian  interests  in  the  more 
remote  parts  of  Manchuria. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  line  should,  after  eighty 
years,  come  under  the  possession  of  the  Chinese 
Government,  which  might  also  buy  up  the  road  and 
its  appurtenances  after  thirty-six  years.1  It  is  inter- 
esting to  see  that  it  also  provided  that  during  the 
eighty  years  of  Russian  management,  all  commodi- 
ties carried  between  China  and  Russia  by  the  railway 
should  pay  in  China  duties  one  third  less  than  the 
ordinary  import  and  export  duties  in  that  Empire,2 
a  provision  hardly  reconcilable  with  the  open  door 
principle,  and  explicitly  contrary  to  the  principles 
proposed  by  the  United  States  to  the  Powers  two 
years  later.3 

The  Eastern  Chinese  Railway  Company  was  or- 
ganized in  February,  1897,  and  the  first  sod  of  the 
Manchuria  Railway  was  cut  with  great  ceremony 
on  the  eastern  frontier  of  the  Kirin  Province  on 
August  28,  1897. 

To  some  this  railway  concession  may  have  ap- 
peared at  first  to  have  been  intended  merely  to  reduce 
the  time  and  expense  of  completing  the  eastern  sec- 
tion of  the  Siberian  Railway  by  allowing  it  to  pass 
across  Manchuria  through  a  route  shorter  and  easier 
than  the  one  along  the  Amur  and  Ussuri  rivers. 
Such  a  belief  was,  however,  soon  dispelled,  or  rather, 
modified,  by  the  acquisition  by  Russia  of  the  lease 

1  The  Agreement,  Art.  12 ;  the  Statutes,  Art.  2. 

2  The  Agreement,  Art.  10  ;  the  Statutes,  Art.  3. 
8  See  p.  150,  note  1,  below. 


100  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

of  the  greatest  naval  harbor  in  the  Yellow  Sea,  and, 
simultaneously,  of  the  right  to  join  this  naval  basis 
by  a  new  railway  with  the  main  Manchurian  line, 
so  as  to  make  complete  the  connection  between  Port 
Arthur  and  the  army  centres  in  Siberia  and  Russia. 
The  Russian  lease  of  this  port  was,  however,  pre- 
ceded by  and  modeled  after  the  German  lease  of 
Kiao-chau,  which  should  therefore  receive  our  brief 
attention  first. 


CHAPTER  HI     ^    :!     •  ■-.-  '.■;  v 

KIAO-CHAU 

Kiao-chau,  in  the  Province  of  Shan-tung,  was,  as 
will  be  remembered,  a  port  marked  in  the  so-called 
Cassini  Convention  for  the  use  of  the  Russian  squad- 
ron. Its  value  as  a  commercial  and  strategical  point 
d'appid,  as  well  as  the  greatness  of  the  mineral 
wealth  of  Shan-tung,  must  have  been  as  well  known 
to  the  Germans  as  to  the  Russians.1  How  it  hap- 
pened that  Russia  forsook  this  important  position, 
or,  more  accurately,  how  Germany  succeeded  in  se- 
curing its  lease  without  a  protest  from  Russia,  still 
remains  to  be  explained.  It  is  known,  however,  that 
the  offers  which  had  been  made  by  China,  perhaps 
in  recognition  at  Germany's  service  in  the  Liao-tung 
affair,2  of  a  docking  and  coaling  station  on  the 

1  Herr  von  Richthofen,  now  the  Foreign  Minister  of  Ger- 
many, and  the  greatest  authority  on  Chinese  geology,  wrote 
an  article  in  the  Kolonialzeitung  of  January  6, 1898,  describing 
the  mineral  resources  of  the  province,  and  concluding  that  the 
Power  which  possessed  Kiao-chau  would  control  the  coal  supply 
in  northern  Chinese  waters.  See  China,  No.  1  (1898),  p.  21. 
The  same  authority  had  shown  years  ago  the  advantageous 
position  of  Kiao-chau. 

It  will  also  be  remembered  that  during  the  Chinese- Japanese 
war,  war-vessels  of  several  Powers  were  temporarily  anchored 
here,  so  that  the  superb  position  of  the  port  was  familiar  to  every 
one. 

2  "Considering  that  there  has  never  been  any  disagreement 


102  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

southern  coast,  had  been  declined  by  Germany ; * 
and  also  that  Germany's  own  attempts  to  secure  a 
'jpornt  ori'thre-ia'p.pa  Island  near  Amoy,  and  later  in 
•  Amoy,  itself,  \)a.i  'never  materialized.  As  to  Kiao- 
"  cnaii;  'the  desire  tif"  Germany  for  its  possession  had 
henceforth  been  often  observed  by  the  Chinese 
Minister  at  Berlin,2  but,  for  the  realization  of  the 
desire,  either  the  time  was  not  ripe,  or  the  suscep- 
tibilities of  Russia  had  to  be  considered.  Toward 
the  latter  half  of  1897,  however,  the  German  Gov- 
ernment seemed  to  have  concluded  that  a  gen- 
eral partition  of  China  was  now  a  likelihood,  for 
which  emergency  Germany  should  prepare  herself 
by  obtaining  a  powerful  foothold  on  the  littoral. 
Observe  the  following  statement  made,  in  a  retro- 
active manner,  after  the  lease  of  Kiao-chau  had 
been  acquired,  by  Herr  von  Biilow  in  the  Reichstag, 
on  April  27,  1898  :  "  Mention  has  been  made  of 
the  partition  of  China.    Such  a  partition  will  not  be 

existing  between  China  and  Germany,  and  that  the  German 
Government  came  to  the  assistance  of  China  in  securing  the 
evacuation  of  the  Liao-tung  Peninsula  by  the  Japanese  for  which 
she  has  never  been  recompensed ;  and  further,  as  England, 
France,  and  Russia  have  taken  maritime  ports  in  the  East,  and 
as  Germany  has  no  port  as  a  rendezvous  for  her  vessels  and  for 
a  coaling  station,  her  position  is  not  equal  to  the  other  great 
Powers."  — The  Tsung-li  Yamen's  memorial  to  the  Throne, 
translated  in  Mr.  Denby's  dispatch  of  March  9,  1898  (U.  S. 
55th  Congress,  3d  Session,  House  Documents,  vol.  i,  p.  189). 
The  same  sentiment  may  have  prompted  the  Tsung-li  Yamen 
to  make  the  offers  stated  in  the  text. 

1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  25. 

2  U.  S.  55th  Congress,  3d  Session,  House  Documents,  vol.  i. 
p.  189. 


KIAO-CHAU  103 

brought  about  by  us,  at  any  rate.  All  we  have  done 
is  to  provide  that,  come  what  may,  we  ourselves  shall 
not  go  empty-handed.  The  traveller  cannot  decide 
when  the  train  is  to  start,  but  he  can  make  sure  not 
to  miss  it  when  it  does  start.  The  devil  takes  the 
hindmost.  ...  In  any  case,  we  have  secured  in 
Kiao-chau  a  strategical  and  political  position  which 
assures  us  a  decisive  influence  in  the  future  of  the 
Far  East.  From  this  strong  position  we  can  look 
on  with  complacency  on  the  development  of  affairs. 
We  have  such  a  large  sphere  of  action  and  such  im- 
portant tasks  before  us  that  we  have  no  occasion  to 
grudge  other  nations  the  concessions  made  them. 
German  diplomacy  will  pursue  its  path  in  the  East 
as  everywhere  else  —  calmly,  firmly,  and  peacefully. 
We  will  never  play  the  part  of  mischief-maker  ;  nor 
will  we  play  that  of  Cinderella."  1  Before  this  glori- 
ous consummation  was  reached,  Germany  must  have, 
it  is  presumed,  made  diplomatic  efforts  to  conciliate 
Russia,  and  it  is  in  this  connection  that  it  is  alleged 
by  some  that  the  two  Powers  then  matured  between 
themselves  a  compromise  whereby  Germany  should 
not  be  molested  in  her  possible  attempt  to  seize 
Kiao-chau  at  the  first  opportunity,  and  Russia,  in 
her  turn,  should  be  free  to  follow  the  precedent  and 
demand  of  China  a  lease  of  Port  Arthur.2 

However  that  may  be,  an  opportunity  for  Ger- 
many's action  came  when,  as  is  well  known,  two 
German  Catholic  priests  were  murdered  by  a  mob 

1  China,  No.  1  (1899),  p.  67. 

2  Tokushu  Joyaku,  p.  355. 


/' 


104  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

in  the  Kii-ye  District,  in  Shan-tung,  on  November  1, 
1897.  The  late  Provincial  Governor,  Li  Ping-hing, 
who  had  recently  been  transferred  to  Sz-chwan, 
was  suspected  of  having  instigated  the  crime.  The 
Peking  Government  at  once  ordered  a  strict  search 
for  the  culprits,  and  in  three  weeks  the  local  au- 
thorities succeeded  in  arresting  four  of  the  guilty 
persons.1  It  was  too  late.  Three  German  men-of- 
war  had  arrived  at  Kiao-chau,  about  November  17, 
to  be  joined  later  by  several  others,  and  landed 
600  marines,  who  seized  the  Chinese  barracks  of 
the  port.2  As  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  had  received 
no  previous  communication  from  the  German  au- 
thorities regarding  the  demonstration,  it  u  could 
only  surmise  that  Kiao-chau  had  been  seized  on 
account  of  the  murder  of  the  German  missiona- 
ries.' ' 3  The  German  Minister  at  Peking,  Baron  von 
Heyking,  then  presented  six  demands,  including 
the  punishment  of  the  late  Governor  Li,  an  in- 
demnity for  the  murdered,  and  the  preference  for 
German  capital  and  engineers  in  the  future  railway 
and  mining  enterprises  in  the  Province  of  Shan-tung 
—  the  desire  for  the  lease  of  Kiao-chau  being  still 
veiled,  —  and  these  demands  were,  with  some  mod- 
ifications, accepted  by  China.  At  this  time,  how- 
ever, Prince  Henry  of  Germany,  whom  the  Kaiser 
had  bade  farewell  at  Kiel  in  his  celebrated  "  mailed 
fist "   speech,  was  on  his  way  to  China  with  his 

1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  3.  2  Ibid. 

8  Ibid.,  No.  2.  Cf.  House  Documents,  op.  cit.,  pp.  187-189,  a 
memorial  of  the  Yamen  to  the  Throne. 


KIAO-CHAU  105 

squadron.  As  soon  as  he  arrived,  Baron  von  Hey- 
king  presented  the  long  concealed  demand  for  a 
lease  of  the  bay  and  the  surrounding  promontories  of 
Kiao-chau.  In  the  face  of  the  strong  position  and 
forces  commanded  by  Germany,  China  had  no  choice 
but  to  yield.1  When  she  was  finally,  on  March  6, 
1898,  prevailed  upon  to  sign  the  Agreement  with 
Germany,  the  Government  of  the  latter  declined  to 
publish  anything  but  its  first  section  containing  the 
use  and  lease  of  Kiao-chau,2  and  the  contents  of 
its  other  two  sections  concerning  the  railway  and 
mining  privileges  granted  to  Germany  3  in  the  Shan- 
tung Province,  as  well  as  a  separate  agreement 
concerning  the  direct  reparation  for  the  crime  of 
Kii-ye,  have  not,  so  far  as  is  known,  been  officially 
given  to  the  world  from  Berlin.4 

The  act  of  Germany  was  a  debacle,  and  in  the 
concessions  she  wrested  from  China  were  involved 
questions  of  grave  importance  and  far-reaching 
consequences.  In  the  first  place,  was  not  the  lease 
of  a  commanding  port  in  reality  an  infringement 
of  the  territorial  sovereignty  of  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire?  In  the  second  place,  how  could  the  prefer- 

1  The  lease  was  later  fixed  for  ninety-nine  years.  The  leased 
territory  covers  about  540  square  kilometres  (208.4  square  miles), 
including  about  80,000  inhabitants. 

2  Das  Staatsarchiv,  Band  61,  No.  11518. 

8  Meyers,  pp.  281-282;  China,  No.  1  (1899),  No.  65;  Toku- 
shu  Joyalcu,  pp.  359-360,  363-365. 

4  For  the  extraordinary  proceedings  of  the  German  Minister 
in  his  dealings  with  the  Chinese  Government,  see  China,  No.  1 
(1898),  Nos.  5,  6,  17,  20,  34,  35,  40,  53,  70,  73,  and  113.  Also 
see  Tokushu  J byahu,  pp.  355-357. 


\ 


106  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

ence  given  to  Germany  in  the  future  railway  and 
mining  operations  in  one  of  the  richest  of  the 
eighteen  Provinces  be  reconciled  with  the  principle 
of  the  equal  opportunity  for  the  economic  enter- 
prise of  all  nations  in  China?  If  the  action  of 
Germany  could  be,  as  it  soon  seemed  to  be,  used 
by  other  Powers  as  a  precedent,  would  not  the  con- 
sequences for  the  cause,  to  say  the  least,  of  the  fair 
treatment  and  mutual  harmony  in  China  of  the 
nations  among  themselves  be  disastrous  ?  It  is  in- 
teresting to  observe  the  attitude  taken  toward  this 
incident  by  Great  Britain,  the  Power  which  pos- 
sessed the  greatest  interest  in  insisting  upon,  as  well 
as  strongest  power  to  enforce,  the  two  cardinal 
principles  of  the  world's  diplomacy  in  China,  namely, 
the  territorial  sovereignty  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
and  the  equality  therein  of  economic  opportunity 
for  all  nations.  Official  dispatches  of  the  day  clearly 
indicate  that,  on  the  one  hand,  Germany  made  ef- 
forts to  allay  the  susceptibilities  of  Great  Britain, 
and  that,  on  the  other,  the  British  remonstrances 
were  not  only  so  mollified  as  to  be  ineffective,  but 
were  also  turned  in  such  a  direction  as  only  to  add 
to  the  dangers  of  the  situation.  Let  us  observe  how 
this  was  done.  It  was  repeatedly  declared,  during 
the  negotiations  between  Germany  and  China,  by 
the  German  Representatives  at  Peking  and  London 
and  by  Herr  von  Billow  himself,  that  the  northern 
port  of  Kiao-chau  had  been  chosen  for  its  remote- 
ness, for  one  thing,  from  the  regions  in  which  Eng- 
land was  directly  interested  ;  that  nothing  was  being 


KIAO-CHAU  107 

done  during  the  negotiations  with  China  which 
would  be  embarrassing  to  Great  Britain  ;  that  Ger- 
many was  raising  no  objections  to  the  British  terms 
of  the  Anglo-German  loan  to  China  now  under  con- 
sideration ;  that  the  management  of  the  new  colony 
would  be  found  to  be  liberal,  for  the  German  Gov- 
ernment was  convinced  that  the  British  system  of 
colonization  was  the  right  one  ;  and  that  the  Kaiser 
and  his  Government  were  strong  partisans  of  a  good 
understanding  between  Germany  and  England.1 
Beside  these  assurances  from  Germany,  it  is  inter- 
esting to  note  that,  on  December  1,  1897,  Sir 
Claude  MacDonald  wrote  from  Peking  to  the  Mar- 
quess of  Salisbury :  "  If  the  German  occupation  of 
Kiao-chau  is  only  used  as  a  leverage  for  obtaining 
satisfactory  reparation  .  .  .  for  the  murder  of  the 
German  missionaries,  the  effect  on  the  security  of 
our  own  people  will  be  of  the  best.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  German  object  is  to  secure  Kiao-chau  as 
a  naval  station,  under  cover  of  their  demands  for 

1  See  China,  No.  1  (1898),  Nos.  39, 49, 74.  It  is  interesting  to 
observe  that  when,  in  order  to  restore  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
Gulf  of  Pechili,  which  had  been  disturbed  by  the  lease  of  Port 
Arthur  by  Russia,  England  demanded  the  lease  of  Wei-hai-Wei, 
she  took  pains  to  explain  to  Germany  that  her  acquisition  of  the 
port,  the  meaning  of  which  was  purely  military,  would  in  no  way 
interfere  with  the  German  interests  in  Shan-tung,  and  that  there 
would  be  no  attempt  to  make  railway  connections  with  Wei-hai- 
Wei.  An  interesting  diplomatic  correspondence  followed  this 
explanation,  which  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  describe.  What  is 
emphasized  here  is  that  England,  in  negotiating  the  lease  of  Wei- 
hai-Wei,  largely  reciprocated  the  cordiality  Germany  had  shown 
in  her  occupation  of  Kiao-chau.  See  China,  No.  1  (1899) ,  Nos. 
2,  8,  9,  10,  and  31. 


108  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

reparation,  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  their  acqui- 
sition of  it  will  prejudice  our  interests."  !  Whether 
or  not  this  idea  was  indorsed  by  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, Sir  Frank  C.  Lascelles,  the  Representative 
at  Berlin,  said  to  Herr  von  Bulow,  on  December  30, 
"  That,  so  far  as  he  knew,  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment had  raised  no  objection  to  the  German  ships 
going  to  Kaio-chau.  Should,  however,  a  demand 
be  put  forward  for  exclusive  privileges,  or  should 
other  countries  seek  to  take  possession  of  Chinese 
ports,  it  would  probably  become  necessary  for  Her 
Majesty's  Government  to  take  steps  for  the  protec- 
tion of  her  vast  interests  in  China." 2  In  this  last 
sentence  is  seen  a  curse  of  China's  foreign  rela- 
tions, that  is,  the  idea  of  the  balance  of  power  — 
a  balance  between  foreign  nations  on  her  ground 
and  at  her  expense.  An  offending  Power  would 
not  retrace  its  steps,  and  another  Power  would  vir- 
tually recognize  them  by  itself  demanding  counter- 
balancing rights  from  China,  which  might  expect 


1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  p.  20. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  14,  No.  39.  Sir  Claude  MacDonald  had  already 
written  to  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  on  December  10:  "I  have  the 
honor  to  inform  your  Highnesses  and  your  Excellencies  that  I 
have  received  telegraphic  instructions  from  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment to  address  the  Yamen  with  regard  to  the  concession  in 
Shan-tung  which  it  is  reported  that  the  German  Government  has 
asked  from  China.  I  am  directed  to  state  that  Her  Majesty's 
Government  will  demand  equality  of  treatment  for  British  sub- 
jects according  to  the  treaty  rights  possessed  by  Great  Britain, 
and  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  will  require  compensation 
on  any  points  in  respect  to  which  those  rights  may  be  disre- 
garded."—  Ibid.,  p.  28,  inclosure  in  No.  70. 


KIAO-CHAU  109 

other  Powers  also  to  follow  suit  with  little  regard 
to  her  primary  rights  of  sovereignty.  Germany 
could  scarcely  have  felt  the  force  of  the  British  pro- 
test which  was,  indeed,  rather  directed  to  China  than 
to  Germany.  The  latter  secured  what  she  asked, 
and  made  Kiao-chau  as  free  a  port  as  her  treaty- 
tariff  system  would  allow  ; '  but  German  claims  to 
the  sole  right  of  railroad  and  mining  concessions 
in  the  province  were  speedily  emphasized  by  the 
organization  of  the  Schan-tung  Eisenbahngesell' 
schaft,  with  a  capital  of  fifty-four  million  marks, 
and  also  of  the  Deutsche  Bergbaugesellschaft.2 

1  See  China,  No.  1  (1899),  p.  240,  No.  322;  China,  No.  1 
(1900),  pp.  12-13,  35,  146-147,  106,  233,  and  241-244. 

2  It  is  unnecessary  to  recount  the  painful  negotiations  in 
1898-9  concerning  the  Tien-tsin-Ching-kiang  railway  conces- 
sion, in  which  the  German  claim  in  Shan-tung  was  strongly  pre- 
sented, and  had  to  be  recognized  to  a  large  extent  by  the  British 
Government.  See  China,  No.  1  (1900),  pp."  14,  16, 17-18,  33, 
118, 121,  175,  180. 


CHAPTER  IV 

PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN 

As  has  been  said,  it  appears  impossible  at  the  pre- 
sent state  of  our  knowledge  to  trace  the  exact  con- 
nection of  Russia  with  the  German  occupation  of 
Kiao-chau.1  What  is  of  more  direct  interest  to  our 
study,  and  is  more  easily  established  by  evidence,  is 
the  fact  that,  with  the  plea  that  she  could  not  be 
denied  what  had  been  granted  to  Germany,2  Russia 
closely  followed  the  latter's  example,3  and,  under 
similar  terms  to  hers,4  demanded  a  lease  of  Port 

1  Cf.  China,  No.l  (1898),  Nos.  1  and  15.  China  seems  to 
have  requested  Russia  to  advise  Germany  to  reconsider  her 
action.  Later,  Russia  is  said  to  have  reported  that  she  had 
failed  to  change  the  mind  of  the  Kaiser. 

2  Count  Muravieff 's  remark  to  Sir  N.  O'Conor,  the  British 
Charge  at  St.  Petersburg,  on  March  28, 1898.  —  China,  No.  1 
(1898),  No.  125. 

3  Kiao-chau  was  occupied  on  November  17,  three  Russian 
war-vessels  came  to  Port  Arthur  on  December  18,  1897  ;  the 
German-Chinese  Agreement  was  concluded  on  March  5,  the 
formal  demand  by  Russia  was  presented  about  the  7th,  and 
granted  on  the  27th  of  the  same  month,  1898, 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  42-43,  Nos.  95,  96,  98,  100.  It  is  interesting  to 
note  that,  on  February  4,  1902,  when  negotiations  were  in  pro- 
gress between  Russia  and  China,  the  former  supporting  large 
exclusive  demands  made  by  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  in  Man- 
churia, M.  Lessar,  the  Russian  Minister,  said  that  his  Govern- 
ment was  merely  asking  for  privileges  similar  to  those  of  Ger- 
many in  Shan-tung.  —  U.  S.  57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House 
Documents,  vol.  i.  p.  274. 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  111 

Arthur  and  Talien-wan,  and  also  a  rail  way  concession 
between  a  point  in  the  Manchurian  line  granted  in 
1896  and  the  ports.  Recent  years  have  seldom  seen 
a  situation  so  instructive  of  the  character  of  the 
Far  Eastern  diplomacy  in  general,  and  of  Russia's 
method  in  particular,  as  the  foreign  relations  in 
China  which  culminated  in  the  conclusion  of  the 
Russo-Chinese  Agreement  of  March  27,  1898. 
These  relations  were  also  unusually  complex,  owing 
to  the  position  which  England  held  therein,  whose 
vast  interests  in  various  parts  of  China  were  at 
once  brought  in  many-sided  contact,  not  only  with 
Russia,  but  also  with  other  Powers  interested  in 
China. 

On  December  20,  1897,  a  report  reached  the 
British  Foreign  Office  that  three  Russian  men-of- 
war  had  arrived  at  Port  Arthur,  and  that  three 
others  were  expected  at  Talien-wan  and  three  more 
at  Port  Arthur.1  Two  days  later  it  was  officially 
explained  by  Count  Muravieff  "  that  the  step  taken 
was  entirely  a  question  of  convenience  for  the 
ships,  and  had  absolutely  no  connection  with  the 
occupation  of  the  bay  of  Kiao-chau  by  Germany." 
The  Count  added  "  that  there  had  always  been  a 
difficulty  about  keeping  more  than  a  certain  num- 
ber of  men-of-war  at  a  time  in  Japanese  ports,  and 
that,  consequently,  the  Imperial  frovernment  had 
been  glad  to  accept  the  offer  of  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  allow  the  Russian  squadron  to  winter 
at  Port  Arthur.  This  arrangement  was  all  the  more 
1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  p.  9,  No.  231. 


112  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONBLICT 

convenient  as  that  port  was  within  an  easy  distance 
of  Vladivostok,  and  had  an  arsenal  where  their 
ships  could  undergo  all  necessary  repairs.  More- 
over, it  was  an  advantage  that  Port  Arthur  was 
quite  free  from  ice  in  the  winter,  though  this  fact 
was  not  so  important  now,  as  Vladivostok  was  at 
present  furnished  with  an  exceptionally  powerful 
ice-breaker,  which  it  was  hoped  would  make  that 
port  available  for  egress  and  ingress  during  the 
winter  months.  In  fact,  Vladivostok  remained,  as 
heretofore,  their  centre  in  the  Far  East,  and  the 
headquarters  of  their  land  and  sea  forces,  so  that 
the  mere  fact  of  the  Russian  squadron  wintering 
at  Port  Arthur  made  no  change  whatever  in  the 
situation."  !  On  the  same  day  that  this  pacific  de- 
claration was  made,  it  was  reported,  as  it  was  later 
confirmed  by  Chinese  authorities,  that  Russia  was 
offering  to  China  a  4  per  cent,  loan  of  16,000,000 
pounds  at  93,  an  extremely  favorable  term,  to  pay 
off  the  balance  of  the  Japanese  indemnity.  The 
suggested  security  was  the  income  of  the  land  tax 
and  likin,  besides  which  Russia  was  said  to  have  de- 
manded as  quid  pro  quo  all  future  railway  conces- 
sions in  Manchuria  and  North  China,  as  well  as  the 
succession  of  a  Russian  subject  to  Sir  Robert  Hart 
as  Inspector- General  of  the  Maritime  Customs.2   It 

1  The  statement  made  by  Count  Muravieff,  on  December  22, 
1897,  at  his  diplomatic  reception,  and  reported  by  Mr.  W.  E. 
Goschen.  —  China,  No.  1  (1898),  pp.  12-13,  No.  37. 

2  See  Ibid.,  Nos.  26,  43,  62.  At  the  same  time,  M.  Pavloff,  the 
Russian    Charge  at  Peking,  demanded   the  dismissal  of   Mr. 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  113 

was  on  this  occasion  that  M.  Pavloff,  claiming  that 
the  Tsung-li  Yamen  had  promised  to  employ  Rus- 
sian engineers  and  Russian  capital  in  the  construc- 
tion of  any  railway  between  the  Great  Wall  and 
the  Russian  frontier,  undertook  to  record  the  al- 
leged promise  and  express  his  gratification,  and, 
seeing  that  the  Yamen  did  not  reply,  took  it  for 
granted  that  the  matter  was  settled,  and  notified 
the  St.  Petersburg  Government  to  that  effect.1  Nor 
did  the  Russian  Representatives  at  Peking  fail 
thereafter  to  appeal  to  this  agreement  concluded  by 
M.  Pavloff  in  so  striking  a  fashion,  whenever  China 
opened  any  discussion  with  another  Power  regard- 
ing any  subject  connected  with  railways  north  of 
Shan-hai-kwan.  In  the  mean  time,  an  Anglo-Ger- 
man syndicate  had  made  an  offer,  last  June,  of  a 
loan  for  the  same  purpose,  and  now  Sir  Claude 
MacDonald  strongly  supported  a  scheme  of  a  new 
loan  presented  by  the  Hong-kong  and  Shanghai 
Bank,  a  British  concern,  in  competition  with  the 
Russian  proposals.2  One  of  the  terms  of  the  Brit- 
ish loan  as  matured  between  the  Bank,  Sir  Claude, 
and  the  Marquess  of  Salisbury,  was  the  opening  of 
Talien-wan  to  foreign  trade.3  The  British  Minis- 
Kinder.  British  chief  engineer  of  the  Northern  Railway.  —  Ibid., 
No.  38;  cf.  Nos.  Ill,  115,  117. 

1  M.  Pavloff's  own  story  to  Sir  Claude  MacDonald,  on  March 
17,  1898.  —  China,  No.  2  (1899),  No.  2. 

8  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  26. 

8  Ibid.,  Nos.  30, 32, 43, 46.  Some  of  the  other  terms  were:  (1) 
the  maritime  and  native  customs,  salt  tax,  and  likin,as  security; 
(2)  a  railway  from  the  Burmese  frontier  to  the  Yang-tsze  valley; 


114  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

ter's  intention  obviously  was,  among  other  things, 
to  forestall  the  possible  Russian  occupation  of  this 
port  as  well  as  Port  Arthur.1  The  significance  was 
well  understood  by  the  Tsung-li  Yamen,  which  was, 
however,  afraid  to  embroil  China  with  Russia,  for 
the  latter's  Charge  d?  Affaires  "  had  protested, 
under  instructions  from  his  Government,  against  its 
[Talien-wan's]  opening  in  the  strongest  manner, 
and  had  warned  the  Yamen  that  it  would  incur  the 
hostility  of  Russia  by  doing  so."  2    The  reason  for 

(3)  a  guarantee  against  the  cession  of  territory  in  the  Yang-tsze 
valley  to  any  other  Power;  (4)  the  opening  of  some  other  ports; 
(5)  the  pledge  that  so  long  as  the  British  trade  with  China  was 
larger  than  the  trade  of  any  other  nation,  the  inspector-general 
of  customs  should  always  be  an  Englishman;  (6)  a  freer  inter- 
nal navigation;  etc.  These  terms  seem  to  have  been  framed  so 
as  to  protect  British  interests  in  China  strictly  within  the  scope 
of  the  most-favored-nation  principle.  The  demand  for  the  open- 
ing of  Talien-wan  and  Nanning  strongly  prejudiced  England 
against  Russia  and  France,  while  the  Burma-Yang-tsze  Railway 
was  unpleasing  to  France,  and  the  non-alienation  of  the  river 
valley  was  sometimes  regarded  by  Russia  as  a  counterpart  of  her 
own  claims  beyond  the  Great  Wall.  The  whole  story  of  the  loan 
negotiation,  as  well  as  that  of  the  Northern  Railway  extension 
loan,  is  highly  interesting  and  important  in  the  recent  history  of 
China,  but  we  are  here  concerned  with  the  bearing  of  the  first 
loan  on  the  development  of  the  Manchurian  question. 

1  It  is  highly  interesting  to  note  that  during  the  latter  part  of 
1903,  when  Russian  aggression  in  Manchuria  and  on  the  north- 
ern frontier  of  Korea  was  feared,  the  American  and  Japanese 
Governments,  with  the  moral  support  of  the  British,  made  suc- 
cessful efforts  to  open  Mukden,  Tatung-kao,  and  Antung  to 
foreign  trade.  This  proposition  had  met  a  strong  Russian  oppo- 
sition, which  also  delayed,  till  after  the  outbreak  of  the  present 
war,  the  opening  of  Wiju  on  the  Korean  border. 

3  China,  No.  1  (1898),  Nos.  51,  57. 


PORT  ARTHUR   AND  TALIEN-WAN  115 

this  strenuous  opposition  was,  on  January  19, 1898, 
explained  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  London, 
who  "  urged  very  strongly  that  if  we  [the  British 
Government]  insisted  on  making  Talien-wan  an 
open  port,  we  should  be  encroaching  on  the  Russian 
sphere  of  influence,  and  denying  her  in  the  future 
that  right  to  the  use  of  Port  Arthur  to  which  the 
progress  of  events  had  given  her  a  claim."  These 
remarks  were  significant  in  showing  how  foreign 
was  the  idea  of  the  open  door  to  the  Russian  policy 
in  Manchuria.  When  Lord  Salisbury  asked  the 
Ambassador,  in  the  same  interview,  what  possible 
objection  he  could  have  to  making  Talien-wan  a 
free  port  if  Russia  had  no  designs  on  that  territory, 
the  latter  replied  "  that  without  any  such  designs 
it  was  generally  admitted  that  Russia  might  claim 
a  commercial  debouche  upon  the  open  sea,  and  that 
in  order  to  enjoy  that  advantage  fully  she  ought 
to  be  at  liberty  to  make  such  arrangements  with 
China  as  she  could  obtain  with  respect  to  the  com- 
mercial regime  which  was  to  prevail  there."  Here 
is  a  clear  indication  that  Russia  had  little  faith 
in  the  compatibility  of  other  nations'  commercial 
welfare  in  China  with  her  own,  or,  in  other  words, 
in  the  ability  of  her  people  and  the  efficiency  of 
their  economic  organization  to  compete  with  other 
nations  in  an  open  market.  Else,  she  would  not 
object  to  the  opening  of  a  port  to  the  world's  trade. 
Lord  Salisbury  reminded  the  Russian  Representa- 
tive that  "the  most-favored-nation  clause  forbade 
China  to  give  Russia  at  Talien-wan  more  favorable 


116  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

terms  with  regard  to  customs  duties  than  she  gave 
to  other  treaty  Powers."1  England's  position, 
which  was  repeatedly  shown  to  Russia,  was  that  it 
was  natural  that  Russia  should  open  a  port  for 
her  commerce  on  the  coasts  of  the  North  Pacific,2 
but  that  it  would  be  a  contravention  of  the  treaty 
rights3  of  other  nations  to  make  of  the  port  an 
exclusive  market  for  Russian  trade.  Under  these 
persistent  representations,  Count  Muravieff  at  last 
declared,  on  January  28,  through  M.  de  Staal, 
Ambassador  at  London,  that  any  (tout) 4  commer- 
cial outlet  secured  by  Russia  "  would  be  open  to 
vthe  ships  of  all  the  great  Powers,  like  other  ports 
•  on  the  Chinese  mainland.  It  would  be  open  to  the 
commerce  of  all  the  world,  and  England,  whose 
trade  interests  are  so  important  in  those  regions, 
would  share  in  the  advantage." 5  Then  what  was 
meant  by  "  open  "  ?  M.  de  Staal  stated  on  Feb- 
ruary 10 :  "I  cannot  in  any  way  anticipate  the 
decisions  of  my  Government,  which,  in  the  event 

i  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  59. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  72,  76,  123,  etc. 

8  The  most-favored-nation  clause  is  referred  to,  which  — 
sometimes  in  general  and  sometimes  in  specific  terms,  and  some- 
times reciprocal  and  conditional,  but  nearly  always  unilateral 
and  unconditional  —  is  inserted  in  the  treaty  of  China  with  each 
Power.    See  Mayers,  op.  cit. 

4  A  dispute  arose  later  between  the  Russian  and  British  Gov- 
ernments on  this  word  "any"  (tout).  The  latter  interpreted  it  to 
mean  any  port  secured  by  Russia  in  China,  while  the  former 
claimed  that  the  Czar's  Government  had  never  promised  to  open 
Port  Arthur  to  foreign  trade.  —  March  13,  1898;  China,  No.  1 
(1898),  pp.  47-48,  No.  114. 

5  Ibid.,  No.  76. 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  117 

of  acquiring  an  outlet  in  Chinese  waters,  naturally 
remains  free  either  to  establish  a  porto  franco 
[i.  e.,  a  port  where  goods  imported  are  exempt 
from  all  import  dues]  there,  or  to  assimilate  the 
port  in  question  to  the  treaty  ports  of  the  Chinese 
littoral. " !  It  will  be  seen  later  that,  through  the 
Imperial  Order  of  July  30  (August  11),  1899,2 
Russia  declared  Dalny  a  "  free  port  "  in  the  sense 
of  a  porto  franco,  under  certain  conditions.  In  the 
face  of  these  elastic  conditions,  one  would  be  slow, 
in  spite  of  the  Order,  to  admit  that  the  question 
stated  by  M.  de  Staal  in  the  quoted  passage  has 
been  definitively  settled  by  his  government  one  way 
or  the  other,  or  in  a  third  alternative.3 

Up  to  this  point,  namely,  about  February  10, 
1898,  one  can  follow  the  gradual  withdrawal  of  Lord 
Salisbury's  position.  He  at  first  seemed  to  have  ac- 
cepted Sir  Claude  MacDonald's  suggestion  to  insist 
upon  the  opening  of  Talien-wan  as  a  condition  of 
the  British-Chinese  loan,  but,  evidently  at  the  Rus- 
sian opposition,  presently  contented  himself  with 
giving  the  following  instruction  to  the  British  Min- 
ister at  Peking :  "  You  are  not  bound  to  insist 
on  making  Talien-wan  a  treaty  port  if  you  think 
it  impracticable,  though  we  give  it  up  with  regret. 
Would  it  be  possible  to  obtain  a  promise  of  such  a 
concession  if  ever  a  railway  was  made  to  that  port  ? 
You  should  maintain  demand  for  opening  of  other 

1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  83. 

2  See  p.  133,  below. 

8  Compare  the  Russian  reply  to  Secretary  Hay's  note  of  Sep- 
tember, 1899,  pp.  135-138,  below. 


118  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

ports." 1  Then,  when  the  Chinese  Government  was 
so  pressed  by  the  opposition  of  Russia  and  France 
as  to  declare  on  January  30  that  unless  England 
v  pledged  herself  to  offer  protection  to  China  against 
Russia,  she  could  not  consent  to  accept  the  loan,2 
Lord  Salisbury's  policy  receded  further  than  before. 
He  now  made  representations  to  Russia  not  to  in- 
fringe the  most-favored-nation  treatment  in  Talien- 
wan,  if  she  should  lease  the  port.  It  is  needless  to  say 
that  such  a  direct  request  to  Russia  was  tantamount, 
on  the  part  of  England,  to  abandoning  the  desire  of 
securing  the  opening  of  the  port  from  China,  which, 
save  for  Russian  threats,  was  willing  to  comply  with 
the  desire ;  and  to  acquiescing  in  and  even  recog- 
nizing Russia's  right  to  lease  the  port,  instead  of 
opening  it  as  a  treaty  port.  Under  these  circum- 
stances, it  was  not  strange  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment was  met  by  Russia  with  the  ambiguous  phrase, 
"  open  port,"  which,  in  spite  of  Lord  Salisbury's 
attempt3  to  interpret  it  in  the  sense  of  a  porto 
franco,  was  found,  in  M.  de  Staal's  statement  of 
February  10,  already  quoted,  to  be  still  more  un- 
certain than  it  appeared  when  it  was  first  declared. 
Russia  seemed  to  have  gained  all  that  England 
lost,  but  it  was  a  mere  prelude  to  a  far  more  seri- 
ous situation  which  was  still  to  develop. 

It  would  have  been  plain  to  any  one,  had  he 

1  On  January  17.  —  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  56.   Cf .  No.  62. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  65,  69,  75,  78,  79. 

In  his  speech  before  the  House  of  Lords  on  February  8.  See 
ibid.,  Nos.  82,  83,  87 ;  the  Parliamentary  Debates,  4th  Series, 
vol.  53,  pp.  40-41. 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  119 

been  susceptible  to  certain  unmistakable  signs,  that 
Russia's  desires  in  Manchuria  were  more  extensive 
than  the  mere  acquisition  of  a  lease  of  a  commercial 
outlet  on  the  Yellow  Sea.  The  same  Count  Mura- 
vieff,  who  had  said  three  weeks  before  that  the  pre- 
sence of  Russian  ships  at  Port  Arthur  late  in  1897 
was  purely  for  the  sake  of  wintering  there,  and  that 
the  fact  that  Port  Arthur  was  ice-free  was  not  very 
important,  now  declared,  on  January  12, 1898,  that 
when  the  Russian  fleet  had  left  the  port,  after  win- 
tering there,  the  Chinese  Government  had  given  the 
Russians  a  prior  right  of  anchorage  —  le  droit 
du  premier  mouillage}  The  question  so  gently 
broached  was  more  clearly  pronounced  a  week  later, 
when  M.  de  Staal  strongly  maintained  that  the  open- 
ing of  Talien-wan  would  result  in  an  encroachment 
upon  the  Russian  sphere  of  influence,  and  in  "  deny- 
ing her  in  the  future  that  right  to  the  use  of  Port 
Arthur  to  which  the  progress  of  events  had  given 
her  a  claim." 2  In  the  face  of  these  official  remarks, 
it  would  be  impossible  to  deny  that  Russia  wished 
to  use,  not  only  Talien-wan,  but  also  Port  Arthur, 
and  the  latter  for  purposes  clearly  other  than  com- 
mercial. Yet  the  British  Government  does  not  seem 
to  have  taken  any  action  in  the  matter,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  its  tacit  recognition  of  Russia's  demand  of 
the  lease  of  Talien-wan  was  not  of  a  nature  to  dis- 
courage her  design  upon  Port  Arthur.  On  Febru- 
ary 14,  China  made  concessions  to  Great  Britain 
regarding  internal  navigation,  the  non-alienation  of 
1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  54.  2  Ibid.,  No.  59. 


120  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  Yang-tsze  Provinces,  and  the  appointment  of  an 
Englishman  to  the  inspectorate-general  of  customs 
so  long  as  the  British  trade  was  preponderant  in 
China  j 1  on  the  19th,  the  preliminary  agreement  of 
the  British  loan  was  signed ;  2  and  March  6  saw  the 
conclusion  of  the  German  agreement  concerning  the 
lease  of  Kiao-chau  and  privileges  in  the  Province  of 
Shan-tung.  Russia  immediately  seized  this  oppor- 
tunity in  bringing  forward  her  long  cherished 
design,  for,  on  March  7,  it  was  simultaneously  re- 
ported in  the  London  Times  and  by  Sir  Claude  Mac- 
Donald,  soon  to  be  confirmed  by  the  Tsungli-Yamen 
and  admitted  by  Count  Muravieff,  that  M.  Pavloff 
was  pressing  the  Peking  Government  to  grant  the 
lease  of  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan  and  the  railway 
concession  from  Petuna  on  the  trans-Manchurian 
Railway  to  the  ports.3  The  report  appears  to  have 
made  a  profound  impression  upon  the  British  Gov- 
ernment, which,  on  the  day  it  was  received,  was 
compelled  to  say  that,  if  the  Russian  demands  were 
granted,  "  her  influence  over  the  Government  of 
Peking  would  be  so  increased,  to  the  detriment  of 
that  of  Her  Majesty's  Government,  that  it  seemed 
desirable  for  them  to  make  some  counter-move.  The 
best  plan  would  perhaps  be,  on  the  cession  of  Wei- 
hai-Wei  by  the  Japanese  [who  had  been  holding  it, 
according  to  the  treaty,  pending  the  final  payment 
of  Chinese  indemnity],  to  insist  on  the  refusal  of  a 
lease  of  that  port  on  terms  similar  to  those  granted 

1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  85.  2  Ibid.,  No.  88. 

8  Ibid.,  Nos.  95,  96,  99,  100,  101,  103.  ' 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  121 

to  Germany. " 1  This  view  was  sounded,  it  is  true, 
to  the  British  Minister  at  Peking,  and  not  to  the 
Russian  Government,  but  the  latter  was  not  to  en- 
counter an  effective  protest  from  a  government 
which  had  so  soon  made  up  its  mind  that  the  protest 
might  fail  and  be  compensated  by  itself  reproducing 
the  evil  at  China's  expense.2   At  any  rate,  Count 

1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  95  (Salisbury  to  MacDonald). 

2  The  Russian  Government  soon  had  occasion  to  gauge  the 
strength  of  the  British  protest,  for,  on  March  8,  Sir  N. 
O'Conor  made  a  striking  statement  to  Count  Muravieff,  as  will 
be  seen  in  tl*}  following  report  (ibid.,  No.  108,  O'Conor  to  Salis- 
bury): "I  ailuded,  as  no  doubt  his  Excellency  was  aware,  to 
the  junction  of  the  Burmese  and  Chinese  railway  systems.  This 
demand  became  at  once  still  more  necessary  and  reasonable  if 
greater  privileges  of  the  same  kind  were  accorded  to  Russia  in 
the  Liao-tung  Peninsula,  as  they  had  apparently  already  been 
accorded  in  Manchuria.  Count  Muravieff  did  not,  however, 
respond  to  these  remarks  beyond  saying  that  he  supposed  the 
Burma-Chinese  line  would,  in  this  case,  descend  to  the  valley 
of  the  Yang-tsze."  The  Count's  remark  may  be  considered  a 
sufficient  reply,  when  it  is  seen  in  connection  with  another 
remark  he  made  a  few  moments  earlier.  When  Sir  N.  O'Conor 
alluded  to  the  objectionable  features  of  leasing  Port  Arthur,  the 
Foreign  Minister  reminded  him  that  British  interests  were  prin- 
cipally represented  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Yang-tsze.  Russia 
would  evade  the  British  protest  by  turning  England's  attention 
to  her  own  sphere,  in  which  Russia  had  little  interest,  and  would 
not  object  to  a  British  repetition  there  of  Russia's  conduct  in 
Manchuria.  Muravieff  must  have  thought  that  O'Conor,  by  his 
reference  to  the  Burmese  Railway,  now  voluntarily  threw  himself 
into  his  net.  Russia  later  succeeded  in  inducing  England  to 
conclude  the  Anglo-Russian  railway  declaration  of  April  28, 
1899,  delimiting  in  a  negative  manner  the  railway  spheres  of  the 
two  Powers  in  China,  Russia  pledging  not  to  seek  concessions 
and  not  to  obstruct  those  of  the  British  in  the  Yang-tsze  valley, 
and  England  pledging  similarly  in  regard  to  Russian  conces- 
sions beyond  the  Great  Wall.    (See  China,  No.  2  (1899),  No. 


122  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Muravieff  deemed  it  now  safe  to  declare,  beginning 
with  March  8,  that  no  alternative  had  been  left  to 
Russia,  under  the  uncertainty  attending  the  develop- 
ment of  affairs  in  the  Far  East  and  other  circum- 
stances, but  to  demand  a  cession  both  of  Talien-wan 
and  Port  Arthur,  the  former  only  to  be  opened  to 
foreign  trade  ;  that  one  of  these  ports  without  the 
other  would  be  of  no  use  to  Russia,  while  the  use 
of  both  was  of  vital  necessity  to  her ;  and  that  the 
lease  would  not  interfere  with  the  sovereign  rights 
of  the  Chinese  Empire.  To  the  last  pledge  was 
added,  probably  at  the  persistent  representations  of 
England,  that  the  treaty  rights  acquired  by  the 
Powers  in  China  would  be  respected.1 

The  distinction  made  by  Count  Muravieff  be- 
tween Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan  at  once  brought 
home  to  the  British  Government  the  gravity  of  the 
situation.  The  first  impulse  on  the  part  of  Lord 
Salisbury  was  to  fall  back  upon  M.  de  StaaPs  state- 
ment of  February  10,  that  any  (tout)  port  which 
Russia  might  acquire  on  the  Chinese  coast  should  be 

138.)  The  Russian  Government  naturally  considered  the  con- 
clusion of  this  agreement  as  a  diplomatic  victory  over  the  Brit- 
ish, and  seemed  to  have  interpreted  its  terms  as  implying  that  all 
the  territory  beyond  the  Great  Wall  was  the  Russian  sphere,  not 
only  of  railway  concessions,  but  also  of  general  interests  and  in- 
fluence. Already  in  May  of  the  same  year,  M.  Pavloff  renewed 
his  demand  at  Peking  for  the  concession  of  a  Russian  railway  to 
be  built  directly  to  the  Chinese  capital,  thus  even  overreaching 
the  limit  set  in  the  British  agreement  of  less  than  a  fortnight 
previous.  See  China,  No.  1  (1900),  pp.  112,  116,  120,  129, 
132-133,  214-215. 
1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  Nos.  101, 105,  108, 110,  114, 120, 149. 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  123 

open  to  the  foreign  trade.1  Count  Muravieff,  how- 
ever, explained  that  the  statement  applied  only  to 
Talien-wan,  but  no  promise  had  been  made  regard- 
ing Port  Arthur.2  On  March  15,  however,  he  was 
authorized  by  the  Czar  to  give  to  Sir  N.  0' Conor 
"  an  assurance  that  both  Port  Arthur  and  Talien- 
wan  would  be  open  to  foreign  trade,  like  other 
Chinese  ports,  in  the  event  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment's obtaining  a  lease  of  these  places  from  the 
Chinese  Government.,,  The  Count  intimated  next 
morning  that  it  would  be  desirable  for  the  British 
Government  not  to  repeat  this  assurance  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  for  "  it  might  be  considered  as  a 
want  of  courtesy  toward  the  Chinese  Government, 
who  had  not  yet  formally  agreed  to  give  the  Russian 
Government  a  lease  of  the  ports  in  question."  3 

Presently,  however,  the  British  Government 
awoke  to  the  conviction  that  Port  Arthur  was  "  not 
a  commercial  harbor,"  and  "  it  was  doubtful  whether 
it  could  be  converted  into  one."  "  But,"  stated  the 
Marquess  of  Salisbury,  "  though  not  a  commercial 
harbor,  Port  Arthur  supplies  a  naval  base,  limited 
indeed  in  extent,  but  possessing  great  natural  and 
artificial  strength.  And  this,  taken  in  connection 
with  its  strategic  position,  gives  it  an  importance  in 
the  Gulf  of  Pechili  and  therefore  at  Peking,  upon 
which,  in  their  representation  to  Japan  at  the  close 
of  the  war  with  China,  the  Russian  Government 
laid  the  greatest  emphasis.  .  .  .  The  possession, 

i  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  104. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  114.  8  Ibid.,  No.  120. 


124  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

even  if  temporary,  of  this  particular  position,  is 
likely  to  have  political  consequences  at  Peking  of 
great  international  importance,  and  the  acquisition 
of  a  Chinese  harbor  notoriously  useless  for  commer- 
cial purposes  by  a  foreign  Power  will  be  universally 
interpreted  in  the  Far  East  as  indicating  that  the 
partition  of  China  has  begun.  ...  It  may,  per- 
haps, be  proper  to  observe  that  a  great  military 
Power  which  is  conterminous  for  over  four  thou- 
sand miles  with  the  land  frontier  of  China,  includ- 
ing the  portion  lying  nearest  to  its  capital,  is  never 
likely  to  be  without  its  due  share  of  influence  on 
the  councils  of  that  country.  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment regard  it  as  most  unfortunate  that  it  has 
been  thought  necessary,  in  addition,  to  obtain  control 
of  a  port  which,  if  the  rest  of  the  Gulf  of  Pechili 
remains  in  hands  so  helpless  as  that  of  the  sover- 
eign Power,  will  command  the  maritime  approaches 
to  its  capital,  and  give  to  Russia  the  same  strate- 
gic advantage  by  sea  which  she  already  possesses 
in  so  ample  a  measure  by  land."  !  In  this  spirit, 
the  British  Government  asked  Count  Muravieff 
through  Sir  N.  O'Conor,  on  March  23,  to  recon- 
sider the  advisability  of  pressing  demands  upon 
China  in  regard  to  Port  Arthur.  England  would  not 
object  to  the  Russian  lease  of  an  ice-free  commer- 
cial harbor  connected  by  rail  with  the  trans-Siberian 

1  Chirm,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  138.  The  Marquess  did  not  refer 
to  a  matter  of  enormous  importance,  that  the  proposed  railways 
would  connect  the  immense  land  and  sea  forces  of  Russia,  which 
he  emphasized. 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  125 

Railway,  but  questions  of  an  entirely  different  kind 
were  opened  if  Russia  obtained  control  of  a  mili- 
tary port  in  the  neighborhood  of  Peking.  England, 
on  her  part,  was  prepared  to  give  assurances  that 
beyond  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  treaty 
rights  she  had  no  interests  in  Manchuria,  and  to 
pledge  herself  not  to  occupy  any  port  in  the  Gulf 
of  Pechili  as  long  as  other  Powers  maintained 
the  same  policy.1  To  this  protest,  so  plainly  at- 
tended by  a  second  wish  of  Great  Britain  to  make 
a  counter-move  when  the  prime  move  of  Russia 
could  not  be  checked,  Count  Muravieff  made,  on 
March  23,  a  firm  reply,  refusing  absolutely  to  admit 
that  the  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  was  vio- 
lated by  the  proposed  lease  of  Port  Arthur,  and 
repeating  his  assertion  that  the  possession  of  that 
harbor  was  a  question  of  vital  necessity  to  Russia. 
Sir  N.  0' Conor  confessed  the  futility  of  his  pro- 
test.2 About  the  same  day,  M.  Pavloff  informed 
the  Peking  Government  that  Russia  could  not  con- 
sider the  question  of  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan 
apart,  and  insisted  upon  their  lease  before  the  27th, 
failing  which,  Russia  would  take  hostile  measures.3  * 
Now  England  definitely  resolved,  on  March  25,  to 
obtain  speedily  the  lease  of  Wei-hai-Wei  in  terms 
similar  to  those  granted  to  Russia  for  Port  Arthur, 
and  ordered  the  British  fleet  to  proceed  from  Hong- 

1  China,  No.  1  (1900),  Nos.  123  and  133. 

3  "I  cannot  say  that  my  efforts  were  successful.  ...  I  was 
unable  to  induce  his  Excellency  to  modify  his  views."  —  Ibid., 
Nos.  125  and  132. 

8  Ibid.,  No.  126. 


126  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

kong  to  the  Gulf  of  Pechili,1  and,  three  days 
later,  notified  the  Russian  Government  that  she 
would  retain  her  entire  liberty  of  action  to  take 
steps  to  protect  her  interests,  and  to  diminish  the 
evil  consequences  which  she  anticipated.2  On  the 
preceding  day,  however,  a  Russo-Chinese  Agree- 
ment had  been  signed,  incorporating  all  the  points 
upon  which  Russia  had  insisted  and  against  which 
England  had  vainly  protested.  Count  Muravieff  at 
once  briefly  announced  to  the  Powers  the  success- 
ful conclusion  of  the  Agreement ; 3  and,  when  the 
British  Government  called  upon  him  to  fulfill  his 
promise  to  give  a  written  assurance  of  Russia's  de- 
clared intention  to  respect  the  sovereign  rights  of 
China  and  the  treaty  privileges  of  the  other  Powers 
in  the  leased  territory,  he  calmly  replied  that  what 
was  interpreted  as  promises  was  in  fact "  very  confi- 
dentially "  expressed  views,  and  that  "  the  time  was 
not  opportune  "  for  making  the  assurances  public. 
Russia  would  not,  he  added,  so  "  abuse  the  lease 
granted  by  a  friendly  Power  "  as  "  to  arbitrarily 
transform  a  closed  and  principally  military  port 
into  a  commercial  port  like  any  other." 4  The  tri- 
umph of  Russia  was  tardily  followed,  on  April  3, 
by  the  promise  England  secured  from  China  to 
lease  Wei-hai-Wei  to  her  for  the  same  period  as 
Port  Arthur,5  thus  again  substituting  for  an  effec- 

1  China,  No.  1  (1900),  No.  129.  2  Ibid.,  No.  138. 

8  Ibid.,  Nos.  134,  136,  and  137. 

4  Cf.  ibid.,  Nos.  135,  137,  138,  139,  140,  149,  and  151. 

5  Ibid.,  No.  144.    The  agreement  was  signed  at  Peking  on 
July  1.    See  Treaty  Series,  No.  14,  1898. 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  127 

tive  prevention  of  evils  the  "  balance  "  *  and  retali- 
ation between  the  Powers  at  the  expense  of  China.2 

1  "Balance  of  power  in  Gulf  of  Pechili  is  materially  altered 
by  surrender  of  Port  Arthur  by  the  Yamen  to  Russia.  It  is  there- 
fore necessary  to  obtain,"  etc.  —  Salisbury  to  MacDonald, 
March  25;  China,  No.  1  {1898),  No.  129.  Cf.  also  China,  No.  1 
(1899),  No.  2. 

It  should  be  said,  in  justice  to  Great  Britain,  that  at  first,  when 
the  Chinese  Government  intimated  toward  the  end  of  February 
that  they  would  lease  Wei-hai-Wei  to  her  if  she  would  accept  it, 
Lord  Salisbury  considered  such  an  offer  premature,  for  his  Gov- 
ernment "aimed  at  discouraging  any  alienation  of  Chinese  terri- 
tory."  —  Ibid.,  Nos.  90  and  91. 

2  Two  other  instances  may  here  be  cited  to  further  illustrate 
the  policy  of  the  British  Government  during  this  critical  period 
of  time.  (1)  Soon  after  the  appearance  of  Russian  war-vessels  at 
Port  Arthur,  Admiral  Buller,  of  the  China  station  of  the  British 
navy,  arrived  at  Chemulpo  with  seven  ships,  on  December  29, 
and  ordered  the  "  Immortalite  "  and  "Iphigenia"  to  proceed  to 
Port  Arthur.  The  former  was,  on  January  10,  ordered  to  leave 
for  Chefu.  The  presence  of  the  British  boats  created  "a  bad 
impression  "  on  Russia,  which  requested  England  to  avoid  dan- 
gers of  conflict  in  the  Russian  "sphere  of  influence."  The  Brit- 
ish Government  explained  that  the  ships  had  been  sent  by  the 
Admiral  without  instruction  from  the  Admiralty,  and  would  soon 
leave,  "  in  ordinary  course  of  cruising."  It  was  added,  at  the 
same  time,  that  British  ships  had  a  perfect  right  to  proceed  to 
Port  Arthur.  It  was  reported  at  one  time  that  the  two  boats  had 
been  ordered  away  from  Port  Arthur  under  protest  from  Russia. 
—  Ibid.,Nos.  31,  48,  52,63,  66,  68.  (2)  On  March  8,Sir  Claude 
MacDonald  was  informed  by  the  Tsung-li  Yamen  that  the  only 
reason  given  by  M.  Pavloff  for  the  demand  of  the  lease  of  the 
two  ports  was  to  "  assist  in  protecting  Manchuria  against  the 
aggression  of  other  Powers."  Probably  England  and  Japan  were 
meant,  and  the  Yamen  was  fully  alive  to  the  absurdity  of  this 
pretext,  but  was  unable  to  resist  the  Russian  demands.  It  there- 
fore begged  earnestly  that  the  British  Government  would  assist 
it  by  giving  a  formal  assurance  to  the  Russian  Government  that 
England  had  no  designs  on  Manchuria.  It  does  not  seem  to  have 


128  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

In  this  connection,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  Rus- 
sian Government  considered,  according  to  Count 
Muravieff,  "  that  China  owed  them  this  [the  lease 
of  the  ports]  for  the  services  they  had  rendered  her 
in  her  war  with  Japan,  and  these  services  must  be 
properly  requited."  *  It  was  no  matter  of  surprise 
to  Japan  that  Russia  now  secured  for  herself  the 
most  strategic  portion  of  the  territory,  the  retention 
of  which  by  Japan  was,  three  years  ago,  declared  by 
the  same  Power  to  be  imperiling  the  position  of 
Peking,  rendering  Korean  independence  nominal, 
and  interfering  with  the  permanent  peace  of  the 
Far  East.  When  it  was  announced  by  Russia,  in 
December  last,  that  Port  Arthur  had  been  lent  to 
her  by  China  only  temporarily  as  a  winter  anchor- 
age, the  Japanese  Government  merely  "  credited 
this  assurance,  and  accordingly  took  note  of  it."  2 
When  the  negotiations  for  the  lease  were  in  pro- 
gress, the  Japanese  Government  made  no  protest, 
and  when  they  were  consummated,  it  manifested  no 
appreciable  sentiment.  At  the  same  time,  it  qui- 
etly approved  of  the  British  lease  of  Wei-hai-Wei,3 

been  thought  necessary  by  the  British  Government  to  give  such 
an  assurance.    See  ibid.,  Nos.  100  and  109. 

1  China,  No.  1  (1898),  No.  114  (O'Conor  to  Salisbury, 
March  13). 

2  Ibid.,  No.  29. 

"The  Japanese  Government,"  said  Baron  Nishi,  Foreign 
Minister  of  Japan,  confidentially,  to  Sir  Ernest  Satow,  about 
March  20,  "had  been  anxious  that  China  should  be  able  to 
maintain  her  position  at  Wei-hai-Wei,  but  if  she  found  it  impos- 
sible to  do  so,  Japan  would  have  no  objection  to  its  being  held 
by  a  Power  disposed  to  assist  in  maintaining  the  independence  of 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  129 

which  the  Japanese  troops  had  still  held  pending 
the  final  payment  of  the  Chinese  indemnity.  Then 
they  speedily  evacuated  the  port  in  favor  of  Eng- 
land, leaving  behind  them  every  accommodation  to 
the  successor.1 

The  Agreement  concluded,  on  March  15/27, 
1898,  between  Li  Hung-chang  and  the  Russian 
Charge,  M.  Pavloff,  has  never  been  published  by 
the  Russian  Government,  and  the  only  sources  to 
which  we  can  turn  are  an  English  translation  of  a 
Chinese  precis  forwarded  by  Sir  Claude  MacDonald 
more  than  a  month  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
Agreement,2  and  the  Chinese  text  that  appears  in 

China."—  China, No.  1  (1899),  No.  35.  Cf.  also  Nos.  49,  79, 
81,  107,  etc. 

1   Ibid.,  Nos.  85,  112,  118,  231,  238. 

Russia  had  undertaken  to  request  Japan  to  promise  that 
China  would  secure  Wei-hai-Wei  after  the  Japanese  evacuation, 
but  Japan  declined  to  make  such  a  pledge.  —  Ibid.,  No.  30.  In 
April,  1902,  the  control  of  Wei-hai-Wei  was  transferred  from 
the  Admiralty  to  the  Colonial  Office.  The  mouth  of  the  harbor  is 
so  large  that  it  would  require  an  enormous  expenditure  and  large 
forces  to  fortify  and  defend  it  adequately.  At  the  time  when  Eng- 
land leased  the  port,  she  was  hardly  inclined  to  let  financial  con- 
siderations thwart  her  effort  to  restore  her  prestige  so  abruptly 
foreshadowed  by  that  of  Russia.  In  1902,  however,  the  lately 
concluded  Anglo-Japanese  agreement  of  alliance  rendered  the 
fortification  of  Wei-hai-Wei  no  longer  necessary.  See  Tokushu 
Joyaku,  pp.  172-173. 

2  China,  No.  1  (1899),  pp.  127-129,  No.  187,  dated  Peking, 
April  29.  Regarding  this  -precis,  Sir  Claude  says:  "  It  bears 
every  sign  of  foreign  authorship,  and  the  original  cannot  have 
been  drafted  by  a  Chinese.  I  have  no  doubt  that  the  document 
correctly  represents  the  sense  of  the  original  agreement,  for  it 
fully  corresponds  with  what  I  have  been  able  to  learn  of  the  con- 
tents of  the  latter."   M.  Cordier  also  relies  on  this  precis  in  his 


130  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  To-A  Kwankei  Tokushu  Joyaku  Isan.1  Port 
Arthur  and  Talien-wan,  with  their  adjacent  waters, 
were  leased  to  Russia  for  twenty-five  years,  subject 
to  renewal  by  mutual  agreement,  the  lease  not  af- 
fecting the  sovereign  rights  of  China  (Articles  1 
and  3) ;  within  the  leased  territory,  Chinese  citizens 
might  continue  to  live,  but  no  Chinese  troops  should 
be  stationed,  and  the  responsibility  of  military  af- 
fairs should  be  vested  in  one  Russian  officer,  who 
should  not  bear  the  Chinese  title  of  governor-gen- 
eral or  governor  (Article  4) ;  Port  Arthur  would  be 
a  naval  port  open  only  to  the  Russian  and  Chinese 
men-of-war,  but  closed  against  the  commercial  and 
naval  ships  of  other  nations,  while  Talien-wan,  ex- 
cept the  portion  used  exclusively  for  naval  purposes, 
would  be  a  trading  port  open  freely  to  the  merchant 
vessels  of  all  nations  (Article  6) ;  the  Russians 
would  be  allowed  to  build  forts  and  barracks,  and 
provide  defenses  (Article  7) ;  there  should  be  a  neu- 
tral territory  to  the  north  of  the  leased  ground,  which 
would  be  administered  by  Chinese  officials,  but  into 
which  no  Chinese  troops  should  be  sent  without 
consulting  the  Russian  authorities  (Article  5) ;  the 
railway  contract  of  1896  might  be  extended  so  as 
to  cover  a  branch  line  to  Talien-wan  and,  if  ne- 
cessary, another  line  between  Niu-chwang  and  the 
Yalu,  but  the  construction  of  the  railways  should 

Histoire  des  relations  de  la  Chine  avec  les  puissances  occidentals, 
vol.  iii.  pp.  362-364. 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  244-245.    This  Chinese  text  natu- 
rally clears  up  some  points  which  are  obscure  in  the  'precis. 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  131 

not  be  made  a  ground  for  securing  territory  (Article 
8).  Sir  Claude  Macdonald  presented  also,  on  June 
14,  what  he  believed  to  be  an  authentic  version  of 
the  Special  Russo-Chinese  Agreement  concluded  on 
April  25  (May  7),  1898,  to  supplement  the  Agree- ) 
ment  of  March  15.1  It  defined  the  extent  of  the 
leased  territory,  and  of  the  neutral  territory  to  the 
north  of  the  former  (Articles  1  and  2).2  Within 
the  latter,  it  was  agreed,  no  ports  should  be  open 
to  the  trade  of  other  nations,  and  no  economic 
concessions  made  to  them,  without  Russian  consent 
(Article  5).  At  Kin-chow,  the  administration  and 
police  were  to  be  Chinese,  but  the  military,  Russian 
(Article  4).  Regarding  railways,  it  was  provided 
that  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan  should  be  the  ter- 
mini of  the  conceded  line,  along  which  no  railway 
privileges  should  be  given  to  other  nations.  Russia 
would,  however,  have  nothing  to  say  if  China  her- 
self should  undertake  to  construct  a  railway  from 
Shan-hai-kwan  to  a  point  near  the  Russian  line 
(Article  3). 

1  See  China,  No.  1  (1899),  p.  188,  No.  273.  Also  Cordier, 
Histoire,  vol.  iii.  pp.  365-366.  A  Japanese  version  obtained  from 
the  Foreign  Office  at  Tokio  appears  in  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp. 
246-247.  The  Special  Agreement  was  supplemented  by  an- 
other Agreement  concluded  on  April  25  (o.  s.),  1899. 

2  The  boundary  of  the  leased  territory  began  with  the  north- 
ern side  of  A-tang  Bay  (Port  Adams),  on  the  west  coast  of 
the  Liao-tung  Peninsula,  and  passed  through  and  included  the 
A-tang  Mountains,  ending  near  Pi-tse-wo,  and  including  the 
adjacent  waters  and  isles.  The  northern  limit  of  the  neutral 
ground  started  at  the  mouth  of  the  Kai-chow  River,  passed  north 
of  Yuyen-ch'eng  and  along  the  Ta-yang  River,  and  ended  at 
and  included  its  mouth. 


132  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

These  agreements  were  accompanied  by  some 
characteristically  pacific  and  magnanimous  utter- 
ances by  the  Czar,  professing  his  firm  friendship 
with  China,  extolling  the  wise  decision  of  the  Son  of 
Heaven  in  granting  the  lease,  and  emphasizing  that 
the  direct  communication  by  means  of  the  great 
Siberian  Railway  with  the  hitherto  closed-up  country 
would  largely  contribute  to  the  peaceful  intercourse 
of  the  peoples  of  the  East  and  West,  to  which  task 
Russia  was  called  by  Divine  Providence.1 

The  leased  territory  was  named  Kwan-tung2  by 
the  Russians,  and  the  Provisional  Regulations  for 
its  administration  were  published  at  St.  Petersburg 
through  the  Bulletin  des  Lois  of  August  20  (Sep- 
tember 1),  1899.3  By  these  regulations,  the  Kwan- 
tung  region  was  placed  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Ministry  of  War,  with  its  chief  seat  of  admin- 
istration at  Port  Arthur  (Articles  4  and  6).  The  Ad- 
ministration Was  headed  by  a  Governor,  appointed 
and  removed  at  the  immediate  will  of  the  Czar,  who 
was  also  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army  forces  of 
the  territory  and  entered  into  immediate  communica- 
tion with  the  commander  of  the  cis-Amur  region, 
and  in  addition  commanded  the  navy  at  Port  Arthur 

1  See  the  Czar's  telegraphic  message  to  the  Chinese  Emperor, 
on  March  15/27;  and  his  Imperial  orders  of  March  17/29  and 
July  30/ August  11.  China,  No.  1  (1899),  pp.  20-21,  1-2,  and 
262-263. 

2  Meaning,  presumably,  east  of  Shan-hai-kwan. 

8  See  China,  No.  1  (1900),  pp.  292-293,  304-311,  and  335. 
Also  the  Tsusho  Isan  (Japanese  Consular  Reports),  April  28, 
1904,  pp.  33-46. 


PORT  ARTHUR  AND  TALIEN-WAN  133 

and  Vladivostok ;  the  latter  port,  however,  retained 
its  Commander  of  the  port,  who  was  subservient  to 
the  Governor  (Articles  3,  7,  12,  13,  and  14).  In 
matters  concerning  frontier  and  foreign  relations, 
the  Governor  directly  communicated  with  the  Rus- 
sian Representatives  at  Peking,  Tokio,  and  Seul, 
and  with  the  Russian  military  and  naval  agents 
(Article  22).  At  the  creation  on  August  13,  1903, 
of  a  Vice-regency  in  this  region,  which  will  receive 
attention  later,  it  became  necessary  to  make  some 
changes  in  the  administrative  rules,  which  had  not 
been  completed  at  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war. 
Talien-wan  being  mainly  open  to  foreign  trade, 
its  organization  and  administration  were  set  on  a 
separate  basis  from  the  rest  of  the  Kwan-tung.  At 
the  instance  of  M.  Witte,  then  the  Minister  of 
Finance,  an  Imperial  Order  was  promulgated  on 
July  30  (August  11),  1899,  ordering  that  near 
Talien-wan  a  new  town  named  Dalny  should  be 
built,  which  was  simultaneously  declared  a  free 
port  under  the  following  conditions,  namely,  that 
the  importation  and  exportation  of  merchandise 
should  be  allowed  free  of  customs  dues  in  Dalny 
within  the  limits  determined,  and  liable  to  modifi- 
cation, by  the  Minister  of  Finance  ;  but  that  goods 
imported  into  Russia  from  Dalny  should  pay  the 
regular  import  duties  in  force  in  the  Russian  Em- 
pire.1 By  the  Provisional  Regulations  already  re- 
ferred to  of  August  20  (September  1)  of  the  same 
year,  the  organization  of  Dalny  was  assigned  to 
1  See  China,  No.  1  (1900),  pp.  262-26S. 


134  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  Eastern  Chinese  Railway  Company,  under  the 
chief  direction  of  the  Minister  of  Finance,  and  its 
administration  was  intrusted  to  a  Prefect,  to  be 
appointed  and  dismissed  by  Imperial  orders  and 
subordinate  to  the  Governor  of  the  Kwan-tung 
(Articles  99  and  10 1).1  It  is  already  well  known 
that  Dalny,  now  covering  about  100  square  versts 
in  area,  was,  according  to  M.  Witte's  plan,  intended 
to  be  the  commercial  terminus  of  the  great  Sibe- 
rian Railway,  and  eventually  the  mercantile  outlet 
on  the  Pacific  of  the  vast  Russian  Empire.  Before 
the  war,  the  works  at  Dalny,  including  its  large 
docks  and  piers,  had  cost  already  nearly  20,000,000 
rubles.  Part  of  this  immense  expenditure  was  to 
have  been  met  by  the  income  of  the  public  sales  at 
auction  of  land-lots,  held  three  times  since  1902,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  the  twenty-five  year  lease  of 
the  territory  to  Russia  would  hardly  justify  her  in 
alienating  portions  of  it  permanently.2 

1  China,  No.  1  {1900),  pp.  308-311. 

2  Conditions  at  Dalny  since  its  foundation  are  minutely  de- 
scribed by  M.  Suzuki,  agent  of  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office  in 
the  Tsusho  Isan  for  April  23  (pp.  39-49),  28  (pp.  32-46),  May  3 
(pp.  37-49),  8  (pp.  42-55),  12  (pp.  36-42),  and  18  (pp.  33-37), 
1904. 


CHAPTER  V 

SECRETARY  HAY'S  CIRCULAR  NOTE 

It  is  unnecessary  for  us  to  describe  how,  between 
1897  and  1899,  other  so-called  spheres  of  influ- 
ence and  of  economic  concessions  than  those  already 
mentioned  were  marked  out  in  China  by  the  Powers, 
for,  important  as  they  are  in  the  general  history  of 
the  modern  East,  they  have  little  bearing  upon  our 
immediate  subject.  It  suffices  to  recall  that  the 
process  was  begun  by  the  German  seizure  of  Kiao- 
chau ;  that  unfortunately  Great  Britain  felt  obliged 
to  have  recourse  to  the  policy  of  the  balance  of 
power ;  and  that  no  other  "  sphere  "  had  the  grave 
significance  and  the  evil  forebodings  of  the  Rus- 
sian territory  of  the  Kwan-tung  in  Manchuria.  It 
was  during  this  period  that  a  Power  whose  position 
was  so  unique  as  to  justify  the  act  appealed  to 
the  other  interested  Powers,  in  September,  1899, 
to  make  declarations  that  they  would  observe  the 
principle  of  the  equal  economic  opportunity  for  all 
nations  in  their  respective  spheres  of  interest  in 
China.  The  principle  thus  proposed  by  the  United 
States  was  stated  to  imply  (1)  non-interference  with 
the  treaty  rights  and  vested  interests  of  each  other ; 
(2)  the  maintenance  of  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff, 
except  in  "free  ports,"  under  the  Chinese  man- 


136  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

agement;  and  (3)  no  differential  treatment  in  the 
harbor  duties  and  railway  charges,  in  the  spheres. 
The  phrase  "  leased  territory "  was  used  in  con- 
nection with  only  the  first  of  these  three  points, 
while  the  words  "  spheres  of  interest "  were  applied 
to  all  three,  so  that  it  was  uncertain  whether  the 
second  and  third  points  were  intended  by  Secretary 
Hay  to  cover  the  leases,  as  well  as  the  spheres.1 
In  reply  to  this  proposition,  Great  Britain,  which 
had  stronger  reason  than  the  United  States  to  in- 
dorse a  policy  which  had  originated  with  her  and 
which  she  had  long  upheld  in  China  at  enormous 
cost,  and  Japan  expressed  their  unequivocal  adher- 
ence to  the  proposed  principle.  Germany,  France, 
and  Italy  also  assented,  all  except  Italy,  however, 
with  the  natural  reservation  that  the  desired  declara- 
tions would  be  made  if  all  other  interested  Powers 
acted  likewise.2  As  regards  the  question  whether 
the  three  points  applied  to  the  leases  and  spheres 
alike,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  Germany,  France, 
and  Great  Britain  replied,  in  effect,  in  the  affirma- 
tive, Germany  using  the  expression  "its  Chinese 
possessions,"  and  France  employing  the  phrase 
"  the  territories  which  were  leased  to  her."  The 
statement  used  by  Great  Britain  was  the  most 
explicit  and  comprehensive,  for  she  mentioned  "  the 
leased  territory  of  Wei-hai-Wei  and  all  territory  in 
China  which  may  hereafter  be  acquired  by  Great 

1  China,  No.  2  (1900),  No.  1. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  2,  3,  4,  and  inclosures  1,  2,  3,  4,  and  5,  in 
No.  5. 


SECRETARY  HAY'S  CIRCULAR  NOTE  137 

Britain,  by  lease  or  otherwise,  and  all  (  spheres  of 
interest '  now  held,  or  that  may  hereafter  be  held 
in  China."  Beside  these  assurances,  the  Russian 
assent  was  highly  significant,  which,  with  the  reser- 
vation similar  to  that  of  the  other  Powers,  stated  : 
"  As  to  the  ports  now  opened,  or  hereafter  to  be 
opened,  to  foreign  commerce  by  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment,1 and  which  lie  beyond  the  leased  territory 
to  Russia,  the  settlement  of  the  question  of  customs 
duties  belongs  to  China  herself,  and  the  Imperial 
Government  [of  Russia]  has  no  intention  whatever 
of  claiming  any  privileges  for  its  own  subjects  to 
the  exclusion  of  foreigners."  But  "  in  so  far  as  the 
territory  leased  by  China  to  Russia  is  concerned, 
the  Imperial  Government  [of  Russia]  has  already 
demonstrated  its  firm  intention  to  follow  the  policy 
of  the  6  open  door '  by  creating  Dalny  (Talien- 
wan)  a  free  port;  and  if  at  some  future  time  that 
port,  although  remaining  free  itself,  should  be 
separated  by  a  custom-limit  from  other  portions 
of  the  territory  in  question,  the  customs  duties 
would  be  levied,  in  the  zone  subject  to  the  tariff, 
upon  all  foreign  merchants  without  distinction  as 
to  nationality.  With  the  conviction,"  the  Russian 
note  concluded,  "  that  this  reply  is  such  as  to  ratify 
the  inquiry  made  in  the  aforementioned  note  [of 
the  United  States],  the  Imperial  Government  is 
happy  to  have  complied  with  the  wishes  of  the 
American  Government,  especially  as  it  attaches 
the  highest  value  to  anything  that  may  strengthen 
1  The  italics  in  the  quotations  are  the  author's. 


138  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

and  consolidate  the  traditional  relations  of  friend- 
ship existing  between  the  two  countries."  1  On  the 
strength  of  the  various  replies  from  the  Powers, 
however,  the  United  States  Government  considered 
that  "  the  Declaration  suggested  by  the  United 
States  on  that  subject  [i.  e.,  the  proposals  about 
the  Chinese  trade]  had  been  accepted  by  those 
Powers/'  and  regarded  the  assent  given  by  them 
"  as  final  and  definite." 2  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  no  Power  made  a  formal  declaration3  sug- 
gested by  Secretary  Hay,  who,  however,  seems  to 
have  deemed  the  replies  with  reservations  as  equiv- 
alent to  such  a  declaration.  It  is  problematical 
whether  this  exchange  of  notes  did  in  the  slightest 
degree  have  the  effect  of  changing  the  actual  situ- 
ation, at  least  so  far  as  Russia  was  concerned. 

1  China,  No.  2  (1900),  inclosure  6  in  No.  5. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  5,  White  to  Salisbury,  March  30, 1900. 
8  Cf.  ibid.,  No.  6. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE    OCCUPATION    OF    MANCHURIA 

We  have  given  only  an  incomplete  account  of  the 
manner  in  which  certain  Powers  seemed,  during  the 
years  1897  and  1898,  to  vie  with  one  another  in 
transgressing,  in  effect,  the  principle  of  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  to  which 
they  at  the  same  time  professed  their  adherence. 
Another  principle,  however,  —  that  of  the  open 
door,  or  of  the  equal  opportunity  in  China  for  the 
commercial  and  industrial  enterprise  of  all  nations, 
—  was,  as  we  have  seen,  not  as  openly  ignored 
even  by  the  most  aggressive  Powers.  The  time  ar- 
rived, in  1900,  when  the  observance  of  both  prin- 
ciples appeared  to  be  the  only  safeguard  against  a 
general  partition  of  China  and  an  internal  revo- 
lution through  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  vast 
Empire.  The  story  of  the  Boxer  trouble  is  too 
fresh  in  every  one's  memory  to  need  to  be  retold. 
It  was  during  this  insurrection,  and  during  the 
march  of  the  allied  forces  toward  Peking  and  the 
long  negotiations  which  followed  it,  that  all 
the  Powers  concerned  repeatedly  and  unequivocally 
pledged  themselves  to  one  another  to  maintain  the 
two  cardinal  principles  of  Chinese  diplomacy.  It 
now  belongs  to  us  to  relate,  however,  that  it  was 


140  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

in  the  midst  of  this  reiterated  promise  of  fair  play 
that  the  most  acute  stage  of  the  Manchurian  ques- 
tion was  reached.  Evidence  is  abundant  to  show 
that  Eussia  was  inclined  greatly  to  underestimate 
the  seriousness  of  the  troubles  in  North  China, 
where  a  concerted  action  of  all  the  interested 
Powers  was  imperative,  while  in  Manchuria,  which 
Russia  had  for  years  regarded  as  her  sphere  of  in- 
fluence,1 she  carried  forward  aggressive  measures 
with  great  rapidity  and  on  an  enormous  scale. 
Thus,  even  so  late  as  June  20,  when  the  railway 
communication  of  Peking  with  Tientsin  had  been 
cut  for  three  weeks ; 2  when  Prince  Tuan  and  his 
anti-foreign  counselors  swayed  the  Court,  and  the 
Tsung-li  Yamen  had  long  proved  utterly  impotent 
to  cope  with  the  situation ; 3  when  the  6000  Chi- 

1  It  may  reasonably  be  said  that  the  meaning  of  the  interven- 
tion of  Russia,  France,  and  Germany,  in  1895,  in  regard  to 
Japan's  claim  upon  the  Liao-tung  Peninsula  may  be  gathered, 
in  a  retroactive  way,  from  Russia's  conduct  in  Manchuria  since 
1896.  At  any  rate,  M.  Pavloff  declared,  in  October,  1897,  that 
"the  Russian  Government  intended  that  the  provinces  of  China 
bordering  on  the  Russian  frontier  must  not  come  under  the  influ- 
ence of  any  nation  except  Russia."  —  China,  No.  1  (1898),  p.  6. 
This  declaration  throws  light  not  only  on  the  trans-Manchurian 
railway  concessions  and  the  lease  of  ports,  but  also  on  Russia's 
action  respecting  the  Northern  Railway  extension  and  the  con- 
sequent Anglo-Russian  agreement  of  April,  1899.  In  May,  1898, 
there  were  already  200  Russian  soldiers  in  Kirin,  and  in  Decem- 
ber, 2000  in  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan,  while  many  Cossacks 
guarded  railway  construction,  and  many  barracks  were  being 
hurriedly  built,  so  that  there  were  sufficient  indications  even 
before  1900  that  Russia  regarded  Manchuria  as  her  sphere  of 
influence. 

2  May  29.  —  China,  No.  3  (1900),  No.  5. 

8  Cf.  China,  No.  h  (1900),  No.  1  (June  5). 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANCHURIA  141 

nese  soldiers  sent  against  the  Boxers  around  Tien- 
tsin betrayed  themselves  into  inaction  ; 1  when  the 
international  relief  corps  of  marines  led  by  Admi- 
ral Seymour  had  already  been  forced  backward ; 2 
when  the  Boxers  had  at  last  poured  into  Peking 3 
and  held  the  foreigners  in  siege  for  a  week,  killing 
many  Chinese  as  well  as  the  Japanese  Chancellor 
Sugiyama ; 4  and  when  the  Taku  forts  had  been 
faken  by  the  allied  squadron,5  only  to  infuriate 
the  anti-foreign  sentiment  all  over  North  China ; 6 
when  no  news  had  been  received  by  him  even  from 
Tientsin  and  Taku  for  the  past  four  days,7  and  after 
he  had  dispatched  4000  Russian  soldiers  for  the 
disposal  of  M.  de  Giers  at  Peking,8  —  Count  Mura- 
vieff  still  held  an  optimistic  view,  and  supposed  that 
the  trouble  would  be  over  within  two  weeks,  saying 
that  Middle  and  South  China  were  under  a  greater 
peril  than  the  North.9  This  last  assertion,  which  he 
made  more  than  once,10  is  significant  when  we  con- 
sider that  Middle  and  South  China  included  regions 
where  British  interests  were  predominant.  Although 

i  China,  No.  3  {1900),  No.  94;  No. 4  (1900),  No.  1  (June  8). 

a  China,  No.  3  (1900),  No.  219  (June  16-26). 

a  Ibid.,  No.  133;  No.  1*  (1900),  No.  2  (evening,  June  13). 

*  China,  No.  3  (1900),  No.  122  (June  13). 

5  Ibid.,  Nos.  132,  148,  157,  and  186  (June  17). 

•  Ibid.,  No.  157. 

7  Ibid.,  No.  159.  It  is  true  that  some  of  these  events  had  not 
been  known  to  Muravieff,  but  enough  news  had  reached  him  to 
show  the  extreme  gravity  of  the  situation. 

8  Ibid.,  No.  149  (June  16). 

9  Ibid.,  No.  159.  Also  see  Nos.  43,  45,  48,  65,  58, 114, 120,  all 
indicating  the  optimistic  view  of  the  Count. 

10  Cf.  ibid.,  No.  120  (June  13). 


142  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Russia  persistently  declared  her  firm  intention  to 
act  in  concert  with  other  Powers  in  North  China, 
it  is  not  altogether  impossible  to  suppose,  as  it  has 
been  alleged,  that  she  was  not  unwilling  to  divert 
the  attention  of  Great  Britain  and  others  from  North 
China,  where  Russia  would  not  have  hesitated,  if 
possible,  to  render  her  sole  assistance  to  China  to 
suppress  the  insurrection.  At  least,  Russia  declared 
it  to  be  one  of  her  objects  in  China  to  "  assist  the 
Chinese  Government  in  the  work  of  reestablishing 
order  so  necessary  in  the  primary  interest  of  China 
herself ;  "  *  at  least,  the  pro-Russian  Li  Hung-chang 
expressed,  on  June  22,  an  otherwise  inexplicable 
confidence  in  his  ability  to  restore  peace.2    The  real 

1  China,  No.  3  (1900),  No.  149  (June  16).  In  the  Czar's  reply 
to  the  Chinese  Emperor's  appeal  for  a  friendly  intervention,  it 
was  stated  that  "  the  efforts  of  Russia  had  but  one  object  in  view, 
namely,  to  assist  in  the  reestablishment  of  order  and  tranquillity 
in  the  Chinese  Empire,  and,  inspired  by  their  traditional  friend- 
ship for  China,  the  Imperial  Government  have  decided  to  render 
to  the  Chinese  Government  every  assistance  with  a  view  to  re- 
pressing the  present  troubles."  From  the  Russian  Official  Ga- 
zette, as  reported  by  Sir  Charles  Scott  on  August  2, 1900;  China, 
No.  1  (1901),  No.  105.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Russia  had  raised 
objections  to  sending  large  forces  from  Japan  to  the  relief  of 
Peking,  one  reason  being  that  she  supposed  they  would  be  com- 
missioned, not  only  to  rescue  the  Legations,  but  also  to  sup- 
press rebellion  and  restore  peace  in  Peking  and  Tientsin. — 
76zrf.,No.  29. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  175.  A  writer  of  diplomatic  history  of  Russia, 
himself  a  Russian,  considers  that  the  anti-foreign  uprising  was 
owing  to  the  conduct  of  other  Powers  [presumably  in  sending 
Christian  missionaries],  in  which  Russia  had  never  participated; 
and  that,  therefore,  it  was  purely  accidental  that  she  took  part  in 
the  Boxer  campaign.  See  the  To- A  Dobun-kwai  Hokoku,  No. 
48,  pp.  35-36. 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANCHURIA  143 

siege  and  firing  of  the  Peking  Legations  had  begun 
two  days  before,  on  June  20,  the  day  when  Count 
Muravieff  uttered  his  optimistic  remarks  at  St. 
Petersburg.  The  latter  died  the  next  day,  and  was 
succeeded  in  the  Foreign  Ministry  by  Count  Lams- 
dorfr*.  On  June  26,  the  Russian  Government  ordered 
the  mobilization  into  Manchuria  of  six  large  corps 
of  troops  from  Hailar,  Blagovestchensk  and  Haba- 
rofsk,  Vladivostok  and  Possiet,  and  European  Rus- 
sia.1 One  estimate  put  the  number  of  the  Russian 
soldiers  who  had  arrived  in  Manchuria  by  August 
at  30,000.2  It  is  not  easy  to  determine  whether 
Russia  took  the  offensive  in  the  great  Manchu- 
rian  campaign  which  now  began,  or  whether  hostile 
acts  of  the  Chinese  precipitated  it,  but  it  seems 
safe  to  say  that  rumors  of  impending  dangers  had 
been  abundant  before  the  Russian  troops  poured 
into  the  territory,3  and  also  that  the  dispatch  of  the 

1  Tokushu  JoyaJcu,  p.  258.  It  is  said  that  M.  Witte  was  at  the 
time  opposed  to  sending  so  large  forces  into  Manchuria. 

8  The  Kokumin,  March  8,  1901. 

8  But  how  soon  before  the  order  of  mobilization  is  unknown. 
Writing  on  June  29  from  St.  Petersburg,  Sir  Charles  Scott 
said  that  the  Russian  Government  was  alarmed  by  some  news 
received  on  that  day  of  the  serious  disturbances  which  had  oc- 
curred near  the  Manchurian  Railway,  and  it  was  rumored  that 
the  Boxers  were  attacking  and  destroying  the  line  north  of  Muk- 
den, and  had  cut  off  telegraphic  communications  with  Vladi- 
vostok. "The  Chinese  Legation  [at  St.  Petersburg]  is  much 
alarmed  by  this  report,"  continued  the  British  Ambassador,  "  as 
they  had  been  seriously  warned  that  the  slightest  movement 
against  the  safety  of  the  Russian  line  would  be  followed  by  an 
instant  and  forcible  action  by  Russia."  —  China,  No.  3  (1900), 
No.  240. 


144  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

latter  apparently  provoked  more  extensive  outrages 
of  the  rioters  than  would  otherwise  have  been  the 
case.  We  hear  of  the  destruction  of  the  railway 
and  burning  of  religious  establishments  near  Liao- 
yang  and  Mukden  only  from  the  end  of  June  and 
beginning  of  July/  and  the  alleged  determination 
of  the  Chinese  troops  to  drive  out  all  Russians 
from  Manchuria  was  reported  in  the  Russian  Offi- 
cial Messenger  toward  the  middle  of  July.2  Just 
at  this  time  riots  occurred  in  the  Liao-tung  and  its 
vicinity,  communication  by  the  Amur  ceased,  and 
Blagovestchensk  was  suddenly  bombarded  by  the 
Chinese,  followed  by  the  slaughter  of  thousands 
of  Chinese  inhabitants  by  the  Russian  soldiers 
under  General  Gribsky.3  Toward  the  south  and 
east,  the  depot  of  Ninguta  was  destroyed,  and  sev- 
eral Russians  were  murdered  at  An-tung,  about 
July  20.  The  Russian  troops,  many  of  whom  had 
now  arrived  at  different  points  in  Manchuria,  cap- 
tured Hun-chun  on  July  27,  Argun  on  July  30, 
Haibin  on  August  3,  and  Aigun  and  San-sin  soon 
afterward.4  Even  the  treaty  port  of  Niu-chwang 
had  also  been  seized,  for  which  conduct  the  Brit- 
ish and  American  consular  agents  could  not  find 
sufficient  justification.    On  August  5,  the  port  was 

1  The  Kolcumin,  March  8,  1901,  etc. 

2  China,  No.  1  (1901),  No.  47. 

There  were  other  cases  reported  of  the  slaughter  of  non- 
combatants.  The  aggregate  of  those  people  killed  was  said  to 
have  reached  25,000.  See  Tohushu  Joyaku,  p.  261,  which  gives 
a  list  of  these  cases  in  detail. 

4  The  Kokumin,  March  8,  1901,  etc. 


COUNT    LAMSDORFF 
Russian  Foreign  Minister 


THE  OCCUPATION  OF  MANCHURIA  145 

placed  under  the  civil  administration  of  Russian 
authorities,  under  which  injustice  and  disorder  were 
said  to  have  much  increased.1  It  was  on  August 
14,  the  day  when  the  allied  forces  had  almost 
reached  Peking,  that  General  Groderkoff  in  com- 
mand of  the  northern  army  of  the  Manchurian 
invasion  wrote  to  the  Minister  of  War  at  St.  Peters- 
burg :  "  Fifty  years  ago  Nevelskoy  raised  the  Rus- 
sian flag  at  the  mouth  of  the  Amur,  on  its  right 
bank,  and  laid  the  foundation  for  our  possessions 
on  that  great  river.  Now,  after  hard  fighting,  we 
have  taken  possession  of  the  right  bank,  thus  con- 
solidating the  great  enterprise  of  annexing  the 
whole  of  the  Amur  to  Russia's  dominions,  and 
making  that  river  an  internal  waterway  and  not  a 
frontier  stream,  whereby  free  and  unmolested  navi- 
gation of  that  artery  through  one  of  the  vastest 
regions  of  the  Empire  has  been  secured."  Indeed, 
by  the  time  when  the  Peking  Legations  were  re- 
lieved, the  major  part  of  Manchuria  had  been 
reduced  under  a  military  occupation  by  Russia.2 
This  may  be  said  to  mark  a  new  stage  in  the  de- 
velopment   of   the    Manchurian    question,  for   no 

1  See  the  reports  of  the  British  Consuls  Hosie  and  Fulford  and 
the  American  Consul  Miller,  in  China,  No.  5  (1900),  p.  47 ;  No. 2 
(1904),  pp. 29-33,  etc.;  and  the  57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House 
Documents,  vol.  i.  pp.  147-158.  At  one  time  the  relations  be- 
tween the  American  sailors  and  citizens  and  the  Russian  authori- 
ties were  wrought  up  to  a  high  tension,  and  Mr.  Miller  used  so 
strong  language  in  his  correspondence  with  the  latter  that  he  had 
to  be  warned  by  Minister  Conger  of  Peking  and  Assistant  Secre- 
tary Pierce  at  Washington. 

2  See  Tokushu  Jbyaku,  pp.  258-262. 


/ 


146  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

longer  was  this  vast  territory  a  mere  sphere  of  Rus- 
sian influence;  it  was  a  prize  of  conquest.1  The 
problem  for  the  Government  of  the  Czar  hence- 
forth seemed  to  the  outside  world  to  be  not  so 
much  how  it  might  tighten  its  hold  upon  Manchu- 
ria, as  how  it  might  convert  the  temporary  occupa- 
tion into  a  permanent  possession. 

1  Count  Lamsdorff  said  on  November  22,  1903,  to  Mr. 
Kurino,  Japanese  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  that  "  Russia 
once  took  possession  of  Manchuria  by  right  of  conquest.  ..." 
The  Kwampo,  March  24,  1904,  supplement,  p.  8. 


CHAPTER   VII 

NORTH  CHINA  AND  MANCHURIA 

The  problem  stated  at  the  close  of  the  last  chap- 
ter forms  an  index  to  a  period  of  Eastern  diplo- 
macy the  singular  features  of  which  hardly  find  a 
parallel  in  the  world's  history.  The  affairs  of  the 
Extreme  Orient  had  in  general  advanced  to  such  a 
stage  that  no  single  Power  could  again  seek  to 
enforce  its  will  without  due  regard  to  the  interests 
of  some  other  Powers.  The  Russian  problem  in 
Manchuria  was,  as  will  be  seen  after  a  little  reflec- 
tion, of  such  a  nature  that  it  could  hardly  be  lit- 
erally propounded  before  the  world.  The  absorp- 
tion of  a  vast  and  rich  territory  in  China  by  a 
Power  whose  policy  was  known  to  be  aggressive 
would  at  once  arouse  a  determined  protest  of  the 
Powers  which  were,  from  interest  and  from  convic- 
tion, committed  to  the  principles  of  the  integrity 
of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the  open  door  therein 
as  the  best  means  of  insuring  a  lasting  peace  in  the 
Far  East.  The  Manchurian  question  had  to  be  de- 
veloped under  a  disguise  until  it  would  be,  if  ever, 
safe  to  cast  aside  the  veil.  Hence  began  Russia's 
long,  laborious  effort  to  explain  to  the  critical  world 
certain  crude  facts  and  deeds  in  Manchuria  in  the 
terms  of  some   refined    foreign   phrases — phrases 


148  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

whose  significance  in  this  particular  case  her  rivals 
well  knew,  but  which  they  could  not  repudiate  so  long 
as  they  themselves  upheld  the  principles  indicated  by 
those  phrases.  However,  the  moment  a  complex  dip- 
lomatic machinery  relies  upon  subterfuges  for  its 
success,  its  ingenuity  will  be  taxed  to  the  utmost, 
or  its  unity  will  be  in  danger.  For  it  will  not  be 
easy  to  make  the  entire  body  of  diplomatic  agents 
speak  the  same  untruths  at*  all  places  and  at  all 
times.  As  soon  as  one  pretext  is  uncovered,  another 
must  be  invented,  as  it  were,  on  the  spur  of  the 
moment,  in  order  to  cover  the  retreat  from  the 
last  one  —  a  necessary  change  which  might  render 
a  quick  readjustment  of  the  entire  organism  to  the 
newly  created  situation  almost  impossible.  It  would 
indeed  have  been  one  of  the  most  striking  feats  of 
the  government  of  a  nation,  if  the  artful  diplomacy 
of  Russia  had  been  able  to  combat  successfully  to 
the  end,  with  the  enemy's  weapon,  the  straight- 
forward statecraft  of  the  partisans  of  fair  play. 
Let  us  now  observe  in  the  remaining  chapters  of 
this  work  how  this  process  went  on,  and  how  it 
finally  defeated  itself,  —  how  ingenuity  gave  place 
to  threats,  and  how  diplomacy  ended  in  war. 

As  has  been  suggested,  Russia  avowed  that  a 
point  in  her  policy  in  China  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Boxer  trouble  was  to  assist  the  friendly  Government 
of  that  Empire  in  suppressing  the  insurrection  and 
restoring  the  normal  order.1   When,   however,  in 

1  The  circular  note  addressed  to  the  Powers  on  June  3/16, 
China,  No.  3  (1900),  No.  49;  the  letter  to  the  Chinese  Gov- 


NORTH  CHINA  AND  MANCHURIA  149 

spite  of  Count  Muravieff's  inclination  to  regard  this 
matter  lightly,  all  the  Powers  concerned  deemed  the 
situation  grave  enough  to  justify  sending  forces  to 
the  rescue  of  their  Representatives  and  subjects  in 
Peking,  it  became  necessary  for  Russia  to  act  in 
concert  with  the  others,  instead  of  alone  assisting 
China.  Russia  promptly,  on  June  16/  declared  her 
intention  to  cooperate  with  the  other  Powers,  and 
claimed,  about  a  month  later,  to  have  proposed  to 
the  Powers  the  following  "  fundamental  principles 
as  their  rule  of  conduct  in  relation  to  events  in 
China,"  which  principles  were  agreed  to  by  the  major- 
ity of  the  Powers  :  2  (1)  Harmony  among  the  Powers ; 

ernment  on  June  11/24,  China,  No.  2  (1904),  p.  18  ;  the 
Czar's  reply  to  the  Chinese  Emperor,  China,  No.l  (1901),  No. 
105,  etc. 

The  Emperor  had  sent  a  specially  worded  personal  message 
to  each  of  the  heads  of  the  French,  German,  Russian,  British, 
American,  and  Japanese  nations,  once  about  July  19  and  again 
on  October  14,  that  is,  before  and  after  the  capture  of  Peking 
by  the  allied  forces.  In  each  case  the  Emperor  made  a  spe- 
cial appeal  to  the  person  addressed,  and  begged  him  to  take 
the  initiative  in  coming  to  China's  assistance  in  solving  the  situa- 
tion. The  various  replies  are  highly  instructive.  It  seems  that 
the  Czar  supposed  that  he  had  alone  been  singled  out  by  the 
Chinese  Empire  for  the  first  special  plea,  and  answered  accord- 
ingly. 

See  China,  No.  1  (1901),  Nos.  1,  51,  56,  61,  78,  79,  105,  113, 
252;  China,  No.  5  (1901),  Nos.  5,  24,  72,  108,  134,  174,  197; 
China,  No.  2  (1904),  p.  18;  56th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House 
Documents,  vol.  i.  pp.  293-296. 

#1  China,  No.  3  (1900),  No.  149. 

2  These  principles,  says  Lord  Salisbury,  on  July  15,  "have 
never  been  accepted  by  Her  Majesty's  Government,  nor  have  we 
as  yet  discussed  with  other  powers  the  circumstances  to  which 
those  principles  might  possibly  apply."  —  China,  No.  1  (1901), 


150  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

(2)  the  preservation  of  the  status  quo  in  China  prior 
to  the  trouble ;  (3)  the  elimination  of  everything 
which  might  conduce  to  a  partition  of  China ;  and 
(4)  the  reestablishment  by  common  action  of  the 
legitimate  central  Government  at  Peking,  which 
would  be  able  of  itself  to  guarantee  order  and  tran- 
quillity in  that  country.1  Probably  before  these  pro- 
No.  44.  Secretary  Hay  thought  that  the  Russian  Charge's  oral 
communication  was  "  not  explicit  enough  "  to  enable  him  to  com- 
ment upon  the  so-called  fundamental  principles  of  Russia. — 
Ibid.,  No.  114.  Later,  about  July  30,  Mr.  Hay  replied  to  Russia 
by  referring  to  his  own  circular  note  of  July  3,  and  said  that  he 
deemed  it  "premature  to  forecast  the  means  of  bringing  about 
those  results  [i.  e.,  the  restoration  of  order  and  responsible  gov- 
ernment in  China] ." — Ibid. ,  No.  140.  It  is  particularly  remark- 
able that  two  of  the  Powers  most  interested  in  the  principles 
proposed  by  Russia  should  be  so  conservative  when  the  ques- 
tion was  propounded  by  that  Power. 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  pp.  1  and  18. 

It  is  interesting  to  compare  these  "fundamental  principles"  of 
Russia  with  the  principles  laid  down  in  Secretary  Hay's  circular 
telegraph  addressed  to  the  Powers  on  July  3,  or  probably  some 
days  before  the  Russian  note :  "  .  .  .  The  purpose  of  the  Presi- 
dent is,  as  it  has  been  heretofore,"  it  said,  "to  act  concurrently 
with  the  other  Powers,  first,  in  opening  up  communication  with 
Peking  and  securing  the  American  officials,  missionaries,  and 
other  Americans  who  are  in  danger ;  secondly,  in  affording  all 
protection  everywhere  in  China  to  American  life  and  property; 
thirdly,  in  guarding  and  protecting  all  legitimate  American  in- 
terests; and  fourthly,  in  aiding  to  prevent  a  spread  of  the  disor- 
ders to  the  other  provinces  of  the  Empire  and  a  recurrence  of 
such  disorders.  It  is,  of  course,  too  early  to  forecast  the  means 
of  attaining  this  last  result;  but  the  policy  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  is  to  seek  a  solution  which  may  bring  about 
permanent  safety,  and  peace  to  China,  preserve  Chinese  terri- 
torial and  administrative  entity,  protect  all  rights  guaranteed  to 
friendly  Powers  by  treaty  and  international  law,  and  safeguard 
for  the  world  the  principle  of  equal  and  impartial  trade  with  all 


NORTH  CHINA  AND  MANCHURIA  151 

positions  were  penned  by  Count  Muravieff,  orders 
had  been  issued  by  Russia  to  mobilize  large  forces 
into  Manchuria.  In  this  territory  and  in  North 
China,  events  progressed  rapidly  in  the  next  few 
weeks,  and,  by  the  middle  of  August,  the  Legations 
had  been  relieved,  and  the  three  Eastern  Provinces 
had  largely  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the  Russians. 
It  is  essential  to  bear  in  mind  this  dual  state  of  af- 
fairs, for  henceforth  it  appeared  that  the  best  efforts 
of  Russian  diplomacy  were  made  at  once,  in  one 
sense,  in  reconciling  to  one  another,  and,  in  another 
sense,  in  insisting  upon,  the  widely  different  situa- 
tions of  Manchuria  and  of  North  China.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  principle  of  the  integrity  of  China  applied 
to  both  regions  alike,  but,  on  the  other,  Russia 
steadily  declined  to  admit  that  Manchuria  was  within 
the  sphere  of  tlfe  concerted  action  of  the  Powers. 
Thus,  in  her  famous  circular  of  August  25,1  she  de- 
clared, in  regard  to  Manchuria,  where  "  temporary 
measures  "  of  military  occupation  "  had  been  solely 
dictated  by  the  absolute  necessity  of  repelling  the 
aggression  of  the  Chinese  rebels,  and  not  with  in- 
terested motives,  which  are  absolutely  foreign  to  the 
policy  of  the  Imperial  Government,"  that,  as  soon  as 

parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire."  —  The  56th  Congress,  2d  Session, 
House  Documents,  vol.  i.  p.  299.  It  will  be  observed  that  the 
American  note  is  not  only  probably  earlier  in  date,  but  also 
much  wider  in  scope,  than  the  Russian  propositions,  for  the 
former  contains  the  open  door  principle,  among  others,  which 
receives  no  reference  in  the  latter.  It  should  be  remembered, 
however,  that  the  American  note  was  not  a  proposition  to  the 
other  Powers. 

1  China,  No.  1  (1901),  No.  256. 


152  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

peace  was  restored  and  the  security  of  the  railway 
was  assured,  "  Russia  would  not  fail  to  withdraw  her 
troops  from  the  Chinese  territory,  provided  such  ac- 
tion did  not  meet  with  obstacles  caused  by  the  pro- 
ceedings of  other  Powers."  *  From  these  words  it 
was  evident  that  Russia  would  not  allow  the  Man- 
churian  question  to  be  discussed  by  the  Powers,  for 
she  would  withdraw  from  it,  as  she  had  occupied  it, 
on  her  own  initiative,  and  with  no  interference  from 
others.  More  important  still  was  the  fact  that  Rus- 
sia, from  this  time  on,  pledged  to  evacuate  Man- 
churia under  the  apparently  reasonable  conditions — 
of  the  question  of  the  fulfillment  of  which,  however, 
Russia  would  be  the  sole  judge  —  that  peace  and 
security  was  restored  in  the  territory,  and  that  other 
Powers  did  not  interfere  with  her  intentions.  As 
regards  North  China,  the  circular  bespoke  a  striking 
action  on  the  part  of  Russia.  Of  the  two  original 
intentions  of  Russia,  namely,  the  rescue  of  Jthe  Rus- 
sian subjects  in  Peking  and  the  assistance  to  China 
to  restore  peace,  the  first  had  now  been  accomplished, 
but  the  second  was  hindered  by  the  absence  of  the 
Imperial  Court  from  the  capital.  In  these  circum- 
stances, Russia,  seeing  no  reason  for  maintaining 
the  Legations  and  allied  forces  in  Peking,  would 
now  withdraw  M.  de  Giers  and  the  Russian  troops 

1  Statements  of  similar  import  occur  in  the  Official  Messenger 
of  August  13,  in  the  instructions  given  on  October  25  by  Count 
Lamsdorff  to  the  Russian  Representatives  abroad,  and  those  on 
December  28  by  General  Kuropatkin  to  the  governors-general 
of  the  Amur  and  Kwan-tung  Provinces.  See  Tokushu  Joyaku, 
pp.  259-260. 


NORTH  CHINA  AND  MANCHURIA  153 ^^— -^ 

to  Tientsin.  It  was  explained  later 1  that,  while  the 
action  of  Russia  was  not  a  technical  proposition  to 
the  other  Powers,  their  concurrence  in  these  mea- 
sures would  conduce  to  the  return  of  the  Court  to 
the  capital  and  f acilitate  the  settlement  of  the  affair 
between  the  allies  and  China.  It  is  interesting  to 
see  that  at  the  same  time  the  Chinese  Representative 
at  St.  Petersburg  urgently  begged  Li  Hung-chang 
to  memorialize  the  Throne  to  the  effect  that  an  edict 
should  be  issued  to  show  China's  severity  and  abil- 
ity to  maintain  order  when  the  European  troops  were 
withdrawn,  and  the  intention  of  the  Court  to  return 
shortly.  The  adoption  of  this  course,  it  was  thought, 
would  allay  the  apprehensions  of  the  allies  regard- 
ing the  withdrawal  of  their  troops  from  Peking.2 

1  Cf.  China,  No.  1  (1901),  Nos.  267,  300,  314,  315. 

Also  see  the  most  interesting  Russian  document,  quoted  in 
China,  No.  2  (1904),  p-  20.  One  of  its  passages  reads  as  follows: 
"It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  an  attack  on  the  ancient  tradi- 
tions of  the  Chinese  and  on  the  prestige  of  their  Government 
might  be  attended  by  the  most  disastrous  consequences  ;  all  the 
more  so  that  the  international  troops  cannot  occupy  indefinitely 
the  capital  of  a  country  of  400,000,000  inhabitants,  whose  right 
to  live  at  home  as  they  please  can  hardly  be  questioned." 

2  China,  No.  1  (1901),  No.  306.  Also  see  No.  313. 

On  August  19  and  21,  Li  Hung-chang  wired  to  Wu  Ting-fang 
to  urge  upon  the  United  States  Government  that,  inasmuch  as 
the  declared  purpose  of  the  allies  to  relieve  the  Legations  had 
now  been  accomplished,  they  should  suspend  hostilities,  with- 
draw their  troops,  and  appoint  envoys  to  negotiate  with  China. 
See  ibid.,  No.  239,  and  the  56th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House 
Documents,  vol.  i.  pp.  197,288-290.  We  may  naturally  infer  either 
that  Li  sent  similar  telegrams  to  Russia,  or  that  Russia  had  con- 
sulted Li  before  the  circular  was  sent  to  the  Powers,  the  general 
tenor  of  thought  is  so  alike  in  the  telegrams  and  in  the  circular. 


154  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

The  Russian  declaration,  so  far  as  it  regarded  North 
China,  in  spite  of  her  avowal  that  she  would  act 
strictly  in  concert  with  the  other  Powers,  was  as 
surprising  to  some  of  the  latter  as  it  must  have  been 
pleasing  to  China.1  As  might  be  expected,  the 
Powers,  except  France,  doubted  the  practicability 
of  so  early  an  evacuation  of  Peking.2  A  similar  pro- 
position by  Russia,  dated  September  17,  so  far  as 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Legations  to  Tientsin  was  con- 
cerned, came  to  the  same  result.3  Russia,  on  her 
part,  actually  withdrew  her  troops  to  Tientsin,  but 
when  peace  negotiations  were  opened  at  Peking  in 
October,  her  Minister  was  obliged  to  be  present 
there.  In  the  mean  time,  the  different  status  in  which 
Russia  held  Manchuria  from  North  China  was  made 
evident  by  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  campaign 
in  the  former.    Ninguta,  Kirin,  and  Tsitsihar  fell 

1  Russia  herself  was  conscious  of  the  fact  that  others  attributed 
to  her  the  motive  of  ingratiating  herself  with  China  at  a  critical 
moment  by  taking,  separately  from  the  other  Powers,  an  action 
favorable  to  China.    See  China,  No.  2  (1901+),  pp.  19-20. 

2  See  China,  No.  1  (1901),  Nos.  275  (Austria);  280,  322,  328, 
(France);  309  (Italy);  281,  293,  305,  317,  318,  321,  327,  335, 
378,  383  (England);  307;  No.  5  (1901),  Nos.  110,  124,  127 
(Japan);  No.  1  (1901),  Nos.  270,  315  ;  56th  Congress,  2d  Ses- 
sion, House  Documents,  vol.  ii.  pp.  304-305,  378-379,  205  (the 
United  States) .  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Boxers  still  roamed  about 
Peking,  and  the  Chinese  Court,  which  had  fled  to  Ta-yuen,  was 
still  under  the  control  of  Prince  Tuan  and  his  associates.  A  hasty 
withdrawal  of  troops  from  Peking  would  have  been  disastrous 
in  its  effect  upon  the  foreigners  and  native  Christians. 

8  See  China,  No.  1  (1901),  Nos.  356  (Russian  proposition); 
371,  395,  401  (England);  398  (Italy);  No.  5  (1901),  No.  128, 
(Japan);  House  Documents,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i.  pp.  203-204,  305-306, 
381-382. 


NORTH   CHINA  AND  MANCHURIA  155 

into  the  Russian  hands  about  the  same  time  as  the 
evacuation  of  Peking  was  announced;  Liao-yang 
was  taken  late  in  September,  and  Mukden  and  Tien- 
ling  early  in  October.  Feng-hwang-Cheng  and  An- 
tung  were  captured  even  so  late  as  December.  On 
September  7,  a  solemn  thanksgiving  was  held  at  the 
site  of  the  burned  town  Sakhalin  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Amur  across  Blagovestchensk,  in  which 
General  Gribsky  delivered  a  speech,  and  the  high 
priest  Konoploff  was  reported  to  have  said  :  "  Now 
is  the  cross  raised  on  that  bank  of  the  Amur  which 
yesterday  was  Chinese.  Muravieff  foretold  that 
sooner  or  later  this  bank  would  be  ours."  * 
1  China,  No.  1  (1901),  No.  375. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  ANGLO-GERMAN  AGREEMENT 

When  we  recall  that  even  before  1900  Russia  de- 
sired to  control  the  railway  enterprises,  not  only  in 
Manchuria,  but  also  on  the  right  side  of  the  Liao 
River,  it  is  not  altogether  strange  that,  simultane- 
ously with  the  occupation  of  Manchuria,  the  northern 
Chinese  line  was  seized  by  her  troops.  This  action, 
however,  did  not  stop  at  the  Great  Wall.  Had  it 
not  been  for  the  protest  of  Great  Britain,  the  Rus- 
sians would  have  seized  the  entire  line  from  Niu- 
chwang  up  to  Peking.  During  the  latter  part  of 
June,  they  captured  the  Tientsin  depot,  burned 
the  office,  destroyed  the  safe  and  the  documents  it 
contained,  and  seized  land,  some  tracts  of  which 
had  been  owned  by  British  subjects.1  On  July  8, 
the  Northern  Railway  was  seized  and  the  British 
engineer,  C.  W.  Kinder,  and  his  staff  were  turned 
out,2  and,  in  spite  of  the  dissent  of  the  British  and 
American  commanders,  the  Admirals  of  the  allied 
Powers  voted  on  July  16  that  the  Russians  should 
manage  the  railway.3  In  August,  the  Russians 
claimed  also  the  line  between  Tong-ku  and  Shan- 

1  China,  No.  7  (1901),  Nos.  fcl,  76,  81,  84,  86,  95,  103,  149, 
153,  154,  174,  187,  189. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  1  and  7.  8  Ibid.,  Nos.  2,  7,  9. 


THE  ANGLO-GERMAN  AGREEMENT  157 

hai-Kwan,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  one  between 
Tientsin  and  Peking,  on  the  other,  thus  complet- 
ing the  control  of  the  entire  connection.1  British 
protests  were  in  a  measure  waived  by  the  new 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  allied  forces,  Count 
von  AValdersee,  who  early  in  October  assigned  the 
repair  of  the  section  up  to  Yang-tsun  to  the  Rus- 
sians.2 About  this  time,  fifty  miles  of  railway 
material  belonging  to  a  British  firm  were  seized  at 
Niu-chwang  by  the  Russians,3  followed  by  the  seizure 
of  the  collieries  at  Tong-shan  and  Lin-si  hitherto 
operated  by  the  Chinese  Engineering  and  Mining 
Company.4  Other  incidents  followed,  greatly  to  the 
annoyance  of  those  whose  interests  had  been  in- 
vested in  the  works.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that, 
on  October  16,  1900,  an  Agreement  was  signed 
between  the  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and 
Germany,  upholding  the  principle  of  the  open  door 
in  China  (Article  1),  disclaiming  territorial  designs 
upon  China  on  the  part  of  the  contracting  Powers 
(Article  2),  and  supplemented  by  the  following 
Article  (3),  embodying  the  well-known  principle  of 
the  balance  of  power  at  China's  expense :  "  In  case  of 
another  Power  making  use  of  the  complications  in 
China  in  order  to  obtain  under  any  form  whatever 
such  territorial  advantages,  the  two  contracting 
parties  reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  come  to  a 

1  China,  No.  7  (1901),  Nos.  11,  14,  19,  20,  22,  23,  25,  30,  35, 
36,  57,  60,  103. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  24,  27,  37,  38,  43,  50,  54,  55,  66,  68. 

8  Ibid.,  Nos.  39,  77.  4  Ibid.,  40,  78. 


158  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

preliminary  understanding  as  to  the  eventual  steps 
to  be  taken  for  the  protection  of  their  own  inter- 
ests in  China." 1  This  is  the  notorious  Anglo-Ger- 
man Agreement,  the  fate  of  which  has  been  an  ob- 
ject of  much  ridicule  among  writers  upon  Chinese 
affairs  of  recent  years.  The  diplomacy  which  had 
resulted  in  the  conclusion  of  this  Agreement  has  not 
been  made  known  to  the  public,  but  as  to  the  cir- 
cumstances which  had  caused  the  two  Powers  to 
negotiate,  it  may  safely  be  inferred  that,  so  far  as 
the  British  side  was  concerned,  the  Russian  conduct 
in  North  China  was  a  potent  factor.2  As  to  the 
deeper  causes  on  both  sides  for  the  extraordinary 
rapprochement,  it  is  easy  to  speculate  upon  but 
unsafe  to  asseverate  them.3  The  Agreement  fur- 
ther stated  that    other  interested  Powers  should 

1  The  British  Parliamentary  Papers,  Treaty  Series,  No.  1, 
1900. 

2  On  November  1,  Lord  Salisbury  wrote  to  the  British  Charge 
at  St.  Petersburg  in  unusually  outspoken  language,  as  follows : 
"In  the  event  of  the  Russians  making  any  complaint  of  our  hav- 
ing concluded  the  Anglo-German  Agreement  without  previously 
consulting  them,  you  should  dwell  on  the  fact  that  the  conduct 
and  language  of  Russian  officers  in  the  Far  East,  in  respect  to  the 
Chinese  railway  from  Niu-chwang  to  Peking,  and  the  way  in 
which  the  property  of  British  subjects  on  that  railway  has  been 
dealt  with  by  the  Russian  military  authorities,  has  caused  much 
perplexity  to  Her  Majesty's  Government.  The  Russian  Govern- 
ment have  given  us  many  satisfactory  assurances  with  respect  to 
their  intentions  in  these  matters,  but  the  little  attention  paid  to 
the  avowed  policy  of  the  Russian  Government  by  officers  on  the 
spot  has  deterred  us  from  fuller  communication."  —  China, 
No.  7  (1901),  No.  45. 

8  See,  for  instance,  the  explanation  offered  in  Tokushu 
Joyaku,  pp.  384-386. 


THE  ANGLO-GERMAN  AGREEMENT  159 

be  invited  to  accept  the  principles  recorded  in  it 
(Article  4).  It  is  interesting  to  see  how  this  pe- 
culiar combination  of  the  principles  of  (1)  the  open 
door,  (2)  the  integrity  of  China,  and  (3)  a  bal- 
ance between  the  Powers  on  the  Chinese  ground, 
was  fiewed  by  the  other  Powers.  Japan  joined  the 
Agreement  on  October  29,  as  a  signatory,  but  not 
as  an  adhering  State.1  France,  Austria,  and  Italy 
recognized  as  identical  with  their  own  all  of  the 
principles  proposed,2  while  the  United  States  did 
likewise  with  the  first  two,  but  expressed  itself  un- 
concerned with  the  third.3  As  for  Russia,  she  seized 
this  opportunity  to  indulge  her  diplomatic  sarcasm. 
She  declared  that,  from  her  point  of  view,  the 
Agreement  "  did  not  perceptibly  modify  the  situa- 
tion in  China,"  and  the  second  principle  perfectly 
corresponded  with  Russia's  intentions,  as  "  she  was 
the  first  to  lay  down  the  maintenance  of  the  integ- 
rity of  the  Chinese  Empire  as  a  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  her  policy  in  China."  Her  reply  to  the 
first  principle  was  delicately  expressed,  as  follows : 
It  "  can  be  favorably  entertained  by  Russia,  as  this 
stipulation  does  not  infringe  in  any  way  the  status 
quo  established  in  China  by  existing  treaties."  4  In 
other  words,  the  open  door  may  or  may  not  apply 
to  other  places  not  yet  covered  by  the  existing 

1  China,  No.  5  (1901),  Nos.  4  and  7,  inclosure  2. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  6,  8,  and  9. 

8  The  56th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Documents,  vol.  i. 
p.  355. 

4  The  italics  are  the  author's. 


160  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

treaties  and  still  open  to  whatever  development 
might  take  place.  The  evil  genius  of  the  third 
Article  of  the  Anglo-German  Agreement  was  not  less 
skillfully  answered  by  Russia :  "  The  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment, while  referring  to  its  Circular  of  the  12th 
(25th)  August,  can  only  renew  the  declaration  that 
such  an  infringement  [by  another  Power]  would 
oblige  Russia  to  modify  her  attitude  according  to 
circumstances."  1  From  these  words,  it  was  plain 
that  outside  of  the  two  contracting  Powers,  the 
Agreement  could  not  exercise  great  influence,  and 
least  upon  Russia,  which  declined  to  observe  any 
new  feature  in  the  instrument.  The  virtue  of  the 
Agreement  was,  moreover,  seriously  impaired  by  the 
insincerity  of  one  of  its  parties,  and  by  the  conse- 
quent difference  of  views  between  themselves.  The 
document  was  openly  talked  about  in  Germany  as 
the  Yang-tsze  Agreement,  it  being  meant  that  Great 
Britain  thereby  pledged  herself  to  abstain  from  an- 
nexing the  Yang-tsze  Provinces,  hitherto  considered, 
much  to  the  jealousy  of  Germany,  as  a  British 
sphere  of  interest.2  More  momentous  was  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  Agreement  included  in  its  scope, 
not  only  the  eighteen  Provinces,  but  also  Manchuria. 
The  answer  would,  of  course,  depend  upon  whether 
both  parties  would  consider,  under  the  provision 

1  ChJna,  No.  5  (1900),  No.  5. 

2  Also  see  the  debate  in  the  House  of  Lords,  on  August  6, 
1901,  between  Earl  Spencer  and  the  Marquess  of  Lansdowne. 
The  Parliamentary  Debutes,  Fourth  Series,  vol.  98,  pp.  1351- 
1365. 


THE  ANGLO-GERMAN  AGREEMENT  161 

of  the  third  Article,  that  they  alike  possessed  a  their 
own  interests "  to  protect  in  Manchuria.  Seen  in 
this  light,  it  is  not  strange  that,  in  the  opinion  of 
Lord  Lansdowne,  the  "  Agreement  most  unquestion- 
ably extended  to  Manchuria,  which  is  part  of  the 
Chinese  Empire," l  while,  from  Count  von  Billow's 
point  of  view,  "  The  Anglo-German  Agreement 
had  no  reference  to  Manchuria.',  "  I  can  imagine 
nothing,"  he  added,  "  which  we  can  regard  with 
more  indifference "  than  Manchuria.2  Evidently 
Germany  had  entered  into  the  Agreement  with  dif- 
ferent motives  from  those  of  Great  Britain,  and 
perhaps  also  with  less  zeal,  if  zeal  there  was. 

1  At  the  House  of  Lords,  on  August  6,  1901.  The  Japanese 
Government,  also,  in  its  reply  to  a  question  of  a  member  of  the 
National  Diet,  interpreted  the  Agreement  to  apply  to  the  whole 
of  the  Chinese  Empire.  —  Tokushu  Joyaku,  p.  389. 

2  At  the  Reichstag  on  March  15,  1901.  —  The  London  Times, 
August  6, 1901,  p.  7.  He  is  also  said  to  have  declared  to  the  Rus- 
sian Representative  at  Berlin  that  Manchuria  was  outside  of  the 
sphere  of  German  commercial  rights,  and  consequently  had  no 
relation  with  the  Anglo-German  Agreement.  It  was  reported 
even  that  Manchuria  was  originally  mentioned  specifically  in 
the  British  draft  of  the  Agreement,  but  the  word  was  struck 
out  at  the  request  of  Germany,  and  the  more  abstract  phrase, 
"spheres  of  influence,"  was  used  therefor.  —  Tokushu  J dyaku, 
pp.  388-389. 


CHAPTER  IX 

A  MODUS  VIVENDI:    THE  ALEXIEFF-TS^NG 
AGREEMENT 

In  the  mean  time,  the  Chinese  Court l  having  largely 
emancipated  itself  from  the  sway  of  the  reactionary 
Prince  Tuan  and  his  associates,  the  Representatives 
at  Peking  of  the  eleven  interested  Powers  had  agreed 
in  September  to  open  discussions  among  themselves 
of  the  terms  of  peace  to  be  presented  to  the  Chinese 
plenipotentiaries,  Prince  Ching  and1  Li  Hung- 
chang.2  The  German  Government,  however,  pro- 
posed, as  a  prerequisite  of  peace  negotiations  with 
China,  a  drastic  measure  demanding  the  surrender 
to  the  Powers  of  the  chief  culprits  of  the  recent 
trouble.  The  proposition  meeting  little  encourage- 
ment from  other  Ministers,  Germany  presented  a 

4 

1  The  Court  had  fled  toward  Ta-yuen-Fu  before  the  allied 
troops  reached  Peking,  and  thence  started  toward  Si-ngan-Fu, 
the  capital  of  many  a  historic  dynasty,  on  October  1. 

2  Russia  had  early  advocated  accepting  Li  as  plenipotentiary, 
while  other  Powers  were  still  skeptical  of  the  nature  of  his  cre- 
dentials. See  China,  No.  1  (1901),  Nos.  254,  356,  368,  371,  398, 
401;  China,  No.  5  (1901),  Nos.  5,  31,  111,  112,  128,  216;  U.  S. 
56th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Documents,  vol.  i.  pp.  203- 
204,  305-306,  381-382.  It  was  not  till  September  20  that  Li 
entered  Peking.  Prince  Ching  had  arrived  there  September  3. 
The  appointment  of  the  Prince  as  a  plenipotentiary  is  said  to 
have  been  partly  due  to  Japanese  influence. 


THE  ALEXIEFF-TS^NG  AGREEMENT  163 

new  condition  on  October  3.  The  latter  was,  how- 
ever, supplanted  by  the  basis  for  negotiations  for- 
mulated on  September  30  and  presented  five  days 
later  to  the  Powers  by  the  French  Minister.1  His 
proposals,  to  which  Russia  immediately  assented,2 
and  which  with  important  amendments 3  and  addi- 
tions became  the  basis  of  the  Protocol  signed  on 
September  7,  1901,  comprised  the  following  six 
points :  (1)  the  punishment  of  the  chief  offenders 
designated  by  the  Representatives  of  the  Powers  at 
Peking ;  (2)  maintenance  of  the  prohibition  of  the 
importation  of  arms  into  China ;  (3)  indemnities  for 
the  foreign  governments,  societies,  and  individuals ; 
(4)  establishment  of  a  permanent  legation  guard  at 
Peking ;  (5)  dismantlement  of  the  Taku  forts ;  and 
(6)  military  occupation  of  two  or  three  points  on 
the  road  from  Tientsin  to  Taku,  so  as  to  keep  open 
the  passage  between  Peking  and  the  sea.  It  is 
needless  for  us  to  follow  the  negotiations  which 
proceeded  at  Peking  after  these  proposals  were 
made  by  France,  but  it  is  important  to  observe  that 
the  French  propositions  were  limited,  in  the  first 
place,  to  North  China,  and,  in  the  second  place,  to 
those  questions  in  North  China  which  concerned  all 
the  Powers  alike.  The  significance  of  all  this,  or  at 
least  of  the  prompt  assent  of  Russia,4  may  well  be 

1  Documents   diplomatiques :    Chine,    1899-1900,   No.   327 
(p.  174).    Also  see  China,  No.  o  (1901),  pp,  5,  46,  53-54. 

2  China,  No.  5  (1901),  No.  17. 

8  For  the  Japanese  amendments,  see  ibid.,  Nos.  60,  151,  178. 

4  Russia  openly  declared  in  her  Messager  Officiel  of  March  24 

(April  6),  1901,  that  the  Russian  views  regarding  the  settlement 


164  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

inferred  from  the  opposition  as  readily  offered  by 
the  latter  when  Germany 1  and  Japan,2  respectively, 
urged  that  a  proper  mention  should  be  made  in  the 
peace  protocol  of  China's  consent  to  repair  the 
murder  of  Baron  von  Ketteler  and  the  Chancellor 
Sugiyama.  Russia  maintained  that  "proposals  of 
this  nature,  serving  principally  as  a  satisfaction  to 
be  given  to  private  views  of  one  State,  ought  not  to 
enter  into  the  common  programme  of  the  collective 
demands,  which  had  as  their  object  the  interests  of 
all  the  Powers  collectively  and  the  reestablishment 
of  a  normal  state  of  affairs  in  the  Celestial  Empire."  3 
"  In  the  Chinese  question  it  is  advisable,"  said  the 
Official  Messenger  of  St.  Petersburg,  "  not  to  lose 
sight  of  the  necessity  of  distinguishing  clearly  the 
questions  which  interest  each  of  the  Powers  in  par- 
ticular and  those  which  affect  the  interests  of  all  the 
Powers  in  general."  4  This  distinction  had  been  fun- 
damental in  the  Russian  diplomacy  in  China  since 
1900,  for,  if  one  question  of  the  former  class  was 
allowed  to  be  dealt  with  in  the  common  deliberation 
of  the  Representatives  of  all  the  Powers,  why  should 
not  another  question  of  the  same  class  be  similarly 
treated?  Or,  in  other  words,  if  the  Sugiyama  af- 
fair was  referred  to  the  collective  council,  the  argu- 

of  the  trouble  in  North  China,  as  distinguished  from  Manchuria, 
had  "  served  the  French  Government  as  a  basis  for  the  elabo- 
ration" of  the  latter's  propositions.  —  China,  No.  2  (190 14), 
pp.  20-21. 

1  November  5.  — China,  No.  5  (1901),  No.  117. 

2  November  28.—  Ibid.,  Nos.  178  and  198. 

8  China,  No.  2  (1904),  p.  21.  4  Ibid.,  p.  20. 


THE  ALEXIEFF-TSENG  AGREEMENT  166 

ment  that  the  Manchurian  problem  should  be 
solved  solely  by  Russia,  without  intervention  of  the 
other  Powers,  would  lose  much  of  its  force.1  The 
ultimate  failure  of  Russian  diplomacy  —  for  diplo- 
macy has  failed  when  it  ends  in  a  war,  and,  if  Rus- 
sia does  succeed,  her  success  will  be  that  of  force, 
not  of  diplomacy  —  may  be  said  to  be  largely  due 
to  the  evident  contradiction  of  this  fundamental 
distinction  between  North  China  and  Manchuria, 
upon  which  she  sought  to  build  her  entire  diplo- 
matic structure  in  this  crisis.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
it  was  as  impossible  to  deny  the  profound  interest 
felt  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  and, 
above  all,  by  Japan,  in  the  economic  development 
of  Manchuria,  as  it  would  have  been  to  exclude 
Russia  from  the  community  of  the  Powers  in  North 
China.  It  should  be  remembered  that  Russia  her- 
self persistently  maintained  that  the  principle  of 
the  integrity  of  China  applied  also  to  Manchuria, 
i  and  she  would  have  hardly  antagonized  other  Powers 
had  she  expressed  an  equally  clear  adhesion  to  the 
principle  of  the  open  door,  and  made  efforts  to 
carry  out  pledges  regarding  both  principles. 

Events  soon  took  place,  however,  which  made 
other  Powers  skeptical  of  Russia's  sincerity  in  her 
profession  of  even  the  principle  of  the  integrity  of 

1  Russia  allowed  the  question  of  the  indemnity  in  Manchuria 
to  be  dealt  with  at  the  general  conferences  at  Peking  together 
with  the  indemnity  respecting  North  China.  In  the  matter  of 
the  punishment  of  guilty  local  officials,  from  the  discussion  of 
which  Russia  abruptly  withdrew  herself,  the  representatives 
of  the  other  Powers  included  Manchuria  in  their  consideration. 


166  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  Chinese  Empire.  The  new  question  thus  thrust 
upon  the  attention  of  the  Powers  was  of  an  ex- 
tremely grave  nature,  for  if  the  sovereignty  of 
Manchuria  should  eventually  pass  into  the  hands 
of  Russia,  the  treaty  rights  that  other  nations  had 
acquired  therein  from  China  might  rightfully  be 
terminated  by  Russia.  Whatever  her  ultimate  ob- 
jects, it  was  hardly  politic  for  her  to  approach  the 
difficult  Manchurian  question  at  the  time  and  iiu. 
the  manner  selected  by  her.  Dr.  George  Morrison 
reported  to  the  Times  on  December  31,  1900, 
and  Sir  Ernest  Satow,  the  British  Minister  at 
Peking,  confirmed  it  as  authentic,1  that  the  dele- 
gates of  Admiral  Alexieff  and  the  Tartar  General 
Tseng-chi,  of  Mukden,  had  signed,  in  November 
last,  an  agreement  whereby  Russia  consented  to 
return  to  the  Chinese  the  civil  government  of  the 
Southern  Province  of  Feng-tien  (Sheng-king)  in 
Manchuria,  on  the  following  conditions  :  — 

1.  "  The  Tartar  General  Tseng  undertakes  to  protect 
the  province  and  pacify  it,  and  to  assist  in  the  construc- 
tion of  the  railroad. 

2.  "He  must  treat  kindly  the  Russians  in  military 
occupation,   protecting  the   railway   and   pacifying  the 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  5  (January  4,  1901).  Sir  Charles 
Scott,  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  reported  on  January  5, 
that  it  appeared  to  be  generally  believed  there  that  "some  provi- 
sional agreement,  such  as  that  indicated,  had  been  concluded  by 
Russia  with  the  local  authorities  in  Manchuria,  and  that  she 
might  eventually  acquire  by  treaty  the  right  to  finish  building 
the  railway  line  through  Manchuria  to  Port  Arthur,  and  to  pro- 
tect it  herself,  the  rights  of  the  Russo-Chinese  Company  being 
transferred  to  the  Russian  Government."  —  Ibid.,  No.  4. 


THE  ALEXIEFF-TS&NG  AGREEMENT  167 

province,    and    provide   them   with    lodging   and    pro- 
visions. 

3.  "  He  must  disarm  and  disband  the  Chinese  soldiery, 
delivering  in  their  entirety  to  the  Russian  military  offi- 
cials all  munitions  of  war  in  the  arsenals  not  already 
occupied  by  the  Russians. 

4.  "All  forts  and  defenses  in  Feng-tien  not  occupied 
by  the  Russians,  and  all  powder  magazines  not  required 
by  the  Russians,  must  be  dismantled  in  the  presence  of 
Russian  officials. 

5.  "Niu-chwang  and  other  places  now  occupied  by 
the  Russians  shall  be  restored  to  the  Chinese  civil  ad- 
ministration when  the  Russian  Government  is  satisfied 
that  the  pacification  of  the  provinces  is  complete. 

6.  "  The  Chinese  shall  maintain  law  and  order  by  local 
police  under  the  Tartar  General. 

7.  u  A  Russian  Political  Resident,  with  general  powers 
of  control,  shall  be  stationed  at  Mukden,  to  whom  the 
Tartar  treneral  must  give  all  information  respecting  any 
important  measure. 

8.  "Should  the  local  police  be  insufficient  in  any  emer- 
gency, the  Tartar  General  will  communicate  with  the 
Russian  Resident  at  Mukden,  and  invite  Russia  to  dis- 
patch reinforcements. 

9.  "  The  Russian  text  shall  be  the  standard."  * 

In  brief,  the  province  was  to  be  disarmed,  its 
military  government  to  be  in  the  Russian  hands, 
its  civil  government  to  be  placed  under  the  super- 
vision of  a  Russian  Resident,  with  additional  duties 
on  the  part  of  the  Chinese  to  provide  for  the  Rus- 

1  The  London  Times,  January  3,  1901,  p.  3.  In  this  and 
other  reports  Dr.  Morrison  seems  to  have  translated  from  Chi- 
nese texts. 


168  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

sian  military  and  to  protect  Russian  properties. 
The  last  provisions  were  coupled  with  the  right 
of  the  Russians  to  supply  reinforcements,  if  the 
Chinese  local  police  should  prove  insufficient.  The 
probable  significance  of  this  measure  will  be  fully 
discussed  in  connection  with  the  Russo-Chinese  Con- 
vention of  April  8,  1902.  As  regards  the  Agree- 
ment now  under  discussion,  Dr.  Morrison  opined 
that  it  would  necessarily  be  followed  by  similar 
agreements  with  reference  to  the  other  two  of  the 
three  Eastern  Provinces/  and  then  all  Manchuria 
would  be  "  a  de  facto  Russian  protectorate,  Russia 
by  a  preexisting  agreement  having  already  the 
right  to  maintain  all  necessary  troops  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  railway."  It  is  needless  to  say  that 
the  report  of  this  Agreement  caused  universal 
amazement  in  the  diplomatic  world.  It  soon  be- 
came known 2  that  the  Chinese  delegate  who  signed 
it  at  Port  Arthur  had  received  no  authorization  to 
do  so  from  the  Peking  Government.3  But  the  Jap- 
anese Government,  hearing  from  a  reliable  source 
that  so  late  as  the  beginning  of  February,  Russia 
was  pressing  China  to  ratify  the  Agreement,  under- 

1  The  Russian  Official  Messenger  of  April  6,  1901,  stated  that 
"temporary  agreements  in  writing  (modus  vivendi)  respecting 
the  reestablishment  of  the  local  civil  administration  in  the  three 
Provinces  of  Manchuria  were,  before  all  else,  concluded  between 
the  Russian  military  authorities  and  the  Chinese  tsian-tsiouns 
[Generals]  of  the  three  Provinces."—  China,  No.  2  (1904),  p.  22. 

2  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  5  (January  4). 

The  Tartar  General  Tseng-chi  was  degraded  for  this  offense, 
but  Russia  succeeded  in  reinstating  him.  —  The  Times,  Febru- 
ary 20,  1901,  p.  5. 


THE  ALEXIEFF-TSENG  AGREEMENT  169 

took  to  express  its  opinion  to  the  Chinese  Min- 
ister at  Tokio,  that  the  conclusion  of  any  such 
agreement  would  be  a  u  source  of  danger  "  to  the 
Chinese  Government,  and  that  no  arrangement 
aifecting  territorial  rights  of  the  Empire  ought  to 
be  concluded  between  the  Chinese  Government  and 
any  one  of  the  Powers.1  At  the  instance  of  Japan, 
Great  Britain  also  made  precisely  the  same  repre- 
sentation to  China,2  Germany  following  the  ex- 
ample in  slightly  different  language,3  and  the 
United  States  also  reminding  China  of  "  the  impro- 
priety, inexpediency,  and  even  extreme  danger  to 
the  interests  of  China,  of  considering  any  private 
territorial  and  financial  engagements,  at  least  with- 
out the  full  knowledge  and  approval  of  all  the 
Powers  now  engaged  in  negotiation."  4 

It  has  often  been  reported  in  the  press  that  the 
Agreement  was  never  ratified  by  either  China  or 
Russia.  Before,  however,  any  of  the  protests  of  the 
Powers  reached  the  Peking  Government,  Count 
Lamsdorff  had,  on  February  6,  "  very  readily  "  ex- 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  8. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  13  (February  13). 

8  The  opinion  of  the  German  Government  was  that  China 
"should  not  conclude  with  any  Power  individual  treaties  of  a 
territorial  or  financial  character  before  they  can  estimate  their 
obligations  toward  all  the  Powers  as  a  whole,  and  before  the 
compliance  with  such  obligations  is  accepted."  —  Ibid.,  Nos.  12, 
13. 

4  Ibid.,  No.  19  (February  19). 

What  action  the  remaining  Powers  took  is  not  shown  in  the 
Blue  Books.  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  are  said  to  have  also 
protested. 


170  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

plained  the  situation  to  the  British  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg.  He  said  it  was  quite  untrue  that  any 
agreement  which  would  give  Russia  new  rights  and 
a  virtual  protectorate  in  Southern  Manchuria  had 
been  concluded  or  was  under  discussion  with  China, 
but  "  the  Russian  military  authorities  who  had  been 
engaged  in  the  temporary  occupation  and  pacifica- 
tion of  that  province  had  been  directed,  when  rein- 
stating the  Chinese  authorities  in  their  former  posts, 
to  arrange  with  the  local  civil  authorities  a  modus 
Vivendi  for  the  duration  of  the  simultaneous  presence 
of  Russian  and  Chinese  authorities  in  Southern 
Manchuria,  the  object  being  to  prevent  the  recur- 
rence of  disturbances  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Russian 
frontier,  and  to  protect  the  railway  from  the  Russian 
frontier  to  Port  Arthur."  "  Some  of  the  details  of 
the  proposed  modus  vivendi  had  been  sent  for  con- 
sideration to  St.  Petersburg,  but  no  convention  or 
arrangement  with  the  central  Government  of  China 
or  of  a  permanent  character  had  been  concluded 
with  regard  to  Manchuria,  nor  had  the  Emperor  any 
intention  of  departing  in  any  way  from  the  assur- 
ances which  he  had  publicly  given  that  Manchuria 
would  be  entirely  restored  to  its  former  condition  in 
the  Chinese  Empire  as  soon  as  circumstances  ad- 
mitted of  it."  1  A  careful  reading  of  this  statement, 
as  typical  of  the  many  declarations  made  by  Rus- 
sia in  regard  to  Manchuria,  will  show  how  untenable 
is  the  popular  view  that  she  persistently  falsifies. 
There  is  here  a  fair  admission  that.a  modus  vivendi 
1  China,  No.  2  (1901). 


THE  ALEXIEFF-TS^NG  AGREEMENT  171 

was  under  way  between  the  Russian  military  officers 
in  Southern  Manchuria  and  the  local  Chinese  au- 
thorities, and  that  it  was  not  of  a  permanent  nature, 
nor  was  it  concluded  with  the  central  Government 
at  Peking,  and  both  of  these  points  accord  with  the 
reported  facts.  Nor  can  one  deny  the  cogency  of 
the  argument  that  Russia  would  evacuate  Manchuria 
"  as  soon  as  circumstances  admitted  of  it."  What 
constituted  the  objectionable  feature  of  the  affair, 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  interested  Powers,  must 
have  been  that,  inasmuch  as  Count  Lamsdorff  would 
not  publish  the  terms  of  the  modus  Vivendi,  it  was 
not  possible  for  them  to  satisfy  themselves  that  it 
contained  nothing  which  would  render  impossible 
the  consummation  of  "  circumstances  "  favorable  for 
evacuation,  and  eventually  tend  toward  a  "  per- 
manent "  possession  of  the  territory  by  Russia.  As 
matters  stood,  it  would  be  as  natural  for  the  Powers 
to  entertain  such  a  doubt,  as  it  was  for  Russia  to 
deem  it  necessary  to  declare,  in  her  circular  of 
August  25,  1900,  that  she  would  withdraw  from 
Manchuria  if,  for  one  thing,  no  obstacle  was  placed 
in  her  way  by  the  action  of  other  Powers.  The 
doubt  of  the  Powers  was  rather  intensified,  if  at  all, 
by  the  further  explanation  by  Count  Lamsdorff  on 
February  6,  that  "when  it  came  to  the  final  and 
complete  evacuation  of  Manchuria,  the  Russian 
Government  would  be  obliged  to  obtain  from  the 
central  Government  of  China  an,effective  guarantee 
against  the  recurrence  of  the  recent  attack  on  her 
frontier  and  the  destruction  of  her  railway,  but  had 


172  THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

no  intention  of  seeking  this  guarantee  in  any  ac- 
quisition of  territory  or  of  an  actual  or  virtual 
protectorate  over  Manchuria,  the  object  being  to 
simply  guarantee  the  faithful  observance  in  the 
future  by  China  of  the  terms  of  the  agreement 
[agreement  between  the  Chinese  Government  and 
the  Russo-Chinese  Bank,  September  28,  1896?], 
which  she  had  been  unable  to  fulfill  during  the 
disturbances.  The  terms  of  this  guarantee  might 
possibly  form  the  subject  of  conversation  here  be- 
tween Count  Lamsdorff  and  the  Chinese  Minister, 
or  be  left  for  discussion  at  Peking." 1  A  month 
before  this  official  statement  of  Russia  reached  the 
London  Government,  the  latter  heard  from  the 
Japanese  Minister,  Baron  Hayashi,  that  Russia  and 
China  had  already  made  at  St.  Petersburg  some 
arrangement  regarding  Manchuria,2  evidently  re- 
ferred to  by  Count  Lamsdorff  in  the  quoted  passage 
as  "an  effective  guarantee." 

1  China,  No.  2  (1901). 

2  China,  No.  2  {190$  >  No.  6. 


CHAPTER  X 

A  "STARTING-POINT"— THE  LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU 
CONVENTION 

It  was  as  early  as  January  12  that  the  Japanese 
Government  had  made  inquiries  directly  at  the 
Russian  Government  regarding  the  contents  of  the 
Agreement  reported  to  have  been  made  between 
Count  Lamsdorff  and  Yang-yu  at  St.  Petersburg.1 
The  report  was  apparently  premature,  for  its 
contents  were  unknown  for  more  than  a  month 
after,  and  even  on  February  18,  Dr.  Morrison 
reported  from  Peking  that,  according  to  a*-  tele- 
gram to  the  Chinese  Government  from  Yang-yu, 
it  would  be  several  days  before  Count  Lamsdorff 
and  M.  Witte  could  settle  the  terms*  between  them- 
selves of  the  new  agreement  they  wished  to  pro- 
pose.2 The  Times  correspondent,  however,  was 
able  to  send  certain  preliminary  articles  which, 
he  said,  had  been  verbally  communicated  by  M. 
Witte  to  Yang-yu.3    On  February  27,  Sir  Ernest 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  6. 

2  The  Times,  February  20,  1901,  p.  5. 

8  Ibid.  "The  Chinese  argue,"  added  Dr.  Morrison,  "that 
Russia,  having  no  interests  south  of  the  Great  Wall,  no  mission- 
aries, no  trade,  and  no  troops,  can  reasonably  expect  in  return 
benevolent  treatment  from  China  in  any  agreement  proposed 
outside  the  Great  Wall,  especially  as  Russia  is  in  military  occu- 


174  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

Satow1  and  Dr.  Morrison2  simultaneously  reported 
the  contents  of  the  agreement  which  Yang-yu  had 
been  called  upon  by  Count  Lamsdorff  to  sign,  and 
which  he  had  telegraphed  to  Peking  on  the  23d. 
The  proposed  convention  was,  according  to  Dr. 
Morrison,  obviously  intended  to  exist  side  by  side 
with  the  Alexieff-Tseng  Agreement  concluded  in 
the  previous  November.  The  substance  of  this  con- 
vention, the  authenticity  of  which  the  same  writer 
claimed  to  have  been  admitted  by  the  Russians 
in  Peking,  was  as  follows  :  — 

1.  "The  Emperor  of  Russia,  being  desirous  of  mani- 
festing his  friendship  for  China,  ignores  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  in  Manchuria,  and  agrees  to  restore  the  whole 
of  that  country  to  China,  to  be  administered  in  all  re- 
spects as  of  old. 

2.  "By  the  6th  Article  of  the  Manchurian  Railway 
Agreement,  the  Railway  Company  was  authorized  to 
guard  the  line  with  troops.  The  country  being  at  present 
in  disorder,  the  number  of  those  troops  is  insufficient  for 
the  purpose,  and  a  corps  must  be  retained  until  order  is 
restored  and  China  has  executed  the  last  four  Articles  of 
the  present  convention. 

3.  "In  case  of  emergency  the  troops  retained  in  Man- 
churia shall  render  every  possible  assistance  to  China  in 
preserving  order. 

pation.  .  .  .  Russia  appears  determined  to  profit  by  the  condi- 
tion to  which  China  is  reduced  by  the  action  of  the  other  Powers, 
just  as  she  profited  by  obtaining  the  Primorsk  Province  after  the 
war  of  1860,  and  Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan  subsequent  to  the 
war  of  1895." 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  14.    Cf.  ibid.,  Nos.  25  and  42. 

2  The  Times,  February  28,  1901,  p.  5. 


THE  LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU  CONVENTION      175 

4.  "Chinese  troops  having  been  the  greatest  aggres- 
sors in  the  recent  attacks  on  Russia,  China  agrees  not 
to  organize  an  army  until  the  railway  is  completed  and 
opened  to  traffic.  When  military  forces  are  organized 
eventually,  their  numbers  shall  be  fixed  in  consultation 
with  Russia.  The  importation  of  arms  and  munitions  of 
war  into  Manchuria  is  prohibited. 

5.  "  As  a  measure  for  the  preservation  of  Manchuria, 
China  shall  dismiss  from  office  all  Generals-in-Chief 
(Tartar  Generals)  and  high  officials  whose  actions  con- 
flict with  friendly  relations,  and  who  are  denounced  for 
that  reason  by  Russia.  China  may  organize  mounted 
and  foot  police  in  the  interior  of  Manchuria,  but  their 
numbers  shall  be  fixed  in  consultation  with  Russia. 

"  Cannon  shall  be  excluded  from  their  armament,  and 
no  subjects  of  another  Power  shall  be  employed  in  the 
execution  of  the  functions. 

6.  "In  accordance  with  the  understanding  formerly 
accepted  by  China,  no  subject  of  another  Power  shall  be 
employed  to  train  naval  or  military  forces  in  the  North- 
ern Provinces  (i.  e.,  Provinces  in  North  China). 

7.  "The  local  authorities  nearest  to  the  neutral  zone 
referred  to  in  Article  5  of  the  Liao-tung  Agreement  (of 
March  15/27,  1898)  shall  make  special  regulations  for 
the  preservation  of  order  in  the  zone. 

"The  administrative  autonomy  of  Kin-chow  shall  be 
abolished. 

8.  "Without  the  consent  of  Russia,  China  shall  not 
concede  mining,  railway,  or  other  privileges  to  another 
Power,  in  the  countries  adjoining  Russia,  that  is  to 
say,  in  Manchuria,  Mongolia,  Tarbagatai,  Hi,  Kashgar, 
Yarkand,  Khoten,  etc.  China  shall  not  herself  construct 
a  railway  in  those  countries  without  Russia's  consent. 

"  Outside  of  Niu-chwang,  land  shall  not  be  leased  to 
he  subjects  of  another  Power. 


176  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

9.  "China  is  under  obligation  to  pay  Russia's  war 
expenses  and  indemnities  to  the  Powers.  The  amount 
of  indemnity  due  to  Russia,  the  dates  of  payment,  and 
the  security,  shall  be  arranged  conjointly  with  the  Powers. 

10.  "The  amounts  due  for  damage  done  to  the  rail- 
way, for  the  property  of  the  Company's  employees  which 
was  stolen,  and  for  losses  caused  by  delay  of  the  works, 
shall  be  arranged  by  the  company  with  China. 

11.  "An  understanding  may  be  come  to  with  the  Rail- 
way Company  to  set  off  the  whole  or  part  of  the  above 
indemnities  against  privileges  of  other  kinds.  This  may 
be  arranged  by  an  alteration  of  the  existing  Railway 
Agreement  (of  August  27  /  September  8,  1896),  or  by  the 
concession  of  further  privileges. 

12.  "China  shall,  as  previously  agreed,1  grant  a  con- 
cession for  the  construction  of  a  railway  from  Manchu- 
rian  main  line,  or  a  branch  line,  to  the  Great  Wall  in  the 
direction  of  Peking."  2 

There  never  appeared  an  authentic  text  of  the 
convention  from  either  the  Russian  or  the  Chinese 
official  sources,  but  its  existence  in  some  drastic 
form  was  intimated  by  the  Viceroys  Liu  and 
Chang,  and  by  the  Court  Ministers  then  at  Si- 
ngan,  as  well  as  by  the  Chinese  Emperor  himself.3 
Furthermore,  it  could  be  plainly  inferred  that  no 
one  but  Chinese  diplomatic  officials  could  have  let 
out  the  terms  of  the  proposed  convention,  or  else 
it  would  have  been  impossible  for  one  to  believe 

1  See  pp.  91-92,  above. 

2  China,  No.  2  (190k),  No.  42.  Other  versions  are  similar 
in  substance  to  this  one,  which  was  forwarded  by  Sir  Ernest 
Satow. 

8  See  China,  No.  2  (190k),  Nos.  16,  17,  32,  35. 


THE  LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU  CONVENTION      177 

that  an  instrument  of  so  immense  a  scope  and  so 
arbitrary  a  nature,  as  had  been  reported,  could 
have  emanated  from  Russia.  If  the  reported  text 
was  in  the  main  authentic,  as  Sir  Ernest  Satow  be- 
lieved it  was,1  it  is  little  wonder  that  Russia  exer- 
cised a  vigorous  pressure  upon  the  Peking  Govern- 
ment for  a  speedy  signing  of^  the  convention  before 
the  arrival  of  effective  protests  from  other  Powers, 
her  Minister  at  Peking  stating  to  Prince  Ching  and 
Li  Hung-chang  that  the  Agreement  concerned  only 
Russia  and  China,  and  that  the  Peking  Government 
should  not  take  any  notice  of  what  the  foreign  Re- 
presentatives might  say  about  it.2  The  Court  ap- 
peared seized  by  a  panic,  excepting  the  pro-Russian 
Li  Hung-chang,  who  pretended  that  he  considered 
that  the  proposed  convention  would  not  impair  the 
sovereignty  of  China  in  Manchuria.3  The  Emperor, 
declaring  that  "  it  was  impossible  for  China  alone 
to  incur  the  displeasure  of  Russia  by  remaining 
firm,"  appealed,  on  February  28,  to  Great  Britain, 
the  United  States,.  Germany,  and  Japan  to  mediate.4 
The  British  Government  at  once  instructed  Sir 
Ernest  Satow  to  stay  the  hand  of  Li,  who  was  about 
to  sign,  till  he  had  received  the  replies  of  the  four 
Powers  whose  mediation  had  been  formally  re- 
quested by  the  Emperor,  and  also  to  urge  the  patri- 
otic Yang-tsze  Viceroys  to  memorialize  the  Throne 

1  China,  No.  2  (190$,  No.  30. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  18  (March  1). 

*  Ibid.,  No.  15  (February  28). 
4  Ibid.,  No.  16. 


178  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

against  the  acceptance  of  the  Kussian  proposition.1 
The  Viceroys,  as  well  as  several  other  subjects  of 
China,  had  already  done  so.2  The  British  remon- 
strance to  China  against  entering  into  separate 
agreements  with  individual  Powers  was  repeated 
on  March  20.3  At  the  same  time  Germany  sug- 
gested, Great  Britain  and  Japan  seconding,  that 
China  should  refer  the  matter  to  the  conference  of 
the  foreign  representatives  at  Peking,  who  were,  it 
should  be  remembered,  in  the  midst  of  their  diffi- 
cult discussion  of  the  preliminary  terms  of  peace 
between  the  Powers  and  China.4  It  is  unnecessary 
to  say  that  Japan,  in  concert  with  Great  Britain, 
strongly  urged  the  Chinese  Government  not  to  sign 
the  convention  separately  with  one  of  the  Powers, 
for  such  an  act  was  contrary  to  the  principle  of 
solidarity  which  then  united  the  Powers,  and  an 
individual  convention  with  a  Power  would  mate- 
rially lessen  the  capacity  of  China  to  meet  her  ob- 
ligations toward  all  the  Powers.5 

At  this  point  we  have  to  record  a  singular  conjunc- 
tion of  circumstances  which  has  caused  criticisms 
not  altogether  favorable  to  Russia.  It  has  already 
been  shown  that  she  had  frequently  had  recourse 
to  acts  which  at  once  placed  her  somewhat  apart 
from  the  community  of  the  Powers,  and  also  were 
liable  to  be  interpreted  as  being  designed  to  in- 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  21  (March  4). 

2  Ibid.,  No.  31.  8  Ibid.,  No.  24. 
-*Ibid.,  Nos.  22  and  23  (March  5). 


6  Ibid.,  No.  28. 


THE  LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU  CONVENTION       179 

gratiate  herself  with  the  afflicted  China.  Thus  Count 
Lamsdorff  more  than  once  deprecated  the  contin- 
uance of  the  punitive  expeditions  which  the  allied 
forces  made  to  one  place  or  another  in  the  Province 
of  Chi-li.1  His  reasons  were  so  apparently  plausible 
that,  under  different  circumstances,  he  might  have 
been  supported  by  certain  other  Powers.2  These 
very  Powers,  however,  most  keenly  resented  Rus- 
sia's detachment  from  the  allies,  when  she  defi- 
nitely cleared  herself  from  the  deliberation  of  the 
Representatives  of  the  Powers  at  Peking  in  regard 
to  the  punishment  to  be  inflicted  by  the  Chinese 
Government  upon  certain  provincial  officials  who 
had  been  directly  guilty  of  outrages  to  foreigners 
during  the  recent  trouble.  The  peace  commission- 
ers had  almost  disposed  of  the  punishment  question, 
in  order  next  to  attack  the  knotty  problem  of  the 
indemnity  to  be  paid  by  China,  but  M.  de  Giers 
had  been  instructed  by  his  Government  u  not  only 
to  abstain  from  entering  into  any  discussion  as 
to  the  nature  or  method  of  execution  of  the  capi- 
tal sentence,  but  also  to  take  no  part  in  the  fur- 
ther discussions  relative  to  the  punishment  to  be 
inflicted  on  the  Chinese  dignitaries."3  "At  the 
meeting  [of  the  peace  commissioners  at  Peking] 
to-day,"  wrote  Sir  Ernest  Satow  on  February  28, 

1  China,  No.  6  (1901),  Nos.  61  (January  30),  and  119  (Feb- 
ruary 20). 

2  Cf.,  e.  g.,  ibid.,  No.  62. 

8  From  the  Official  Messenger  of  St.  Petersburg  of  April  5, 
1901;  China,  No.  2  (190Jb),  p.  22. 


180  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  day  after  he  reported  the  draft  of  the  most 
exhaustive  agreement  broached  by  Kussia  upon 
China,  and  the  very  day  when  the  Chinese  Em- 
peror appealed  to  Great  Britain,  Germany,  the 
United  States,  and  Japan  to  intervene,  "  we  pre- 
sented to  our  colleagues  our  list  of  provincial  offi- 
cials, of  whom  ten  were  named  as  deserving  the 
death  penalty  and  about  ninety  to  be  punished  in 
a  lesser  degree.  Objection  was  made  only  by  the 
Kussian  Minister,  who  stated  that  he  could  not  ac- 
cept our  proposals  unless  he  received  fresh  instruc- 
tions, and  that  his  Government's  wish  from  the 
beginning  had  been  to  substitute  a  less  severe  form 
of  punishment  for  the  death  penalty.  Both  my 
French  colleague  and  I  are  of  opinion  that  our 
death  penalty  list  might  justly  have  included  far 
more  than  what  had  been  demanded,  and  is  exceed- 
ingly moderate  in  its  reduced  form."  '  On  March 
15,  that  is,  about  the  time  when  the  terms  of  her 
proposed  agreement  were,  as  will  be  presently  seen, 
modified  by  Russia  in  China's  favor,  Sir  Charles 
Scott  wrote  Lord  Salisbury  that  recently  Count 
Lamsdorff  had  intimated  that  "  he  considered  the 
question  of  the  punishment  of  Chinese  officials 
at  an  end  as  far  as  concerned  Russia,"  and  that 
"he  referred  to  the  murders  of  the  missionaries 
as  a  subject  in  which  Russia  was  not  interested." 2 

1  China,  No.  6  (1901),  No.  135. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  176.  It  may  be  remembered  that  Japan  had  even 
a  stronger  reason  than  Russia  to  abstain  from  all  the  unplea- 
sant questions  connected  with  the  missionaries,  but  it  is  need- 


THE  LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU  CONVENTION      181 

Such  a  remark  was  regarded  as  a  radical  departure 
from  the  diplomatic  amenities  between  the  Powers. 
Kussia  might  without  offense  have  pleaded  her 
reasons  against  the  opinion  of  the  majority,  and 
then  dissented  at  the  final  vote,  but  it  was  consid- 
ered a  very  different  matter  for  her  to  declare,  in 
such  a  way  as  would  openly  place  the  other  Powers 
in  a  false  light  in  the  eyes  of  the  Chinese,  that  she 
had  nothing  to  do  with  the  question.  The  act,  it 
must  be  said,  came  with  particular  ill  grace  at  a 
time  when  Russia  was  believed  to  be  negotiating 
an  agreement  with  China,  separately,  and  in  terms 
manifestly  contrary  to  the  fundamental  principles 
upon  which  the  Powers'  diplomacy  at  Peking  was 
based.1  A  joint  vote  demanding  the  punishment 
of  the  officials  had  to  be  presented  to  the  Chinese 
commissioners,  on  April  1,  with  the  signatures  of 
all  but  M.  de  Giers.2 

Directly  in  connection  with  this  episode  may  be 
considered  the  fact  that,  at  the  urgent  request  of 

less  to  say  that,  in  her  joint  action  with  other  Powers  in  the  mat- 
ter of  the  official  punishment  and  other  questions,  she  regarded 
missionaries  and  other  foreigners  alike  as  subjects  with  certain 
inviolable  rights. 

1  Dr.  Morrison  wrote  from  Peking  on  March  3:  "To  render 
China  more  willing  speedily  to  sign  the  convention,  M.  de  Giers 
has  informed  Li  Hung-chang  that  Russia  will  not  participate  in 
the  demand  for  the  execution  of  ten  provincial  officials  guilty  of 
inhuman  murders  of  white  men,  whose  death  justice  demands. 
Thus  the  murdered  English  men,  women,  and  children  may  be 
described  as  England's  contribution  toward  securing  to  Russia 
the  advantages  derived  from  this  convention."— The  London 
Times,  March  4,  1901,  p.  5. 

2  China,  No.  6  (1901),  No.  234. 


182  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

China,  Eussia  had  in  the  mean  time  somewhat  mod- 
ified the  terms  of  her  proposition,  about  March 
19,  so  as,  in  brief,  to  allow  China  to  station  troops 
in  Manchuria  for  the  protection  of  the  Russian  rail- 
ways and  the  prevention  of  fresh  disorders,  their 
numbers  and  posts  to  be  determined  by  consulting 
Russia;  and  also  to  prohibit  the  importation  of 
arms  and  ammunition  only  in  accordance  with  the 
agreement  with  the  Powers  (Article  4) ;  to  exclude 
cannon  from  the  armament  of  the  Chinese  mounted 
and  foot  police  forces  in  Manchuria  only  until  peace 
is  restored  (Article  5) ;  to  retain  the  administrative 
autonomy  of  Kin-chow  (Article  7);  and  to  arrange 
with  the  Company  the  matter  of  indemnities  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  general  method  used  by  the  Powers 
(Article  10).  The  eighth  Article  was  altered  so  as  to 
apply  the  exclusive  measure  only  to  Manchuria,  and 
the  sixth  was  entirely  expunged.1  Simultaneously 
with  these  modifications  in  China's  favor,  Russia 
seemed  to  have  suddenly  increased  her  pressure  upon 
the  helpless  Court  of  China.  Count  Lamsdorff  was  re- 
ported 2  to  have  declared  to  Yang-yu  that  he  would 
withdraw  the  draft  and  break  off  negotiations  if  it 
were  not  signed  within  two  weeks  from  March  13. 
An  Imperial  Decree,  dated  March  20,  and  addressed 
to  Sir  Chin-chen  Lo-feng-luh,  the  Chinese  Minister  at 
London,  stated :  "  The  Manchurian  Agreement  has 
now  been  amended,  but  the  stipulated  time  within 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  Nos.  28,  29,  42. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  28,  30.  Later  confirmed  by  the  Chinese  officials. 
See  No.  33. 


THE  LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU  CONVENTION      183 

which  the  Agreement  is  to  be  signed  will  soon  ex- 
pire. As  the  Marquess  o£  Lansdowne  has  advised  us 
to  wait  for  his  reply  [to  the  Edict  of  February  28], 
we  have  now  to  command  Lo-feng-luh  to  ask  Lord 
Lansdowne  either  (1)  to  help  us  out  of  the  difficulty, 
or  (2)  to  ask  Russia  to  extend  the  time  stipulated 
for  signing  the  Agreement.  Otherwise,  we,  being 
placed  in  great  difficulty,  will  be  unable  to  oppose 
Russia  any  further.  An  immediate  reply  is  expected. 
Respect  this."  !  On  the  next  day  came  an  urgent 
appeal  from  Yang-tsze  Viceroys  and  Taotai  Sheng, 
who  requested,  under  instructions  from  the  Chinese 
Government,  that  Great  Britain,  the  United  States, 
Germany,  and  Japan  intervene  to  obtain  an  exten- 
sion of  time  with  a  view  to  the  modification  of  the 
Articles  regarding  civil  administration  in  the  Chi- 
nese garrisons  in  Manchuria,  the  exclusive  trading 
rights  demanded  by  the  Russians,  and  the  proposed 
railway  to  the  Wall. 2  Six  days  later,  on  March  27, 
the  two-week  period  expired,  and  the  Chinese  Court, 
which  still  sojourned  at  Si-ngan  in  the  Shen-si 
Province,  telegraphed  to  Sir  Chin-chen  Lo-feng-luh, 
as  follows  :  "  We  have  followed  the  advice  of  Lord 
Lansdowne,  in  not  giving  our  authority  to  sign  the 
Manchurian  Agreement.  In  your  telegrams  of  the 
20th3  and  23d4  instant,  you  have  assured  us  of 
the  moral  support  of  England  if  we  followed  her 
advice.     Our  Plenipotentiaries,  Prince  Ching  and 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  32.  2  Ibid.,  No.  33. 

8  Probably  ibid.,  No.  31. 
This  telegram  has  not  appeared  in  the  Blue  Books. 


184  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Viceroy  Li,  report  that  Kussia  will  now  permanently 
occupy  Manchuria,  and  that  the  collective  negotia- 
tions will  have  to  be  suspended.  The  Court  feels 
great  anxiety  about  this  matter.  As  Manchuria  is 
the  cradle  of  the  present  dynasty,  how  could  China 
tolerate  a  permanent  occupation  of  that  region  ?  We 
now  apply  for  the  positive  assistance  of  England  in 
bringing  about  a  satisfactory  settlement  between 
China  and  Russia,  in  order  to  avoid  a  rupture  with 
that  Power,  which  could  not  fail  to  be  detrimental 
to  the  interests  of  China  and  the  treaty  Powers. 
Please  lay  the  contents  of  the  telegram  before  Lord 
Lansdowne  and  request  an  immediate  reply."  *  It 
is  possible  that  these  messages  were  simultaneously 
repeated  to  some  or  all  of  the  rest  of  the  four 
Powers,  and,  if  so,  it  becomes  tenable  that,  but  for 
the  protests  of  the  Powers,  Li  Hung-chang  might 
have  signed  the  agreement.  Nor  can  it  be  denied 
that,  even  after  their  final  refusal  to  accept  the 
Russian  proposals,  the  Chinese  officials  clearly  ap- 
prehended that,  failing  the  positive  support  of  the 
Powers,  Manchuria  would  he  permanently  occupied 
by  the  northern  Power.  It  is,  of  course,  uncertain, 
and  perhaps  also  immaterial,  whether  they  had  vol- 
untarily reached  that  conclusion,  or  whether  the 
Russians  had  led  them  to  the  belief  by  threats. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  see  what  explanations  Russia 
had  offered,  for  Japan  about  January  12 2  and 
Great  Britain  on  March  4 3  had  made  inquiries  at 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  35.  2  Ibid.,  No.  6. 

8  Ibid.,  No.  20. 


THE  LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU  CONVENTION      185 

the  Russian  Government  in  respect  to  the  actual 
text  of  the  Agreement.  Lord  Lansdowne  repeated 
his  query  on  March  9,  adding  that  if  the  version 
reported  by  Sir  Ernest  Satow  was  approximately 
accurate,  it  was  "  impossible  to  describe  it  as  a 
contract  of  a  temporary  and  provisional  nature, 
and  our  treaty  rights  were  certainly  affected  by  it." 
Then,  in  his  oft  outspoken  vein,  the  Marquess  con- 
cluded :  "  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  surely  reasonable 
that  we  should  ask  his  Excellency's  [Count  Lams- 
dorff's]  help  in  exposing  the  trick,  and  putting  the 
saddle  on  the  right  horse,  if,  as  he  suggests,  garbled 
versions  of  the  Agreement  are  being  circulated  by 
the  Chinese  Government  in  order  to  create  dissen- 
sion between  the  Powers  ;  and  you  may  state  that 
to  join  the  Russian  Government  in  exhibiting  in  its 
true  light  so  discreditable  a  manoeuvre  would  afford 
the  liveliest  satisfaction  to  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment."1 Russia,  however,  would  not  communicate 
the  text  of  the  proposed  Agreement,  and  it  was 
explained  later  by  Count  Lamsdorff  that  there  had 
been  a  "programme,"  the  detail  of  which  had  at 
one  time  or  another  been  under  discussion,  but 
there  had  never  existed  any  regular  draft  Agree- 
ment in  twelve  Articles;  that  the  Czar  had  at 
no  time  given  him  the  full  powers  indispensable 
for  concluding  such  an  agreement,  and  that  in 
her  negotiations  with  China  [concerning  the  pro- 
gramme], three  different  Departments  of  the  Rus- 
sian Government  had  been  equally  engaged.  These 
1  China,  No.  2  (lMf),  No.  26. 


186  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

circumstances,  and  also  "  the  unwise  interference 
of  the  press  and  public,  which  seemed  to  assert  a 
very  dangerous  claim  to  be  admitted  to  a  seat  and 
voice  in  the  councils  of  the  Powers  regarding 
China,"  made  it  very  difficult  for  the  Count  to  be  as 
frankly  communicative  as  he  would  otherwise  have 
wished  to  have  been.  Indeed,  "  it  would  have  been 
impossible  for  him  to  have  discussed  the  details  of 
these  negotiations  with  a  third  Government."  1  To 
the  Japanese  Minister,  who  had  been  instructed  by 
his  Government  to  make  the  friendly  proposal  to 
Russia  that  the  Representatives  of  the  Powers  at 
Peking  should  be  given  an  opportunity  to  consider 
the  draft  of  the  Manchurian  Agreement  before  it 
was  signed,  Count  Lamsdorff  replied  in  no  less  in- 
teresting manner.  He  observed,  on  March  26,  that 
the  Agreement  solely  concerned  two  independent 
States,  and  must  be  concluded  without  the  inter- 
vention of  any  other  Powers,  and  politely  but  firmly 
declined  to  consider  any  such  proposal  as  was  made 
by  Japan.  The  Count  added,  however,  that  "  he 
could  give  an  official  assurance  to  the  Japanese 
Minister  that  neither  the  sovereignty  and  the  in- 
tegrity of  China  in  Manchuria  nor  the  treaty  rights 
of  any  other  Power  were  affected  by  the  proposed 
Agreement;  that  it  was  of  a  provisional  nature, 
and  a  necessary  preliminary  to  the  Russian  troops 
evacuating  the  province.  Its  early  signature  was 
desired  by  his  Excellency  in  order  that  the  unjust 
suspicions  aroused  by  false  reports  with  regard  to 
1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  39. 


THE  LAMSDORFF-YANG-YU  CONVENTION      187 

it  might  be  removed  by  its  publication."  1  Satis- 
fied neither  with  this  statement  nor  with  China's 
refusal  to  sign  the  Agreement,  the  Japanese  Gov- 
ernment is  said  to  have  made  a  second  protest  at 
St.  Petersburg  in  a  more  resolute  tone  than  in 
the  first,  on  April  5.2  On  the  same  day,  however, 
appeared  in  the  Russian  Messager  Officiel  a  long 
statement  recapitulating  Russia's  relations  with 
China  since  the  beginning  of  the  Boxer  affair,  and 
declaring  that,  owing  to  the  publication  in  the 
foreign  press  of  all  sorts  of  false  reports  of  the 
alleged  treaties  with  China,  and  to  the  serious  ob- 
stacles that  had  apparently  been  put  in  the  way  of 
China  as  regards  the  conclusion  of  an  agreement 
with  Russia  serving  as  "a  starting-point"  toward 
the  restoration  of  Manchuria  to  China,  "it  had 
been  found  impossible  immediately  to  take  the 
measures  contemplated  for  the  gradual  evacuation 
of  Manchuria."  The  negotiations  had  been  dropped. 
"  With  regard  to  the  question  of  the  complete  and 
final  restitution  of  this  territory  to  China,"  con- 
cluded the  official  statement,  "  it  is  evident  that  it 
can  only  be  accomplished  after  a  normal  state  of 
affairs  has  been  reestablished  in  the  Chinese  Em- 
pire, and  a  central  Government  has  been  secured 
in  the  capital,  independent  and  sufficiently  strong 
to  guarantee  Russia  against  the  renewal  of  the  dis- 
turbances of  last  year.  While  maintaining  the 
present  temporary  form  of  government  with  the 

1  Chirm,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  34. 

2  The  Kokumin,  April  6,  1901. 


188  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

object  of  insuring  order  in  the  neighborhood  of 
the  vast  Russian  frontier,  but  remaining  unalter- 
ably true  to  their  original  programme,  as  repeatedly 
formulated,  the  Imperial  Government  will  quietly 
await  the  future  progress  of  events."  * 

1  China,  No.  2  tfW),  No.  37,  pp.  17-28. 


CHAPTER  XI 

FURTHER  DEMANDS 

Russia  did  not  wait  long  before  reaching  another 
"  starting-point."  No  sooner  did  the  effort  of  Vice- 
roy Chang  Chih-tung  and  the  late  Viceroy  Liu 
Kun-yi  to  create  among  the  Representatives  of  some 
Powers  a  sentiment  in  favor  of  opening  all  Man- 
churia to  foreign  trade,  so  as  to  forestall  the  annex- 
ation of  the  territory  by  Russia,  miscarry,1  than  Sir 
Ernest  Satow  reported  from  "  a  thoroughly  trust- 
worthy source, "  on  August  14,  1901,  that  Russia 
was  resuming  her  negotiations  with  China  to  bring 
about  the  signature  of  the  amended  Manchurian 
Agreement  of  the  preceding  March.2  Lord  Lans- 
downe  at  once  instructed  him  to  inform  the  Chinese 
authorities,  if  his  advice  was  requested,  that  the 
proper  course  for  them  to  pursue  would  be  to  call 
the  attention  of  the  Powers  to  the  matter  and  to 
communicate  the  text  of  the  provisions  in  question, 
should  they  prove  inconsistent  with  the  treaty  obliga- 
tions of  China  to  other  Powers  or  with  the  integrity 
of  the  Empire ;   so  that  the  British  Government 

1  The  Kokumin,  May  19,  1901. 

2  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  40.  In  No.  42  (August  21),  Sir  Er- 
nest gives,  in  three  parallel  columns,  the  original  terms  proposed 
by  Russia  in  February,  the  alterations  of  March,  and  the  pro- 
posals now  made  in  August.  The  last  two  are  nearly  identical. 


190  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

should  be  ready  to  advise  whether  an  infraction  of  its 
treaty  rights  was  involved,  or  whether  the  provi- 
sions were  in  any  other  way  objectionable.1  It  does 
not  appear  that  Russia  exercised  great  pressure 
upon  China  for  the  conclusion  of  the  Agreement. 
Toward  the  end  of  the  month,  M.  de  Giers  was  re- 
placed as  Russian  Minister  at  Peking  by  M.  Paul 
Lessar,  formerly  a  railway  engineer  on  the  Afghan 
frontier,  and  a  man  of  delicate  health  but  brilliant 
parts.  Meanwhile,  the  peace  commissioners  of  the 
eleven  Powers  had  at  last,  on  September  17, 
1901,  succeeded  in  signing  at  Peking  with  the  two 
Chinese  Plenipotentiaries  the  final  Protocol  between 
China  and  the  Powers  for  the  resumption  of  their 
friendly  relations.2  It  seems  that,  when  the  affairs 
in  North  China  were  thus  finally  settled,  Russia 
felt  herself  freer  than  she  ever  had  been  to  deal  in- 
dependently with  China  concerning  the  Manchurian 
question,  which  the  Powers  had  allowed  to  remain. 
Moreover,  the  Imperial  Court  was  expected  shortly 
to  return  to  the  capital,  and  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment began  to  look  anxiously  for  the  withdrawal  of 
foreign  troops  from  the  realm.  Seizing  this  oppor- 
tunity, M.  Lessar  seems  to  have  mooted,  probably 
on  October  5,3  a  new  convention  of  evacuation, 
whose  comparatively  mild  terms  commended  them- 
selves powerfully  at  this  moment  to  the  Chinese 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  41  (August  16). 

2  See  Mayers,  pp.  283-318;  or  the  Blue  Book,  Treaty  Series, 
No.  17,  1902:  Final  Protocol  between  the  Foreign  Powers  and 
China  for  the  Resumption  of  Friendly  Relations. 

8  Tokushu  Joyaku,  p.  266. 


FURTHER  DEMANDS  191 

commissioners,  especially  to  Li  Hung-chang.1  Con- 
sidering the  feeble  attitude  of  China,  it  would  have 
been  extremely  difficult  for  the  interested  Powers  to 
protest  to  her  against  the  acceptance  of  the  Russian 
demands,  had  not  the  Viceroys  Liu  and  Chang,  after 
learning  their  contents,  again  strongly  reminded 
the  Emperor  and  the  Empress  Dowager  of  the 
direct  peril  to  the  reigning  dynasty  which  might 
result  from  acceding  to  the  Kussian  proposals.  In 
accordance  with  the  wishes  of  the  Court,  the  dying 
Li  Hung-chang  is  said  to  have,  on  his  sick-bed, 
seen  M.  Lessar,  and  appealed  to  the  Russian  friend- 
ship toward  China  to  modify  the  terms  of  the  pro- 
posed amendment.2  Li  soon  passed  away,  on  No- 
vember 7,  leaving  the  gravest  problem  of  China  in  a 
state  of  extreme  uncertainty.  As  to  the  contents  of 
the  Russian  proposition,  it  is  interesting  to  observe 
that  they  were  presently  revealed  from  a  source 
whose  veracity  could  hardly  be  questioned.  On 
December  11,  Prince  Ching  disclosed  them  to  Mr. 
Conger.3  They  coincided  with  those  that  the  latter 
had  reported  to  Secretary  Hay  on  the  3d,  namely, 
that,  stated  briefly,  Russia  should  evacuate  Man- 
churia, under  the  usual  conditions,  in  three  years; 
that  China  should  protect  the  railways  and  Russian 
subjects  in  the  territory ;  that  she  might  station, 

1  See  the  summary  of  Li's  highly  interesting  letter  of  Sep- 
tember 30,  which  has  just  appeared  in  the  London  Times  for 
October  12,  1904,  p.  6. 

2  Tokushu  Jbyaku,  pp.  266-267;  The  Kokumin,  November  2, 
pp.  23,  30,  190-191. 

8  The  U.  S.  57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Documents, 
vol.  i.  p.  272. 


192  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

in  places  other  than  lands  assigned  to  the  Railway 
Company,  mounted  and  foot  soldiers,  whose  num- 
bers should,  however,  be  determined  by  an  agree- 
ment with  Russia,  and  who  should  exclude  artillery ; 
that  troops  of  no  other  nationality  should  be  em- 
ployed in  protecting  the  railways ;  that  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Agreement  of  April,  1899,  should  be 
strictly  adhered  to ;  that  subjects  of  no  other  nation- 
ality should  without  Russian  consent  be  allowed  to 
build  railways  or  bridges  in  Southern  Manchuria; 
and  that  the  Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sin-min- 
ting  Railways  should  be  returned  to  China  after  her 
payment  to  Russia  of  the  expenditure  incurred  by 
the  latter  in  their  occupation.1  Prince  Ching,  it  ap- 
pears, presented  a  counter-proposition  to  the  Russian 
convention,  which,  among  other  things,  seems  to 
have  requested  that  the  evacuation  of  Manchuria 
should  be  completed  within  one  year,  instead  of  three, 
as  was  provided  in  the  original  draft.  Russia's  reply 
to  this  arrived  in  Peking  the  last  of  January,  1902, 
agreeing  to  reduce  the  period  of  evacuation  from 
three  to  two  years.2  At  the  same  time,  however,  the 
Russian  Government  now  strongly  supported,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  proposed  convention,  a  separate  agree- 
ment proposed  by  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank.  The 
latter,  according  to  Prince  Ching,  contained,  besides 
the  railway  concessions  already  granted  to  the  Bank, 

1  The  U.  S.  57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Documents, 
vol.  i.  p.  271.  Compare  a  version  in  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  266- 
267. 

2  The  U.  S.  57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Documents, 
vol.  i.  p.  272. 


LI    HUNG-CHANG 


FURTHER  DEMANDS  193 

provision  that  China  should  herself  undertake  all 
industrial  development  in  Manchuria,  but  if  she 
required  financial  help  from  the  outside,  application 
should  always  first  be  made  to  the  Russo-Chinese 
Bank ;  only  when  the  latter  did  not  wish  to  engage 
in  the  work  might  citizens  of  other  countries  be 
allowed  to  undertake  it.  A  clause  was  also  to  be 
inserted,  the  practical  value  of  which  is  not  clear, 
that  citizens  of  every  country  should  have  the  same 
rights  as  they  then  did  to  trade  at  the  open  ports 
and  in  the  interior.1  Prince  Ching  was  obliged  to 
acknowledge  to  Mr.  Conger,  on  January  19,  1902, 
that,  owing  to  the  pressure  which  Russia  increased 
simultaneously  with  the  apparent  concessions  she 
had  made,  she  would  yield  no  further,  and  "  he  was 
convinced  that,  if  China  held  out  longer,  they 
would  never  again  secure  terms  so  lenient ;  that 
the  Russians  were  in  full  possession  of  the  territory, 
and  their  treatment  of  the  Chinese  was  so  aggra- 
vating that  longer  occupation  was  intolerable ;  that 
they  must  be  got  out,  and  that  the  only  way  left 
for  China  to  accomplish  this  was  to  make  the  best 
possible  terms.  The  only  terms  that  Russia  would 
consent  to  were  the  signing  of  both  the  Convention 
and  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  Agreement."  2 

It  is  unnecessary  to  say  that  against  the  Russian 
demands  Great  Britain,  Japan,  and  the  United 
States  had  separately  and  more  than  once  entered 

1  The  U.  S.  57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Documents, 
vol.  i.  pp.  273-274. 

1  Ibid.,  pp.  273-274  (Conger  to  Hay). 


194  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

firm  protests  at  Peking.  The  conduct  of  the  first 
two  Powers,  however,  is  not  shown  in  the  published 
documents.  Secretary  Hay  reminded  the  Russian 
and  Chinese  Governments,  on  February  3,  of  the 
repeated  assurances  made  by  the  Czar's  Foreign 
Minister  of  his  devotion  to  the  principle  of  the 
open  door  in  all  parts  of  China,  and  said :  "  An 
agreement  whereby  China  gives  any  corporation  or 
company  the  exclusive  right  or  privilege  of  open- 
ing mines,  establishing  railroads,  or  in  any  other 
way  industrially  developing  Manchuria,  can  but  be 
viewed  with  the  greatest  concern  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States.  It  constitutes  a  monopoly, 
which  is  a  distinct  breach  of  the  stipulations  of 
the  treaties  concluded  between  China  and  foreign 
Powers,  and  thereby  seriously  affects  the  rights  of 
American  citizens." !  To  this  note,  the  interesting 
reply  of  Count  Lamsdorff,  signed  by  himself,  was  : 
" .  .  .It  [the  Russian  Government]  feels  itself 
bound  ...  to  declare  that  negotiations  carried  on 
between  two  entirely  independent  States  are  not 
subject  to  be  submitted  to  the  approval  of  other 
Powers.  There  is  no  thought  of  attacking  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  '  open  door  '  as  that  principle  is  under- 
stood by  the  Imperial  Government  of  Russia?  and 
Russia  has  no  intention  whatever  to  change  the 
policy  followed  by  her  in  that  respect  up  to  the 
present  time.    If  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  should 

1  The  U.  S.  57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Documents, 
vol.  i.  pp.  926-928. 

2  The  italics  in  the  quotation  are  the  author's. 


FURTHER  DEMANDS  195 

obtain  concessions  in  China,  the  agreements  of  a 
private  character  relating  to  them  would  not  differ 
from  those  heretofore  concluded  by  so  many  other 
foreign  corporations.1  But  would  it  not  be  very 
strange  if  the  '  door '  that  is  s  open  '  to  certain  na- 
tions should  be  closed  to  Russia,  whose  frontier  ad- 
joins that  of  Manchuria,  and  who  has  been  forced  by 
recent  events  to  send  her  troops  into  that  province 
to  reestablish  order  in  the  plain  and  common  inter- 
est of  all  nations?  ...  It  is  impossible  to  deny 
to  an  independent  State  the  right  to  grant  to  others 
such  concessions  as  it  is  free  to  dispose  of,  and  I 
have  every  reason  to  believe  that  the  demands  of 
the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  do  not  in  the  least  exceed 
those  that  have  been  so  often  formulated  by  other 
foreign  companies,  and  I  feel  that  under  the  cir- 
cumstances it  would  not  be  easy  for  the  Imperial 
Government  to  deny  to  the  Russian  companies  that 
support  which  is  given  by  other  Governments  to 
companies  and  syndicates  of  their  own  national- 
ities. At  all  events,  I  beg  your  Excellency  to  believe 
that  there  is  not,  nor  can  there  be,  any  question  of 
the  contradiction  of  the  assurances  which,  under  the 
orders  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor,  I  have  had  occa- 

1  Observe  how  powerfully  Russia  applies  this  argument.  On 
February  4,  M.  Lessar  said  that  Russia  was  merely  asking 
privileges  in  Manchuria  similar  to  those  granted  to  Germany 
in  Shan-tung. — The  U.  S.  57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House 
Documents,  vol.  i.  p.  274.  Russia,  if  she  would,  could  with  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  impunity  inquire  of  Great  Britain  and  other 
Powers  how  it  was  that  they  allowed  Germany  to  acquire  her 
apparently  exclusive  rights  in  Shan-tung,  and  now  objected  to 
Russia's  following  her  example  only  on  a  larger  scale. 


196  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

sion  to  give  heretofore  in  regard  to  the  principles 
which  invariably  direct  the  policy  of  Russia." 1  It 
should  be  noted  here  that  Count  Lamsdorff's  state- 
ment, while  it  refers  to  the  Agreement  with  the  Bank, 
which  he  supported,  contains  no  reference  to  the 
Convention  proposed  by  the  Russian  Government. 

Negotiations  lagged,  China  probably  declining 
to  sign  under  the  remonstrances  of  Great  Britain, 
the  United  States,  and  Japan.  On  March  2,  Prince 
Ching  showed  Mr.  Conger  a  draft  of  his  new  coun- 
ter-proposals, which  Japan  was  said  to  have  wholly, 
and  Great  Britain  in  the  main,  approved.2  These 
proposals  are  interesting  for  their  practical  identity, 
save  a  slight  difference,3  with  the  final  Russo-Chi- 
nese  Convention  of  April  8,  1902,  which  will  be 
fully  treated  in  a  subsequent  chapter.  This  fact  is  a 
conclusive  evidence  that  after  March,  Russia  sud- 
denly accepted  nearly  all  of  the  counter-proposals 
made  by  China.  This  abrupt  condescension  on  the 
part  of  Russia  is  supposed  to  have  been  partly  due 
to  an  important  event  which  had  recently  taken 
place  in  the  diplomatic  world  —  the  conclusion  of 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement  signed  at  London  on 
January  30,  1902,  and  simultaneously  announced 
in  Parliament  and  the  Imperial  Diet  of  Tokio  on 
February  12. 

1  The  U.  S.  57th  Congress,  2d  Session,  House  Documents, 
vol.  i.  p.  929. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  277-279. 

8  I.  e.,  the  draft  of  March  limited  the  period  of  evacuation  to 
one  year,  instead  of  a  year  and  a  half,  as  in  the  convention  of 
April. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   ANGLO-JAPANESE   AGREEMENT  AND   THE 
RUSSO-FRENCH   DECLARATION 

The  details  of  the  negotiations  preliminary  to  the 
consummation  of  this  remarkable  stroke  of  diplo- 
macy have  not  been  made  public,  but  we  are  in 
possession  of  some  salient  facts  from  which  succes- 
sive steps  leading  up  to  the  final  conclusion  may  be 
inferred  with  tolerable  certainty.  It  is  well  known 
that  Great  Britain,  which  had  always  occupied  a 
predominant  place  in  the  foreign  relations  of  Japan, 
had  persistently  opposed  the  latter' s  ardent  wish  and 
continual  struggle  to  revise  the  humiliating  treaties 
which  had,  about  1858,  been  imposed  by  the  Powers 
upon  the  weak  feudal  Government  of  Yedo.  In 
1894,  however,  contrary  to  her  past  policy,  Great 
Britain  led  other  Powers  in  according  to  Japan  a 
cordial  recognition  of  the  latter's  progress  in  vari- 
ous lines  of  her  national  activity,  and  assenting  to 
the  revision  of  her  treaties.  During  the  war  with 
China  in  1894-5,  the  British  attitude  was  one  of 
friendly  neutrality  between  the  two  Oriental  Em- 
pires, but  the  events  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
war,  especially  the  forced  retrocession  of  the  Liao- 
tung  Peninsula,  closely  followed  by  the  tightening 
hold  of  the  Muscovites   upon  the  Peking  Court, 


198  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

seemed  to  have  aroused  the  sympathy  of  Great 
Britain  with  Japan,  mingled  probably  with  the  fear 
of  the  loss  of  some  of  her  own  predominant  eco- 
nomic interests  in  China.  From  this  time  on,  the 
interests  of  the  two  Powers  had  been  seen  to  coin- 
cide in  the  Far  East  to  an  increasing  degree,  and 
the  relations  of  their  Governments  had  steadily 
risen  in  cordiality.1  At  the  rupture  of  the  Boxer 
insurrection  in  1900,  the  Cabinet  of  Lord  Salisbury 
manifested  so  much  faith  in  Japan  as  to  request 
her  immediately  to  dispatch  large  forces  to  the  re- 
lief of  the  besieged  Legations  at  Peking,  Great 
Britain  going  even  so  far  as  to  engage  to  undertake 
the  necessary  financial  responsibilities  of  the  pro- 
posed expedition.2  Both  during  the  campaign  and 
throughout  the  negotiation  for  peace,  the  two 
Powers,  as  well  as  the  United  States,  conducted 
themselves  together,  as  is  apparent  from  our  fore- 
going discussion,  in  perfect  harmony.3   The  common 

1  The  reader  will  remember  the  cordial  exchange  of  views 
between  the  two  Powers  when  Wei-hai-Wei  was  leased  to  Great 
Britain  in  1898.  There  occurred  in  the  East  several  affairs  of 
minor  importance  in  which  the  British  and  Japanese  authorities 
acted  with  mutual  good- will ;  e.  g..,  the  arrangement  for  a  Brit- 
ish concession  at  Niu-chwang  in  1899.  See  China,  No.  1  (1900) , 
pp.  215-218. 

2  See  the  British  Parliamentary  Papers  :  China,  No.  3 
(1900),  Nos.  146,  121,  129,  134,  141,  155,  169-171,  180-181, 
188-189,  191,  193,  203,  210,  216,  238,  241,  212,  217,  224,  236, 
246-247,  252,  260,  265-267;  China,  No.  1  (1901),  Nos.  122- 
124,  42,  4,  18,  23,  29,  32  (July  13,  1900),  41,  52,  57,  38. 

8  Mr.  Kato,  Foreign  Minister  at  Tokio  at  the  time,  remarked 
later  that  even  in  matters  about  which  the  two  Powers  had  not 
exchanged  their  views,  their  Representatives  at  Peking  acted  in 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  AGREEMENT  199 

danger  in  Manchuria  still  further  cemented  their 
friendship.  All  this  cordial  relation,  spontaneous 
as  it  was,  would  not,  however,  account  for  the  for- 
mation of  a  definite  alliance  between  the  two  Gov- 
ernments. It  seems  at  least  probable  that  the  An- 
glo-German Agreement  of  October,  1900,  as  much 
by  the  importance  of  some  of  its  principles  as  by 
its  very  inefficiency,  served  as  a  natural  step  toward 
a  more  wholesome  alliance.1  In  this  new  direction, 
Great  Britain  is  said  to  have  taken  the  initiative. 
This  supposition  will  appear  not  improbable  when 
it  is  considered  that  her  immense  interests  in  China, 
which  had  begun  to  be  eclipsed  by  other  Powers, 
would  be  best  secured  and  promoted  by  the  main- 
tenance of  the  integrity  of  China  and  the  open  door 
in  her  market,  and  that  this  object  could  not  be 
better  assured  than  by  an  alliance  with  the  strong- 
est Eastern  Power,  whose  fast  growing  interests  in 
the  neighboring  lands  were  in  a  large  measure 
identical  with  hers.    Suggestions  for  such  an  agree- 

such  mutual  sympathy  that  it  was  suspected  that  a  secret  under- 
standing must  have  existed  between  them. —  Tokushu  Joyaku, 
p.  411. 

1  In  this  connection  it  was  thought  not  improbable  that  Ger- 
many herself  might  have  informally  suggested  the  feasibility  of 
a  triple  alliance  between  herself  and  Great  Britain  and  Japan  in 
the  same  line  as  the  Anglo-German  Agreement,  which  Japan  had 
joined  as  a  signatory.  In  his  speech  before  the  Reichstag,  how- 
ever, Herr  von  Biilow  declared,  on  March  3,  that  Germany  was 
not  the  father  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance.  At  any  rate,  the 
German  suggestion,  if  there  was  one,  never  materialized,  but 
gave  place  to  another  and  still  more  important  form  of  agree- 
ment in  which  the  world-politics  of  the  versatile  Kaiser  played 
no  part. 


200  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

ment  are  known  to  have  been  made  by  Great  Brit- 
ain to  Japan  under' the  Ito  Cabinet  in  April,  1901, 
and  again  under  the  present  Katsura  Cabinet'  in 
July,  but  it  was  not  till  October  of  that  year  that 
definite,  negotiations  were  opened  by  Japan.  The 
Premier,  Viscount  Katsura,  seems  to  have  ascertained 
in  December  that  the  elder  statesmen  of  the  Empire 
were  in  hearty  accord  with  the  agreement  toward 
which  the  negotiations  had  pointed.1  At  this  stage 
of  the  negotiations,  also,  there  had  developed  other 
circumstances  under  which  the  "splendid  "isolation 
of  Great  Britain  appeared  less  tenable  than  before. 

l.  The  position  which  one  of  the  elder  statesmen  out  of  office, 
Marquis  Ito,  occupied  in  this  diplomatic  evolution,  has  been  a 
subject  of  much  speculation.  He  was  not  only  on  his  tour  in 
America  and  Europe  when  the  Agreement  was  concluded,  but 
also  had  made  efforts  at  St.  Petersburg  to  come  to  an  entente 
with  Russia.  From  this,  it  has  even  been  charged  that  he  was 
opposed  to  an  Agreement  with  Great  Britain.  It  now  appears, 
however,  that  he  had  discussed  the  latter  question  with  Premier 
Katsura  before  he  sailed  for  Europe,  and  that  he  proceeded 
to  St.  Petersburg  with  a  full  authorization  from  the  Govern- 
ment to  exchange  views  with  Count  Lamsdorff  regarding  Korea. 
In  the  mean  time,  the  Cabinet  continued  its  negotiations  with 
Great  Britain.  Each  must  have  kept  the  other  well  informed 
of  the  progress  of  the  respective' negotiations,  with  this  impor- 
tant difference,  however,  that  Marquis  Ito  apparently  enter- 
tained the  view,  which  the  Cabinet  respected  without  accepting, 
that  a  British  alliance  would  be,  not  less  desirable,  but  more 
difficult  of  realization,  than  a  Russian  agreement  concerning 
Korea.  Unexpectedly  to  the  Marquis,  his  effort  did  not  ma- 
terialize as  well  as  he  had  hoped,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
seemed  as  if  his  significant  presence  in  Russia  had  hastened  the 
hands  of  the  jealous  British  Foreign  Office,  which  now  put  its 
seal  upon  the  terms  as  agreed  upon  with  rather  unexpected 
readiness. 


COUNT    KATSURA 
Premier  of  Japan 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  AGREEMENT  201 

Half  a  year  after  the  Anglo-German  Agreement  was 
rendered  valueless  by  the  declarations  of  Herr  von 
Billow,  the  Czar  paid  a  significant  visit,  in  Septem- 
ber, not  only  to  France,  but  also  to  Germany.  The 
ebullition  of  friendly  sentiments  between  the  heads 
of  the  States  was  not  less  effervescent  at  Danzig 
than  at  Dunkirk.  The  Russo-Chinese  Bank  pre- 
sently floated  a  loan  of  80,000,000  marks  at  Ber- 
lin, thus  insuring  to  that  extent  the  interests  of 
the  Germans  in  Russian  success  in  the  East.  At 
the  same  time  the  situation  in  Manchuria  had  been 
growing  more  serious  than  before,  while  Ger- 
many had  seemed  no  longer  inclined  to  join  Great 
Britain  in  the  latter' s  protests  against  the  menacing 
conduct  of  Russia.  Grave  as  was  the  danger  to  the 
political  and  commercial  prestige  of  Great  Britain 
in  the  East,  her  hands  were  still  closely  tied  by  the 
vexatious  South  African  question.  If  there  ever 
was  need  of  an  agreement  with  the  rising  Power 
of  the  Orient,  it  had  probably  been  never  more 
keenly  felt  by  the  British  Government  than  in  the 
last  part  of  the  year  1901.  Side  by  side  with  these 
favorable  circumstances  for  an  understanding,  the 
student  should  not  for  a  moment  lose  from  sight 
two  fundamental  conditions  which  drew  together, 
not  only  the  Governments,  but  also  the  people,  of 
Great  Britain  and  Japan  with  mutual  attraction. 
One  was  sentimental :  each  of  the  two  nations  found 
in  the  other,  though  in  different  ways  from  one 
another,  something  of  a  counterpart  of  its  geographi- 
cal position,  its  material  needs  and  aspirations,  and 


202  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  energy  and  enterprise  of  its  individual  members. 
This  mutual  sympathy  was  largely  intensified  by, 
not,  indeed,  so  much  the  identity  of  their  interests 
in  the  East,  as  the  common  principles  under  which 
these  interests  would  be  best  protected  —  the  inde- 
pendence and  strength  of  China  and  Korea,  and  the 
equal  opportunity  therein  for  the  economic  enter- 
prise of  all  nations. 

The  final  outcome  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  negoti- 
ations was  a  remarkable  product,  the  like  of  which 
is  seldom  seen  in  history,  especially  when  it  is  con- 
sidered that  it  united  reciprocally  two  nations  widely 
apart  in  race,  religion,  and  history,  one  of  which 
had  rarely  in  time  of  peace  entered  into  a  regular 
alliance  even  with  a  European  Power.1  The  most 
striking,  as  well  as  th|6  most  important  for  our 
study,  must  be  regarded  the  entirely  fair  and  open 
principles  to  which  the  Agreement  gave  clear  ex- 
pression. These  remarks  may  not  be  better  sub- 
stantiated than  by  quoting  the  exact  words  of  the 
document  itself,  and  of  the  dispatch  inclosing  the 
Agreement  from  Lord  Lansdowne  to  Sir  Claude 
MacDonald,  the  British  Minister  at  Tokio,  which 
read  as  follows :  — 

"The  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  ac- 
tuated solely  by  a  desire  to  maintain  the  status  quo  and 

1  The  writer  is  indebted  to  th^Kbkumin  Shimbun  for  many 
important  suggestions  regarding  the  negotiations  between  the 
two  Powers  which  resulted  in  the  conclusion  of  the  Agreement. 
Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  407-411,  gives  a  brief  explanatory  view  of 
the  conditions  under  which  the  Agreement  was  concluded. 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  AGREEMENT  203 

general  peace  in  the  extreme  East,  being  moreover  spe- 
cially interested  in  maintaining  the  independence  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  the  Empire  of  China  and  the  Empire 
of  Korea,  and  in  securing  equal  opportunities  in  those 
countries  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations, 
hereby  agree  as  follows :  — 

"  Article  I.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  having 
mutually  recognized  the  independence  of  China  and 
Korea,  declare  themselves  to  be  entirely  uninfluenced 
by  any  aggressive  tendencies  in  either  country.  Having 
in  view,  however,  their  special  interests,  of  which  those 
of  Great  Britain  relate  principally  to  China,  while  Japan, 
in  addition  to  the  interests  which  she  possesses  in  China, 
is  interested  in  a-  peculiar  degree,  politically  as  well  as 
commercially  and  industrially,  in  Korea,  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  recognize  that  it  will  be  admissible  for 
either  of  them  to  take  such  measures  as  may  be  indispen- 
sable in  order  to  safeguard  those  interests  if  threatened 
either  by  the  aggressive  action  of  any  other  Power,  or  by 
disturbances  arising  in  China  or  Korea,  and  necessitat- 
ing the  intervention  of  either  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  for  the  protection  of  the  lives  and  property  of  its 
subjects. 

"Article  II.  If  either  Great  Britain  or  Japan,  in  the 
defense  of  their  respective  interests  as  above  described, 
should  become  involved  in  war  with  another  Power,  the 
other  High  Contracting  Party  will  maintain  a  strict  neu- 
trality, and  use  its  efforts  to  prevent  other  Powers  from 
joining  in  hostilities  against  its  ally. 

"  Article  III.  If  in  the  above  event,  any  other  Power 
or  Powers  should  join  in  hostilities  against  that  ally,  the 
other  High  Contracting  Party  will  come  to  its  assistance, 
and  will  conduct  war  in  common,  and  will  make  peace  in 
mutual  agreement  with  it. 

H  Article  IV.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that 


204  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

neither  of  them  will,  without  consulting  the  other,  enter 
into  separate  arrangements  with  another  Power  to  the 
prejudice  of  the  interests  above  described. 

"Article  V.  Whenever,  in  the  opinion  of  either 
Great  Britain  or  Japan,  the  above-mentioned  interests 
are  in  jeopardy,  the  two  Governments  will  communicate 
with  one  another  fully  and  frankly. 

"Article  VI.  The  present  Agreement  shall  come 
into  effect  immediately  after  the  date  of  its  signature,  and 
remain  in  force  for  five  years  from  that  date. 

"In  case  neither  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
should  have  notified  twelve  months  before  the  expiration 
of  the  said  five  years  the  intention  of  terminating  it,  it 
shall  remain  binding  until  the  expiration  of  one  year 
from  the  day  on  which  either  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  shall  have  denounced  it.  But  if,  when  the  date 
fixed  for  its  expiration  arrives,  either  ally  is  actually  en- 
gaged in  war,  the  alliance  shall,  ipso  facto,  continue  until 
peace  is  concluded. 

"In  faith  whereof  the  Undersigned,  duly  authorized 
by  their  respective  Governments,  have  signed  this  Agree- 
ment, and  have  affixed  thereto  their  seals. 

"  Done  in  duplicate  at  London,  the  30th  January,  1902. 
"LANSDOWNE, 

His  Britannic  Majesty's  Principal  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

"HAYASHI, 

Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister  Plenipo- 
tentiary of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan 
at  the  Court  of  St.  James." l 

1  The  British  Parliamentary  Papers,  Treaty  Series,  No.  3, 
1902:  Agreement  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  Japan  relative 
to  China  and  Korea,  signed  at  London,  January  30,  1902. 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  AGREEMENT  205 

"  Foreign  Office,  January  30,  1902. 
"Sir  Claude  MacDonald  [the    British   Minister   at 
Tokio]: 

"I  have  signed  to-day,  with  the  Japanese  Minister, 
an  Agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  of 
which  a  copy  is  inclosed  in  this  dispatch. 

"  This  Agreement  may  be  regarded  as  the  outcome  of 
the  events  which  have  taken  place  during  the  past  two 
years  in  the  Far  East,  and  of  the  part  taken  by  Great 
Britain  and  Japan  in  dealing  with  them. 

"Throughout  the  troubles  and  complications  which 
arose  in  China  consequent  upon  the  Boxer  outbreak  and 
the  attack  upon  the  Peking  Legations,  the  two  Powers 
have  been  in  close  and  uninterrupted  communication, 
and  have  been  actuated  by* similar  views. 

"We  have  each  of  us  desired  that  the  integrity  and 
independence  of  the  Chinese  Empire  should  be  preserved, 
that  there  should  be  no  disturbance  of  the  territorial 
status  quo  either  in  China  or  in  the  adjoining  regions, 
that  all  nations  should,  within  those  regions,  as  well  as 
within  the  limits  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  be  afforded 
equal  opportunities  for  the  development  of  their  com- 
merce and  industry,  and  that  peace  should  not  only  be 
restored,  but  should,  for  the  future,  be  maintained. 

"From  the  frequent  exchanges  of  view  which  have 
taken  place  between  the  two  Governments,  and  from  the 
discovery  that  their  Far  Eastern  policy  was  identical,  it 
has  resulted  that  each  side  has  expressed  the  desire  that 
their  common  policy  should  find  expression  in  an  inter- 
national contract  of  binding  validity. 

"  We  have  thought  it  desirable  to  record  in  the  Pre- 
amble of  that  instrument  the  main  objects  of  our  common 
policy  in  the  Far  East  to  which  I  have  already  referred, 
and  in  the  first  Article  we  join  in  entirely  disclaiming  any 
aggressive  tendencies  either  in  China  or  Korea.  We  have, 


206  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

however,  thought  it  necessary  also  to  place  on  record  the 
view  entertained  by  both  the  High  Contracting  Parties, 
that  should  their  interests  as  above  described  be  endan- 
gered, it  will  be  admissible  for  either  of  them  to  take  such 
measures  as  may  bef  indispensable  in  order  to  safeguard 
their  interests,  and  words  have  been  added  which  will  ' 
render  it  clear  that  such  precautionary  measures  might 
become  necessary  and  might  be  legitimately  taken,  not 
only  in  the  case  of  aggressive  action  or  of  an  actual  at- 
tack of  some  other  Power,  but  in  the  event  of  disturbances 
arising  of  a  character  to  necessitate  the  intervention  of 
either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  for  the  protection 
of  the  lives  and  property  of  its  subjects. 

"The  principal  obligations  undertaken  mutually  by 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  are  those  of  maintaining  a 
strict  neutrality  in  the  event  of  either  of  them  becoming 
involved  in  war,  and  of  coming  to  one  another's  assist- 
ance in  the  event  of  either  of  them  being  confronted  by 
the  opposition  of  more  than  one  hostile  Power.  Under 
the  remaining  provisions  of  the  Agreement,  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  undertake  that  neither  of  them  will, 
without  consultation  with  the  other,  enter  into  separate 
arrangements  with  another  Power  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
interests  described  in  the  Agreement,  and  that  whenever 
those  interests  are  in  jeopardy,  they  will  communicate 
with  one  another  fully  and  frankly. 

u  The  concluding  Article  has  reference  to  the  duration 
of  the  Agreement  which,  after  five  years,  is  terminable 
by  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  at  one  year's 
notice. 

"His  Majesty's  Government  had  been  largely  influ- 
enced in  their  decision  to  enter  into  this  important  con- 
tract by  the  conviction  that  it  contains  no  provisions 
which  can  be  regarded  as  an  indication  of  aggressive 
or  self-seeking   tendencies   in   the  regions  to  which   it 


THE  ANGLO-JAPANESE  AGREEMENT  207 

applies.  It  has  been  concluded  purely  as  a  measure  of 
precaution,  to  be  invoked,  should  occasion  arise,  in  the 
defence  of  important  British  interests.  It  in  no  way 
threatens  the  present  position  or  the  legitimate  interests 
of  other  Powers.  On  the  contrary,  that  part  of  it  which 
renders  either  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  liable  to 
be  called  upon  by  the  other  for  assistance  can  operate 
only  when  one  of  the  allies  has  found  himself  obliged  to 
go  to  war  in  defence  of  interests  which  are  common  to 
both,  when  the  circumstances  in  which  he  has  taken  this 
step  are  such  as  to  establish  that  the  quarrel  has  not  been 
of  his  own  seeking,  and  when,  being  engaged  in  his  own 
defence,  he  finds  himself  threatened,  not  only  by  a  single 
Power,  but  by  a  hostile  coalition. 

"  His  Majesty's  Government  trust  that  the  Agreement 
may  be  found  of  mutual  advantage  to  the  two  countries, 
that  it  will  make  for  the  preservation  of  peace,  and  that, 
should  peace  be  unfortunately  broken,  it  will  have  the 
effect  of  restricting  the  area  of  hostilities. 
"  I  am,  etc., 

"LANSDOWNE."1 

The  singular  nature  of  these  documents  stands 
out  so  clearly  on  their  face  that  it  hardly  needs 
a  special  reference.  Not  only  has  Manchuria  at 
last  been  clearly  interpreted  by  both  Powers  as 
lying  within  the  scope  of  the  Agreement,  but  it  is 
explicitly  admitted  therein  that  Japan  possesses 
extensive  interests  in  the  Korean  peninsula,  which 
is  for  that  reason  included  in  the  sphere  within 
which  the  contracting  parties  unequivocally  disa- 

1  The  British  Parliamentary  Papers:  Japan,  No.  1  {1902), 
Dispatch  to  His  Majesty's  Minister  at  Tokio,  forwarding  Agree- 
ment between  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  of  January  30, 1902. 


208  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

vow  aggressive  tendencies.  Nor  does  this  sum  up 
all  the  difference  between  this  and  the  Anglo-Ger- 
man Agreement,  for,  while  in  the  latter  the  denial 
of  the  parties'  aggressive  designs  was  limited  to  the 
period  of  the  Boxer  complication,  and,  moreover, 
coupled  with  a  reservation  amounting  to  the  re- 
cognition of  the  theory  of  readjusting  the  balance 
between  the  Powers  at  the  expense  of  China,  the 
new  alliance  unconditionally  upholds  the  independ- 
ence of  China  and  Korea,  and  any  measure,  either 
peaceful  or  warlike,  taken  by  either  party  to  safe- 
guard its  interests,  if  they  are  in  any  way  threat- 
ened, would  by  no  means  alter  its  devotion  to  the 
principles  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  Chinese 
and  Korean  Empires  and  of  the  open  door  in  those 
countries.  The  alliance  exists  solely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  effectively  safeguarding  the  interests  already 
acquired  by  the  two  Powers  on  the  common  ground, 
and  it  is  implied  in  an  unmistakable  manner  that 
those  interests  may  best  be  maintained  by  the  total 
abstention,  in  any  event,  from  all  aggressive  or 
exclusive  tendencies  in  China  and  Korea,  and, 
what  is  equally  important,  that  the  observation  of 
these  principles  would  forcibly  tend  to  preserve  the 
general  peace  in  the  Far  East.  Owing  to  the  covert 
violation  of  these  principles  by  another  Power, 
however,  peace  has  been  broken,  but  the  Anglo- Jap- 
anese Agreement  has  not  expired.  The  latter  would, 
however,  fall  to  the  ground  the  moment  one  of  the 
parties,  either  as  a  result  of  a  war  or  otherwise, 
should  attempt  to  depart  from  the  principles  of  the 


THE  RUSSO-FRENCH  DECLARATION  209 

open  door  and  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  neigh- 
boring Empires. 

Lord  Lansdowne  considered  the  Agreement  "  a 
measure  of  precaution,"  and  hoped  that  it  would 
M  make  for  the  preservation  of  peace,  and  that, 
should  peace  be  unfortunately  broken,  it  would  have 
the  effect  of  restricting  the  area  of  hostilities." 
Presently  these  hopes  were  openly  seconded,  but 
in  reality  neutralized,  by  the  Russo-French  Decla- 
ration of  March  17,  which  stated  :  — 

"  The  allied  Governments  of  Russia  and  France  have 
received  a  copy  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  Agreement  of  the 
30th  January,  1902,  concluded  with  the  object  of  main- 
taining the  status  quo  and  the  general  peace  in  the  Far 
East,  and  preserving  the  independence  of  China  and 
Korea,  which  are  to  remain  open  to  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  all  nations,  and  have  been  fully  satisfied  to 
find  therein  affirmed  the  fundamental  principles  which 
they  have  themselves,  on  several  occasions,  declared  to 
form  the  basis  of  their  policy,  and  still  remain  so. 

*'  The  two  Governments  consider  that  the  observance 
of  these  principles  is  at  the  same  time  a  guarantee  of 
their  special  interests  in  the  Far  East.1  Nevertheless, 
being  obliged  themselves  also  to  take  into  consideration 
the  case  in  which  either  the  aggressive  action  of  third 
Powers,  or  the  recurrence  of  disturbances  in  China, 
jeopardizing  the  integrity  and  free  development  of  that 
Power,  might  become  a  menace  to  their  own  interests, 
the  two  allied  Governments  reserve  to  themselves  the 

1  Observe  the  clearness  of  this  statement.  This  idea  is  only 
implied  in  the  Anglo- Japanese  Agreement.  It  is  remarkable  that 
an  explicit  statement  of  this  nature  should  come,  as  it  did,  from 
the  Powers  from  which  it  would  have  been  less  expected  than 
from  their  rivals. 


210  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

right  to  consult  in  that  contingency  as  to  the  means  to  be 
adopted  for  securing  those  interests."  ' 

The  St.  Petersburg  Messager  Officiel  of  March 
20,  published,  with  the  Declaration,  the  statement 
that  the  Russian  Government  had  received  the 
announcement  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement 
"  with  the  most  perfect  calm,"  for  Russia  likewise 
insisted  on  the  maintenance  and  integrity  of  China 
and  Korea.  "  Russia,"  it  continued  to  say,  "  de- 
sires the  preservation  of  the  status  quo  and  general 
peace  in  the  Far  East,  by  the  construction  of  the 
great  Siberian  Railroad,  together  with  its  branch 
line  through  Manchuria,  toward  a  port  always  ice- 
free.  Russia  aids  in  the  extension  in  these  regions 
of  the  commerce  and  industry  of  the  whole  world. 
Would  it  be  to  her  interest  to  put  forward  obsta- 
cles at  the  present  time  ?  The  intention  expressed 
by  Great  Britain  and  Japan  to  attain  those  same 
objects,  which  have  invariably  been  pursued  by  the 
Russian  Government,  can  meet  with  nothing  but 
sympathy  in  Russia,  in  spite  of  the  comments  in 
certain  political  spheres  and  in  some  of  the  foreign 
newspapers,  which  endeavored  to  present  in  quite  a 
different  light  the  impassive  attitude  of  the  Imperial 
Government  toward  a  diplomatic  act  which,  in  its 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  50.  The  so-called  triple  alliance 
of  Europe  was  renewed  in  May,  with  a  declaration  that  it,  to- 
gether with  the  Russo-French  alliance,  maintained  peace.  The 
latter,  as  is  shown  here,  had  extended  itself  from  Europe  to  the 
Far  East,  owing  largely  to  the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Agreement.  The  growing  solidarity  of  the  world's  international 
politics  may  in  some  degree  be  discerned  here. 


THE  RUSSO-FRENCH  DECLARATION  211 

eye,  does  not  change  in  any  way  the  general  sit- 
uation of  the  political  horizon."  1 

It  seems  to  be  generally  overlooked  that,  so  far 
as  the  published  documents  are  concerned,  there 
occurs  no  statement  that  the  Russo-French  alliance 
extended  from  Europe  to  the  Far  East  under  pre- 
cisely the  same  conditions  as  those  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Agreement.  In  other  words,  although  the 
general  principles  of  the  latter  are  indorsed,  one 
finds  nowhere  that  its  terms  of  war  and  neutrality 
and  its  provisions  regarding  the  duration  of  the 
validity  of  the  instrument  have  also  been  repro- 
duced by  Russia  and  France  in  their  mutual  con- 
vention. Regarding  the  precise  conditions  of  their 
alliance,  therefore,  the  world  is  left  much  in  the 
dark,  save  what  it  takes  for  granted.  Nor  are  the 
principles  of  the  integrity  and  the  open  door  of 
China  and  Korea  so  fully  and  explicitly  stated  here 
as  in  the  Agreement  of  the  rival  allies,  while  the 
reservation  at  the  end  of  the  Declaration  does  not 
make  it  clear  that  these  principles  may  not  be  dis- 
carded, under  certain  circumstances,  according  to 
the  interpretations  of  the  parties  themselves  of  the 
means  to  be  taken  to  safeguard  their  interests. 

Turning  to  the  general  tenor  of  the  documents, 
the  student  will  at  once  observe  their  marked  char- 
acteristics. It  is  at  least  singular,  one  would  think, 
that  the  "  most  perfect  calm  "  and  the  "  impassive 
attitude"  of  the  Russian  Government  should  be 

1  The  Evening  Post,  March  20, 1902  ;  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp. 
415-416. 


212  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

expressed  in  so  many  words.  If,  again,  the  allied 
Powers  were,  as  they  declare,  in  perfect  accord  with 
the  principles  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  it  is  not 
intelligible  why  they  should  entertain,  as  it  appears, 
so  deep  a  suspicion  toward  the  "  political  spheres  " 
in  which  the  Russian  calmness  was  said  to  have  been 
deliberately  misinterpreted,  and  also  toward  the 
"  third  Powers  "  "  whose  aggressive  action  "  might 
"  jeopardize  the  integrity  and  free  development "  of 
China.  This  sense  of  distrust  becomes  all  the  more 
pronounced  when  it  is  contrasted  with  the  assertion 
that  the  agreement  between  Great  Britain  and 
Japan  brought  no  change  on  the  political  horizon 
of  the  East.  It  was  reported  about  the  time  when 
the  Russian  Minister  and  the  French  Charge  d'  Af- 
faires at  Tokio  handed  the  Declaration  to  Baron 
Komura,  that  the  allied  Powers  had  made  their 
Declaration  because  they  feared  that  Great  Britain 
and  Japan  might,  in  virtue  of  the  first  Article  of 
their  Agreement,  object  even  to  legitimate  means 
of  protecting  the  French  and  Russian  interests  in 
the  Far  East.1  If  the  four  Powers  upheld  the  same 
principles,  no  such  apprehension  of  two  of  them 
against  the  other  two  could  be  either  cordial  or  even 
justifiable.  Under  these  considerations,  one  can 
hardly  avoid  the  conclusion  that  the  allied  Govern- 
ments of  Russia  and  France  must  have  been  ani- 
mated less  by  the  principles  they  professed  than  by 
the  deep  rivalry  of  their  interests  with  those  of  the 
other  allies.  For  it  is  at  least  certain  that,  ever  since 
1  The  Kokumin,  March  23,  1902. 


THE  RUSSO-FRENCH  DECLARATION  213 

their  memorable  coalition  with  Germany  in  1895, 
in  the  coercion  of  Japan,  Russia  and  France  had 
acted  in  mutual  good-will,  the  former  being  mainly 
aided  by  the  latter  in  Manchuria  and  Korea,  and 
the  latter  by  the  former  in  the  southern  Chinese 
provinces,1  in  their  diplomatic  manoeuvres  in  those 
countries  and  in  their  struggles  with  Japan  and 
Great  Britain.2  If  the  Agreement  and  the  Declara- 
tion are  considered  the  formal  expression  of  the 
cordial  sentiment  which  had  long  existed  and  been 
growing  between  the  two  sets  of  the  Powers,  they 
may  be  said  to  have  brought  no  change  upon  the 
political  horizon ;  but  it  seems  impossible  to  deny 
that  their  publication  greatly  clarified  the  political 
atmosphere  in  the  East,  and,  in  spite  of  the  verbal 
meaning  of  the  declaration,  not  a  little  accentuated 
the  widening  contrast  between  the  two  different  poli- 
cies upheld  by  the  two  powerful  coalitions.  In  this 
sense,  the  political  evolution  of  the  Far  East  may 
be  said  to  have  now  reached  an  important  stage 
after  the  European  intervention  in  Japan  in  1895.3 

1  See,  for  instance,  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  Docu- 
ments Diplomatiques :  Chine,  18H-8,  No.  19  (p.  12);  No.  36 
(p.  29);  No.  37  (p.  30);  No.  61  (pp.  45-46);  No.  65  (p.  49). 

2  During  the  peace  negotiations  at  Peking  after  the  Boxer 
war,  Russia  and  France  cooperated  as  closely  as  did  Great 
Britain,  Japan,  and  the  United  States. 

8  See  pp.  77  ff.,  above. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  CONVENTION  OF  EVACUATION 

It  will  be  remembered  that  we  left  the  Russo- 
Chinese  negotiation  regarding  Manchuria  at  the 
point  where  Prince  Ching,  either  late  in  February 
or  early  in  March,  presented  a  counter-proposal  to 
the  Russian  demands.1  It  has  also  been  shown  that 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement  closely  preceded, 
and  the  Franco-Russian  Declaration  followed,  this 
event.  By  that  time  the  allied  forces  had  gradually 
retired  from  North  China,  and  the  Chinese  Court, 
which  had  fled  to  Si-ngan,  had  retraced  its  steps  to 
Peking,  arriving  at  the  palace  on  January  7,  1902. 
The  political  surroundings  of  the  East  seemed  to 
have  assumed  a  somewhat  more  reassuring  out- 
look, except  in  Manchuria,  than  they  had  worn  at 
any  time  since  the  siege  of  the  Legations  in  1900. 
The  Russian  Government  seized  this  opportunity  to 
conclude  with  China,  on  April  8,  1902,  along  the 
line  suggested  by  the  counter-draft  of  Prince  Ching, 
the  now  celebrated  Convention  providing  for  the 
evacuation  of  Manchuria,  which  went  into  effect 

1  It  was  said  with  a  great  deal  of  probability  that  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  Anglo-Japanese  Agreement  had  had  a  reassuring 
effect  upon  Prince  Ching  in  his  struggle  to  refuse  Russian 
demands. 


THE  CONVENTION   OF  EVACUATION  215 

simultaneously  with  .its  signature.    We  subjoin  this 
important  document/  together  with  the  official  state- 

1  The  following  is  the  French  text,  which  is  considered  as  the 
standard  in  the  interpretation  of  the  Convention  (China,  No.  2 
(190J}),  No.  54,  inclosure)  :  — 

"Sa  Majeste  l'Empereur  et  Autocrate  de  Toutes  les  Russies 
et  Sa  Majeste  l'Empereur  de  Chine,  dans  le  but  de  retablir  et  de 
consolider  les  relations  de  bon  voisinage  rompues  par  le  souleve- 
ment  qui  a  eu  lieu  en  1900  dans  le  Celeste  Empire,  ont  nomme 
pour  leurs  Plenipotentiaires,  a  l'effet  d'etablir  un  accord  sur  cer- 
taines  questions  concernant  la  Mandchourie :  — 

"Les  susdits  Plenipotentiaires,  munis  de  pleins  pouvoirs,  qui 
ont  ete  trouves  suffisants,  sont  convenus  des  stipulations  sui- 
vantes :  — 

"Article  1.  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale  l'Empereur  de  Toutes  les 
Russies,  desireux  de  donner  une  nouvelle  preuve  de  son  amour  de 
la  paix  et  de  ses  sentiments  d'amitie  envers  Sa  Majeste  l'Em- 
pereur de  Chine,  malgre  que  ce  soit  de  differents  points  de  la 
Mandchourie  situes  sur  la  frontiere  que  les  premieres  attacques 
contre  la  population  paisible  Russe  aient  ete  faites,  consent  au 
retablissement  de  l'autorite  du  Gouvernement  Chinois  dans  la 
province  precitee,  qui  reste  une  partie  integrate  de  l'Empire  de 
Chine  et  restitue  au  Gouvernement  Chinois  le  droit  d'y  exercer 
les  pouvoirs  gouvernementaux  et  administratifs,  comme  avant 
son  occupation  par  les  troupes  Russes. 

"  Article  2.  En  prenant  possession  des  pouvoirs  gouvernemen- 
taux et  administratifs  de  la  Mandchourie,  le  Gouvernement 
Chinois  confirme,  aussi  bien  par  rapport  aux  termes  que  par  rap- 
port a  tous  les  autres  Articles,  l'engagement  d 'observer  stricte- 
ment  les  stipulations  du  contract  conclu  avec  la  Banque  Russo- 
Chinoise  le  27  Aoiit,  1896,  et  assume,  conformement  a  l'Article 
5  du  dit  contrat,  1 'obligation  de  proteger  par  tous  les  moyens  le 
chemin  de  fer  et  son  personnel,  et  s 'oblige  egalement  de  sauve- 
garder  la  securite  en  Mandchourie  de  tous  les  sujets  Russes  en 
general  qui  s'y  trouvent  et  des  enterprises  fondees  par  eux. 

"Le  Gouvernement  Russe, en  vue  de cette obligation  assumee 
par  le  Gouvernement  de  Sa  Majeste  l'Empereur  de  Chine,  con- 
sent de  son  cote  dans  le  cas  ou  il  n'y  aura  pas  de  troubles,  et  si  la 
maniere  d'agir  des  autres  Puissances  n'y  mettra  pas  obstacle,  a 


216  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

ment  with  which  the  former  was  published  in  the 
St.  Petersburg  Messager  Officiel  of  April  12 :  — 

retirer  graduellement  toutes  ses  troupes  de  la  Mandchourie  de 
maniere  a :  — 

"  (a.)  Evacuer  dans  le  courant  de  six  mois  apres  la  signature 
de  la  Convention  les  troupes  Russes  de  la  partie  sud-ouest  de  la 
Province  de  Moukden  jusqu'au  fleuve  Liao-ho,  en  remettant 
les  chemins  de  fer  a,  la  Chine; 

"(b.)  Evacuer  dans  le  courant  des  six  mois  suivants  les 
troupes  Imperiales  Russes  de  la  partie  restante  de  la  Province  de 
Moukden  et  de  la  Province  de  Kirin;  et 

"  (c.)  Retirer  dans  le  courant  des  six  mois  suivants  le  reste  des 
troupes  Imperiales  Russes  qui  se  trouvent  dans  la  Province  de 
Hei-Lung-Kiang. 

"Article  3.  En  vue  de  la  necessite  de  conjurer  a  l'avenir  la 
repetition  des  troubles  de  1900,  dans  lesquels  les  troupes  Chi- 
noises  cantonnees  dans  les  provinces  limitrophes  a  la  Russie  ont 
pris  part,  le  Gouvernement  Russe  et  le  Gouvernement  Chinois 
se  chargeront  d'ordonner  aux  autorites  militaires  Russes  et  aux 
dzian-dziuns  de  s'entendre  en  vue  de  fixer  le  nombre  et  de  deter- 
miner les  lieux  de  cantonnement  des  troupes  Chinoises  en  Mand- 
chourie tant  que  les  troupes  Russes  n'auront  pas  ete  retirees  ; 
le  Gouvernement  Chinois  s 'engage  en  outre  a  ne  pas  former 
d'autres  troupes  en  sus  du  nombre  determine  de  cette  maniere 
par  les  autorites  militaires  Russes  et  les  dzian-dziuns,  et  lequel 
doit  etre  suffisant  pour  exterminer  les  brigands  et  pacifier  le  pays. 

"  Apres  l'evacuation  complete  des  troupes  Russes,  le  Gouverne- 
ment Chinois  aura  le  droit  de  proceder  a  l'examen  du  nombre 
des  troupes  se  trouvant  en  Mandchourie  et  sujettes  a  etre  aug- 
mentees  ou  diminuees,  en  informant  a  temps  le  Gouvernement 
Imperial;  car  il  va  de  soi  que  le  maintien  de  troupes  dans  la  pro- 
vince precitee  en  nombre  superflu  menerait  inevitablement  a 
l'augmentation  des  forces  militaires  Russes  dans  les  districts 
voisins,  et  provoquerait  ainsi  un  accroissement  de  depenses  mili- 
taires, au  grand  desavantage  des  deux  l£tats. 

"Pour  le  service  de  police  et  le  maintien  de  l'ordre  interieur 
dans  cette  region,  en  dehors  du  territoire  cede  a  la  Societe  du 
Chemin  de  Fer  Chinois  de  l'Est,  il  sera  forme,  aupres  des  Gou- 
verneurs   locaux  — ,  dzian-dziuns,  une  gendarmerie   Chinoise 


THE   CONVENTION  OF  EVACUATION  217 

"  The  grave  internal  disorders  which  suddenly  broke 
out  over  the  whole  of  China  in  the  year  1900,  exposing 

a  pied  et  a,  cheval  composee  exclusivement  de  sujets  de  Sa 
Majeste  l'Empereur  de  Chine. 

"Article  4.  Le  Gouvernement  Russe  consent  a  restituer  a 
leurs  proprietaires  les  lignes  ferrees  de  Shanhaikwan-Yinkow- 
Sinminting,  occupees  et  protegees  par  les  troupes  Russes  depuis 
la  fin  du  mois  de  Septembre,  1900.  En  vue  de  cela,  le  Gouverne- 
ment de  Sa  Majeste  l'Empereur  de  Chine  s 'engage:  — 

"  1.  Que  dans  le  cas  ou  il  serait  necessaire  d 'assurer  la  secu- 
rite  des  lignes  ferrees  precitees,  le  Gouvernement  Chinois  s'en 
chargera  lui-meme  et  n'invitera  aucune  autre  Puissance  a  entre- 
prendre  ou  a,  participer  a  la  defense,  construction,  ou  exploita- 
tion de  ces  lignes,  et  ne  permettra  pas  aux  Puissances  etrangeres 
d'occuper  le  territoire  restitue  par  la  Russie. 

"2.  Que  les  lignes  ferrees  susmentionnees  seront  achevees  et 
exploiters  sur  les  bases  precises  tant  de  1 'Arrangement  entre  la 
Russie  et  l'Angleterre  en  date  du  16  Avril,  1899,  que  du  contrat 
conclu  le  28  Septembre,  1898,  avec  une  Compagnie  particuliere 
relativement  a  un  emprunt  pour  la  construction  des  lignes  pre- 
citees, et,  en  outre,  en  observant  les  obligations  assumees  par 
cette  Compagnie,  c'est-a-dire,  de  ne  pas  prendre  possession  de 
la  ligne  Shanhaikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting  ni  d'en  disposer  de 
quelque  facon  que  ce  soit. 

"3.  Que  si  par  la  suite  il  sera  procede  a  la  continuation  des 
lignes  ferrees  dans  le  sud  de  la  Mandchourie  ou  a  la  construction 
d'embranchements  vers  elles,  aussi  bien  qua  la  construction 
d'un  pont  a  Yinkow  ou  au  transfert  du  terminus  du  chemin  de 
fer  de  Shanhaikwan  qui  s'y  trouve,  ce  sera  fait  apres  une  en- 
tente preamable  entre  les  Gouvernements  de  Russie  et  de  Chine. 

"4.  Vu  que  les  depenses  faites  par  la  Russie  pour  le  retab- 
lissement  et  Fexploitation  des  lignes  ferrees  restituees  de  Shan- 
haikwan-Yinkow-Sinminting n'ont  pas  ete  comprises  dans  la 
somme  totale  de  l'indemnite,  elles  lui  seront  remboursees  par  le 
Gouvernement  Chinois.  Les  deux  Gouvernements  s'entendront 
sur  le  montant  des  sommes  a  rembourser. 

"Les  dispositions  de  tous  les  Traites  anterieurs  entre  la  Rus- 
sie et  la  Chine,  non  modifiees  par  la  presente  Convention, 
restent  en  pleine  vigueur. 

"  La  presente  Convention  aura  force  legale  a  dater  du  jour  de 


218  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  Imperial  Mission  and  Russian  subjects  to  danger, 
obliged  Russia  to  take  decided  measures  to  protect  her 
Imperial  interests.  With  this  object  in  view,  the  Imperial 
Government,  as  is  already  known,  dispatched  a  consid- 
erable military  force  to  Peking,'  which  had  been  aban- 
doned by  the  Emperor  and  the  Government  authorities, 
and  introduced  a  Russian  army  into  the  frontier  State 
of  Manchuria,  to  which  the  disorders  in  the  Province  of 
Pechili  had  quickly  spread,  and  were  manifested  by  an 
attack  upon  the  Russian  frontier  by  the  native  chiefs  and 
army,  accompanied  by  a  formal  declaration  of  war  on 
Russia  by  the  local  Chinese  authorities. 

"  Nevertheless,  the  Imperial  Government  informed  the 
Government  of  the  Emperor  that  Russia,  in  undertaking 
these  measures,  had  no  hostile  intentions  toward  China, 
whose  independence  and  integrity  were  the  foundation 
of  Russian  policy  in  the  Far  East. 

"True  to  these  principles,  Russia,  as  soon  as  the  dan- 
ger threatening  the  Imperial  Mission  and  Russian  sub- 
jects was  over,  withdrew  her  forces  from  Pechili  before 
any  of  the  other  Powers,  and,  at  the  first  indication  of 
peace  in  Manchuria  being  restored,  declared  her  readi- 
ness to  determine,  in  a  private  Agreement  with  China, 

la  signature  de  ses  exemplaires  par  les  Plenipotentiaires,  de  l'un 
et  de  l'autre  Empire. 

"L'echange  des  ratifications  aura  lieu  a  Saint-Petersbourg 
dans  le  delai  de  trois  mois  a  compter  du  jour  de  la  signature  de  la 
Convention. 

"En  foi  de  quoi  les  Plenipotentiaires  respectifs  des  deux 
Hautes  Parties  Contractantes  ont  signe  et  scelle  de  leurs  sceaux 
deux  exemplaires  de  la  presente  Convention,  en  langues  Russe, 
Chinoise,  et  Francaise.  Des  trois  textes,  dument  confronted  et 
trouves  concordants,  le  texte  Fran9ais  fera  foi  pour  Interpreta- 
tion de  la  presente  convention. 

"Faite  en  double  expedition  a,  Pekin,  le  .  .  .  ,  correspond- 
ant  au  .  .  .  " 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  EVACUATION  219 

the  manner  and  earliest  date  of  her  evacuation  of  that  pro- 
vince, with,  however,  certain  guarantees  of  a  temporary- 
nature,  which  were  rendered  necessary  by  the  disorderly 
condition  of  affairs  in  the  above-mentioned  province. 

"The  conclusion  of  this  Agreement  dragged  over 
many  months,  owing  to  the  difficult  position  in  which  the 
high  Chinese  dignitaries  were  placed,  being  unable,  in  the 
absence  of  the  Court,  to  decide  upon  action,  as  becomes 
the  Representatives  of  a  perfectly  independent  Empire. 

*  Latterly,  however,  the  pacification  of  China  has  pro- 
gressed with  notable  success.  After  the  signature  of  the 
Protocol  of  the  25th  of  August  (7th  September),  1901, 
the  Imperial  Court  returned  to  Peking ;  the  central 
lawful  authority  resumed  its  rights,  and  in  many  parts 
of  the  Empire  the  local  administrations  were  reestab- 
lished. At  the  first  reception  of  the  Corps  Diplomatique 
in  Peking,  the  Chinese  Empress  expressed  to  the  foreign 
Representatives  her  gratitude  for  their  cooperation  in 
suppressing  the  disturbances,  and  assured  them  of  her 
unshakable  determination  to  take  every  measure  for  the 
reestablishment  in  the  country  of  the  normal  state  of 
affairs  existing  before  the  disturbances  arose. 

"This,  indeed,  solved  the  problem  in  which  Russia 
was  principally  interested  when  the  disorders  broke  out 
in  the  neighboring  Empire.  The  Imperial  Government, 
pursuing  no  selfish  aims,  insisted  that  other  Powers  also 
should  not  violate  the  independence  and  integrity  of 
China ;  and  that  the  lawful  Government,  with  which 
Russia  had  concluded  various  agreements,  should  be 
reinstated,  and  thus,  when  the  disorders  were  over,  the 
friendly  relations  with  China,  which  had  existed  from 
time  immemorial,  should  be  continued. 

*  Taking  into  consideration  that  this  was  the  only  ob- 
ject with  which  Russian  troops  were  sent  into  the  Celes- 
tial Empire,  and  that  China  has  given  written  guarantee 


220  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

for  the  maintenance  of  order  in  the  country,  and  repaid 
Russia  with  material  expenses  to  which  she  was  put  by 
her  military  operations  in  China,  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment henceforth  sees  no  necessity  for  leaving  armed  forces 
within  the  confines  of  the  neighboring  territory.  There- 
fore, by  Imperial  will,  on  the  26th  March  (April  8)  was 
signed  by  the  Russian  Minister  at  Peking,  M.  Lessar, 
and  by  the  Chinese  Plenipotentiaries,  the  following  Agree- 
ment as  to  the  conditions  of  the  recall  of  the  Russian 
forces  from  Manchuria. 

"AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  RUSSIA  AND  CHINA  RESPECT- 
ING MANCHURIA 

"  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  and  Autocrat  of  All  the 
Russias,  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China,  with 
the  object  of  reestablishing  and  confirming  the  relations 
of  good  neighborhood,  which  were  disturbed  by  the 
rising  in  the  Celestial  Empire  of  the  year  1900,  have 
appointed  their  Plenipotentiaries  to  come  to  an  agree- 
ment on  certain  questions  relating  to  Manchuria.  These 
Plenipotentiaries,  furnished  with  full  powers,  which  were 
found  to  be  in  order,  agreed  as  follows :  — 

"Article  1.  His  Imperial  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
Russia,  desirous  of  giving  fresh  proof  of  his  peaceable  and 
friendly  disposition  toward  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
China,  and  overlooking  the  fact  that  attacks  were  first 
made  from  frontier  posts  in  Manchuria  on  peaceable  Rus- 
sian settlements,  agrees  to  the  reestablishment  of  the  au- 
thority of  the  Chinese  Government  in  that  region,  which 
remains  an  integral  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  and 
restores  to  the  Chinese  Government  the  right  to  exer- 
cise therein  governmental  and  administrative  authority, 
as  it  existed  previous  to  the  occupation  by  Russian  troops 
of  that  region. 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  EVACUATION  221 

"Article  2.  In  taking  possession  of  the  governmental 
and  administrative  authority  in  Manchuria,  the  Chinese 
Government  confirms,  both  with  regard  to  the  period 
and  with  regard  to  all  other  Articles,  the  obligation  to 
observe  strictly  the  stipulations  of  the  contract  concluded 
with  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  on  the  27th  August,  1896, 
and  in  virtue  of  paragraph  5  of  the  above-mentioned 
contract,  takes  upon  itself  the  obligation  to  use  all  means 
to  protect  the  railway  and  the  persons  in  its  employ,  and 
binds  itself  also  to  secure  within  the  boundaries  of  Man- 
churia the  safety  of  all  Russian  subjects  in  general  and 
the  undertakings  established  by  them. 

"The  Russian  Government,  in  view  of  these  obliga- 
tions accepted  by  the  Government  of  His  Majesty  the 
Emperor  of  China,  agrees  on  its  side,  provided  that  no 
disturbances  arise  and  that  the  action  of  other  Powers 
should  not  prevent  it,  to  withdraw  gradually  all  its  forces 
from  within  the  limits  of  Manchuria  in  the  following 
manner:  — 

"  (a.)  Within  six  months  from  the  signature  of  the 
Agreement  to  clear  the  southwestern  portion  of  the  Pro- 
vince of  Mukden  up  to  the  river  Liao-ho  of  Russian 
troops,  and  to  hand  the  railways  over  to  China. 

"  (b.)  Within  further  six  months  to  clear  the  remainder 
of  the  Province  of  Mukden  and  the  Province  of  Kirin 
of  Imperial  troops. 

"  (c»)  Within  the  six  months  following  to  remove  the 
remaining  Imperial  Russian  troops  from  the  Province  of 
Hei-lung-chang. 

"  Article  3.  In  view  of  the  necessity  of  preventing  in 
the  future  any  recurrence  of  the  disorders  of  last  year,  in 
which  Chinese  troops  stationed  on  thte  Manchurian  fron- 
tier also  took  part,  the  Imperial  Russian  and  Chinese 
Governments  shall  undertake  to  instruct  the  Russian 
military  authorities   and  the  Tsiang-Tsungs,   mutually 


222  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

i 
to  come  to  an  agreement  respecting  the  numbers  and  the 
disposition  of  the  Chinese  forces  until  the  Russian  forces 
shall  have  been  withdrawn.  At  the  same  time  the  Chinese 
Government  binds  itself  to  organize  no  other  forces  over 
and  above  those  decided  upon  by  the  Russian  military 
authorities  and  the  Tsiang-Tsungs  as  sufficient  to  sup- 
press brigandage  and  pacify  the  country. 

"  After  the  complete  evacuation  of  Manchuria  by  Rus- 
sian troops,  the  Chinese  Government  shall  have  the  right 
to  increase  or  diminish  the  number  of  its  troops  in  Man- 
churia, but  of  this  must  duly  notify  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, as  it  is  natural  that  the  maintenance  in  the  above- 
mentioned  district  of  an  over  large  number  of  troops 
must  necessarily  lead  to  a  reinforcement  of  the  Russian 
military  force  in  the  neighboring  districts,  and  thus  would 
bring  about  an  increase  of  expenditure  on  military  re- 
quirements undesirable  for  both  States. 

"  For  police  service  and  maintenance  of  internal  order 
in  the  districts  outside  those  parts  allotted  to  the  Eastern 
Chinese  Railway  Company,  a  police  guard,  under  the 
local  Governors  (* Tsiang-Tsungs'),  consisting  of  cavalry 
and  infantry,  shall  be  organized  exclusively  of  subjects 
of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China. 

"Article  4.  The  Russian  Government  agrees  to 
restore  to  the  owners  the  Railway  Shan-hai-kwan-Niu- 
chwang-Sinminting,  which,  since  the  end  of  September, 
1900,  has  been  occupied  and  guarded  by  Russian  troops. 
In  view  of  this,  the  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror of  China  binds  itself:  — 

"  1.  In  case  protection  of  the  above-mentioned  line 
should  be  necessary,  that  obligation  shall  fall  exclusively 
on  the  Chinese  Government,  which  shall  not  invite  other 
Powers  to  participate  in  its  protection,  construction,  or 
working,  nor  allow  other  Powers  to  occupy  the  territory 
evacuated  by  the  Russians. 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  EVACUATION  223 

"2.  The  completion  and  working  of  the  above-men- 
tioned line  shall  be  conducted  in  strict  accordance  with 
the  Agreement  between  Russia  and  England  of  the  16th 
April,  1899,  and  the  Agreement  with  the  private  Corpo- 
ration respecting  the  loan  for  the  construction  of  the  line. 
And  furthermore,  the  corporation  shall  observe  its  obli- 
gations not  to  enter  into  possession  of,  or  in  anyway  to 
administer,  the  Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting 
line. 

"3.  Should,  in  the  course  of  time,  extensions  of  the 
line  in  Southern  Manchuria,  or  construction  of  branch 
lines  in  connection  with  it,  or  the  erection  of  a  bridge  in 
Niu-chwang,  or  the  moving  of  the  terminus  there,  be 
undertaken,  these  questions  shall  first  form  the  subject 
of  mutual  discussion  between  the  Russian  and  Chinese 
Governments. 

"4.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  expenses  incurred  by 
the  Russian  Government  for  the  repair  and  working  of 
the  Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang-Sinminting  line  were  not 
included  in  the  sum  total  of  damages,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment shall  be  bound  to  pay  back  the  sum  which, 
after  examination  with  the  Russian  Government,  shall  be 
found  to  be  due. 

"  The  stipulations  of  all  former  Treaties  between  Russia 
and  China  which  are  not  affected  by  the  present  Agree- 
ment shall  remain  in  force. 

u  The  Agreement  shall  have  legal  force  from  the  day  of 
its  signature  by  the  Plenipotentiaries  of  both  States. 

"The  exchange  of  ratifications  shall  take  place  in  St. 
Petersburg  within  three  months  from  the  date  of  the  sig- 
nature of  the  Agreement. 

"For  the  confirmation  of  the  above,  the  Plenipoten- 
tiaries of  the  two  Contracting  Powers  have  signed  and 
sealed  two  copies  of  the  Agreement  in  the  Russian, 
French,  and  Chinese  languages.  Of  the  three  texts  which, 


224  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

after  comparison,  have  been  found  to  correspond  with 
each  other,  that  in  the  French  language  shall  be  con- 
sidered as  authoritative  for  the  interpretation  of  the 
Agreement. 

"Done  in  Peking  in  duplicate,  the  26th  March,  1902. 

"At  the  same  time,  M.  Lessar  handed  a  note  to  the 
Chinese  Plenipotentiaries,  which  declares,  in  the  name  of 
the  Imperial  Government,  that  the  surrender  of  the  civil 
government  of  Niu-chwang  into  the  hands  of  the  Chinese 
administration  will  take  place  only  upon  the  withdrawal 
from  that  part  of  foreign  forces  and  landing  parties,  and 
the  restoration  to  the  Chinese  of  the  town  of  Tien-tsin, 
at  present  under  international  administration. 

"From  the  above,  it  is  shown  that  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment, in  complete  adherence  to  its  repeated  declara- 
tions, commences  the  gradual  evacuation  of  Manchuria 
in  order  to  carry  it  out  upon  the  conditions  above  enu- 
merated, if  no  obstacles  are  placed  in  the  way  by  the 
unexpected  action  of  other  Powers  or  of  China  herself; 
that  the  surrender  of  the  civil  government  of  Niu-chwang 
into  the  hands  of  the  Chinese  administration  is  to  take 
place  according  to  a  written  declaration  given  to  the 
Celestial  Government,  only  when  foreign  forces  and  land- 
ing parties  are  withdrawn  from  the  port,  and  if,  at  the 
same  time,  the  question  of  the  restoration  of  Tien-tsin  to 
the  Chinese  has  been  conclusively  settled. 

"The  Chinese  Government,  on  its  side,  confirms  all 
the  obligations  it  has  previously  undertaken  toward  Rus- 
sia, and  particularly  the  provisions  of  the  1896  Agree- 
ment, which  must  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  friendly  rela- 
tions of  the  neighboring  Empires.  By  this  defensive 
Agreement,  Russia  undertook  in  1896  to  maintain  the 
principle  of  the  independence  and  integrity  of  China, 
who,  on  her  side,  gave  Russia  the  right  to  construct  a  line 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  EVACUATION  225 

through  Manchuria  and  to  enjoy  the  material  privileges 
which  are  directly  connected  with  the  above  undertaking. 
"After  the  instructive  events  of  the  last  two  years,  it  is 
possible  to  hope  for  the  complete  pacification  of  the  Far 
East,  and  the  development  of  friendly  relations  with 
China  in  the  interests  of  the  two  Empires.  But,  undoubt- 
edly, if  the  Chinese  Government,  in  spite  of  their  positive 
assurances,  should,  on  any  pretext,  violate  the  above 
conditions,  the  Imperial  Government  would  no  longer 
consider  itself  bound  by  the  provisions  of  the  Manchurian 
Agreement,  nor  by  its  declarations  on  this  subject,  and 
would  have  to  decline  to  take  the  responsibility  for  all 
the  consequences  which  might  ensue."  * 

The  comparatively  mild  terms  of  this  Convention 
may  well  be  pointed  out.2  Except  in  the  negative 
reservations  of  Article  4,  there  is  found  here  no 
provision  for  the  exclusive  control  by  the  Russians 
of  the  mining  and  railway  enterprises  either  in  or 
out  of  Manchuria.  On  the  contrary,  the  sovereign 
rights  in  Manchuria,  including  those  respecting 
the  disposition  of  military  forces,  will  in  eighteen 
months  be  almost  completely  restored  to  the  Chinese 
Government,  and  the  entire  agreement  will  become 
operative  from  the  very  day  of  its  signature.  The 
Convention  seemed  to  confirm  the  avowed  intention 
of  Russia  to  love  peace  and  respect  the  integrity  of 
China.  It  is  not  strange  that  Prince  Ching  per- 
sonally thanked    Great   Britain,   Japan,    and   the 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  51,  inclosure. 

2  Glance  over  the  comparative  terms,  shown  in  parallel  col- 
umns, of  the  Russian  demands  of  February,  the  amendments 
of  March,  1901,  and  the  present  Agreement.  Ibid.,  No.  42, 
inclosure. 


226  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

United  States  for  the  valuable  support  they  had 
rendered  China  in  the  negotiations  which  had  ter- 
minated in  the  conclusion  of  this  instrument.1 

If,  however,  the  subsequent  conduct  of  Russia  in 
Manchuria  has  appeared  to  contradict  the  tenor  of 
the  Agreement,  it  is  only  necessary  to  point  out  how 
elastic  and  expansive  its  terms  are.  Paragraph  5, 
Article  2,  of  the  Bank  Agreement  of  September  8, 
1896,  imposing  upon  the  Chinese  Government  the 
duty  to  protect  the  Manchurian  Railway  and  the  per- 
sons employed  in  it,  is  not  only  reinforced  but  also 
expanded  so  as  to  make  it  incumbent  upon  China 
"to  secure  within  the  boundaries  of  Manchuria  the 
safety  of  all  Russian  subjects  in  general  and  the 
undertakings  established  by  them."  Unless  Man- 
churia is  considered  a  territory  distinct  from  the  rest 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,  no  Russians  or  other  for- 
eigners have  the  right  to  reside  in  the  interior  save 
in  the  treaty  posts.  Yet  the  Chinese  Government 
is  held  responsible  for  the  security  of  the  Russians 
and  their  enterprises  in  Manchuria,  which  is  re- 
garded virtually  as  a  Russian  colony,  into  which 
immigrants  from  Siberia  and  European  Russia  have 
been  sent  with  wonderful  rapidity.  Nor  does  this 
additional  obligation  on  the  part  of  China  any 
longer  bind  her  to  a  private  company  called  the 
Russo-Chinese  Bank,  but  henceforth  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  Czar.  The  discharge  of  so  onerous  a 
duty  is  made  a  condition  for  the  Russian  evacuation 
of  Manchuria. 

1  See  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  55. 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  EVACUATION  227 

It  is  not  generally  known  that  this  condition, 
otherwise  so  difficult,  was  practically  impossible  so 
long  as  the  presence  of  the  Russian  forces  kept  the 
Chinese  troops  greatly  reduced  in  number.  The 
apprehended  disorder  must  come,  as  it  always  has 
done,  and  as  none  knew  better  than  the  Russians, 
from  the  groups  of  unoccupied  men,  the  so-called 
mounted  bandits  {ma  tseh),  who  infested  the 
Provinces  of  Sheng-king  and  Kirin,  where  they 
sided  ♦with  whatever  power  suited  their  fancy  and 
interest,  exercised  their  own  law,  and  in  one  way  or 
another  kept  the  country  in  a  state  of  great  insta- 
bility. It  should  be  noted  that  they  were  either  dis- 
banded soldiers  or  the  possible  candidates  for  the 
Chinese  troops  to  be  levied  to  safeguard  Manchuria 
—  for  military  life  in  China  seldom  attracts  peaceful 
citizens.  So  long  as  the  presence  of  the  Russian 
forces  rendered  the  regular  service  of  the  outlaws 
in  the  Chinese  army  unnecessary,  their  means  of 
subsistence  would  be  derived  less  often  from  a 
settled  agricultural  life  than  from  plundering.  Be- 
tween March,  1902,  and  August,  1903,  a  Russian 
officer  successfully  enlisted  the  service  of  some  450 
of  these  marauders,  and  employed  them  in  the  tim- 
ber work  which  the  Russians  secured  in  Eastern 
Manchuria  in  the  name  of  one  of  the  chiefs  of  the 
bandits.1    Before  and  after  this  period,  however, 

1  Mr.  Eitaro  Tsurouka,  who  has  personally  visited  several  of 
the  chiefs  of  the  banditti,  gives  an  extremely  interesting  account 
of  their  origin,  their  relations  to  the  Chinese  authorities  and  Rus- 
sian officers,  and  the  history  of  their  affairs  down  to  the  end  of 


228  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  Russian  officers  continually  reported  sanguinary 
conflicts  with  the  robbers,  the  fear  of  whom  has 
seemed  to  constitute  the  main  justification  for  the 
steady  progress  of  the  Russian  measures  of  tighten- 
ing a  hold  upon  Manchuria.1  Side  by  side  with  this 
grave  situation,  we  should  also  observe  that  the 
Convention  provided  that,  even  after  the  evacu- 
ation, if  an  evacuation  were  possible,  the  numbers 
and  the  stations  of  the  Chinese  troops,  upon  whom 
the  duty  of  protecting  the  rapidly  increasing  Rus- 
sian subjects  and  properties  in  Manchuria  would 
devolve,  should  always  be  made  known  to  Russia, 
so  that  unnecessarily  large  forces  should  not  be 
stationed.  Russia  would  judge  whether  the  Chinese 
forces  were  excessive,  and  exert  her  influence  to 
keep  them  in  reduced  numbers,2  while,  at  the  same 
time,  their  capacity  as  well  for  receiving  the  banditti 

1903.  — The  To-A  Dobun-kwai  HokoJcu,  No.  53  (April,  1904), 
pp.  1-14.  Cf.  China,  No.  2  (190A),  No.  130,  inclosure. 

1  About  August,  1901,  the  British  Consul  at  Niu-chwang,  Mr. 
A.  Hosie,  reported  that  the  force  then  at  the  disposal  of  the , 
Tartar  General  of  the  Sheng-king  Province  was  limited  by  the 
Russian  authorities  to  6500  men,  which  meant  that  over  10,000 
men  possessing  firearms  had  been  let  loose.  The  Chinese  police 
force  was  insufficient  to  back  the  authority  of  the  Governor- 
General,  and  constant  military  expeditions  by  the  Russians 
were  consequently  rendered  necessary.  —  China,  No.  2  (1904), 
p.  33.  Also  see  the  British  Consular  Report  on  Niu-chwang  for 
1901,  pp.  3-4. 

2  Early  in  March,  1903,  Prince  Ching  negotiated  with  M.  Les- 
sar  about  the  number  of  Chinese  troops  that  should  occupy  the 
country  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  Russians.  "The  Chinese 
Government  were  proposing  to  send  18,000  men,  whilst  the  Rus- 
sian Legation  considered  that  12,000  men  would  be  sufficient." 
— 'China,  No.  2  (190Jf),  No.  84  (Townley  to  Lansdowne). 


THE  CONVENTION  OF  EVACUATION  229 

into  their  ranks  as  for  affording  protection  to  the 
Russian  life  and  property  would,  to  say  the  least, 
soon  reach  its  limits.  Thus  the  explicit  terms  of 
the  Convention  were  constructed  so  as  to  be  greatly 
neutralized,  as  it  would  seem,  by  what  was  implied 
and  could  only  be  inferred  by  analysis.  In  the  light 
of  these  considerations  may  be  seen  the  statement 
that,  "  undoubtedly,  if  the  Chinese  Government,  in 
spite  of  their  positive  assurances,  should,  on  any 
pretext,  violate  the  above  conditions  [i.  e.,  of  the 
Convention],  the  Imperial  Government  would  no 
longer  consider  itself  bound  by  the  provisions  of 
the  Manchurian  Agreement,  nor  by  its  declarations 
on  this  subject,  and  would  have  to  decline  to  take 
the  responsibility  for  all  the  consequences  which 
might  ensue/' 1  —  a  reservation  which  Count  Lams- 
dorff  considered  "  a  very  necessary  one." 2  In  the 
same  light,  also,  one  may  read  the  statement  made 
by  Sir  Ernest  Satow  to  Prince  Ching,  that  "  the 
Convention  did  not  appear  to  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment to  be  entirely  satisfactory," 3  and  also  the 
pungent  remark  of  Lord  Lansdowne  to  M.  de  Staal, 
that  there  were  several  points  in  the  Agreement 
which  had  caused  much  criticism  in  England,  par- 
ticularly those  provisions  which  limited  China's  right 
to  dispose  of  her  own  military  forces  and  to  con- 
struct railway  extensions  within  her  own  territory. 
"  I  did  not,  however,"  adds  the  Marquess,  "  desire 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  p.  38,  already  quoted  in  p.  225,  above. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  53  (Lamsdorff's  statement  to  Scott,  on  April  23). 
*  Ibid.,  No.  55  (April  15). 


230  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

to  examine  these  provisions  too  microscopically,  and 
I  shared  his  [M.  de  Staal's]  hope  that  the  Agree- 
ment would  be  loyally  and  considerately  interpreted 
on  both  sides,  and  that  the  evacuation  of  the  pro- 
vince would  be  completed  within  the  appointed 
time."1 

The  last  but  not  the  least  difficulty  about  the 
Agreement  was  its  absolute  silence  regarding  the 
so-called  "  railway  guards/'  organized  ostensibly  by 
the  Eastern  Chinese  Railway  Company,  whose  ex- 
istence would  make  the  promised  evacuation  almost 
entirely  nominal.  It  will  be  remembered  that,  so 
far  as  the  published  agreements  between  China  and 
Russia  are  concerned,  one  fails  to  find  any  conven- 
tional ground  for  the  organization  of  the  railway 
guards,  save  in  Article  8  of  the  Statutes  —  not  a 
Russo-Chinese  agreement,  but  purely  Russian  stat- 
utes —  published  on  December  11/13,  1896,  which 
provided  :  "  The  preservation  of  order  and  decorum 
on  the  lands  assigned  to  the  railway  and  its  appur- 
tenances should  be  confined  to  the  police  agents 
appointed  by  the  Company.  The  Company  should 
draw  up  and  establish  police  regulations." 2  This 
right  of  Russia  to  police  the  railway  lands  seems 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  52  (Lansdowne  to  Scott,  April  30). 
This  conversation  had  ensued  from  M.  de  Staal's  visit  to  Lord 
Lansdowne,  the  purpose  of  which  was,  on  the  part  of  the  Rus- 
sian Ambassador,  to  explain  to  the  British  Foreign  Minister 
the  unreasonableness  of  the  popular  allegation  that  Russia  had, 
in  concluding  the  Agreement  of  April  8,  surrendered  to  the 
diplomatic  pressure  exerted  by  Great  Britain. 

2  Russia,  No.  2  (1904),  P-  6.  Already  quoted  in  p.  98,  above. 


THE   CONVENTION  OF  EVACUATION  231 

to  have  been  tacitly  perpetuated  by  the  present 
Convention  of  1902/  and,  from  this,  it  may  per- 
haps be  assumed  that  the  Chinese  Government  had 
some  time  before  April  8,  1902,  agreed  to  the 
statutory  rule  of  Russia  which  has  just  been  quoted. 
However  that  may  be,  a  permission  to  establish  a 
police  force  could  scarcely  justify  the  organization 
of  railway  guards  selected  from  the  regular  troops 
and  receiving  a  higher  pay  than  the  latter.  More- 
over, it  still  remains  to  be  officially  declared  that 
the  numbers  of  the  guards  would  not  be  deter- 
mined by  Kussia  at  will  and  without  consulting 
China.  These  guards  seem  to  have  numbered  only 
2000  or  3000  before  the  Manchurian  campaign  of 
1900,  but  in  October  of  that  year  Mr.  Charles  Har- 
dinge,  the  British  Charge  d*  Affaires  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, wrote  to  Lord  Salisbury  :  "  I  learn  that  ac- 
tive recruiting  for  this  force  is  now  in  progress,  and 
its  numbers  are  to  be  raised  to  12,000  men  under 
command  of  officers  in  the  regular  army.  Intrenched 
camps  are  also  being  constructed  at  all  the  stra- 
tegic positions  along  the  line."  2  Then,  on  the  eve 
of  the  termination  of  the  first  period  of  evacuation 
in  1902,  it  was  reported  by  Consul  Hosie  :  "  I  am 
credibly  informed  that  the  number  of  the  military 
guard  of  the  Russian  railways  in  Manchuria  has 
been  fixed  at  30,000  men."3  Latterly,  the  name  has 

1  Cf.  the  last  clause  of  Article  3. 
3  China,  No.  5  (1901),  No.  23. 

8  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  63,  September  9,  1902  (Hosie  to 
Satow). 


232  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

been  changed  to  the  "  frontier  guards,"  which,  after 
the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  were  said  to  have 
been  made  up  of  fifty-five  mounted  squadrons,  fifty- 
five  foot  companies,  and  six  batteries  of  artillery, 
aggregating  25,000  men,  instead  of  30,000,  and 
guarding  the  railways  in  sections  of  thirty-three 
miles.1  There  is  no  intention  here  to  maintain  the 
accuracy  of  these  reports,  or  to  decide  whether  the 
numbers  are  adequate  for  the  purpose  in  view,  but 
one  would  be  tempted  to  think  that  the  Russian 
Government  made  a  regrettable  omission  in  the  new 
Manchurian  Agreement,  when  it  made  no  reference 
to  the  forces  which  were  justified  by  no  open  con- 
tract with  China,  and,  theoretically  speaking,  were 
not  incapable  of  an  indefinite  expansion. 

1  Telegraph  from   Miandonha  [?],   May  18,  1904.   In  the 
Evening  Post  of  a  few  days  later. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE   EVACUATION 

Unsatisfactory  as  the  Manchurian  Agreement  of 
April  8, 1902,  appeared  to  Great  Britain  and  Japan, 
they  refrained  from  entering  any  protest  against  its 
conclusion.  They  probably  preferred  the  imperfect 
obligation  the  Convention  imposed  upon  the  con- 
tracting parties  to  an  indefinite  prolongation  of  the 
dangerous  conditions  which  had  prevailed.  What 
remained  for  them  and  for  China  was  to  watch  the 
conduct  of  Russia  in  Manchuria  and  test  her  veracity 
according  to  their  own  interpretations  of  the  Agree- 
ment. In  the  mean  time,  the  questions  which  had 
existed  between  China  and  the  Powers  were  being 
one  after  another  disposed  of ;  the  distribution  of 
the  indemnities  was  finally  agreed  upon  on  June  14, 
the  Provisional  Government  of  Tien-tsin  by  the 
Powers  came  to  an  end  on  August  15,  and  the 
rendition  of  the  city  to  the  Chinese  authorities  was 
accomplished.  The  date  set  for  the  evacuation  of 
the  southwest  of  the  Sheng-king  Province  up  to  the 
Liao  River,  October  8,  drew  on,  and  the  evacua- 
tion took  place.  The  Tartar  General  Tseng-chi  had 
received  an  Imperial  mandate  to  take  over  from 
the  hands  of  the  Russians  the  specified  territory 
and  its  railways,  even  before  the  middle  of  Septem- 


234  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

ber,1  and,  on  October  28,  Prince  Ching  was  able  to 
state  to  Sir  Ernest  Satow  :  "  Their  Excellencies  the 
Minister  Superintendent  of  Northern  Ports  and  the 
Military  Governor  of  Mukden  have  now  severally 
reported  by  telegram  that  all  the  railways  outside 
the  Great  Wall  have  been  handed  back,  and  that 
the  southwest  portion  of  the  Mukden  (Sheng-king) 
Province  as  far  as  the  Liao  River  has  been  com- 
pletely evacuated  by  Russian  troops." 2  But  what 
was  evacuation?  Some  troops  may  have  been  sent 
to  European  Russia,  others  to  different  stations 
in  Siberia,  including  the  strategically  important 
Nikolsk,  near  the  eastern  border  of  Manchuria, 
and  still  others  to  Mongolia,  where  Russian  forces 
were  reported  to  have  suddenly  increased,  until  in 
December  they  were  said  to  have  numbered  about 
27,000.3  No  small  number  were  also  transferred  to 
Port  Arthur 4  and  Vladivostok.5  It  was,  however,  al- 
leged by  several  observers  that  the  main  part  of  the 
so-called  evacuation  meant  nothing  more  than  the 
transferring  of  Russian  troops  from  Chinese  towns 
and  settlements  to  the  rapidly  developing  Russian 
settlements  and  quarters  within  Manchuria.    It  was 


1  China,  No.  2  (190J>),  No.  65,  inclosure  2. 

8  Ibid.,  No.  66,  inclosure. 

8  The  To- A  Dobun-kwai  Hokolcu,  No.  38  (January,  1903), 
pp.  105-106. 

4  E.  g.,  400  men  from  (probably)  Shan-hai-kwan,  June  24. — 
China,  No.  2  (190J/,),  No.  58,  inclosure.  Also  some  from  Liao- 
yang,  in  August.  —  Ibid.,  No.  61,  inclosure. 

6  E.  g.,  from  Kin-chou-Fu  early  in  September.  —  Ibid.,  No. 
62,  inclosure. 


THE  EVACUATION  235 

reported  from  various  sources 1  that  along  the  2326 
versts  of  the  railroads  there  were  about  eighty  so- 
called  depots,  each  two  to  five  square  miles  in  ex- 
tent, which  had  been  marked  out  as  the  sites  of  new 
Russian  settlements,  and  in  many  cases  as  stations 
of  the  railway  guards.  The  most  important  line, 
connecting  Port  Arthur  with  Harbin,  was  studded 
with  such  depots  at  every  fifteen  or  twenty  miles. 
In  many  of  these  depots  were  to  be  seen  exten- 
sive barracks  built  of  brick,  one  at  Liao-yang,  for 
example,  being  capable  of  holding  3000  men, 
and  another  at  Mukden,  in  the  building  of  which 
bricks  of  the  wall  of  the  Chinese  Temple  of  Earth 
were  surreptitiously  utilized,2  accommodating  6000. 
Besides  the  barracks,  permanent  blockhouses  were 
met  with  every  three  or  four  miles.  The  guards 
of  the  railways,  whose  numbers  were  just  at  this 
time  fixed  at  30,000,3  were  recruited  from  the  regu- 
lar troops,  from  whom  they  were  distinguished  by 
green  shoulder-straps  and  collar-patches,  and  also  by 
higher  pay,  and  the  regular  troops  themselves  could 
be  contained  in  large  numbers  in  the  depots  and 
barracks  and  blockhouses  when  the  evacuation  was 
completed.4  At  the  same  time,  the  Russians  seemed 

1  Cf .  Dr.  Morrison's  articles  in  The  Times,  January  3  (p.  8) 
and  14  (p.  5),  1903. 

2  China,  No.  2  (190J/),  No.  56,  inclosure  (Hosie  to  Satow). 
8  Ibid.,  No.  63,  inclosure  (Hosie  to  Satow,  September  9). 

4  Cf.  ibid.,  No.  61,  inclosure  (Hosie  to  Satow,  August  21), 
which  says  :  "I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  a  considerable 
town,  to  consist  of  some  300  cottages,  of  which  about  100  have 
already  been  built,  is  in  course  of  construction  on  both  sides  of 


236  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

to  have  destroyed  nearly  all  the  forts  and  confis- 
cated the  guns  of  the  Chinese,  whose  defense  had 
thus  been  reduced  almost  to  nil.  The  military 
power  of  the  Tartar  Generals  at  the  capitals  of  the 
three  Manchurian  Provinces  was  held  under  a  strict 
surveillance  of  the  Russian  officers,  who  also  readily 
controlled  highroads  and  rivers.  It  was,  moreover, 
uncertain  how  much  of  this  control  and  supervi- 
sion by  the  Russians  would  be  relaxed  after  the 
promised  evacuation,  or  how  much  it  would  then 
be  replaced  by  the  powerful  position  the  Russians 
would  hold  in  their  own  quarters  in  Manchuria. 
The  conclusion  seemed  inevitable  to  some  people 
that  by  the  so-called  evacuation,  if  it  should  ever 
take  place  in  the  face  of  the  enormous  obstacles 

the  Russian  railway  to  the  immediate  northwest  of  the  city  of 
Liao-yang  Chou.  These  cottages,  which  when  completed  will 
occupy  a  large  piece  of  land  bought  from  the  Chinese  proprie- 
tors by  the  Railway  Company,  are  intended  for  the  residence  of 
railway  employees  and  of  the  artisans  who  will  be  engaged  at  the 
cleaning  and  repairing  shops  to  be  established  at  this  important 
depot. 

"While  this  foreign  town  is  growing  outside,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment buildings  inside  the  city  of  Liao-yang  are  being  rapidly 
evacuated,  in  many  cases  the  only  vestige  of  the  Russian  occu- 
pation being  a  solitary  sentry  keeping  guard  over  the  property. 
Russian  troops  are  also  being  withdrawn  from  Liao-yang  and 
conveyed  by  rail  to  Port  Arthur." 

A  more  direct  testimony  came  from  the  Russian  diplomats, 
probably  M.  Lessar  himself,  who,  even  so  late  as  at  the  begin- 
ning of  September,  1903,  or  a  month  before  the  end  of  the  stipu- 
lated period  for  the  complete  evacuation  of  Manchuria,  inti- 
mated to  Prince  Ching  that  the  reason  for  the  delay  of  the  actual 
evacuation  was  "that  the  barracks  for  the  railway  guards  were 
not  ready."—  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  156. 


THE  EVACUATION  237 

which  the  Agreement  did  not  seek  to  remove, 
Russia  would  gain  a  much  stronger  hold  upon  the 
Manchurian  territory  than  during  the  preceding 
period  of  open  military  occupation.1  It  was  also 
pointed  out  that  the  forts,  docks,  and  other  mili- 
tary and  naval  establishments  at  Port  Arthur,  cost- 
ing millions  of  rubles,  were  not  compatible  with  the 
short  term  of  the  lease  of  the  port,  and  their  prac- 
tical value  would  be  seriously  impaired  by  a  true 
evacuation  of  the  rest  of  Manchuria. 
•  So  far  as  the  immediate  interests  of  foreign 
nations,  aside  from  the  general  principle  of  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Chinese  Empire,  were  concerned, 
nothing  was  more  to  be  desired  than  a  speedy 
evacuation  of  the  treaty  port  of  Niu-chwang,  where 
the  Russians  had  maintained  a  provisional  govern- 
ment since  August  5,  1900.2  At  the  conclusion  of 
the  Agreement  of  April,  1901,  M.  Lessar  delivered 
a  note  verbale  to  the  Chinese  Government,  stating 

1  The  Novoe  Vremya  itself  declared  toward  the  end  of  the 
year  1902  that,  contrary  to  the  popular  notion  that  Russia  was 
evacuating  Manchuria,  she  was  just  beginning  to  consolidate  her 
influence  in  that  region. 

As  regards  the  number  of  the  Russian  troops  left  in  Man- 
churia after  the  first  period  of  evacuation,  we  have  the  following 
authoritative  statement  by  Count  Cassini,  Russian  Ambassador 
to  the  United  States:  "Faithfully  adhering  to  the  terms  of  her 
treaty  with  China  respecting  Manchuria,  she  [Russia]  had  with- 
drawn the  major  portion  of  her  troops  from  that  province  until 
between  60,000  and  70,000  only  remained."—  The  North  Ameri- 
can Review  for  May,  1904,  pp.  682-683.  It  is  not  clear  whether 
this  number  included  the  Russian  soldiers  stationed  outside  of 
the  Chinese  quarters. 

2  See  pp.  144-145,  above. 


238  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

that  Niu-chwang  would  be  restored  as  soon  as  the 
Powers  terminated  their  administration  of  Tien- 
tsin, and  that,  if  the  latter  event  did  not  take  place 
before  October  8,  then  Niu-chwang  would  be  sur- 
rendered to  China  in  the  first  or  second  month 
after  that  date.1  The  rendition  of  Tien-tsin  was  ac- 
complished by  the  Powers  on  August  15,  but  the 
restoration  of  Niu-chwang  not  only  did  not  follow 
it.  but  seemed  to  be  indefinitely  delayed  for  the 
trivial  reasons  presented  one  after  another  by  the 
Russian  authorities :  that,  for  instance,  one  or  two 
foreign  gunboats  were  present  in  the  harbor;2  that 
the  Chinese  had  refused  to  agree  to  the  constitution 
of  a  sanitary  board;3  and  that  the  Chinese  Tao-tai 
detailed  to  receive  back  the  civil  government  of  the 
port  had  not  arrived  from  Mukden,  where,  it  has 
been  discovered,  he  had  been  detained  by  the  Rus- 
sians much  against  his  will.4  Up  to  the  present 
time,  the  maritime  customs  dues  at  this  important 
trade  port  have  been  paid  to  the  Russo-Chinese 
Bank,  and,  for  a  large  sum  thus  received,  the  Bank 
is  said  to  have  paid  to  the  Chinese  authorities  nei- 
ther the  amount  nor  the  interest.5 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  pp.  38  and  42. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  72,  74,  75,  111,  112. 
8  Ibid.,  Nos.  131,  132. 

4  Ibid.,  Nos.  70,  122,  130,  131. 

5  The  Kokumin,  May  30,  1904;  a  Peking  correspondence. 
Also  see  China,  No.  2  (1904),  Nos.  44, 46-48,  69,  73,  96, 99, 102, 
105,  124. 


CHAPTER  XV 

DEMANDS  IN  SEVEN  ARTICLES 

The  most  important  section  of  Manchuria,  strategi- 
cally, namely,  that  part  of  the  Province  of  Sheng- 
king  which  lies  east  of  the  Liao  River  and  the  entire 
Province  of  Kirin,  was  to  be  evacuated,  according 
to  the  Agreement,  before  April  8,  1903.  As  that 
date  drew  near,  and  long  afterward,  the  disposi- 
tion of  the  Russian  forces  appeared  incompatible 
with  even  the  nominal  withdrawal  which  character- 
ized the  first  period  of  evacuation.  It  is  true  that 
in  the  Sheng-king  Province,  except  the  regions 
bordering  on  the  Yalu  River  on  the  Korean  fron- 
tier, the  Russian  troops  began  to  withdraw  soon 
after  the  end  of  the  first  period,  but  only  "  to  the 
railway  line."  1  The  important  border  regions,  es- 
pecially Feng-hwang-Cheng  and  An-tung,  however, 
remained  in  Russian  occupation,  the  former  still 
holding  700  cavalry  in  June.2  From  March,  there 
had  been  mysterious  movements  of  small  detach- 
ments of  troops  toward  this  frontier,3  of  which 
Count   Lamsdorff   and   M.  Witte  alike  professed 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  57,  inclosure  (Hosie  to  Satow, 
November  7, 1902).  Also  No.  108  (Townley  to  Lansdowne,  May 
5,  1903). 

*  Ibid.,  No.  128  (Hosie,  June  22,  1903). 

8  Ibid.,  No.  116  (April  8). 


240  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

a  complete  ignorance,1  but  concerning  which  M. 
Plangon,  the  Russian  Charge  a"  Affaires  at  Peking, 
had  made  an  explanation  which  seemed  utterly  un- 
intelligible, that  the  Russian  troops  had  been  moved 
in  order  to  counteract  a  threatened  Japanese  move- 
ment. It  soon  appeared,  however,  that  the  Rus- 
sians had  begun  to  cut  timber  on  both  sides  of  the 
Yalu  River,2  and,  with  the  consent  of  Admiral 
Alexieff,  had  hired  the  services  of  some  Russian 
soldiers,3  some  of  whom  had  gone  to  Yong-am-po 
on  the  Korean  side  of  the  Yalu.4  The  detachments 
outside  of  Feng-hwang-Cheng,  amounting  at  first 
to  only  five  men  at  Ta-tung-kao  and  twenty  at 
Yong-am-po,  would  have  been  small  enough  to  be 
ignored,  had  it  not  been  for  the  significant  fact 
that  the  occupation  of  Yong-am-po,  which  will  be 
discussed  later  on,5  constituted  a  menace  to  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Korean  Empire  similar  to  one  which 
threatened  China  when  Russia  leased  Port  Arthur ; 
for  a  railway  concession  granted  in  the  Russo-Chi- 
nese  Agreement  of  March  27,  1898,6  would  bring 
this  port  into  connection  with  the  entire  railroad 
and  military  system  of  Manchuria  and  the  great 
Russian  Empire.  Further  west,  at  Liao-yang,  ex- 
cept the  nominal  withdrawal  reported  in  the  pre- 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  75  (April  15);  113  (May  14). 

2  For  the  Manchurian  side,  see  p.  227,  above.    The  timber 
concession  on  the  Korean  side  will  be  taken  up  in  a  later  section. 

3  China,  No.  2  (1904),  Nos.  75,  115,  128. 

4  Ibid.,  Nos.  115,  129. 

*  Pp.  289  ff.,  318  ff.,  below. 
Article  8.     See  pp.  130-131,  above. 


DEMANDS  IN  SEVEN  ARTICLES  241 

vious  August/  there  was  no  indication  of  its  evacu- 
ation,2 and  at  Mukden,  the  capital  of  Sheng-king, 
3200  soldiers,  who  constituted  the  major  part  of 
the  forces,  were  reported  to  have  evacuated,3  but 
the  remainder,  after  proceeding  to  the  train,  sud- 
denly returned  and  took  up  their  old  quarters,4 
some  or  all  of  them  wearing  civilian  dress.5  It  is 
unknown  whither  the  3200  men  had  gone,  but  the 
Russian  Consul  merely  moved  to  the  railway  outside 
the  town.6  To  the  north,  it  was  evident  in  May  that 
the  Province  of  Kirin  had  hardly  begun  to  be 
evacuated  even  in  the  nominal  sense,  as  in  parts  of 
the  Sheng-king  Province.7  So  late  as  in  September, 
the  Russian  authorities  at  Peking  talked  to  Prince 
Ching  of  leaving  6000  or  7000  troops  in  the  Kirin 
and  Hei-lung  Provinces  for  another  year.8 

Long  before  September,  however,  it  had  become 
apparent  that  the  delay  in  the  second  part  of  the 
Manchurian  evacuation  was  due  to  no  casual  event. 
The  appointed  time-limit,  the  8th  of  April,  had 
hardly  been  twenty  days  past,  with  no  signs  indic- 
ative of  a  possible  speedy  withdrawal,  when  new 
demands  in  seven  articles  of  an  highly  exclusive 

1  See  p.  235,  note  4,  above. 

2  China,  No.  2  (190£),  No.  130,  inclosure  (May  4,  1903). 
8  Ibid.,  No.  71  (April  14). 

4  Ibid.,  No.  122. 

6  Ibid.,  No.  130,  inclosure  (May  4). 
6  Ibid. 

1  Ibid.,  No.  137,  inclosure  (Consul  Fulford  at  Niu-chwang, 
May  19). 

8  Ibid.,  No.  156  (Satow  to  Lansdowne,  September  10). 


242  THE  KUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

nature,  which  the  Kussian  Charge  a" Affaires  had 
lodged  at  the  Foreign  Office  of  Peking,1  leaked 
out,2  were  confirmed  by  Prince  Ching,3  and  spread 
broadcast  over  the  astonished  world.  Further  evac- 
uation was  probably  implied,  if  not  declared,  to  be 
dependent  upon  the  acceptance  of  these  demands,4 
the  most  authentic  version  5  of  which  is  here  sub- 
joined :  — 

"  1.  No  portion  of  territory  restored  to  China  by  Rus- 
sia, especially  at  Niu-chwang  and  in  the  valley  of  Liao- 
hb,  shall  be  leased  or  sold  to  any  other  Power  under  any 
circumstances  ;  if  such  sale  or  lease  to  another  Power  be 
concluded,  Russia  will  take  decisive  steps  in  order  to 
safeguard  her  own  interests,  as  she  considers  such  sale 
or  lease  to  be  a  menace  to  her. 

"2.  The  system  of  government  actually  existing 
throughout  Mongolia  shall  not  be  altered,  as  such  altera- 
tion will  tend  to  produce  a  regrettable  state  of  affairs,  such 
as  the  uprising  of  the  people  and  the  disturbances  along 
the  Russian  frontier;  the  utmost  precaution  shall  be 
taken  in  that  direction. 

1  The  author  has  been  informed  from  a  reliable  source  that 
the  Charge's  note  containing  those  demands  was  dated  April  5, 
1903. 

2  Again  the  revelation  must  have  emanated  from  the  Chinese 
official  circle.  M.  Lessar  is  said  to  have,  about  June  4,  bitterly 
complained  at  the  Peking  Foreign  Office  of  their  breach  of 
faith,  and  requested  that  there  should  be  appointed  two  special 
Chinese  negotiators,  who  should  be  entirely  responsible  for  the 
secrecy  of  the  matter. 

8  China,  No.  2  {190Jfiy  No.  81  (Townley  to  Lansdowne,  April 
24). 

4  Ibid.,  No.  127. 

5  Ibid.,  No.  94.    Also  see  Nos.  77,  78,  81,  82,  86. 


DEMANDS  IN  SEVEN  ARTICLES  243 

"  3.  China  shall  engage  herself  not  to  open,  of  her  own 
accord,  new  ports  or  towns  in  Manchuria,  without  giving 
previous  notice  to  the  Russian  Government,  nor  shall 
she  permit  foreign  consuls  to  reside  in  those  towns  or 
ports. 

"4.  The  authority  of  foreigners  who  may  be  engaged 
by  China  for  the  administration  of  any  affairs  whatever, 
shall  not  be  permitted  to  extend  over  any  affairs  in 
Northern  Provinces  (including  Chili),  where  Russia  has 
the  predominant  interests. 

"In  case  China  desires  to  engage  foreigners  for  the 
administration  of  affairs  in  Northern  Provinces,  special 
offices  shall  be  established  for  the  control  of  Russians :  for 
instance,  no  authority  over  the  mining  affairs  of  Mongolia 
and  Manchuria  shall  be  given  to  foreigners  who  may  be 
engaged  by  China  for  the  administration  of  mining  af- 
fairs ;  such  authority  shall  be  left  entirely  in  the  hands 
of  Russian  experts. 

u  5 .  As  long  as  there  exists  a  telegraph  line  at  Niu-chwang 
and  Port  Arthur,  the  Niu-chwang-Peking  line  shall  be 
maintained,  as  the  telegraph  line  at  Niu-chwang  and 
Port  Arthur  and  throughout  Sheng-king  Province  is 
under  Russian  control,  and  its  connection  with  her  line  on 
the  Chinese  telegraph  poles  at  Niu-chwang,  Port  Arthur, 
and  Peking  is  of  the  utmost  importance. 

"6.  After  restoring  Niu-chwang  to  the  Chinese  local 
authorities,  the  customs  receipts  there  shall,  as  at  present, 
be  deposited  with  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank. 

"7.  After  the  evacuation  of  Manchuria,  the  rights 
which  have  been  acquired  in  Manchuria  by  Russian  sub- 
jects and  foreign  companies  during  Russian  occupation 
shall  remain  unaffected  ;  moreover,  as  Russia  is  duty- 
bound  to  insure  the  life  of  the  people  residing  in  all  the 
regions  traversed  by  the  railway,  it  is  necessary,  in  order 
to  provide  against  the  spread  of  epidemic  diseases  in  the 


244  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Northern  Provinces  by  the  transportation  of  passengers 
and  goods  by  railway  train,  to  establish  at  Niu-chwang 
a  quarantine  office  after  the  restoration  of  the  place  to 
China ;  the  Russian  civil  administrators  will  consider  the 
best  means  to  attain  that  end.  Russians  only  shall  be 
employed  at  the  posts  of  Commissioner  of  Customs  and 
Customs  Physician,  and  they  shall  be  placed  under  the 
control  of  the  Inspector-General  of  the  Imperial  Maritime 
Customs.  These  officials  shall  perform  their  duties  con- 
scientiously, shall  protect  the  interests  of  the  Imperial 
maritime  customs,  and  shall  exhaust  their  efforts  in 
preventing  the  spread  of  those  diseases  into  the  Rus- 
sian territories.  A  permanent  Sanitary  Board,  presided 
over  by  the  Customs  Tao-tai,  shall  be  established.  The 
foreign  Consuls,  Commissioner  of  Customs,  Customs 
Physician,  and  Agent  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway 
Company  shall  be  Councilors  of  the  Board.  As  regards 
the  establishment  of  the  Board  and  the  management  of 
its  affairs,  the  Customs  Tao-tai  shall  consult  with  the 
Russian  Consul,  and  the  Customs  Tao-tai  shall  devise 
the  best  means  to  obtain  funds  necessary  for  the  pur- 
pose." 

These  demands,  as  will  be  seen,  comprised, 
besides  the  non-alienation  of  Manchuria  to  any  other 
Power,  and  the  status  quo  in  Mongolia,  drastic 
measures  of  closing  the  former  territory  against  the 
economic  enterprise  of  all  nations  but  the  Russians ; 
and,  in  that  respect,  were  supplementary  to  the 
Agreement  concluded  a  year  before,  which  studi- 
ously omitted  clauses  prejudicial  to  the  principle 
of  the  open  door.  From  the  standpoint  of  this  last 
principle,  therefore,  no  demands  could  be  more  ob- 
jectionable than  those  now  presented  by  M.  Plancon. 


DEMANDS  IN  SEVEN  ARTICLES  245 

The  Empress  Dowager  of  China  was  said  to  have 
sneered  at  the  report,  and  to  have  remarked  that, 
if  she  had  been  disposed  to  grant  such  demands,  she 
would  never  have  requested  the  Powers  to  withdraw 
as  soon  as  possible  their  forces  from  North  China.1 
Prince  Ching  not  only  considered  the  Russian  terms 
quite  unacceptable,  but  failed  to  see  any  reason  or 
right  on  the  part  of  Russia  to  impose  fresh  con- 
ditions which  infringed  China's  sovereign  rights. 
He  accordingly  refused  to  entertain  these  conditions, 
perhaps  on  April  23. 2  The  Japanese  Government 
had  already  entered  a  firm  protest,3  and  was  fol- 
lowed by  that  of  the  British  Government,  which 
considered  the  demands  as  violating  the  most-fa- 
vored-nation clause,  and  otherwise  highly  inadmis- 
sible.4 Before  the  British  protest  reached  him,  Mr. 
Townley,  the  British  Charge,  had  assured  Prince 
Ching  that  the  latter  would  receive  from  Great 
Britain  similar  support  in  resisting  the  Russian  de- 
mands to  that  which  was  given  him  during  the  ne- 
gotiation of  the  Manchurian  Convention.5  Soon 
afterward,  the  United  States  Government  also  in- 
structed Mr.  Conger  to  urge  on  the  Peking  Foreign 
Office  the  advisability  of  refusing  the  first  and 
second  of  the  conditions  laid  down  by  Russia,  and, 
moreover,  made  direct  inquiries  at  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment in  a  friendly  spirit,  pointing  out  that  the 

1  The  Kokumin. 

2  China,  No.  2  (1904),  Nos.  78,  81,  127. 
8  Perhaps  on  April  21. 

4  China,  No.  2  (1904),  Nos.  79  and  80  (April  23). 
6  Ibid.,  Nos.  81,  82  (April  24). 


246  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

reported  demands  were  not  in  accordance  with  the 
proposed  stipulations  contained  in  the  new  draft 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and  China,  a  copy 
of  which  was  communicated  to  Count  Lamsdorff.1 
This  latter  act  of  Secretary  Hay  was  promptly 
followed  by  Great  Britain,  whose  Government 
instructed  its  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  to  ad- 
dress the  Foreign  Minister  in  language  similar  to 
that  used  by  the  American  Representative.2  It 
may  be  safely  inferred  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment also  took  a  similar  step.  There  thus  resulted 
a  natural  cooperation  between  the  three  Powers, 
whose  straightforward  policy  was  clearly  expressed 
by  Lord  Lansdowne  as  follows  :  "  To  open  China 
impartially  to  the  commerce  of  the  whole  world,  to 
maintain  her  independence  and  integrity,  and  to 
insist  upon  the  fulfillment  of  treaty  and  other 
obligations  by  the  Chinese  Government  which  they 
have  contracted  towards  us." 3 

According  to  the  instructions  he  had  received 
from  his  Government,  Mr.  MacCormick,  the  United 
States  Ambassador,  had  an  interview  with  Count 
Lamsdorff  in  the  evening  of  April  28.  The  Count  at 
once  denied  in  the  most  positive  manner  that  such 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  Nos.  83,  85  (April  26  and  27).  Cf. 
No.  82. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  89  (April  28) .  It  does  not  appear  that  this  instruc- 
tion was  carried  out,  for  when  Count  Lamsdorff  gave  to  the 
American  Ambassador  a  positive  denial  of  the  truth  of  the  cur- 
rent reports,  the  British  Ambassador  deemed  it  unnecessary  to 
repeat  the  inquiry.  See  ibid.,  No.  91  (April  29). 

3  Ibid.,  No.  90,  Lansdowne  to  Herbert  (April  28). 


DEMANDS  IN  SEVEN  ARTICLES  247 

demands  as  were  rumored  had  been  made  by  the 
Russian  Government.  He  expressed  surprise  that 
they  should  have  been  credited  in  any  quarter,  and 
that  a  friendly  government  like  that  of  the  United 
States  should  be  the  only  one  to  question  him  as  to 
whether  Russia  could  have  made  demands  some  of 
which  were  on  the  face  of  them  ridiculous,  as,  for 
instance,  those  for  the  right  of  using  China's  tele- 
graph poles  and  for  the  restriction  of  foreign  trade 
in  Manchuria.  It  may  be  questioned  whether  Count 
Lamsdorff  has  ever  made  to  a  strong  Power  another 
denial  in  as  positive  language,  which  was,  one 
will  soon  observe,  as  quickly  falsified  by  subsequent 
events,  as  this  remarkable  disclaimer  of  April  28, 
1903.  He  went  on  to  say  that  he  could  give  the 
United  States  Government  the  most  positive  as- 
surances that  Russia  would  faithfully  adhere  to  its 
pledges  regarding  Manchuria,  and  to  her  assurances 
to  respect  the  rights  of  other  Powers.  Moreover, 
American  capital  and  commerce  were  what  Russia 
most  desired  to  attract  in  order  to  develop  Manchu- 
ria. The  Count  also  intimated  that  any  delay  in 
the  evacuation  was  due  to  the  natural  necessity  of 
obtaining  assurances  that  China  was  fulfilling  her 
part  of  the  agreement.  This  could  be  better  ascer- 
tained by  the  Russian  Minister,  M.  Lessar,  who 
had  been  absent  from  Peking  on  sick  leave,  but 
was  about  to  return  to  his  post,  than  by  an  acting 
Charge  a" Affaires.1   A  careful  reading  of  this  dis- 

1  Namely,  M.  Plancon.     The  same  M.  Plancon  stated  the 
next  day  to  Prince  Ching  that  the  delay  in  the  evacuation  was 


248  THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

claimer  will  show  that  it  denied  that  the  reported 
demands  had  been  made  by  Russia,  but  it  did  not 
establish  that  no  demands  whatsoever  had  been 
made  by  her.  This  consideration  would  seem  to 
make  it  truly  remarkable  that  Mr.  MacCormick 
should  have  been,  as  he  was,  entirely  satisfied  with 
the  result  of  the  interview,  and  should  have  had  no 
further  remark  to  make.  He  could  perhaps  have 
inquired  whether  M.  Plan  con  had  acted  without 
authorization,  what  were  the  conditions  he  had  pro- 
posed, and  by  what  means  M.  Lessar  was  expected 
to  obtain  the  assurances  from  China  that  her  obli- 
gations would  be  fulfilled.1 

The  positive  statements  of  Count  Lamsdorff  were 
partly  reinforced  and  partly  neutralized  by  the 
clever  remarks  made  on  April  29  by  Count  Cas- 
sini,  the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Washington,  which 
appeared  in  the  New  York  Tribune  of  May  1.  He 
considered  it  unfortunate  that  Mr.  Conger  should 
have  been  misinformed,  by  unreliable  parties,  of 
Russia's  intentions  in  Manchuria,  of  which  they 
were  grossly  ignorant,  —  a  matter  which  was  re- 
gretted, he  was  sure,  no  less  by  the  American  Gov- 
ernment than  by  Russia.  He,  however,  not  only 
intimated  that  some  sort  of  negotiation  was  in  pro- 
gress between  Russia  and  China  regarding  Man- 
due  to  the  military  party  in  Russia.  —  China,  No.  2  (1904), 
No.  95.  The  statements  of  the  two  diplomats  are  not  necessarily 
contradictory  to  each  other. 

For  the  interview  between  MacCormick  and  Lamsdorff,  see 
ibid.,  Nos.  91,  92,  103. 


DEMANDS   IN  SEVEN  ARTICLES  249 

churia,  but  was  bold  enough  to  say  that  the  United 
States  would  assist  Russia  in  quieting  the  uneasy 
sentiment  caused  by  false  reports.     He  said  :  — 

"  Because  of  the  singularity  of  the  interest  held  by  the 
United  States  in  Manchuria  —  for  all  the  world  realizes 
that  yours  is  a  trade,  not  a  territorial  one  —  it  lies  within 
the  power  of  your  Government  to  exert  a  powerful  influ- 
ence in  the  preservation  of  peace  there.  Russia's  desire 
is  also  for  peace,  not  disturbances,  in  Manchuria,  and 
it  is  to  this  end  that  negotiations  are  now  proceeding  in 
Peking  in  the  effort  to  establish  a  condition  of  evacua- 
tion, and  to  safeguard  Manchuria  against  a  recurrence  of 
the  troubles  of  1900. 

u  Striking  evidence  of  the  direct  effect  in  this  country 
caused  by  unrest  in  China  was  seen  in  1900,  when,  I  am 
told,  many  cotton  mills  in  the  United  States  were  forced 
to  shut  down  until  conditions  in  China  were  again  normal. 
This  fact  and  the  evidence  the  United  States  has  already 
given  of  its  desire  to  make  for  peace  are  sufficient  assur- 
ance that  the  Washington  Government  will  lend  its  strong 
moral  support  to  calm  excitement  wherever  it  has  been 
aroused  by  the  incorrect  reports  from  Peking.' ' 

According  to  Count  Cassini,  it  was  "  because  of 
the  long  standing  and  genuine  friendliness  which, 
without  exception,  had  characterized  the  relations 
of  these  two  great  countries,  as  well  as  in  recogni- 
tion of  the  frankness  with  which  the  American 
Secretary  of  State  had  dealt  with  my  Government 
in  all  diplomatic  matters,"  that  the  latter  took 
pleasure  in  assuring  the  United  States  regarding 
negotiations  pending  with  another  Power,  "even 
though  in  so  doing  all  diplomatic  precedent  was 


250  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

broken."  "  I  am  not  aware/'  he  said,  "  that  any 
other  Powers  have  received  from  the  Foreign  Office 
[of  St.  Petersburg]  such  a  statement  as  was  handed 
your  Ambassador/'  In  referring  to  Mr.  MacCor- 
mick's  interview,  however,  it  will  be  seen  that 
Count  Lamsdorff  made  no  direct  reference  to  the 
negotiations  at  Peking,  still  less  to  their  contents, 
and  the  assurances  he  gave  had  before  and  have 
since  been  frequently  and  in  similar  terms  repeated 
to  other  Powers  by  Russia. 

By  far  the  most  illuminating  part  of  M.  Cassini's 
conversation  was  its  practical  confirmation  of  the 
truth  of  one  of  the  reported  demands  of  Russia 
which  were  considered  the  most  objectionable,  and 
which  Count  Lamsdorff  specifically  denied,  char- 
acterizing them  "  as  on  the  face  of  them  ridiculous," 
namely,  that  no  new  ports  should  be  opened  in 
Manchuria  for  the  world's  trade.  u  Of  the  opening 
of  new  treaty  ports  in  Manchuria,"  said  M.  Cassini, 
"  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  speak  at  present,  but  it 
is  the  earnest  conviction  of  those  best  acquainted 
with  the  state  of  affairs  there  that  such  a  move  will 
not  be  to  the  best  interest  of  the  territory.  Were 
the  question  solely  a  commercial  one,  it  would  be 
different.  But  open  a  treaty  port  in  Manchuria, 
and  close  upon  the  heels  of  commerce  will  follow 
political  complications  of  all  kinds,  which  will 
increase  the  threats  to  peace."  In  this  statement 
Count  Cassini  not  only  virtually  contradicted  Count 
Lamsdorff,  but  also,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  was  sub- 
sequently contradicted  by  the  latter. 


DEMANDS  IN  SEVEN  ARTICLES  251 

A  careful  reader  of  these  words  uttered  by  one 
of  Russia's  greatest  diplomatic  agents  abroad  will 
feel  satisfied  that,  despite  Count  LamsdorfFs  elastic 
statement  to  the  contrary,  Russia  was  actually  pro- 
posing some  terms  to  China.,  and  that  one  of  those 
terms  probably  was  that  Manchuria  should  have  no 
more  treaty  ports.  When  diplomacy  relies,  even  to 
a  slight  extent,  upon  subterfuges,  it  risks  a  certain 
lack  of  consistent  unity  among  its  exponents,  and 
the  rule  could  hardly  have  for  exceptions  even  such 
highly  trained  diplomats  as  Lamsdorff  and  Cassini. 

Count  Lamsdorff's  disclaimer  was  uttered  on 
April  28,  and  Count  Cassini' s  statement  was  dated 
April  29  and  appeared  in  the  press  on  May  1.  In 
the  mean  time,  the  Foreign  Office  of  Peking  had 
refused  the  Russian  conditions  in  an  official  note. 
Yet,  on  April  29,  M.  Plancon  suggested  that  each 
condition  might  be  answered  separately,  and  the 
suggestion  was  verbally  refused  by  Prince  Ching. 
Thereupon  the  Russian  Charge  presented  a  note 
intimating  that  his  Government  wished  to  be  as- 
sured on  the  first  three  of  the  original  demands, 
namely,  whether  a  territorial  cession  to  another 
power  in  the  Liao  Valley  was  contemplated  by 
China  ;  whether  there  was  an  intention  to  assimilate 
the  administration  of  Mongolia  to  that  of  China 
proper ;  and  whether  China  would  permit  the  ap- 
pointment of  foreign  Consuls  in  Manchuria  in 
other  places  than  Niu-chwang.  In  reply,  Prince 
Ching  stated,  naturally,  that  there  had  never  been 
any  question  of  ceding  territory  in  the  Liao  Valley 


252  THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

to  a  foreign  Power ;  that  the  question  of  altering 
the  administrative  system  of  Mongolia  had  been 
discussed,  but  it  had  been  disapproved  by  the 
Throne,  and  was  not  under  consideration  for  the 
present ;  and  that,  in  regard  to  the  appointment  of 
new  Consuls  in  Manchuria,  it  depended  upon  the 
opening  of  new  ports,  which  would  be  decided  only 
by  the  extent  of  the  commercial  development  of 
Manchuria.1  On  the  next  day,  or,  as  the  late  Sir 
M.  Herbert  rather  inaccurately  wrote  to  Lord  Lans- 
downe,  "  two  days  after  the  Eussian  Government 
had  categorically  denied  that  the  demands  had  been 
made,"  M.  Plancon  reiterated  to  Prince  Ching,  not 
three,  but  all,  of  the  seven  conditions,  and,  conse- 
quently, the  Chinese  treaty  commissioners  at  Shang- 
hai were  instructed,  for  the  present,  to  refuse  to 
their  American  colleagues  the  opening  of  treaty 
ports  in  Manchuria,  which  the  latter  had  been  de- 
manding. The  United  States  Government,  how- 
ever, taking  little  heed  of  M.  Cassini's  argument, 
instructed  its  commissioners  at  Shanghai,  on  the 
strength  of  Count  Lamsdorff's  denial,  to  insist  upon 
the  opening  of  new  Manchurian  ports.2  Against 
this  demand,  M.  Plancon  seems  to  have  renewed 
his  pressure  upon  the  Chinese  Government  several 
times  during  May,3  saying  that  he  had  received  no 
instructions  from  St.  Petersburg  to  revoke  his  op- 
position.4   At  last,  Secretary  Hay  instructed  Mr. 

1  China,  No.  2  (190^),  No.  95.  2  Ibid.,  No.  98. 

8  Ibid.,  Nos.  110  (May  8);  114  (May  19);  117  (May  23). 
4  Ibid.,  No.  114  (May  19). 


DEMANDS  IN  SEVEN  ARTICLES  253 

Conger  to  suggest  to  M.  Lessar,  on  the  latter's  ar- 
rival at  Peking,  that  a  simultaneous  communication 
should  be  made  by  them  to  the  Peking  Foreign 
Office  to  the  effect  that  the  Russian  Government 
had,  as  Count  Lamsdorff  had  said,  no  objection  to 
the  opening  of  the  treaty  ports.1  The  Russian 
Minister  returned  to  Peking  toward  the  end  of 
May,  and  telegraphed  to  his  Government  the  sug- 
gestion made  by  the  American  Government.2  He, 
as  well  as  M.  Cassini,  renewed  the  assurance  that 
Russia  was  not  opposed  to  the  opening  of  the  ports, 
and  Mr.  MacCormick,  who  returned  on  leave  to 
Washington,  confirmed  the  assurance.3  Secretary 
Hay  now  hoped  that  the  only  possible  opposition 
to  be  met  would  come  from  none  but  the  Chinese 
Government,  and  requested  the  support  in  the 
matter4  of  the  British  and  Japanese  Ministers  at 
Peking,  which  was  willingly  given.  So  late  as  on 
June  5,  however,  M.  Cassini  addressed  a  note  to 
Mr.  IJay,  inquiring  what  was  the  meaning  attached 
by  the  United  States  Government  to  the  term 
"  treaty  port,"  and  what  action  it  wished  Russia  to 
take.  Mr.  Hay  could  only  refer,  in  answer  to  the 
first  query,  to  the  correspondence  which  passed 
between  the  Russian  and  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernments in  1899,5  and  request,  in  reply  to  the 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  117. 

2  Ibid.,  No.  119. 

8  Ibid.,  Nos.  119,  120. 
4  Ibid.,  No.  120  (June  4). 
6  See  Chapter  V.,  above. 


254  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

second,  that  Russia  should  inform  China  that  it 
was  untrue  that  the  former  was,  as  had  been  stated 
by  China,  preventing  the  opening  of  the  treaty 
ports.1  Secretary  Hay  was  so  urgent  about  this 
matter  that  he  considered  it  indifferent  whether  the 
opening  was  granted  in  a  treaty  or>  as  a  compro- 
mise, by  a  special  Imperial  edict.2  M.  Lessar  had 
the  first  interview  after  his  return  with  Prince 
Ching  on  June  10,3  and,  according  to  the  Japan- 
ese press,  renewed  the  original  seven  conditions,4 
including  the  refusal  of  ports.  The  Prince  was 
believed  to  have  refused  to  discuss  any  of  the  con- 
ditions except  those  regarding  the  establishment 
of  a  sanitary  board  and  the  payment  of  customs 
duties  into  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  at  Niu-chwang, 
which  might  be  reconsidered.  The  Prince  was  then 
granted  another  five  days'  sick  leave,  returned  to 
the  summer  palace,  and  declined  to  see  any  foreign 
Minister.5  Rumors  were  then  afloat  which  would 
have  one  believe  that  the  Prince,  in  spite  of  the 
earnest  protests  of  the  British  and  Japanese  Repre- 
sentatives, was  gradually  yielding  to  Russian  in- 
fluence. It  is  at  least  significant  that  at  this  criti- 
cal point  he  informed  Mr.  Townley,  the  British 
Charge  a"  Affaires,  on  June  19,  that  an  agreement 
would  soon  be  arrived  at  with    Russia   whereby 


1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  121. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  117,  121. 
8  Ibid.,  No.  123. 

4  Cf.  ibid.,  No.  125. 

6  Ibid.,  No.  123,  and  the  Japanese  press. 


M.    LESSAR 
Bussian  Minister  at  Peking 


DEMANDS  IN  SEVEN  ARTICLES  255 

Manchuria  would  be  preserved  to  China  without 
any  loss  of  sovereign  rights.  He  added  that  Chiua 
would  open  treaty  ports  in  Manchuria,  if  she  saw 
fit,  after  the  Eussian  evacuation.1  The  signifi- 
cance of  these  remarks  could  easily  be  read  between 
the  lines.  Not  only  was  the  Russian  evacuation 
uncertain,  but  also  it  was  no  less  patent  to  Russia 
than  to  China  that,  in  the  marts,  the  opening  of 
which  was  under  discussion,  namely,  Mukden  and 
perhaps  Harbin,  as  well  as  An-tung  and  Tatung- 
kao  near  the  Korean  boundary,  the  immediate 
trade  prospects  were  not  considered  so  great  as  the 
political  danger  which  their  opening  might  to  some 
degree  avert.  Had  the  evacuation  been  certain,  and 
had  the  commercial  consideration  been  the  sole 
question  involved,  it  would  have  been  unnecessary 
either  to  hasten  their  opening  or  even  to  select  those 
very  places.  Nor  would  MM.  Cassini,  Lessar,  and 
Plancon  have  been  so  strongly  opposed  to  the  pro- 
position. Seen  in  the  light  of  these  considerations, 
Prince  Ching's  new  position  appeared  plainly  to  in- 
dicate the  gaining  of  Russian  influence  upon  the 
helpless  Foreign  Office  of  Peking. 

Nor  for  two  years  and  a  half  since  the  first 
agreement  was  reported  to  have  been  concluded  be- 
tween Admiral  Alexieff  and  Tartar  General  Tseng- 
chi,  had  the  Manchuria  question  vexed  the  world. 
If  the  question  had  concerned  none  but  Russia  and 
China,  and  the  former  had  been  slow  to  promise 
and  loyal  to  her  pledges  and  the  latter  strong 
1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  126. 


256  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

enough  to  guard  her  own  interest,  the  uncertain 
conditions  in  Manchuria  would  not  have  constituted, 
as  they  did,  a  grave  and  continual  menace  to  the 
general  peace  of  the  Far  East.  Unfortunately,  the 
Russian  pledges,  on  the  one  hand,  were  attended  by 
serious  conditions,  some  of  which  it  seemed  impos- 
sible to  fulfill  and  others  contrary  to  the  recognized 
principles  of  international  intercourse  to  which 
Russia  had  professed  constant  devotion,  and,  on  the 
other,  China  had  again  and  again  shown  herself 
impotent  to  resist  what  she  would  otherwise  reject. 
Above  all,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  were, 
both  from  interest  and  from  principle,  firmly  com- 
mitted in  the  East  to  a  policy  which  was  in  constant 
danger  of  being  undermined  by  the  conduct  of 
Russia.  For  Japan,  however,  the  Manchurian  ques- 
tion possessed  an  even  graver  significance,  for,  with 
the  fall  of  the  Three  Eastern  Provinces  into  the 
Russian  hands,  the  independence  of  Korea,  as  well 
as  the  security  of  Japan  herself,  would  be  threatened, 
while  a  consequent  closure  of  Manchuria  against 
Japan's  economic  activity  would  seriously  maim  her 
growth  and  life  as  a  nation.  It  was  now  considered, 
therefore,  that  the  irritating  situation  should  no 
longer  be  allowed  to  continue,  and  that  the  time 
had  at  last  come  when  Japan  should  with  determi- 
nation deal  directly  with  Russia,  in  order  to  effect 
once  for  all  an  arrangement  satisfactory  and  benefi- 
cial to  all  the  parties  concerned  and  to  the  world  at 
large. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

DIPLOMATIC  STRUGGLE    IN  KOREA,  I 

Manchuria,  however,  constituted  only  one  half  — 
perhaps  the  less  important  half  —  of  the  great 
Eastern  problem  which  perplexed  the  world  and  im- 
periled the  future  life  of  Japan.  In  the  other  half, 
namely,  Korea,  Japan  was  confronted  by  a  situation 
similar  and  closely  allied  to  that  in  Manchuria,  and 
more  directly  menacing  to  herself.  Let  us  briefly 
describe  the  evolution  of  the  complex  Korean  ques- 
tion which  ensued  upon  the  Chinese-Japanese  war 
of  1894-5. 

The  war  had  arisen  from  the  conflicting  wishes 
of  the  belligerent  Powers  regarding  Korea,  China 
asserting  suzerain  rights  over  the  Peninsular  King- 
dom, and  the  interests  of  Japan  making  its  effective 
independence  imperative.  Unfortunately,  Korea's 
lack  of  material  strength  rendered  her  real  independ- 
ence impossible,  and  her  strength  could  be  secured, 
from  the  Japanese  point  of  view,  only  by  a  thorough- 
going reform  of  her  administrative,  financial,  and 
economic  system,  which  had  sunk  into  a  state  of  un- 
speakable corruption  and  decay.  By  her  victory,  the 
colossal  task  devolved  upon  Japan  of  reforming  the 
national  institutions  of  a  people  whose  political  train- 
ing in  the  past  seemed  to  have  made  them  particu- 


258  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

larly  impervious  to  such  an  effort.  Perhaps  no  work 
more  delicate  and  more  liable  to  blunder  and  mis- 
understanding could  befall  a  nation  than  that  of 
setting  another  nation's  house  in  order  who  would 
not  feel  its  necessity.  In  this  difficult  enterprise, 
the  Japanese  showed  themselves  as  inexperienced  as 
the  Koreans  were  reluctant  and  resentful.  Three 
million  yen  were  furnished  by  Japan  to  Korea  in 
the  interest  of  various  reforms,  as  also  were  numer- 
ous councilors,  including  such  able  men  as  Shui- 
chiro  Saito  and  the  late  Toru  Hoshi.  Some  of  the 
others,  however,  were  either  inferior  in  attainments 
or  impatient  of  slow  processes.  The  entire  move- 
ment was  intrusted  to  the  direction  of  the  new 
Japanese  Minister,  Count  K.  Inoue,  a  generous, 
brilliant,  and  bold  statesman.  He  presented  to  the 
Korean  sovereign  a  plan  of  reform,  which  included 
the  proposal  to  remove  from  her  share  of  political 
control  the  versatile  Queen,  whose  family  of  the 
Min  had  grown  powerful  by  means  of  the  abuses 
which  the  Count  wished  to  eradicate.  In  this  at- 
tempt, in  which  he  was  largely  successful,  of  draw- 
ing a  line  of  demarcation  between  the  Court  and 
the  Government,  he  inevitably  incurred  the  deep 
ire  of  the  family  whose  influence  had  been  predomi- 
nant both  at  the  capital  and  in  the  country.  Other 
measures  of  his  reform  further  antagonized  the  offi- 
cial nobility  of  the  Kingdom.1  The  influence  of 
the  Count,  however,  was  so  great,  and  the  training 
of  Korean  troops  by  Japanese  officers  seemed  so 
1  Cf.  Dobun-kwai,  No.  49,  p.  7. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  259 

successful,  that  even  the  domineering  Queen  was 
obliged  to  await  a  more  favorable  moment  to  regain 
her  lost  prestige. 

At  that  time  Russia  was  represented  at  Seul  by 
M.  Waeber,  who  had  been  in  Korea  for  more  than 
ten  years,  and  whose  personality  and  diplomatic 
arts  had  won  him  warm  friends  in  the  Court,  par- 
ticularly the  Queen  and  her  party.  At  one  time, 
before  the  late  war,  when  the  ascendency  of  the 
Chinese  Resident,  Yuan  Shi-kai,had  created  disaffec- 
tion among  certain  Koreans,  M.  Waeber  was  said 
to  have  succeeded  in  quietly  allying  himself  with 
those  people  and  promoting  Russian  influence  over 
them.1  It  was  now  again  found  possible  for  him 
and  his  talented  wife  to  recommend  themselves  to 
the  large  body  of  men  and  women  whose  feeling 
the  Japanese  had  in  one  way  or  another  alienated, 
and  slowly  but  surely  to  undermine  the  latter's  in- 
fluence in  Seul.2  The  successful  coercion  of  Japan 
by  the  three  Powers  after  the  treaty  of  Shimono- 
seki  must  also  have  gone  far  toward  reducing  the 
prestige  of  Japan  in  the  eye  of  the  Koreans,  who 
are  singularly  susceptible  to  the  influence  of  events 
of  this  nature. 

As  soon  as  Count  Inoiie  left  Seul,  the  Queen 
again  came  to  the  front.  On  July  7,  1895,  she 
suddenly  accused  of  treason  the  most  influential 
member  of  the  Cabinet  and  chief  of  the  pro-Japan- 
ese party,  Pak  Yong-hio,  who  again  had  to  flee  to 
Japan,  where  he  had  recently  spent  ten  years  of  a 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  731-732.  3  Ibid.,  p.  740. 


260  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

refugee's  life.1  Count  Inoue  returned  to  Seul,  and 
again  the  Queen  held  her  breath.  A  Cabinet  was 
organized  of  partisans  of  reform.  The  Count  was, 
however,  relieved  of  his  post  late  in  July,  and  in 
September  was  succeeded  as  the  Japanese  Minis- 
ter by  Viscount  Lieutenant-General  Goro  Miura,  a 
man  of  undoubted  sincerity,  but  utterly  without 
diplomatic  training.  No  sooner  had  Inoiie  left 
Korea  than  the  Queen  reasserted  herself,  increased 
the  personnel  of  her  household,  and  restored  many 
of  her  old  extravagances  so  lately  removed  by  the 
reformer.  She  had  been  further  embittered  by 
the  sharp  rivalry  shown  against  her  and  the  Min  by 
the  King's  father,  Tai-wen-kun,  and  his  party.  The 
Queen  finally  planned  a  coup  d'etat,  early  in  Octo- 
ber, with  a  view  to  disbanding  the  soldiers  trained 
by  Japanese  officers  and  replacing  the  progressive 
Cabinet  members  with  her  friends.  A  crisis  was 
imminent,  and  it  was  at  this  juncture  that  some 
of  the  Japanese  in  Seul  betrayed  themselves  into 
a  crime  which  caused  a  bitter  disappointment  and 
lasting  disgrace  to  the  Government  and  the  nation 
at  home.  Perceiving  that  a  passive  attitude  would 
result  in  a  great  calamity,  certain  Koreans  and 
Japanese  rose  early  on  October  8,  to  bring  Tai-wen- 
kun  out  of  his  secluded  residence.  Accompanied  by 
two  battalions  of  trained  soldiers,  the  veteran  states- 
man rode  toward  the  King's  palace,  where  he  was 
to  present  a  plan  of  reform,  but  was  opposed  by  the 

1  G.  Takeda,  Kinji  Kyohvto  Gwaiko  Shi  (recent  history  of 
diplomacy  in  the  Far  East,  Tokio,  1904),  pp.  22-23. 


DIPLOMATIC  STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  261 

guard,  who  fired  at  his  escort.  In  the  midst  of  the 
melee  which  ensued,  some  of  the  bravoes  rushed 
into  the  Inner  Palace  and  murdered  the  Queen.1 
The  deed  was  no  less  crushing  a  blow  to  the  Jap- 
anese nation  than  it  was  to  the  bereaved  King  of 
Korea,  for  the  former's  ardent  desire  always  to 
adhere  to  the  fairest  principles  of  international  con- 
duct was,  for  once,  frustrated  by  the  rash  act  of  a 
handful  of  their  brethren  at  Seul.  The  pernicious 
influence  of  the  Queen  passed  away,  and  the  power 
of  the  reform  Cabinet  was  for  the  moment  assured, 
but  only  at  the  expense  of  a  revolting  crime  which 
the  Japanese  will  never  cease  to  lament.  It  is  prob- 
able that  the  murder  of  the  Queen,  as  apart  from 
the  rise  of  Tai-wen-kun,  was  premeditated,  and  also 
that  Minister  Miura  had  been  prevailed  upon  to 
connive  at  the  guilt.  The  Japanese  Government  at 
once  recalled  and  tried  him  and  forty-seven  other 
suspected  persons,  and  prohibited  Japanese  from 
visiting  Korea  without  special  permission. 

Mr.  (now  Baron)  Komura,  who  presently  suc- 
ceeded to  the  Ministry  at  Seul,  seemed  to  reverse 
the  policy  of  his  predecessors  and  abstain  from 
active  interference.  The  Korean  Cabinet  also  ap- 
peared powerless  to  check  the  Russian  party,  whose 
power  was  growing  apace.  Prominent  politicians 
out  of  office  frequently  conferred  at  the  Russian 

1  G.  Takeda,  pp.  25-30;  Y.  Hamada,  Nichi-Ro  Gwaikb  Ju- 
nen  Shi  (ten  years  of  Japanese-Russian  diplomacy,  Tokio, 
1904), p.  47.  Also  see  the  Korea  Review,  July  (pp.  331-336) 
and  August  (pp.  369-371),  1904. 


j 


262  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

Legation,  where  some  of  them  were  even  said  to 
have  taken  refuge  from  the  law.  There  a  leader  of 
this  party  (who  till  May  of  the  present  year  repre- 
sented Korea  at  St.  Petersburg)  matured  a  plan  to 
overthrow  the  Cabinet,  or,  in  case  of  failure,  to  ab- 
duct the  King  and  the  Crown  Prince  to  Vladivostok. 
The  plan,  however,  was  discovered  on  November 
28,1  only  to  be  followed  by  another,  which  proved 

#  successful.  In  January,  1896,  there  took  place  a 
slightjiprisingin  Northern  Korea,  at  the  instiga- 

/  j  tion,  it  was  saidTof  pro-Russian  leaders.  When  the 
major  portion  of  the  army  had  been  sent  out  of 
the  capital  to  suppress  the  alleged  rebellion,  127 
Russian  marines  with  a  cannon  suddenly  landed  at 
Chemulpo  on  February  10,  and  immediately  entered 
Seul.  The  next  day,  before  dawn,  the  King,  with 
the  seal  of  the  state,  as  well  as  the  Crown  Prince 
and  Princess  and  some  court  ladies,  fled  in  disguise 
to  the  Russian  Legation,  where  the  King  remained 
for  a  twelvemonth,  till  February  20  of  the  follow- 
ing year.  At  his  arrival  at  the  Legation,  an  edict 
was  issued  proclaiming  the  Cabinet  Ministers  guilty 
of  treason,  and  ordering  their  decapitation.  An- 
other edict  canceling  the  order  appeared  too  late, 
for  the  Prime  Minister  and  two  other  Ministers  had 
been  murdered  on  the  streets  in  broad  daylight, 
and  their  heads  exposed  by  the  wayside,  while 
three  others  had  fled  to  Japan  for  life.2   The  mur- 

1  G.  Takeda,  pp.  30-32. 

8  Ibid.,  pp.  33-34;    Tokushu  Joyaku,   pp.   740-741.      See 
also  the  Korea  Review,  August,  1904,  pp.  377-378. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  263 

ders  of  February,  1896,  would  have  come  down  to 
history  as  more  atrocious  than  the  crime  of  October 
8, 1895,  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  the  latter 
involved  the  life  of  a  queen. 

The  King  being  virtually  in  the  custody  of  the 
Russians,  their  ascendency  resulted  as  a  matter  of 
course.  They  secured,  among  other  things,  an  im- 
mense timber  concession  on  the  northern  frontier 
and  on  Uinung  Island,1  and  a  mining  concession 
along  the  Tumen  River.2  The  Korean  forces  trained 
by  Japanese  officers  were  abolished  in  May,3  and  the 
Japanese  soldiers  stationed  at  the  ports  and  Seul 
also  were  reduced  in  number.4     iy 

The  Government  at  Tokio  even  appeared,  for  a 
time  at  least,  to  forsake  its  historic  policy  of  safe- 
guarding Korea's  independence  by  its  sole  aid,  but 
to  seek  Russia's  cooperation  toward  the  same  end. 
With  this  object  in  view,  Japan  seized  the  occa- 
sion of  the  coronation  of  the  Czar  to  send  Field 
Marshal  Marquis  Aritomo  Yamagata5  as  special 
envoy  to  St.  Petersburg,  with  a  commission  to 
negotiate  with  the  Russian  Government  an  agree- 
ment regarding  the  relative  position  of  the  two 
Powers  in  Korea.    The  result  was  the  following 

1  The  contract  dated  August  28,  1890  (o.  s.).—  Tokushu 
Joyaku,  pp.  781-791. 

3  The  contract  of  April  22, 1896.  —  Ibid.,  pp.  772-775. 
8  G.  Takeda,  p.  45. 

4  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  740-741. 

6  It  is  said  that  Marquis  Ito  himself  had  a  mind  to  represent 
Japan  at  the  coronation,  but  the  mission  was  finally  intrusted  to 
the  Field  Marshal.  It  will  be  remembered  that  China  sent  Li 
Hung-chang  for  this  occasion. 


264  THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Yamagata-Lobanoff   Protocol,  signed  on  June  9, 
1896:  — 

"Article  I.  The  Japanese  and  Russian  Govern- 
ments should,  with  the  object  of  remedying  the  financial 
embarrassments  of  Korea,  counsel  the  Korean  Govern- 
ment to  suppress  all  unnecessary  expenses  and  to  estab- 
lish an  equilibrium  between  expenditure  and  revenue. 
If,  as  a  result  of  the  reforms  which  should  be  considered 
indispensable,  it  should  become  necessary  to  have  re- 
course to  foreign  debts,  the  two  Governments  should,  of 
a  common  accord,  render  their  support  to  Korea. 

"Article  II.  The  Japanese  and  Russian  Govern- 
ments should  try  to  abandon  to  Korea,  in  so  far  as  the 
financial  and  economic  situation  of  that  country  should 
permit,  the  creation  and  the  maintenance  of  an  armed 
force  and  of  a  police  organized  of  native  subjects,  in  pro- 
portions sufficient  to  maintain  internal  order,  without 
foreign  aid. 

"Article  III.  With  a  view  to  facilitating  communi- 
cations with  Korea,  the  Japanese  Government  shall  con- 
tinue to  administer  the  telegraphic  lines  which  are  actu- 
ally in  its  possession. 

"  It  is  reserved  to  Russia  to  establish  a  telegraphic  line 
from  Seul  to  her  frontier. 

"These  various  lines  should  be  purchased  by  the 
Korean  Government,  as  soon  as  it  finds  means  so  to  do. 

"  Article  IV.  In  case  the  principles  above  expounded 
require  a  more  precise  and  more  detailed  definition,  or  if 
in  the  future  other  points  should  arise  about  which  it 
should  be  necessary  to  consult,  the  Representatives  of  the 
two  Governments  should  be  instructed  to  discuss  them 
amicably."  1 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  742-744;  the  Kaitei  Jcyaku  Isan,  pp. 
601-602;  the  Treaties  and  Conventions  between  the  Empire  of 
Japan  and  other  Powers,  p.  393. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  265 

A  few  days  earlier,  on  May  14,  there  was  con- 
cluded at  Seul  between  M.  Komura  and  M.  Waeber, 
the  Japanese  and  Russian  Ministers,  a  Memorandum 
dealing  with  matters  of  more  immediate  interest 
to  the  two  Powers.1  M.  Waeber  agreed  to  advise 
the  Korean  King  to  return  from  the  Russian  Lega- 
tion to  his  palace,  as  soon  as  there  was  no  more 
apprehension  for  his  safety,  M.  Komura  pledging 
in  return  to  keep  the  Japanese  political  bravoes 
(so-shi)  in  Seul  under  a  strict  surveillance  (Article 
I.).  It  was  declared  that  the  present  Cabinet  mem- 
bers2 of  Korea  were  noted  for  generous  and  mild 
principles,  and  had  been  appointed  to  their  posts 
by  the  King  of  his  own  accord.  The  Japanese  and 
Russian  Representatives  should  always  make  it  their 
aim  to  advise  the  King  to  govern  his  people  in 
generous  spirit  (Article  II.).  The  remainder  of  the 
Memorandum  is  more  worthy  of  record  :  — 

"Articde  III.  The  Representative  of  Russia  quite 
agrees  with  the  Representative  of  Japan  that,  at  the 
present  state  of  affairs  in  Korea,  it  may  be  necessary  to 
have  the  Japanese  guards  stationed  at  some  places  for 
the  protection  of  the  Japanese  telegraph  line  between 
Fusan  and  Seul,  and  that  these  guards,  now  consisting  of 
three  companies  of  soldiers,  should  be  withdrawn  as  soon 
as  possible  and  replaced  by  gendarmes,  who  will  be  sta- 
tioned as  follows:  fifty  men  at  Tai-ku,  fifty  men  at  Ka- 
heung,  and  ten  men  each  at  ten  intermediate  posts  be- 
tween Fusan  and  Seul.    This  distribution  may  be  liable 

1  See  the  same  references  as  are  given  in  the  preceding  note, 
pp.  740-742,  596-600,  and  391,  respectively. 
a  Some  of  them  were  strongly  pro-Russian. 


266  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

to  some  changes,  but  the  total  number  of  gendarme  force 
shall  never  exceed  200  men,  who  will  afterwards  be 
gradually  withdrawn  from  those  places  in  which  peace 
and  order  have  been  restored  by  the  Korean  Government.1 

"Article  IV.  For  the  protection  of  the  Japanese 
settlements  at  Seul  and  the  open  ports  against  the  possi- 
ble attacks  by  the  Korean  populace,  two  companies  of 
Japanese  troops  may  be  stationed  at  Seul,  one  company 
at  Fusan  and  one  at  Gensan,  each  company  not  to  ex- 
ceed 200  men.  These  troops  shall  be  quartered  near  the 
settlements,  and  should  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  no  appre- 
hensions of  such  attacks  could  be  entertained. 

"  For  the  protection  of  the  Russian  Legation  and  Con- 
sulates, the  Russian  Government  may  also  keep  guards 
not  exceeding  in  number  the  Japanese  troops  at  these 
places,  which  will  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  tranquillity 
in  the  interior  is  completely  restored."  a 

A  casual  reading  of  these  agreements  will  show 
how  far  the  Japanese  Government  had  receded  from 
the  position  she  originally  took  in  regard  to  Korea. 
Ever  since  Japan  concluded  her  treaty  with  Korea 
in  1876,3  which  for  the  first  time  established  the 
international  position  of  the  latter  State  as  a  sover- 
eign Power,  Japan's  policy  had  been  to  uphold 
the  independence  and  the  opening  of  the  Peninsu- 

1  These  gendarmes  had  never  been  withdrawn  before  the  pre- 
sent war  broke  out.  The  Koreans  frequently  tried  to  cut  the  tele- 
graph line. 

2  Japanese  soldiers  in  Korea  before  the  present  war  were  sta- 
tioned to  the  fullest  extent  stipulated  in  this  Article.  Owing  to 
the  small  number  of  the  Russian  residents  in  Korea,  the  Russian 
Government  never  stationed  as  many  soldiers  in  Korea  as  did  the 
Japanese. 

8  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  714-717. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  267 

lar  Kingdom.  From  the  strict  terms  of  this  policy, 
Japan  has  allowed  herself  to  depart  twice,  —  in  her 
agreements,  first,  with  China  in  1885,  and,  again, 
with  Russia  in  1896,  —  not  by  forsaking  its  prin- 
ciples, but  in  each  case  by  entering,  in  the  pursuit 
of  the  policy,  into  an  impossible  association  with  an 
aggressive  Power.  In  each  of  the  two  instances  the 
attempt  failed  within  a  decade,  and  resulted  in  hos- 
tilities. In  1885,  Japan  and  China  simultaneously 
withdrew  their  forces  from  Korea,  and  thereby 
cleared  the  ground  for  the  renewed  conflict  of  their 
opposing  interests,  which  were  artificially  placed 
on  a  par  with  one  another.  In  1896,  Japan  ad- 
mitted Russia's  right  to  build  a  telegraph  line  in 
North  Korea  which  should  correspond  to  the  Jap- 
anese line  in  the  south,  and  to  station  in  Korea  a 
number  of  troops  equal  to  that  of  the  Japanese 
soldiers.  Despite  the  millenniums  of  her  historic 
relations  with  Korea,  and  the  actual  preponderance 
of  her  interests  therein,  and  after  her  successful 
liberation  of  the  Kingdom  from  Chinese  suzerainty 
by  a  costly  war,  Japan,  now  admitted  into  the  Pen- 
insular politics  on  an  equal  footing  with  herself  a 
Power  which  owed  its  bright  success  to  a  mere  di- 
plomacy of  less  than  two  years'  stan< 
policy  seemed  to  be  guided  by  principles  entirely  at 
variance  with  the  independence  and  strength  of 
Korea. 

At  the  coronation  of  the  Czar,  Korea  was  repre- 
sented by  an  influential,  pro-Russian  member  of  the 
Min  family.    It  was  then  rumored  that  he  concluded 


268  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

with  the  Russian  Government  a  secret  agreement 
by  which  Korea  undertook  to  employ  Russian  mili- 
tary instructors  and  financial  councilors.  However 
that  may  be,  the  Russian  Representatives  at  Seul 
are  said  to  have  since  appealed  more  than  once  to 
the  "  secret  agreement "  in  their  attempts  to  force 
the  engagement  of  Russian  service  upon  the  Korean 
Government.1  If  these  reports  were  true,  no  bet- 
ter proof  of  the  light  estimate  with  which  Russia 
from  the  first  regarded  the  Yamagata-Lobanoff 
Protocol  could  be  found  than  her  alleged  agree- 
ment with  Min  Yong-hwan,  for  the  latter  was  a  di- 
rect reversal  of  the  first  two  Articles  of  the  former. 
Russia  may  be  credited  with  having  succeeded,  by 
her  separate  and  mutually  contradictory  arrange- 
ments with  Min,  Yamagata,  and  Li  Hung-chang,2  in 
simultaneously  bringing  the  three  Eastern  Powers 
to  terms. 

Whatever  the  truth  of  the  reported  Russo- 
Korean  Agreement,  Russia  did  no  sooner  sign  her 
Japanese  Protocol  of  June  9,  than  she  began  to 
violate  its  terms.  In  the  same  month,  it  was  re- 
solved that  Korean  troops  should  henceforth  be 
instructed  under  the  Russian  system  of  military 
education,  and  accordingly,  in  October,  three  army 
officers,  a  medical  officer,  and  ten  soldiers  from 
Russia  arrived  at  Seul.  In  April,  1897,  M.  Waeber 
was  urging  upon  the  Seul  Government  the  employ- 
ment of  160  officers  and  soldiers,  and,  despite  the 
reluctance  of    Korea  and  inquiries   from   Japan, 

1  G.  Takeda,  pp.  50-51.  2  See  pp.  87  ff.,  above. 


DIPLOMATIC  STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  269 

three  Russian  officers  and  ten  soldiers  entered  the 
capital  in  July,  whose  service  for  three  years  was 
finally,  on  September  6,  imposed  upon  the  Korean 
Government  by  M.  A.  de  Speyer,  the  j  new  Russian 
Minister.  Thus  the  royal  guard  and  five  battalions 
of  the  Korean  infantry,  numbering  about  3000, 
came  under  Russian  instruction.1  A  month  later, 
M.  Speyer  requested  that  the  control  of  all  the 
receipts  from  the  taxes  and  customs  be  placed  in 
the  hands  of  one  M.  Kir  Alexieff.  At  that  time, 
however,  a  British  subject,  Mr.  MacLeavy  Brown, 
had  not  served  his  term  as  Financial  Adviser  and 
General  Director  of  Customs  of  Korea.  Failing 
the  assent  of  the  Finance  Department,  M.  Speyer 
pressed  upon  the  Foreign  Department,  which  yielded 
at  last.  The  British  Consul,  Mr.  Jordan,  protested 
in  vain,  for,  on  October  26,  the  Korean  King  issued 
an  edict  releasing  Mr.  Brown  from  his  duties.  A 
Russo-Korean  Bank  was  soon  organized  to  trans- 
act the  financial  and  economical  affairs  of  Korea. 
On  December  27,  seven  British  men-of-war  visited 
Chemulpo,  and  Mr.  Jordan  went  thither,  return- 
ing to  Seul  accompanied  by  a  naval  officer  and  ten 
marines.  Mr.  Brown  was  consequently  restored  to 
his  office,  and  M.  Alexieff  had  to  content  himself 
with  a  subordinate  position  under  him.2 

It  was  a  misfortune  to  Russia  that  her  able  re- 
presentative at  Seul,  M.  Waeber,  who  had  been  in 
Korea  since  1884,  had  been  transferred  to  Mexico, 
and  was  replaced  by  M.  Speyer.    The  former  dip- 

1  G.  Takeda,  pp.  45-47.  3  Ibid.,  pp.  48-50. 


270  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

lomat's  pleasing  manners  were  succeeded  by  the  lat- 
her's overbearing  conduct,  which  appeared  gradually 
to  alienate  from  Russian  influence  many  a  former 
friend  of  M.  Waeber.  The  anti-Russian  sentiment 
grew  finally  so  strong  that  a  large  number  of  intel- 
ligent Koreans  organized  the  Korean  Independence 
Society,  whose  object  was  declared  to  be  to  restore 
the  military,  financial,  and  political  control  of  the 
Kingdom  to  the  hands  of  the  Koreans.  The  impa- 
tient M.  Speyer  was  reported  to  have  written  a  note 
to  the  Korean  Government,  on  March  7,  1898, 
asking  for  a  reply  within  twenty-four  hours  to  the 
query  whether  Korea  was  really  in  want  of  the  ser- 
vice of  the  Russian  experts,  whose  position  had  be- 
come rather  precarious.  The  astounded  Government 
replied  politely  but  firmly  in  the  negative.  Other 
events  occurred  which  further  evinced  the  arbitrary 
attitude  of  M.  Speyer.  With  an  equally  astonishing 
decision,  he  ordered,  on  March  17,  all  the  financial 
and  military  councilors  to  be  recalled  to  Russia. 
The  Russo-Korean  Bank  was  also  disorganized* 
M.  Speyer  himself  leaving  Korea  in  April,  his  post 
was  occupied  by  the  amiable  M.  Matunine.1  About 
this  time,  a  new  Russo-Japanese  Protocol  was  signed 
at  Tokio  between  Baron  Rosen,  the  Russian  Minis- 
ter to  Japan,  and  Baron  Nishi,  the  Foreign  Minister 
of  the  Japanese  Government. 

It  is  evident  that  the  relaxation  of  Russia's  di- 
plomacy in  Korea  was  in  no  small  measure  due  to 

1  G.  Takeda,  pp.  53-54,  and  Jumpei  Shinobu,  Kan  Hanto 
(the  Korean  peninsula),  pp.  505-512. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE   IN  KOREA  271 

the  swift  movement  of  events,  as  well  as  her  own 
all-engrossing  activity,  in  China.  The  Nishi-Rosen 
Protocol  of  April  25,  1898,  concluded  as  it  was  at 
this  unfavorable  moment  for  Russia,  was  far  more 
in  Japan's  favor  than  the  agreements  of  1896.  It 
not  only  gave  an  explicit  recognition  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  Korea,  but  also  incorporated  in  the 
second  Article  the  best  principles  of  the  previous 
agreement,  and,  in  addition,  fully  recognized  the 
special  economic  interests  of  Japan  in  the  Penin- 
sula.   The  entire  Protocol  deserves  quotation :  — 

"  Article  I.  The  Imperial  Governments  of  Japan  and 
Russia  definitely  recognize  the  independence  and  the 
perfect  sovereignty  of  Korea,  and  mutually  engage  to 
abstain  from  all  direct  interference  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  that  country. 

"  Article  II.  Desirous  of  removing  all  possible  causes 
of  misunderstanding  in  the  future,  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernments of  Japan  and  Russia  mutually  engage,  in  case 
Korea  should  have  recourse  to  the  counsel  and  assist- 
ance of  either  Japan  or  Russia,  not  to  take  any  measure 
regarding  the  nomination  of  military  instructors  and  finan- 
cial advisers,  without  having  previously  arrived  at  a  mu- 
tual accord  on  the  subject. 

"Article  III.  In  view  of  the  great  development  of 
the  commercial  and  industrial  enterprises  of  Japan  in 
Korea,  as  also  of  the  considerable  number  of  the  Japanese 
subjects  residing  in  that  country,  the  Russian  Imperial 
Government  shall  not  obstruct  the  development  of  the 
commercial  and  industrial  relations  between  Japan  and 
Korea."  " 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  744-745;  the  Kaitei  Joyaku  Isan, 
p.  603;  the  Treaties  and  Conventions,  p.  394  (French  text). 


272  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Each  one  of  these  three  Articles  should  be  care- 
fully noted,  for  five  years  later,  in  1903,  they, 
together  with  the  last  Article  of  the  Yamagata- 
Lobanoff  Protocol  of  June  9,  1896,  became  a  con- 
ventional ground  for  Japan's  direct  negotiations 
with  Russia  which  preceded  the  present  war.  Par- 
ticular attention  is  called  to  the  third  Article, 
wherein  Russia  recognized  for  the  first  time  the 
peculiar  interest  of  the  Japanese  nation  in  the  eco- 
nomic development  of  Korea. 

Less  artificial  as  the  Protocol  was  in  comparison 
with  the  former  agreements,  it  was,  however,  hardly 
adequate  as  an  instrument  to  reconcile  the  conflict- 
ing interests  of  Russia  and  Japan.  Fresh  compli- 
cations could  well  be  expected  from  the  second 
Article,  for  it,  on  the  other  hand,  barred  the  reform- 
atory attempts  of  a  Power  whose  interests  demanded 
the  independence  and  strength  of  Korea,  and, 
on  the  other,  cleared  the  ground  for  the  renewed 
activity  of  another  Power  which  had  little  intention 
to  abstain  from  undermining  the  vital  interests  of 
Japan.  Under  these  precarious  circumstances  was 
opened  the  second  period  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
relations  in  Korea. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE   IN   KOREA,   II 

From  1899,  both  Japan  and  Russia  were  repre- 
sented at  Seul  by  new  Ministers,  Mr.  G.  Hayashi 
and  M.  Paul  Pavloff.  The  latter  had  been  the 
Charge  at  Peking,  where  he  had  recently  made  a 
brilliant  success  in  securing  for  Russia  a  lease  of 
Port  Arthur  and  Talien-wan,  and  the  right  to  con- 
nect these  ports  by  rail  with  the  great  Siberian  line. 
The  contrast  of  character  between  the  bold  and 
ambitious  Pavloff  and  the  slow,  tenacious  Hayashi 
was  an  interesting  index  to  the  dramatic  struggle 
which  ensued  in  Korea  between  the  rival  Powers. 
For  five  years  after  the  arrival  of  the  diplomats, 
the  desires  of  Russia  and  Japan  seemed  to  clash, 
not  only  in  Seui,  but  also  in  all  directions  within 
the  Peninsula.  Nearly  every  move  made  by  either 
Power  was  countervailed  by  the  other,  Russia  in 
most  cases  being  the  prime  mover  and  Japan  closely 
disputing  the  action  of  her  rival.  The  feeble  Gov- 
ernment of  Korea  was  sorely  vexed  between  the 
vigorous  demands  and  protests  of  the  contending 
Powers,  while  the  flexible  will  of  the  Emperor  l  and 

1  The  sovereign  of  Korea,  formerly  King  (wang),  assumed 
the  title  Emperor  (Hwang-ti),  On  October  12, 1897,  for,  in  the 
Chinese  language,  the  wang  may  be  a  tributary  prince,  but  the  ti 
is  the  master  of  an  independent  state. 


274  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

the  discord  and  venality  of  his  servants  aggravated 
the  endless  confusion  of  the  situation.  Let  us  now 
briefly  observe  how  this  keen  rivalry  manifested 
itself  in  the  south,  at -the -capital,  and  in  the  north 
of  Korea. 

In  South  Korea,  nothing  better  could  be  desired 
by  Russia  than  a  lease,  of  Masampo,  a  harbor  un- 
surpassed1 for  its  naval  facilities  and  most  admi- 
rably situated  as  a  connecting-point  between  Vladi- 
vostok and  •  Port  Arthur.  An  opportunity  came  in 
May,  1899,'  when  Masampo,  together  with  two  other 
ports,  was  opened  for  foreign  trade,  for  the  for- 
eigner is  at'  liberty  to  purchase  land  within  the 
three-mile  radius  of  an  open  port.  In  the  same 
month,  M.  Pavloff  with  the  Military  Attache  visited 
Masampo  on  his  way  home  on  a  furlough,  and  was 
met  there  by  Admiral  Makaroff,  commander  of  the 
Eastern  squadron  of  the  Russian  navy,  and,  after 
making  an  extended  survey  of  the  coast  and  the 
harbor,  selected  the  most  strategic  site  on  the  fore- 
shore, which  he  earmarked  by  setting  up  posts  at 
its  limits.  This  large  lot,  M.  Pavloff  notified  the 
local  authorities,  would  presently  be  purchased  by 
a  private  Russian  steamship  company  as  the  site 
for  a  dock  and  coaling-sheds.  It  was  not  till  July 
that  M.  Stein,  interpreter  at  the  Russian  Legation, 
went  to  the  port  with  a  view  to  effecting  the  pur- 
chase of  the  selected  lot,  which,  to  his  chagrin,  had 
already  been  bought  by  certain  Japanese  subjects 
from  its  legitimate  owners.  In  vain  the  Russian 
Charge  demanded  the  Seul  Government  to  cancel 


7*5?.  h7  George 


M.    PAVLOFF 
Late  Russian  Minister  at  Seul 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  275 

the  contract  and  resell  the  land  to  the  Russian 
company,  for,  as  the  Government  repeatedly  ex- 
plained, the  authorities  had  no  right  to  interfere 
with  the  alienation  of  private  land  by  its  owners 
within  the  three-mile  radius  of  any  treaty  port.  As 
unavailing  was  the  request  of  the  Charge  upon  Mr. 
Hayashi  to  induce  the  buyers  to  relinquish  even  a 
portion  of  the  purchased  lot.  Then  the  local  au- 
thorities at  Masampo  were  approached  by  the  Rus- 
sian Representatives,  and  consequently  the  deed  of 
purchase  was  for  a  long  time  withheld  by  them, 
though  it  was  at  length  given  to  the  new  owners. 
On  September  14,  M.  Stein,  now  the  Charge,  noti- 
fied the  Korean  Government  that,  under  the  instruc- 
tions of  the  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  he  would  be 
obliged  to  take  liberty  of  action  in  order  to  protect 
Russian  interest,  if  the  Japanese  contract  was  not 
canceled  ;  on  October  4,  again,  he  threatened  that 
a  forcible  seizure  of  land  would  result  from  the 
non-compliance  of  the  Korean  Government.  The 
replies  of  the  latter  were  unalterably  firm  in  refus- 
ing to  annul  a  lawful  transaction.1  In  the  mean 
time,  Russian  diplomatic  agents,  naval  officers,  and 
engineers  from  Seul  and  Vladivostok  were  fre- 
quently visiting  Masampo,  and  buying  from  the 
natives  tracts  of  indifferent  value.2  In  March,  1900, 
M.  Pavloff  returned  from  his  furlough,  and  de- 
manded the  signature  of  the  Masampo  lease-con- 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  747-751.   See  also  The  Times,  August 
30,  1899. 

2  The  Kokumin,  October  10,  1899. 


276  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

tract  in  quite  indefinite  terms  which  he  had  previ- 
ously framed.  On  March  16,  Rear  Admiral  Hili- 
debrand  came  to  Chemulpo  with  several  war-vessels, 
and  proceeded  to  Seul,  where  he  was  magnificently 
received  by  M.  Pavloff  and  had  an  audience  with 
the  Emperor.  Two  days  later,  the  lease  agreement 
was  signed  *  by  the  Korean  Foreign  Minister  and 
M.  Pavloff,  which,  however,  was  of  little  practical 
use  so  long  as  the  most  important  tract  had  been 
bought  by  the  Japanese.  On  the  same  day,  the 
Minister  secured  from  the  Korean  Government  a 
pledge  not  to  alienate  any  part  of  the  Kojedo  Island 
near  Masampo  and  its  surrounding  territories,  Rus- 
sia herself  engaging  not  to  seek  such  alienation  on 
her  part.2 

No  sooner  did  Russia  appear  to  content  herself 
with  these  valueless  formal  pledges  from  Korea 
than  she  again  sought  to  acquire  land  round 
Masampo.  At  the  close  of  March,  M.  Pavloff  had 
almost  succeeded  in  securing  the  purchase  of 
Nampo  outside  the  three-mile  limit  of  Masampo, 
but  the  reminder  of  Mr.  Hayashi,  expressed  through 
the  Foreign  Office  of  Seul,  that  the  foreigner  was 
not  entitled  to  own  land  beyond  the  fixed  radius 
of  a  treaty  port,  produced  its  desired  effect.  Nampo 
was  forsaken,  and  another  lot  inside  the  three-mile 
boundary  was  purchased  by  the  Russians.3  In  May, 
M.  Pavloff  wished  to  lease  Tja-pok  on  the  inner 
shore  of  Masampo,  but,  finding  again  that  a  Japan- 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  751-752.         2  Ibid.y  pp.  752-753. 
8  The  Kokumin,  April  1,  and  3,  1900. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  277 

ese  subject  haxLalready  leased  it,  finally  acquired 
the  lease  of  Pankumi  upon  the  outer  shore,  for 
the  purpose  of  erecting  a  hospital,  warehouses,  and 
a  recreation  ground,  for  the  use  of  the  Russian 
navy.1  This  concession,  however,  has  not  been  ex- 
tensively utilized  by  the  Russians,  owing  probably 
to  the  inferior  site  of  Pankumi.2  Mr.  Hayashi  met 
the  Russian  concession  by  acquiring,  between  May 
and  October  29,  1901,  about  forty  acres  of  land 
within  the  treaty  limits  of  Masampo  as  a  settle- 
ment for  Japanese  citizens.3 

It  is  needless  to  add  that  the  firm  attitude  of  the 
Korean  Government,  which  alone  saved  Masampo 
from  the  fate  of  Port  Arthur,  was  in  the  main  due 
to  the  persistent  representations  and  support  ren- 
dered to  Korea  by  Mr.  Hayashi  against  Russian 
encroachment.  For  if  the  control  of  Masampo  was 
a  matter  of  supreme  importance  for  the  Russian 
navy,  Japan,  on  her  part,  could  not  for  a  moment 
tolerate  the  presence,  in  the  harbor  so  near  to  her- 
self, of  a  Power  whose  vast  dominion  was  extending 
eastward  with  tremendous  pressure.  Russia's  ill 
success  at  Masampo,  however,  was  not  to  mark  the 
end  of  her  activity  on  the  southern  coast  of  Korea, 
which  contains  a  few  other  harbors  only  second 
in  importance  to  Masampo.    In  one  of  these,  Chin- 

1  The  Kokumin,  May  25,  1900,  and  May  21,  1901. 

2  Tokushu  Joyaku,  p.  751. 

8  The  Kokumin,  May  21  and  November  1,  1901.  The  final 
agreement  between  Hayashi  and  the  Korean  Foreign  Minister 
was  signed  on  May  17, 1902,  and  published  in  the  Kwampo. 


278  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

hai  Bay,  M.  Pavloff  made,  about  March,  1901,  an 
unauthorized  demand  for  a  lease,  which  again  was 
refused.1  From  that  time  till  the  opening  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  negotiations  in  1903,  the  Russian 
Representative  did  not  think  the  time  opportune  to 
prefer  further  demands  on  this  coast. 

Turning  now  to  the  diplomacy  at  the  Korean 
capital,  we  observe  that  its  first  aim  seems  to  have 
been  to  repeat  the  old  policy  of  replacing  Mr.  Mac- 
Leavy  Brown,  a  British  subject,  as  the  Director- 
General  of  Korean  Customs,  with  M.  Kir  Alexieff, 
and  also  to  put  Korea  under  financial  obligation  to 
Russia  by  means  of  a  loan.  In  March,  1901,  Mr. 
Brown  was  suddenly  ordered  by  the  Korean  Gov- 
ernment, which  acted  obviously  at  the  instance  of 
the  Russian  Representative,  to  vacate  his  residence 
and  surrender  his  post.  The  British  Charge,  Mr. 
Gubbins,  had  barely  succeeded  in  prevailing  upon 
the  Korean  Government  to  revoke  the  latter  half  of 
the  order,  when  in  May  another  order  was  issued 
calling  for  the  delivery,  not  only  of  Mr.  Brown's 
official  residence,  but  also  of  the  customs  office 
building — an  order  equivalent  to  a  dismissal  from 
office.  From  this  predicament  Mr.  Brown  was  nar- 
rowly rescued  by  an  earnest  representation  made  on 
May  5  by  Mr.  Hayashi  to  the  Korean  Emperor.2  By 
this  time,  the  affair  had  been  complicated  by  an 
agreement  of  a  5,000,000  yen  loan,  which  had  been 
signed  on  April  19,  between  the  Korean  Govern- 

1  The  Kokumin,  March  20,  1901,  and  August  7,  1902. 

2  Ibid.,  May  5  and  10,  1901. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  279 

ment  and  the  French  agent,  M.  Cazalis,  of  the  Yun- 
nan Syndicate.1  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  give  the 
detail  of  this  abortive  agreement,  for  it  was  never 
ratified  by  the  Emperor,  but  fell  through  from  the 
inability  of  the  Syndicate  to  fulfill  its  terms.2  It  is 
only  necessary  to  say  that  if  the  loan  had  material- 
ized, a  large  control  over  the  coinage,  mining,  and 
general  finances  of  Korea  would  have  passed  into  the 
hands  of  the  French  subjects  and  perhaps  also  of  the 
Russo-Chinese  Bank.  This  Bank,  in  the  latter  half 
of  1902,  seems  to  have  offered  a  fresh  loan  through 
its  agents  at  Seul,  Gunzburg  and  Company,  under 
the  condition  that  the  firm  should  obtain  a  perma- 
nent monopoly  of  ginseng,  which  had  then  been  in 
the  hands  of  the  Japanese,  and  also  the  right  of 
working  certain  mines.3  This  proposition  also  mis- 
carried, evidently  owing  to  the  protest  from  the 
Japanese  Minister,  who  discovered  in  it  a  violation 
of  the  first  Article  of  the  Yamagata-Lobanoff  Pro- 
tocol of  June  9, 1896.  A  Belgian  loan,  which  was 
rumored  early  in  1903,  seems  to  have  shared  the 
same  fate  with  all  the  loans  previously  suggested.4 
In  this  connection,  it  should  be  noted,  in  justice 
to  all  the  parties  concerned,  that  toward  the  latter 
half  of  1900  there  was  a  movement  in  Japan  to  sug- 
gest a  loan  to  the  Korean  Government,  but  that  the 


1  The  Kokumin,  April  23,  24,  May  3,  June  9,  1901. 

2  Ibid.,  May  18,  1901;  January  19,  February  1,  correspond- 
ence dated  April  2,  1902. 

8  Ibid.,  October  22,  November  17,  1902. 
4  Ibid.,  January  27,  1903. 


280  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Premier,  Marquis  Yamagata,  declined  to  counte- 
nance the  scheme.1  He  probably  did  not  wish  his 
nation  to  become  a  party  to  a  violation  of  an  agree- 
ment it  made  with  Russia  in  1896. 

In  1902-3,  the  interest  of  Russia  was  represented 
at  Seul,  not  only  by  her  regular  Representative,  but 
also  by  Baron  Gunzburg,  who  served  as  an  agent 
for  many  an  economic  enterprise  in  Korea  proposed 
by  the  Russians,  by  an  Alsatian  lady,  Mile.  Sonn- 
tag,  a  relative  of  Mme.  Waeber  and  an  influen- 
tial member  of  the  court  circle,  and,  temporarily, 
by  M..  Waeber  himself,2  who  had  come  to  Seul  as 
special  envoy  of  the  Czar  to  attend  the  fortieth  an- 
niversary of  the  accession  of  the  Korean  Sovereign 
to  the  throne.3  These  persons  were  further  sup- 
ported by  a  few  Koreans  who  had  lived  in  Siberia 
and  adopted  Russian  citizenship,  and  whose  rapid 
promotion  in  office  had  excited  jealousy  among  the 
nobility  in  Seul.4  Among  the  latter,  also,  there  were 
Russian  sympathizers  of  the  greatest  political  influ- 
ence. Taking  advantage  of  the  continual  discord 
among  the  politicians  in  Seul,  which  at  that  time 

1  From  a  statement  made  by  an  intimate  friend  of  Marquis 
Ito,  who,  in  October,  1900,  succeeded  Yamagata  in  the  premier- 
ship. See  the  Kohumin,  November  10, 1903. 

2  From  1900  till  May,  1903. 

8  A  Government  can  seldom  afford  so  many  foreign  councilors 
and  commissioners  -as  were  found  in  Korea.  Besides  these 
and  several  other  Russians,  there  were  in  Seul,  Mr.  Masuo  Kato, 
a  Japanese  adviser,  Mr.  Sands,  the  once  influential  American 
adviser,  several  French  engineers,  and  a  Belgian  councilor  to 
the  ministry  of  internal  affairs. 

4  The  Kokumin,  Seul  correspondence,  dated  August  7, 1902. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  281 

manifested  itself  in  the  rancorous  hatred  between 
the  supporters  of  the  Crown  Prince  and  those  of 
Lady  Om,  who  aspired  to  the  position  of  the  Queen, 
the  Russians  succeeded  in  enlisting  the  good-will 
of  the  leaders  of  both  parties,  Yi  Yong-ik  and  Yi- 
Keun-thaik.  Once  a  lad  of  mean  birth  in  the 
north,1  Yi  Yong-ik,  by  his  unscrupulous  methods, 
had  amassed  a  large  fortune  and  risen  to  the  Min- 
istry of  the  Imperial  Household,  until,  in  November, 
1902,  he  found  himself  the  object  of  a  sharp  oppo- 
sition by  Yi  Keun-thaik  and  a  large  section  of  the 
gentry  of  Seul.  He  at  once  took  refuge  in  the  Rus- 
sian Legation,  and  was  then  taken  on  board  the 
"  Korietz  "  to  Port  Arthur,  where  he  used  his  seal 
of  the  Imperial  Estates  Board  and  transacted  his 
official  business  as  before.2  On  January  13,  1903, 
he  returned  to  Seul,  and  used  his  influence  to  fur- 
ther the  already  started  obstruction  to  the  bank- 
notes issued  by  the  Korean  branch  of  the  First  Bank 
of  Japan.  These  notes  had  first  appeared  in  May, 
1902,  and,  beside  the  deplorable  monetary  system 
of  Korea,  met  so  great  a  demand  from  the  commer- 
cial world  that,  by  the  end  of  the  year,  the  amount 
issued  had  risen  nearly  to  1,000,000  yen  against  a 
reserve  only  a  little  below  that  sum.3  Suddenly,  at 
the  instance  of  the  Russians  who  wished  to  issue 
similar  notes   from   the  Russo-Chinese  Bank,  the 

1  The  Kokumin,  Seul  correspondence,  dated  June  3,  1899; 
November  30,  1902. 

2  Ibid.,  Seul  correspondence,  dated  December  23,  1902. 
8  See  p.  23,  above. 


282  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Korean  .Government  had  prohibited  the  circulation 
of  the  Japanese  notes  in  December,  1902.  The 
credit  of  the  notes  and  the  benefit  of  their  use  had 
been  so  obvious,  however,  that,  in  spite  ,of  the  Gov- 
ernment order,  the  Director-General  of  the  Customs 
had  still  received  payments  in  them,  and  the  Chinese 
Minister  had  advised  his  countrymen  to  continue 
their  use.  The  veto  had  then  been  removed,  only  to 
be  renewed  at  the  return  of  Yi  Yong-ik  from  Port 
Arthur.  He  had  entertained  the  desire,  which  has 
been  found  utterly  impracticable,  of  himself  estab- 
lishing a  central  bank  and  issuing  paper  notes.1  He 
employed  all  the  means  at  his  disposal  to  resist  the 
opposition  of  the  Japanese  Kepresentative,  who  was 
now  supported  by  his  British  colleague,  Mr.  Jordan. 
The  bank-notes  were  not  reinstated  till  February 
13,  1903,  when  a  compromise  was  at  last  reached 
with  the  Korean  Government.2  It  is  impossible  to 
establish  the  complicity  of  the  Russian  diplomats  in 
Yi  Yong-ik' s  obstruction,  which  thus  ended  in  fail- 
ure, beyond  the  fact  that  the  Korean  politician  had 
been  in  close  touch  with  the  Muscovites.  From  the 
historical  point  of  view,  Russia  could  hardly  have 
interfered  with  the  issue  of  the  Japanese  bank-notes 
without  transgressing  the  third  Article  of  the  Nishi- 
Rosen  Protocol  of  April  25, 1898.     ^ 

Thus  far  we  have  related  the  comparative  failure 
of  Russia's  diplomacy  in  South  Korea  and  at  the 

1  The  Kokumin,  telegrams,  March  11,  26,  27,  April  11,  1903. 
Ibid.,'  correspondence,  February  2,  5,  9,  16,    18,  March 
4, 1903. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  283 

capital.  In  the  north,  however,  which  was  conter- 
minous with  her  dominion  and  with  Manchuria, 
Russia  achieved  a  greater  success.  On  March  29, 
1899,1  M.  Pavloff  succeeded,  after  his  earlier  and 
much  larger  demands  had  failed,  in  leasing  for 
twelve  years,  for  the  use  of  Count  H.  Keyserling, 
a  Russian  subject,  three  whaling  stations2  on  the 
northeastern  coast,  each  700  by  350  feet  in  ex- 
tent. This  concession  was  offset  by  one  secured  by 
a  Japanese  citizen,  on  February  14,  1900,3  which 
conferred  upon  him  the  right  of  whaling  for  three 
years,  subject  to  renewal,  along  the  Korean  coast, 
excepting  the  waters  for  the  distance  of  three  li 
adjoining  the  three  provinces  on  which  the  Key- 
serling concessions  were  situated  and  the  Province 
of  Chul-la. 

Further  north,  upon  the  frontier,  the  long  bound- 
ary line  naturally  divides  itself  into  two  parts, 
namely,  the  Tumen  River,  separating  Korea  from 
Primorsk  of  Siberia  and  the  Kirin  Province  of  Man- 
churia, and  the  Yalu  River,  which  borders  upon  the 
strategically  most  important  Province  of  Sheng- 
king  of  South  Manchuria.  Along  the  former  stream, 
Russia  acquired  by  a  treaty  of  1884 4  the  opening 

1  The  contract  is  found  in  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  800-806. 
Also  see  the  U.  S.  56th  Congress,  1st  Session,  House  Documents, 
vol.  i.  pp.  484-488. 

2  (1)  Along  the  coast  near  Cape  Tikhmeneff,  Ulsan  Bay, 
Kiong-sang  Province;  (2)  on  the  island  of  Ching-po,  Ham- 
kiung  Province ;  and  (3)  at  Chang-shing,  Kang-wan  Province. 

«  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  799-800. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  731-732  (August  8,  1884,  o.  s.). 


284  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

of  the  port  of  Kiong-hung  to  the  Russian  land 
trade,  and  a  free  navigation  of  the  Tumen.  A 
dozen  years  later/  when  the  Sovereign  sojourned 
at  the  Russian  Legation,  the  Muscovites  concluded 
an  agreement  with  the  Seul  Government  whereby 
they  were  granted  the  privilege  of  mining  gold  and 
other  minerals  for  fifteen  years,  and  coal  for  twenty 
years,  in  two  districts  near  Kiong-hung,  as  well  as 
the  right  to  construct  a  railway  or  carriage-road 
from  the  mines  to  the  shore.  It  has  often  been  re- 
ported that  the  poverty-stricken  people  as  well  as 
the  venal  officers  along  the  river  have  continually 
mortgaged  their  property  to  the  Russians,  who  thus 
have  acquired  extensive  tracts  of  land,  circulated 
Russian  coins  among  the  natives,  and  otherwise  im- 
planted their  influence  far  and  wide.  Then  early 
in  1902,  M.  Pavloff  sought  to  make  a  step  in  ad- 
vance in  this  direction,  when,  without  permission 
from  Korea,  a  telegraph  line  was  extended  from 
Possiet  to  Kiong-hung  across  the  Tumen  River. 
He  desired  that  the  Seul  Government  should  re- 
cognize the  accomplished  fact,  and  Rear  Admiral 
Skrydloff,  commanding  the  Pacific  squadron  of  the 
Russian  navy,  visited  the  capital  on  February  17, 
and  intimated  his  hope  that  the  question  would  be 
amicably  settled.  The  Foreign  Minister,  Pak  Che- 
sun,  however,  successfully  ordered  on  February  22 
that  the  telegraph  line  so  surreptitiously  built  be 
removed.  In  the  mean  while,  it  was  discovered  that 
the  St.  Petersburg  Government  had  had  nothing  to 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  772-775,  April  22,  1896. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  285 

do  with  the  building  of  the  line  which  had  recently 
been  removed.  M.  Pavloff,  however,  succeeded  in 
securing  the  dismissal  of  Pak  from  his  post.  He  also 
persisted  in  demanding  the  right  of  the  Russians  to 
reconstruct  the  line  across  the  Tumen  River.  He 
was  as  much  justified  in  preferring  such  a  demand, 
as  was  the  Korean  Government  in  refusing  to  ac- 
cede to  it.  The  latter  was  probably  apprehensive 
that  its  concession  to  Russia  would  be  followed  by 
similar  demands  from  other  Powers.  At  present, 
the  Korean  telegraph  line  reaches  from  Seul  to 
Kion-song,  some  forty  miles  from  Kiong-hung.1 

On  the  Yalu  River,  also,  M.  Pavloff  desired  a  tel- 
egraphic connection  with  Wiju  from  Port  Arthur 
and  from  Harbin,  which,  after  a  failure  in  May, 
1902,  was  at  last  granted  in  April,  1903.2 

More  important,  however,  is  the  question  of  the 
Seul-Wiju  Railway,  which  had  been  the  bone  of  con- 
tention between  Japan  and  the  allied  Powers  of 
Russia  and  France,  until  the  outbreak  of  the  present 
war  suddenly  changed  the  situation  in  favor  of  the 
former.  By  the  temporary  articles  of  August  20, 
1894,3  Korea  had  granted  a  prior  right  to  the  Japan- 
ese Government  or  companies  to  construct  railways 
between  Seul  and  Fusan.  The  actual  undertaking, 
however,  was  so  delayed,  that,  on  March  29, 1896,4 

1  The  Kokumin,  Seul  correspondence,  dated  April  8,  1902. 

2  Ibid.,  telegram,  May  8, correspondence,  May  11,  1902  ;  tele- 
gram, March  28,  and  correspondence,  April  16,  1903. 

8  Tokushu  Joyaku,  p.  722. 
4  Ibid.,  pp.  761-764. 


286  THE  KUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Mr.  James  R.  Morse,  an  American  citizen,  succeeded 
in  acquiring  the  Seul-Chemulpo  concession,  and  be- 
gan to  build  the  line.  In  October,  1898,  Mr.  Morse 
sold  the  concession  to  certain  Japanese  capitalists, 
and  the  line,  which  was  the  first  railway  owned 
abroad  by  Japanese  subjects,  has  been  in  running 
order  since  July,  1900.  The  contract  for  the  other 
line  —  Fusan-Seul  —  was  not  made  by  the  Japanese 
till  September  8,  1898.1  Prior  to  this,  on  July  3, 
1896,2  a  French  company  had  acquired  a  grant  to 
connect  Seul  with  Wiju  on  the  Yalu  by  rail.  Find- 
ing, however,  little  prospect  of  starting  the  work 

1  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  765-768.  This  contract  includes 
certain  interesting  provisions,  which  the  reader  may  compare 
with  those  of  the  Manchurian  railways.  There  occur  two  exclu- 
sive measures,  that  none  but  Koreans  and  Japanese  may  hold 
shares  of  the  railway  capital  (Article  15),  and  that  no  other  for- 
eigners shall  reside  within  lands  assigned  for  the  depots  (Ar- 
ticle 5).  The  work  should  be  begun  within  three  years  after  the 
signature  of  the  contract,  and  be  completed  within  ten  years 
hence  (Article  10).  After  fifteen  years  of  operation,  the  Korean 
Government  might  purchase  the  entire  line,  and,  if  unable  to  do 
so,  the  purchase  would  be  postponed  by  periods  of  ten  years 
(Article  12).  As  soon  as  the  Korean  finances  should  admit,  the 
railway  might  be  made  a  common  work  between  the  Koreans 
and  Japanese  (Article  13).  The  laborers  and  the  timber  em- 
ployed in  the  construction  should  as  far  as  possible  be  obtained 
in  Korea  (Article  6).  The  lands  assigned  for  the  line  and  its 
depots  shall  belong  to  the  company  only  so  long  as  it  operates 
the  road,  and  the  Korean  Government  should  furnish  no  other 
lands  to  the  company  (Articles  3  and  8).  It  should  be  added 
that  the  Japanese  Government  guaranteed  a  six  per  cent,  in- 
terest for  the  capital  of  the  company. 

For  further  details  of  the  Seul-Chemulpo  and  Fusan-Seul 
Railways,  see  p.  24,  and  notes,  above. 

2  For  the  contract,  see  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  770-772. 


DIPLOMATIC  STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  287 

within  the  specified  period  of  three  years,  the  com- 
pany tried  to  sell  the  concession,  first  to  the  Russian 
Government  and  then  to  Japan,  but  neither  was  pre- 
pared to  accept  the  proposed  terms.  About  1900, 
Yi  Yong-ik  instituted  in  the  Imperial  Household 
Department  the  Northwestern  Railway  Bureau,  over 
which  he  presided,  with  the  express  purpose  of 
building  the  line  with  Korean  capital.  The  French 
Minister  at  Seul,  however,  had  a  short  time  before 
obtained  exclusive  right  to  furnish  material  and 
engineers  for  the  building  of  the  line,  so  that  Ko- 
rean money  and  French  skill  were  to  be  enlisted  for 
the  service.1  After  a  long  delay,  President  Yi  held 
a  great  undertaking  ceremony  on  May  8, 1902,  but 
it  was  patent  to  every  one  that  no  Korean  capital 
was  forthcoming.  As  was  expected,  not  a  mile  of 
rail  having  been  laid,  the  work  was  suspended  in 
June,  and  indefinitely  postponed.2  Considering, 
however,  that  a  Seul-Wiju  line  would  naturally  pass 
through  the  gold  mines  of  Yun-san  and  Yin-san  and 
the  coal  region  of  Ping-yang,  and  the  great  agricul- 
tural province  of  Hwang-hai,  as  well  as  such  com- 
mercial centres  as  Kai-song,  Ping-yang,  Hwang-ju, 
and  An-ju,  the  advantages  of  controlling  this  line 
appeared  too  great  for  the  competing  foreigners 
to  leave  its  construction  to  the  care  of  the  impe- 
cunious Korean  Government.  Particularly  jealous 
were  the  Russians  of  the  line  passing  into  the  hands 

1  Tokushu  Joyahdy  pp.  768-770 ;  the  Kokumin,  September 
7, 1901. 
a  The  Kokumin,  July  4,  1902. 


288  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

of  their  political  rivals,  for  then  —  if,  furthermore, 
a  railway  connection  were  effected  by  the  same 
rivals  between  Wiju  and  Niu-chwang —  the  deep- 
laid  design  of  Russia  to  make  Dalny  the  great  trad- 
ing port  for  Manchuria  and  North  China  would  be 
seriously  upset  by  the  railway  reaching  directly  from 
the  producing  centres  of  these  regions  and  Korea 
to  the  port  of  Fusan,  whence  a  ready  communication 
oversea  might  well  radiate  toward  Japan,  Europe, 
and  America.  It  was  natural,  therefore,  for  M. 
Stein,  Russian  Charge  a"  Affaires,  again  to  recom- 
mend, as  he  did  on  February  15,  1903,  the  honest 
Baron  Gunzburg  to  the  Korean  Government,  and 
to  demand  of  the  latter  on  behalf  of  the  Baron  the 
right  of  laying  the  Seul-Wiju  Railway.  The  Govern- 
ment, however,  declined1  to  entertain  the  application, 
as  it  was  its  intention  to  complete  the  line  on  its 
own  resources,  and  not  to  concede  it  to  any  foreign 
Power.2  Later,  another  attempt  was  made  in  August 
by  the  Seul  Government  to  reopen  the  work  of  con- 
struction, for  which  a  French  syndicate  represented 
by  M.  Rondon  was  to  supply  all  machinery,3  but, 
again,  the   lack  of  funds  frustrated  the  attempt. 

1  It  is  said  that  the  Russian  Representative  obtained  a  promise 
from  the  Korean  Government  to  grant  to  no  other  foreigners  the 
right  of  either  the  construction  or  the.  mortgage  of  this  railway. 
—  The  Kokumin,  December  10,  1903.  It  now  matters  little 
whether  this  report  was  true  or  not,  since  the  Korean  Govern- 
ment abrogated  on  May  18, 1904,  all  the  agreements  it  had  con- 
cluded with  the  Russians. 

2  The  Kokumin,  February  18, 1903;  the  Dobun-fcwai,  No.  41, 
pp.  91-93. 

8  The  Kokumin,  August  4,  1903. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  289 

Since  that  time,  no  important  development  of  this 
question  had  transpired  before  the  beginning  of  hos- 
tilities between  Russia  and  Japan. 

We  have  so  far  seen  enough  of  Korean  diplo- 
macy to  comprehend  something  of  the  Russian 
method  of  furthering  her  influence  over  Korea,  and 
of  the  manner  in  which  Japan  struggled  to  safe- 
guard her  fast  increasing  iuterests1  in  the  penin- 
sula and  to  maintain  the  terms  of  the  Russian 
agreements  of  1896  and  1898.  We  have,  however, 
reserved  up  to  this  point  the  latest  and  most  impor- 
tant question  of  the  timber  concession  upon  the 
northern  frontier.  In  no  other  matter  had  the 
characteristic  method  of  Russian  diplomacy  excited 
more  apprehension  in  Korea  and  Japan,  for  nothing 
could  better  illustrate  the  close  connection,  in  the 
Muscovite  policy,  of  Manchuria  and  North  Korea 
—  a  connection  which  appeared  to  threaten  at  once 
the  integrity  of  the  two  adjoining  Empires  and  the 
safety  of  Japan  —  than  the  Yong-am-po  incident 
which  arose  in  April,  1903,  in  relation  to  the  tim- 
ber concession.  The  contract 2  for  this  concession 
dated  so  far  back  as  August  28,  1896,  when  the 
Korean  King  was  a  guest  at  the  Russian  Legation. 
It  had  secured  for  a  Russian  merchant  at  Vladivos- 
tok the  right  to  organize  a  Korean  lumber  company 
(Article  1),  having  a  monopoly  for  twenty  years  of 
the  forestry  enterprise  round  the  Mu-san  region  upon 
the  Tumen  River  and  also  on  the  Uinung  Island  in 
Japan  Sea  (Article  2).  The  work,  in  order  to  be  valid, 

1  See,  e.  g.,  pp.  10-30.      2  Tokushu  Joyaku,  pp.  781-791. 


290  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

had  to  be  begun  within  one  year  after  the  signature 
of  the  agreement  (Article  15).  Only  when  work  in 
these  two  regions  should  have  been  under  way,  the 
company  might,  within  five  years 1  from  the  same 
date,  start  a  similar  exploitation  along  the  Yalu 
Kiver  (Article  2).2  Accordingly,  the  Eussian  syndi- 
cate undertook  to  fell  trees  at  Mu-san  in  1897  and 
again  in  1898,3  though  never  on  a  large  scale.4 
On  the  Uinung  Island,  however,  where  good  timber 
had  nearly  been  exhausted  after  many  years  of  cut- 
ting by  the  Japanese,  the  Russians  had  at  no  time 
made  a  serious  attempt  to  exploit  it.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  right  of  the  Russians  to  exploit 
forests  upon  the  Yalu  so  late  as  1903  was  at  least 
not  clear.5  Nevertheless,  the  extensive  public  works 
at  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  and  on  the  railways 
had  created  so  great  a  demand  for  timber,  that 
the  Chinese  woodmen  were  cutting  trees  along  the 
foot  of  the  Long  White  Mountains  and  sending 
them  downstream  to  An-tung,  where  alone  the 
traffic  annually  aggregated  the  sum  of  1,500,000 

1  It  is  said  that  the  time-limit  was  extended,  on  January  1, 
1901,  for  twenty  years.    See  Tokushu  Joyaku,  p.  783. 

2  The  company  agreed  to  pay  to  the  Korean  Imperial  House, 
through  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank,  a  royalty  amounting  to  one 
fourth  of  the  annual  profit.  The  company  was  to  furnish  all  the 
capital,  and  was  exempt  from  all  kinds  of  taxes  and  dues  (Ar- 
ticles 10,  11,  14). 

8  The  Kokumin,  correspondence,  April  18,  1903 ;  Tokushu 
Joyaku,  pp.  781-782. 

4  Toward  the  end  of  May,  1903,  simultaneously  with  their 
activity  on  the  Yalu,  the  Russian  soldiers  began  again  to  cut  trees 
at  Mu-san. 

6  Cf.  Article  2  of  the  contract. 


DIPLOMATIC  STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  291 

taels.1  The  Russians  now  seemed  to  have  planned 
to  exploit  both  sides  of  the  Yalu,  and  they  would 
not  have  caused  trouble,  had  they  employed  legiti- 
mate means  to  accomplish  their  ends.  On  the  Man- 
churian  side,  finding  that  a  foreigner  could  not  get 
a  timber  concession  from  the  Chinese  authorities, 
they  used  the  name  of  a  leader  of  the  mounted 
bandits  whom  a  Russian  military  officer  had  be- 
friended, and,  after  securing  a  concession,  employed 
those  bandits  in  felling  trees.2  In  regard  to  the 
Korean  side  of  the  river,  after  nearly  seven  years' 
inactivity  since  the  grant  of  the  concession,  M. 
Stein,  Russian  Charge  at  Seul,  suddenly  notified 
the  Korean  Government,  on  April  13,  1903,  that 
Baron  Gunzburg  would  henceforth  represent  at  Seul 
the  interest  of  the  timber  syndicate,  which  would 
now  commence  its  work  upon  the  Yalu.3  Early  in 
May,  forty-seven  Russian  soldiers  in  civilian  dress, 
presently  increased  to  sixty,  besides  a  larger  number 

1  The  Kokumin,  correspondence,  July  27, 1903.  Lower  down 
the  stream,  at  Tatung-kao,  the  amount  sometimes  reached  the 
annual  value  of  7,000,000  taels. 

2  See  an  address  by  Eitaro  Tsuruoka,  who  has  recently  trav- 
eled in  Manchuria  and  is  acquainted  with  several  of  the  lead- 
ers of  the  bandits.  The  Dobun-kwai,  No.  53  (April,  1904),  pp. 
1-14. 

8  The  Kokumin,  April  23,  1903.  The  capital  of  the  syndicate 
was  reported  to  be  5,000,000  rubles,  of  which  2,000,000  were  said 
to  have  been  furnished  by  the  Russian  Government.  —  76id.,  cor- 
respondence, June  19,  1903.  This  rumor  was  not  authenticated. 
It  is  safe  to  say,  however,  that  Baron  Gunzburg's  connection 
with  the  syndicate  was  largely  nominal.  The  present  writer  is 
not  in  a  position  to  explain  the  relation  of  the  notorious  M.  Be- 
zobrazoff  to  the  timber  work  on  the  Yalu. 


292  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

of  Chinese  and  Koreans  under  Russian  employ, 
were  reported  to  have  come  to  Yong-am-po,1  a  point 
near  the  mouth  of  the  river  and  rather  remote  from 
the  places 2  where  actual  cutting  was  in  progress, 
and  had  begun  to  construct  what  was  claimed  to  be 
timber-warehouses,  but  later  proved  to  be,  besides 
some  godowns,  a  blacksmith  plant  and  a  six-foot 
mound.3  At  the  same  time,  there  was  taking  place 
a  mysterious  mobilization  of  troops  from  Liao-yang 
and  Port  Arthur  towards  Feng-hwang-Cheng  and 
An-tung  on  the  other  side  of  the  Yalu.4  The  Ko- 
rean frontier  officers  reported  that  a  panic  had  been 
created  among  the  inhabitants,  and  that  the  Korean- 
Manchurian  commerce  had  stopped.5  Presently,  the 
Russian  soldiers  at  Yong-am-po  were  reported  to 
have  been  increased,  first  by  100,  and  then  by  200, 
who  purchased  from  the  natives,  under  the  name  of 
a  Korean  citizen  and  against  the  wishes  of  the  local 
authorities,  fifteen  houses  and  some  twelve  acres  of 
land.6    When  the  Korean  Government  had,  on  May 

1  The  Kokumin,  telegram,  May  8  and  9,  1903. 

2  Principally  Mt.  Paik-ma. 

8  The  Kokumin,  telegram,  June  11,  correspondence,  June  19, 
1903.  When  Japanese  soldiers  reached  Yong-am-po  soon  after 
the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  they  found  there  a  large  ware- 
house, and  fifteen  large  brick  and  twenty  or  more  smaller  build- 
ings. Rails  had  been  laid  between  the  sea  and  the  warehouse, 
which  was  also  connected  with  the  Yalu  by  a  new  canal.  A  fort 
had  also  been  left  standing,  but  the  guns  had  been  taken  away. 

4  Ibid.,  telegram,  May  8  and  9,  1900.  Cf.  the  British  Parlia- 
mentary Papers  :  China,  No.  2  (190Q,  Nos.  115,  116,  128,  129, 
131,  134. 

6  The  Kokumin,  telegram,  May  9,  1903. 

6  Ibid.,  telegram,  May  22  and  25,  1903. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE  IN  KOREA  293 

15,  demanded  of  M.  Stein  to  order  the  evacuation 
of  the  Russians,1  M.  Pavloff,  who  had  recently  re- 
turned from  his  trip  to  Russia,  requested,  on  the 
contrary,  that  the  Korean  Government  should  pro- 
tect the  Russian  subjects  at  Yong^-am-po.2  A  desul- 
tory discussion  then  ensued  between  M.  Pavloff  and 
the  Korean  Government,  while  further  increases 
of  the  Russian  forces  at  An-tung  beyond  the  river 
were  reducing  the  frontier  regions  generally  into  a 
state  of  anarchy.3  About  the  middle  of  June,  the 
Russians  forcibly  seized  rafts  belonging  to  some 
Koreans  and  Chinese  that  came  down  the  stream, 
and  shot  two  Chinese  who  resisted.4  A  Japanese- 
Chinese  syndicate,  also,  which  had  secured  a  timber 
concession  in  this  region  in  March  from  the  Korean 
Government,  reported  that  its  rafts  had  been  seized, 
and  its  work  had  consequently  been  suspended.5 
Prior  to  this,  four  Russian  war-vessels  under  com- 
mand of  Admiral  Starck  came  to  Chemulpo  in  the 
night  of  June  5,6  and  stayed  there  till  the  11th.  No 
matter  whether  there  was  any  significance  in  this 
act,  it  is  sufficient  to  record  that  it  took  place  at 
this  critical  moment.  Not  the  least  serious  feature 
of  the  affair  was  the  disagreement  of  opinion  about 
it  inside  the  Korean  Government.  When,  on  June 
11,  the  Council  of  State  passed  a  resolution  that  the 

1  The  Kokumin,  telegram,  May  16. 

2  Ibid.,  correspondence,  May  20. 
8  Ibid.,  telegram,  June  13. 

4  Ibid.,  telegram,  June  17. 

*  Ibid.,  June  16. 

•  Ibid.,  telegram,  June  6. 


294  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

conduct  of  the  Russians  upon  the  frontier  was  con- 
trary to  the  treaty  arrangements  between  the  two 
Powers,  the  Foreign  Office,  on  the  14th,  sought  to 
refute  the  ground  in  an  elaborate  note.1  The  grav- 
ity of  the  situation  as  evinced  in  all  these  facts  need 
hardly  be  pointed  out.  Whatever  the  intentions  of 
the  Russian  Government  or  even  of  its  Representa- 
tive at  Seul,  the  action  of  the  Muscovites  at  Yong- 
am-po  was  precisely  of  a  nature  to  remind  one  of 
their  previous  fortification  of  Port  Arthur,  which 
had  eventually  prepared  their  entry  into  the  whole 
of  Manchuria.  The  fact  that  the  occupation  of 
Yong-am-po  took  place  simultaneously  with  the 
suspension  of  the  evacuation  of  Manchuria  and  with 
the  active  military  connection  between  its  army 
centres  and  the  Korean  frontier,  gave  the  present 
affair  an  exceedingly  ominous  appearance.  And 
yet,  in  the  face  of  these  perilous  circumstances,  the 
Korean  Government  showed  itself  so  impotent  and 
so  little  alive  to  the  situation  as  to  be  divided 
against  itself  on  a  minor  point  of  the  law  of  the 
case.  In  such  a  state  of  things,  the  usual  method 
of  Japan  to  resist  Russia  through  Korea  would  be 
utterly  futile. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  recall  that  any  attempt  upon 
the  integrity  of  Korea  was  in  violation  of  the  fun- 
damental principle  which  formed  the  first  Article 
of  the  Nishi-Rosen  Protocol  of  April  25,  1898,2 
as  well  as  against  the  spirit  of  this  and  the  two 

1  The  Kokumin,  correspondence,  June  19. 

2  See  p.  271,  above. 


DIPLOMATIC   STRUGGLE   IN  KOREA  295 

other  Russo-Japanese  agreements  regarding  Korea. 
These  agreements  seemed  to  Japan  to  have  in  one 
way  or  another  been  palpably  violated  by  the  Rus- 
sians in  many  of  their  actions  in  Korea,  to  which 
the  Yong-am-po  affair  was  a  climax.  Under  cir- 
cumstances so  continually  irritating  to  the  peace 
of  the  East  and  so  threatening  to  her  own  vital 
interests,  the  Government  of  Japan  now  felt  jus- 
tified, when  the  climax  was  reached,  in  opening 
direct  negotiations  with  Russia,  in  order  to  arrive 
at  such  a  definite  understanding  of  the  relative 
position  of  the  Powers  in  Korea,  as  would  insure 
the  mutual  benefit  of  the  three  nations  concerned. 


CHAPTEK  XVIII 

THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS,  I 

It  was  in  view  of  these  dangerously  unstable  cir- 
cumstances in  Manchuria  and  Korea  that,  on  June 
23,  1903,  the  four  principal  members  of  the  Jap- 
anese Cabinet !  and  five  Privy  Councilors 2  met 
before  the  Throne,  and  decided  on  the  principles 
upon  which  negotiations  with  Eussia  should  be 
opened.3  Having  thus  formulated  the  policy  to  be 
pursued,  Baron  Komura  telegraphed  to  the  Jap- 
anese Minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  Mr.  Kurino,  on 
July  28,  as  follows  4 :  — 

1  Viscount  Katsura,  Premier ;  Baron  Komura,  Foreign  Min- 
ister ;  and  Messrs.  Terauchi  and  Yamamoto,  Ministers,  respec- 
tively, of  the  Army  and  Navy. 

2  Marquises  ltd  and  Yamagata,  and  Counts  Matsukata, 
Inoiie  and  Oyama. 

3  The  Japanese  dailies. 

4  The  Nichi-Ro  Kosho  ni  kwan  su  ru  Ofuku  (diplomatic  cor- 
respondence respecting  the  negotiations  between  Japan  and  Rus- 
sia), dispatch  No.  1.  This  correspondence  (hereafter  abbrevi- 
ated as  N.-R.)  was  presented  by  the  Japanese  Government  to 
the  Houses  of  the  Imperial  Diet,  respectively,  on  March  23  and 
26,  and  published  in  the  Kwampo  (Official  Gazette)  of  March  24 
and  27,  1904.  It  contains  fifty-one  dispatches,  all  telegraphic, 
covering  the  period  of  more  than  six  months  between  the  open- 
ing of  the  negotiations  and  the  severance  of  all  diplomatic  rela- 
tions between  the  two  Powers,  namely,  between  July  28,  1903, 
and  February  6,  1904. 

An  authoritative  English  translation  of  this  correspondence 


BARON    KOMURA 
Japanese  Foreign  Minister 


THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         297 

"  The  Imperial  Government  [of  Japan]  have  observed 
with  close  attention  the  development  of  affairs  in  Man- 
churia, and  its  present  situation  causes  them  to  view  it 
with  grave  concern. 

"  So  long  as  it  was  hoped  that  Russia  would  carry  out, 
on  the  one  hand,  the  engagement  that  she  made  with 
China,  and,  on  the  other,  the  assurances  she  had  given 
to  other  Powers,  regarding  the  subject  of  the  evacuation 
of  Manchuria,  the  Imperial  Government  maintained  an 
attitude  of  watchful  reserve.  But  the  recent  conduct  of 
Russia  has  been,  at  Peking,  to  propose  new  demands,  and, 
in  Manchuria,  to  tighten  her  hold  upon  it,  until  the  Im- 
perial Government  is  led  to  believe  that  Russia  must  have 
abandoned  the  intention  of  retiring  from  Manchuria. 
At  the  same  time,  her  increased  activity  upon  the  Korean 
frontier  is  such  as  to  raise  doubts  as  to  the  limits  of  her 
ambition. 

"The  unconditioned  and  permanent  occupation  of 
Manchuria  by  Russia  would  create  a  state  of  things  pre- 
judicial to  the  security  and  interest  of  Japan.  The  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunity  would  thereby  be  annulled, 
and  the  territorial  integrity  of  China  impaired.  There  is, 
however,  a  still  more  serious  consideration  for  the  Japan- 
ese Government.  That  is  to  say,  if  Russia  was  established 
on  the  flank  of  Korea,  it  would  be  a  constant  menace  to 
the  separate  existence  of  that  Empire,  or  at  least  would 
make  Russia  the  dominant  Power  in  Korea.  Korea  is  an 
important  outpost  in  Japan's  line  of  defense,  and  Japan 
consequently  considers  her  independence  absolutely  es- 

has  been  issued  from  Washington,  probably  by  members  of  the 
Japanese  Legation  there.  In  the  quotations  from  the  correspond- 
ence that  appear  in  these  pages,  the  language  of  the  transla- 
tion —  accurate  as  it  is  —  has  been  largely  changed,  in  order  to 
make  it  coincide  as  closely  as  possible  with  the  literal  meaning  of 
the  original. 


298  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

sential  to  her  own  repose  and  safety.  Moreover,  the  politi- 
cal as  well  as  commercial  and  industrial  interests  and  in- 
fluence which  Japan  possesses  in  Korea  are  paramount 
over  those  of  other  Powers,  These  interests  and  influence, 
Japan,  having  regard  to  her  own  security,  cannot  con- 
sent to  surrender  to,  or  share  with,  another  Power. 

"The  Imperial  Government,  after  the  most  serious 
consideration,  have  resolved  to  consult  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment, in  a  spirit  of  conciliation  and  frankness,  with  a 
view  to  the  conclusion  of  an  understanding  designed  to 
compose  questions  which  are  at  this  time  the  cause  of 
their  anxiety.  In  the  estimation  of  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment, the  moment  is  opportune  for  making  the  attempt 
to  bring  about  the  desired  adjustment,  and  it  is  believed 
that,  failing  this  opportunity,  there  would  be  no  room  for 
another  understanding. 

"The  Imperial  Government,  reposing  confidence  in 
your  judgment  and  discretion,  have  decided  to  place  the 
delicate  negotiations  in  your  hands. 

"  It  being  the  wish  of  the  Imperial  Government  to  place 
their  present  invitation  to  the  Russian  Government  en- 
tirely on  an  official  footing,  you  are  accordingly  instructed 
to  open  the  question  by  presenting  to  Count  Lamsdorff, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Russia,  a  note  verbale  to 
the  following  effect :  — 

"'The  Japanese  Government  desire  to  remove  from 
the  relations  of  the  two  Empires  every  cause  of  future 
misunderstanding,  and  believe  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment share  the  same  desire.  The  Japanese  Government 
would  therefore  be  glad  to  enter  with  the  Imperial  Rus- 
sian Government  upon  an  examination  of  the  condition 
of  affairs  in  the  regions  of  the  extreme  East,  where  their 
interests  meet,  with  a  view  to  defining  their  respective 
special  interests  in  those  regions. 

" '  If  this  suggestion  fortunately  meets  with  the  approval, 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         299 

in  principle,  of  the  Russian  Government,  the  Japanese 
Government  will  be  prepared  to  present  to  the  Russian 
Government  their  views  as  to  the  nature  and  scope  of 
the  proposed  understanding.' 

"  In  presenting  the  foregoing  note  to  the  Russian  For- 
eign Minister,  you  will  be  careful  to  make  him  under- 
stand that  our  purposes  are  entirely  friendly,  but  that  we 
attach  great  importance  to  the  subject. 

"  You  will  present  the  note  to  Count  Lamsdorff  as  soon 
as  possible,  and  keep  me  fully  informed  regarding  the 
steps  taken  by  you  under  this  instruction  ;  and  immedi- 
ately upon  the  receipt  of  an  affirmative  reply  from  the 
Russian  Government,  the  substance  of  our  proposals  will 
be  telegraphed  to  you." 

To  this  request  of  Japan,  Count  Lamsdorff  ex-< 
pressed  a  perfect  agreement,1  for,  as  he  had  very 
often  said  to  Mr.  Kurino,  "an  understanding  be- 
tween the  two  countries  was  not  only  desirable,  but 
was  the  best  policy."  "  Should  Russia  and  Japan 
enter  into  a  full  understanding/ '  said  he,  "  no  one 
would  in  future  attempt  to  sow  the  seeds  of  dis- 
cord between  the  two  countries." 2  The  assent  of 
the  Foreign  Minister  was  later  sustained  by  the 
Czar.3 

Thus  the  way  was  opened  for  an  amicable  in- 
terchange of  the  views  of  the  two  Powers.  This 
auspicious  beginning  of  the  negotiations  stands 
in  striking  contrast  to  their  disastrous  end.     The 

1  N.-R.,  No.  2. 

2  It  is  singular  that  even  Count  Lamsdorff  should  thus  par- 
ticipate in  the  characteristic  plaint  of  the  Russians  that  they  are 
an  object  of  unjust  machinations  of  other  nations. 

8  N.-R.,  No.  3,  received  at  Tokio  on  August  6. 


300  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

discrepancy  was  perhaps  in  no  small  measure  due 
to  a  political  situation  at  St.  Petersburg  which 
was  completely  beyond  the  control  of  Count  Lams- 
dorff,  and  probably  also  of  the  Czar.  It  should  be 
remembered  that  Baron  Komura,  like  Marquis 
Ito,  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  conclusion  of  a 
satisfactory  agreement  with  Russia  was  not  only 
desirable,  but  also  possible.  The  same  belief  was 
strongly  shared  by  Mr.  Kurino.  It  is  also  difficult 
to  suppose  that  Count  Lamsdorff  entered  upon 
the  negotiations  with  a  deliberate  intention  to  intro- 
duce into  them  insurmountable  difficulties,  as  he 
was  presently  obliged  to  do,  so  as  to  bring  them  to 
a  complete  deadlock.  On  the  contrary,  his  remarks 
quoted  in  the  preceding  paragraph  seem  to  indicate 
that  he  and  Mr.  Kurino  had  frequently  talked  of 
the  wisdom  of  coming  to  a  perfect  adjustment  of  the 
interests  of  the  two  Powers  in  the  East,  and  that 
he  was  gratified  that  the  opportunity  was  offered 
by  the  Japanese  Government  to  give  effect  to  what 
he  had  long  considered  "  the  best  policy."  About 
this  time,  however,  it  had  begun  to  be  surmised 
abroad  that  the  peace  party,  with  which  the  Count 
and  M.  Witte  were  said  to  be  in  sympathy,  had  been 
largely  overshadowed  by  the  less  intelligent  warlike 
faction.  It  was  unknown  what  were  the  results  of 
the  observations  of  General  Kuropatkin,  the  then 
Minister  of  War,  who  had  made  a  tour  of  the  East 
between  the  end  of  April  and  the  end  of  July.  Nor 
was  it  possible  to  discover  what  took  place  in  the 
great  conference  held  at  Port  Arthur  early  in  July, 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS        301 

in  which  the  General,  as  well  as  Admiral  Alexieff, 
MM.  Lessar,  Pavloff,  Rosen,  and  Pokotiloff,  took 
part.  However  that  may  be,  it  could  hardly  be 
denied  that  henceforth  the  Eastern  affairs  passed 
under  the  sway  of  a  less  thoughtful  body  of  men 
at  St.  Petersburg,  and  of  that  executive  officer  of 
great  talent,  but  strategist  and  diplomat  of  unknown  L^ 
value,  Admiral  Alexieff,  at  Port  Arthur.  M.  Witte 
was  relieved  of  his  Ministry  of  Finance,  and  trans- 
ferred to  the  presidency  of  the  council  of  ministers, 
which  was  known  to  be  of  small  real  authority.  On 
August  13,  an  Imperial  ukase  was  published  in  the 
Russian  Official  Messenger,  stating  that,  "  in  view 
of  the  complex  problems  of  administration  of  the 
eastern  confines  of  the  Empire,  we  [the  Czar  Nic- 
olas] found  it  necessary  to  create  a  power  capable 
of  assuring  the  peaceful  development  of  the  coun- 
try and  satisfying  urgent  local  needs."  For  this 
purpose,  a  special  vice-regency  called  the  Far  East 
was  created  out  of  the  Amur  and  Kwantung  ter- 
ritories, and  Admiral  Alexieff  was  appointed  Vice- 
roy of  the  Far  East.  He  was  vested  with  supreme 
power  in  the  civil  administration  of  the  territories, 
with  the  command  of  the  naval  forces  in  the  Pa- 
cific and  of  all  the  troops  quartered  in  the  country 
under  his  jurisdiction,  and  with  the  management  of 
the  diplomatic  relations  of  these  regions  with  the 
neighboring  States.  The  Viceroy  was  released  from 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  Ministers  at  St.  Petersburg, 
and  the  only  control  to  be  exercised  over  him  by 
the  central  power  was  through  a  special  committee  <~- 


302  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

of  men  1  nominated  by  the  Czar  and  presided  over 
by  himself.2  Statutes  concerning  this  special  com- 
mittee of  the  Far  East  —  which  has  in  itself  no 
executive  power  —  were  promulgated  on  Septem- 
ber 30.3  When  we  consider  the  probable  state  of 
Eussian  politics  at  the  time,  the  significance  of 
thus  elevating  Alexieff  and  clothing  him  with  enor- 
mous powers  could  hardly  be  concealed.  Hence- 
forth the  control  of  the  Eastern  diplomacy  of  Russia 
seemed  to  have  rested  more  with  the  Viceroy  at 
Port  Arthur  than  with  the  Foreign  Minister  at  St. 
Petersburg.4 

Admiral  Alexieff  was  appointed  Viceroy  on  Au- 
gust 13.  On  the  preceding  day,5  the  first  Japanese 
note  was  handed  to  Count  Lamsdorff  by  Mr.  Ku- 
rino,  who  had  held  it  for  about  a  week  pending  the 

1  These  men  were,  according  to  Article  2  of  the  Statutes  of 
September  30,  "the  Ministers  of  the  Interior,  of  Finance,  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  and  of  War,  the  head  of  the  Ministry  of  Marine, 
and  such  persons  as  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  may  find  it  expe- 
dient to  summon,  either  to  sit  permanently  on  the  committee,  or 
to  take  part  temporarily  at  its  meetings.  The  Viceroy  of  the  Far 
East,  being,  by  his  duties,  a  member  of  the  committee,  shall  be 
present  at  the  meetings  when  he  is  in  St.  Petersburg." 

2  The  British  Parliamentary  Papers:  China,  No.  2  (190^), 
No.  144. 

*  Ibid.,  No.  155. 

4  After  the  opening  of  hostilities  in  February  of  the  present 
year,  the  Russian  Foreign  Office  made  a  statement  of  Russia's 
case,  in  which  it  was  said  that,  when  the  Japanese  Government 
proposed  in  August,  1903,  to  open  the  negotiations,  "Russia  con- 
sented, and  Viceroy  Alexieff  was  charged  to  draw  up  a  project 
for  a  new  understanding  with  Japan  in  cooperation  with  the 
Russian  Minister  at  Tokio.  .  .  ."  See  p. '327,  note  9,  below. 

6  N.-R.,  No.  6. 


ADMIRAL    ALEXIEFF 
Viceroy  of  the  Far  Fast 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS        303 

Czar's  assent  to  Japan's  proposition  of  July  28, 
already  quoted.  In  this  note,  delivered  on  August 
12,  Baron  Komura  wrote  as  follows  :  — 

"In  reference  to  my  telegram  of  the  28th  July,  the 
Imperial  Government,  after  giving  most  serious  consid- 
eration to  the  condition  of  affairs  in  those  regions  where 
the  interests  of  the  two  Powers  meet,  have  decided  to 
propose  the  following  articles  as  the  basis  of  an  under- 
standing between  Japan  and  Russia :  — 

"  1.  'A  mutual  engagement  to  respect  the  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Chinese  and  Korean  Em- 
pires, and  to  maintain  the  principle  of  equal  opportunity 
for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  those 
countries. 

"  2. '  A  reciprocal  recognition  of  Japan's  preponderat- 
ing interests  in  Korea  and  Russia's  special  interests  in 
railway  enterprises  in  Manchuria,  and  of  the  right  of 
Japan  to  take  in  Korea,  and  of  Russia  to  take  in  Man- 
churia, such  measures  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  pro- 
tection of  their  respective  interests  as  above  defined, 
subject,  however,  to  the  provisions  of  Article  1  of  this 
Agreement. 

"3.  'A  reciprocal  undertaking  on  the  part  of  Russia 
and  Japan  not  to  impede  the  development  of  those  in- 
dustrial and  commercial  activities,  respectively,  of  Japan 
in  Korea  and  of  Russia  in  Manchuria,  which  are  not  in- 
consistent with  the  stipulations  of  Article  1  of  this  Agree- 
ment. 

" '  An  additional  engagement  on  the  part  of  Russia  not 
to  impede  the  eventual  extension  of  the  Korean  Railway 
into  Southern  Manchuria  so  as  to  connect  with  the  East- 
ern Chinese  and  Shan-hai-kwan-Niu-chwang  lines. 

"4.  'A  reciprocal  engagement  that,  in  case  it  should  be 
found  necessary  to  send  troops  by  Japan  to  Korea,  or  by 


304  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

Russia  to  Manchuria,  for  the  purpose  either  of  protecting 
the  interests  mentioned  in  Article  2  of  this  Agreement, 
or  of  suppressing  insurrection  or  disorder  liable  to  create 
international  complications,  the  troops  so  sent  are  in  no 
case  to  exceed  the  actual  number  required,  and  are  to  be 
forthwith  recalled  as  soon  as  their  missions  are  accom- 
plished. 

"5.  'The  recognition  on  the  part  of  Russia  of  the 
exclusive  right  of  Japan  to  give  advice  and  assistance  in 
the  interest  of  reform  and  good  government  in  Korea, 
including  necessary  military  assistance. 

"6.  'This  Agreement  to  supersede  all  previous  ar- 
rangements between  Japan  and  Russia  respecting  Ko- 
rea.' 

"  In  handing  the  foregoing  project  to  Count  Lamsdorff ," 
wrote  Baron  Komura  to  Mr.  Kurino  in  the  same  dispatch 
which  contained  the  proposed  Articles,  "you  will  say  that 
it  is  presented  for  the  consideration  of  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment in  the  firm  belief  that  it  may  be  found  adequate 
to  serve  as  a  basis  upon  which  to  construct  a  satisfactory 
arrangement  between  the  two  Governments,  and  you  will 
assure  Count  Lamsdorff  that  any  amendment  or  sugges- 
tion he  may  find  it  necessary  to  offer  will  receive  the  im- 
mediate and  friendly  consideration  of  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment, It  will  not  be  necessary  for  you  to  say  much  in 
elucidation  of  the  separate  items  of  the  project,  as  they 
are  largely  self-explanatory  ;  but  you  might  point  out 
that  the  project  taken  as  a  whole  will  be  found  to  be  little 
more  than  a  logical  extension  and  amplification  of  the 
principles  already  recognized  by,  or  of  conditions  em- 
bodied in  the  previous  engagements *  concluded  between, 
the  two  Governments."  2 

1  Evidently  the  reference  is  to  the  three  Russo-Japanese 
agreements  concerning  Korea  concluded  in  1896  and  1898. 

2  N-R.,  No.  3,  originally  dated  Tokio,  August  6. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS        305 

These  articles  are  memorable,  as  their  more  essen- 
tial features  were  never  altered  in  the  later  notes 
from  Japan,  as  the  persistent  rejection  by  Russia  of 
the  principles  embodied  in  these  articles  inevitably 
ended  in  hostilities,  and,  the  most  important  of  all, 
as  much  of  the  future  of  the  East  would  seem  to 
depend  upon  whether  these  principles  should  win 
or  fail  through  the  war.  The  principles  were  as 
obvious  as  the  note  was  "  largely  self-explanatory." 
At  their  basis  was  the  desire  for  a  general,  lasting 
peace  of  the  Far  East,  or,  in  other  words,  an  effective 
elimination  of  unnatural,  irritating  circumstances, 
so  that  the  East  may  develop  its  enormous  material  \ 
and  moral  resources,  and  thereby  establish  with 
the  West  an  intimate  and  mutually  beneficial  rela- 
tionship. Upon  this  fundamental  desire  were  built 
two  great  principles,  which  had  long  been  the 
mottoes  of  Eastern  diplomacy ;  namely,  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of,  and  the  "  open  door  "  in,  China 
and  Korea.  These  principles,  which  Russia  had 
frequently  avowed  on  her  own  initiative,  Japan 
now  requested  her  to  uphold  mutually  with  herself. 
Side  by  side  with  these  considerations,  the  vested 
interests  and  the  peculiar  position,  respectively,  of 
Russia  in  Manchuria  and  Japan  in  Korea,  were  to  be 
reciprocally  recognized  by  the  two  Powers,  in  such 
a  way,  however,  as  not  to  infringe  the  two  great 
principles  already  named.  Observe  that  the  Russian 
interests  in  Manchuria  were  not  less  respected  than 
the  Japanese  interests  in  Korea,  nor  was  the  Rus- 
sian occupation  of  Manchuria  more  guarded  against 


306  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

than  the  Japanese  annexation  of  Korea.  The  only 
ground  in  the  note  for  a  possible  misinterpretation 
was  the  Article  which  provided  for  Japan's  sole 
right  to  advise  and  aid  Korea  for  the  cause  of  the 
good  government  and  reform  of  the  latter.  Experi- 
ence had  shown  that  the  independence  and  progress 
I  of  Korea,  upon  which  one  half  of  Japan's  own 
1  future  rested,  would  be  possible  only  by  the  internal 
reform  and  development  of  the  Peninsular  Empire, 
and  that,  unfortunately,  the  task  of  reform  could 
not  safely  be  left  either  with  the  indolent  Korea 
or  with  another  Power,  be  it  China  or  Russia,  whose 
ultimate  object  would  be  best  served  were  Korea  to 
remain  feeble.  The  reform  of  Korea  may  truly  be 
called  the  penalty  of  Japan's  geographical  position, 
and  the  latter's  success  in  the  fulfillment  of  this 
most  delicate  mission  must  depend  on  her  sense 
of  just  proportion  and  utmost  self-control.  And 
nothing  seems  to  kindle  the  Japanese  nation  with 
a  higher  ambition  than  their  profound  determina- 

Ition  to  perform  what  they  deem  their  historic  mission 
in  the  fairest  spirit  of  human  progress.  Only  along 
these  lines,  moreover,  by  a  peculiar  coincidence  of 
circumstances,  the  securest  interests  of  Japan  as  a 
nation  seem  to  lie.  For  it  appears  to  be  her  singu- 
lar fortune  that  her  interests  become  every  year 
more  closely  tied  with  the  best  tried  principles  of 
progress.  Upon  fairness  her  life  depends,  and  upon 
it  the  natural  growth  of  the  millions  of  the  East 
would  seem  to  rest.  It  appeared,  therefore,  evident 
to  the  Japanese  statesmen  that  in  no  other  manner 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS        307 

than  along  the  course  suggested  by  their  proposi- 
tions to  Kussia  could  the  welfare  of  all  the  inter- 
ested parties  be  assured,  and  the  future  repose  and 
progress  of  the  East  guaranteed.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  nothing  could  be  more  distasteful 
to  the  party  presumably  in  control  of  the  Eastern 
policy  of  Russia  at  the  time  than  the  reciprocal  un- 
derstanding proposed  by  Mr.  Kurino  in  his  note  of 
August  12. 

Before  replying  to  this  note,  Count  Lamsdorff 
suddenly  demanded,  on  August  23,  that  negotia- 
tions should  be  conducted  at  Tokio  instead  of  at  St. 
Petersburg,  as  had  been  desired  by  Japan.1  This 
move  of  Russia  was  closely  parallel  to  the  policy 
she  once  pursued  in  China  regarding  the  lease  of 
Port  Arthur,  when  she  declined  to  negotiate  at  the 
Russian  Capital.2  A  discussion  at  St.  Petersburg 
might  save  it  from  many  of  the  vexatious  delays 
which  would  naturally  attend  its  being  held  at  an 
Eastern  capital,  away  from  the  Foreign  Office  of 
the  Power  whose  interest  counseled  procrastination. 
Of  the  several  reasons  presented  by  Russia  for  her 
proposition,  one  was  that  the  local  knowledge  of 
Viceroy  Alexieff  had  constantly  to  be  consulted. 
Japan  pointed  out  that  the  proposed  Agreement 
concerned  matters  of  principle,  and  not  of  local 
detail.3  Her  repeated  request,  however,  to  negotiate 

1  N.-R.y  No.  7. 

2  The  British  Parliamentary  Papers:  China,  No.  1  (1898) , 
Nos.  100  and  109. 

8  N.-R.,  Nos.  8,  11. 


308  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

at  St.  Petersburg  was  firmly  refused  by  Russia,  as 
was  also  Japan's  suggestion  that  her  note  be  made 
the  basis  of  the  discussion.1  Negotiations  were 
therefore  transferred  to  Tokio,  and  the  Japanese 
note  and  the  Russian  counter-note  —  the  latter  not 
then  received  —  were  together  to  serve  as  the  base 
|  of  the  pourparlers?  This  question,  which  marked 
the  beginning  of  many  long  delays  to  follow,  itself 
consumed  two  weeks  before  any  real  progress  of  the 
negotiations  could  be  made. 

After  a  delay  of  nearly  eight  weeks,  Russia,  on 
October  3,  sent  her  counter-note,  which,  as  will  be 
seen  from  the  following  telegram  of  the  5th,  from 
Baron  Komura  to  Mr.  Kurino,  revealed  the  utter 
irreconcilability  of  the  wishes  of  the  two  Powers  :  — 

"  Baron  Rosen  [Russian  Minister  at  Tokio]  came  back 
from  Port  Arthur  on  the  3d  instant.  He  called  on  me 
the  same  day,  and  handed  me  the  following  as  the  Rus- 
sian counter-proposals,  which,  he  said,  had  been  sanc- 
tioned by  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  upon  the 
joint  representations  of  Admiral  Alexieff  and  himself:  — 

u  I.  *  Mutual  engagement  to  respect  the  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Korean  Empire. 

"  2.  '  Recognition  by  Russia  of  Japan's  preponderating 
interests  in  Korea,  and  of  the  right  of  Japan  to  give  ad- 
vice and  assistance  to  Korea  tending  to  improve  the  civil 
administration  of  the  Empire  without  infringing  the  stip- 
ulations of  Article  1. 

"  3.  *  Engagement  on  the  part  of  Russia  not  to  impede 
the  commercial  and  industrial  undertakings  of  Japan  in 
Korea,  nor  to  oppose  any  measures  taken  for  the  pur- 

1  N.-R.,  Nos.  10,  11.  2  Ibid.,  No.  14,  September  7. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   NEGOTIATIONS         309 

pose  of  protecting  them,  so  long  as  such  measures  do  not 
infringe  the  stipulations  of  Article  1. 

"  4.  *  Recognition  of  the  right  of  Japan  to  send,  for  the 
same  purpose,  troops  to  Korea,  with  the  knowledge  of 
Russia,  but  their  number  not  to  exceed  that  actually  re- 
quired, and  with  the  engagement  on  the  part  of  Japan 
to  recall  such  troops  as  soon  as  their  mission  is  accom- 
plished. 

"5.  'Mutual  engagement  not  to  use  any  part  of  the 
territory  of  Korea  for  strategical  purposes,  nor  to  under- 
take on  the  coasts  of  Korea  any  military  works  capable 
of  menacing  the  freedom  of  navigation  in  the  Straits  of 
Korea. 

"6.  'Mutual  engagement  to  consider  that  part  of  the 
territory  of  Korea  lying  to  the  north  of  the  thirty-ninth 
parallel  as  a  neutral  zone  into  which  neither  of  the  con- 
tracting parties  shall  introduce  troops. 

"  7.  '  Recognition  by  Japan  of  Manchuria  and  its  lit- 
toral as  in  all  respects  outside  her  sphere  of  interest. 

"8.  'This  Agreement  to  supersede  all  previous  agree- 
ments between  Russia  and  Japan  regarding  Korea.'  "  * 

In  comparing  this  counter-note  with  the  original 
note  of  Japan,  it  will  at  once  be  seen  that  Russia 
seriously  reduced  Japan's  demands  concerning  Ko- 
rea by  excluding  her  right  of  rendering  advice  and 
assistance  to  Korea  in  the  latter's  military  affairs, 
and  also  by  quietly  suppressing  the  important 
clause  providing  for  mutual  recognition  of  the 
principle  of  the  equal  economic  opportunity  for  all 
nations  in  Korea.  Moreover,  Russia  imposed  upon 
Japan  the  following  new  conditions  regarding  Ko- 
rea :  not  to  use  any  part  of  the  territory  for  stra- 
1  N.-R..  No.  17. 


310  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

tegical  purposes ;  not  to  fortify  the  southern  coast ; 
and  to  consider  the  territory  north  of  the  thirty- 
ninth  parallel,  covering  nearly  one  third  of  the  area 
of  the  Empire,  as  neutral 1  between  the  two  Powers. 
As  regards  Manchuria,  Russia  silently  discarded  the 
two  fundamental  principles  proposed  by  Japan  and 
often  avowed  by  Russia  herself,  namely,  China's 
sovereignty  over  it  and  the  equal  economic  opportu- 
nity for  all  nations  therein.  On  the  contrary,  Rus- 
sia requested  Japan  to  declare  Manchuria  and  its  lit- 
toral as  outside  of  her  sphere  of  interest.  If  the  Power 
which  exchanged  necessaries  of  life  with  Manchuria 
in  fast  growing  quantities,  controlled  more  than 
ninety  per  cent,  of  the  exports  at  Niu-chwang,  and 
numbered  tens  of  thousands  of  its  subjects  resid- 
ing in  the  Three  Provinces,  should  be  required  by 
Russia  to  declare  itself  uninterested  in  Manchu- 
ria, the  exclusive  designs  of  Russia  upon  the  terri- 
tory would  seem  to  need  no  stronger  proof.  The 
general  tenor  of  the  note  of  October  3  was,  thus, 
to  exclude  Manchuria  from  discussion,  and,  further- 
more, to  restrict  Japan's  influence  in  Korea.    Russia 

1  The  Russian  Government  explained  later,  in  the  note  deliv- 
ered on  January  6,  1904,  that  the  creation  of  a  neutral  zone  was 
"for  the  very  purpose  which  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government 
had  likewise  in  view,  namely,  'to  eliminate  everything  that 
might  lead  to  misunderstandings  in  the  future;'  a  similar  zone, 
for  example,  existed  between  the  Russian  and  British  posses- 
sions in  Central  Asia." — N-R.,  No.  38. 

It  is  easy  to  see,  however,  that  neutralization  is  merely  common 
appropriation  in  a  negative  form,  and  might,  like  cases  of  the 
latter,  as  in  Primorsk  and  Sakhalien,  result  in  absorption  bjlone 
of  the  two  Powers  between  which  the  territory  was  neutralized. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         311 

explained  that  the  question  of  Manchuria  rested 
between  herself  and  China,  and  that  she  had  no  rea- 
son to  make  any  arrangement  about  it  with  a  third 
Power.  To  this,  Japan  replied  that  she  had  asked 
from  Russia  no  concession  of  any  kind  in  Manchuria, 
but  merely  requested  her  to  recognize  anew  the 
principles  which  she  had  voluntarily  and  repeatedly 
professed.  Such  a  recognition,  Japan  contended, 
was  of  vital  interest  to  her,  inasmuch  as  the  Russian 
occupation  of  Manchuria  would  continually  threaten 
the  independence  of  Korea.1  It  was  evident  from 
Russia's  counter-note  that  there  lay  an  impassable 
gulf  between  the  propositions  of  the  two  Powers, 
not  only  in  the  actual  terms  under  discussion,  but 
also  in  the  principles  involved  in  them,  for,  to  all 
appearance,  nothing  could  prove  more  clearly  that 
Russia  was  bent  upon  absorbing  and  closing  up  all 
Manchuria,  as  well  as  marking  out  Northern  Korea 
as  an  eventual  sphere  of  her  influence,  and  that  she 
was  unwilling  to  recognize  the  profound  and  increas- 
ing common  interest  of  Japan  and  Manchuria,  and 
the  vital  importance  to  the  former  of  the  independ- 
ence, strength,  and  development  of  Korea. 

The  date  fixed  in  the  Convention  in  April,  1902, 
for  the  final  evacuation  of  Manchuria  arrived  on 
October  8,  1903  —  five  days  after  the  Russian  V 
counter-note  was  received  by  Japan,  but  the  day 
came  and  passed  with  no  sign  of  the  evacuation. 
On  the  contrary,  the  Russian  Minister  at  Peking 
was  engaged,  regardless  of  the  negotiations  at 
1  N.-R.,  No.  20. 


312  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Tokio  between  his  Government  and  the  Japanese, 
in  urging  Prince  Ching  to  change  the  terms  of 
the  Convention.  Those  who  had  been  impressed 
by  the  manner  and  contents  of  the  Russian  reply 
to  the  Japanese  note  did  not  fail  to  observe  in  M. 
Lessar's  conduct  at  Peking  another  proof  of  the 

'  slight  weight  which  the  Russians  attached  to  the 
overtures  of  Japan  at  least  concerning  Manchuria. 
For,  if  Russia  succeeded  in  securing  China's  consent 
to  her  new  demands  regarding  Manchuria,  which 
in  every  way  transgressed  the  principles  contained 
in  the  Japanese  note,  the  Manchurian  negotiations 
between  Russia  and  Japan  would  become  unneces- 
sary. The  Russian  course  of  action  at  Tokio  and 
Peking  was  thus  consistent  in  ignoring  Japan's 
vital  interests  in  Manchuria,  and,  therefore,  was 
regarded  as  consistently  insulting  to  Japan.  The 
secret  of  the  situation  seemed  to  be,  as  has  been 
already  suggested,  that  the  centre  of  gravity  of 
Russian  diplomacy  in  the  East  had  largely  shifted 

^  from  St.  Petersburg  to  Port  Arthur  —  from  Count 
Lamsdorff  to  the  inflexible  Admiral  Alexieff.  Ever 
since  the  latter  had  convened,  at  Port  Arthur,  early 
in  July,  a  large  council  of  the  diplomatic,  military 
and  naval,  and  financial  agents  of  Russia  in  the 
Eastern  Asiatic  countries,  as  well  as  General  Kuro- 
patkin,  who  was  then  traveling  in  the  Orient,  it 
had  appeared  that  the  Viceroy  of  the  Far  East,1  and 

1  Before  August  13,  when  he  was  appointed  Viceroy  of  the 
Far  East,  Alexieff  was  as  yet  Governor-General  of  the  Kwan- 
tung  region. 


THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         313 

not  the  Foreign  Office  at  the  Russian  Capital,  was 
the  guiding  spirit  of  the  Czar's  policy  in  Korea, 
China,  and  Japan.  Hereafter,  Count  Lamsdorff 
could  perhaps  moderate  the  terms,  and  transmit  to 
Japan  the  revised  contents,  of  the  Viceroy's  uncon- 
ciliatory  views,  but  had  otherwise  lost  the  control 
of  the  situation.  The  reason  why  Alexieff  had 
risen  to  such  a  great  influence  may  not  be  known 
until  the  relations  he  had  with  M.  Bezobrazoff,  the 
late  von  Plehve,  and  other  influential  politicians  at 
St.  Petersburg  of  that  day,  become  more  clearly 
understood  than  they  are  to-day.  As  to  the  proba- 
ble views  of  the  Viceroy  regarding  the  situation 
in  the  East,  it  is  not  hard  to  infer  them  from  the 
diplomatic  history  in  China,  Korea,  and  Japan,  dur- 
ing the  half  year  ending  with  February,  1904. 

Let  us  make  a  brief  review  of  the  diplomatic 
manoeuvres  of  the  Russian  Representative  at  Peking 
regarding  Manchuria,  which  proceeded  much  as  if 
his  Government  were  not  engaged  in  negotiations 
with  Japan  in  respect  to  the  same  territory.  The 
secret  Manchurian  agreement  which  was  reported 
to  have  been  concluded  on  July  20  '  was  probably 
unfounded,  and  its  detail  may  otherwise  be  safely 
left  unnoticed.  The  nature  of  the  Russian  policy 
regarding  Manchuria  could,  however,  be  inferred 
from  the  remarkable  exchange  of  views  which  took 
place  at  London  in  July  between  Lord  Lansdowne 
and  the  Russian  Ambassador,  Count  Benckendorff. 
In  this  interview  on  July  11,  the  latter  said,  in 
1  The  Japanese  dailies. 


314  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

effect :  "  Whatever  may  be  the  result  of  the  nego- 
tiations which  are  pending  between  Russia  and 
China,  .  .  .  the  Imperial  Government  [of  Russia] 
has  no  intention  of  opposing  the  gradual  opening 
of  China,  as  commercial  relations  develop,1  of  some 
towns  in  Manchuria  to  foreign  commerce,  exclud- 
ing, however,  the  right  to  establish  '  Settlements.9 
This  declaration  does  not  apply  to  Harbin.  The 
town  in  question  being  within  the  limits  of  the  con- 
cessions for  the  Eastern  Chinese  Railway,  is  not 
unrestrictedly  subject  to  the  Chinese  Government ;l 
the  establishment  there  of  foreign  consulates  must 
therefore  depend  upon  the  consent  of  the  Russian 
Government." 2  The  three  conditions  here  printed 
in  italics  would  seem  not  only  contradictory  to  the 
declaration  made  by  Count  Lamsdorff  to  Mr.  Mac- 
Cormick  on  April  28,3  but  also  almost  tantamount 
to  opposing  the  opening  of  any  new  treaty  port  in 
Manchuria.  For  it  was  well  understood  that  the 
desire  on  the  part  of  some  Powers  for  the  speedy 
opening  of  some  new  ports  in  Manchuria  was  largely 
calculated  to  prevent  the  aggressive  and  exclusive 
proceedings  of  Russia  in  that  territory.  If,  as  Count 
Benckendorff  suggested,  the  development  of  trade 
relations  was  the  sole  reason  for  "  gradually  "  open- 
ing some  towns,  if  foreign  settlements  should  be 
excluded  from  the  new  ports,  and  if  Harbin,  and 
logically  all  the  towns  situated  at  the  "  depots  "  of 

1  The  italics  in  the  quotation  are  the  author's. 

2  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  133  (Lansdowne  to  Scott). 
8  See  pp.  246-248,  above. 


THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         315 

the  railway,  could  not  be  opened  without  Russian 
consent,  Manchuria,  excepting  the  regions  touch- 
ing the  few  towns  which  had  already  been  opened, 
would  remain  open  to  the  growing  influence  of 
Russia,  but  practically  sealed  to  the  rest  of  the 
world.1  This  inference  was  presently  demonstrated 
by  the  new  demands  made  at  the  Peking  Foreign 
Office  by  M.  Lessar  on  September  6.  These  de- 
mands, presented,  as  they  were,  in  the  midst  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  negotiations  at  Tokio  and  on  the 
eve  of  the  close  of  the  period  of  Manchurian  evacu- 

1  It  is  highly  interesting  that  at  this  moment,  when  the  Rus- 
sian Government  was,  on  the  one  hand,  negotiating  with  Japan, 
and,  on  the  other,  proposing  new  demands  upon  China,  the  Rus- 
sian Ambassador  at  London  intimated  the  desire  of  his  Govern- 
ment to  come  to  an  agreement  with  Great  Britain  regarding  their 
interest  in  China.  It  appears  that  Russia  wished  Great  Britain 
to  declare  Manchuria  as  outside  of  her  sphere  of  interest,  in 
return  for  a  similar  declaration  by  Russia  regarding  the  Yang- 
tsze  valley.  Lord  Lansdowne's  reply  was  characteristic.  "I 
repeated,"  he  wrote  to  Sir  C.  Scott,  "  that  we  should  be  glad  to 
arrive  at  one  [i.  e.,  an  agreement  with  Russia],  but  that  it  must,  of 
course,  include  the  Manchurian  question.  We  could,  however, 
of  course  not  come  to  terms  unless  we  were  fully  informed  as  to 
the  intentions  of  the  Russian  Government  [in  Manchuria].  Count 
Benckendorff  again  asked  me  whether,  if  we  were  satisfied  upon 
this  point,  we  should  be  likely  to  assist  in  bringing  about  an 
arrangement  between  the  Russian  and  Chinese  Governments.  I 
said  that  we  should  certainly  make  no  secret  of  our  concurrence, 
if  we  were  thoroughly  satisfied.  Meanwhile,  however,  I  was 
afraid  that  our  attitude  must  remain  observant  and  critical." 
—  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  142  (August  12).  Cf.  No.  139. 

The  Russian  Government  could  not  have  forgotten  that  Great 
Britain  had  agreed  with  Japan,  on  January  30, 1902,  that  nei- 
ther of  the  two  Powers  should  come  to  a  separate  understand- 
ing with  another  Power  regarding  China  or  Korea  without  a  full 
and  frank  discussion  between  themselves. 


316  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

ation,  deserve  a  special  notice.  Briefly  stated,  M. 
Lessar  requested  :  (1)  that  China  should  not  alienate, 
in  any  manner,  any  port,  of  whatever  size,  of  Man- 
churia to  any  other  Power ;  (2)  that  Russia  should 
be  allowed  to  construct  wharves  on  the  Sungari 
River,  to  connect  them  by  telegraph,  and  to  station 
Russian  troops  to  protect  the  telegraph  lines  and 
the  ships  plying  the  river ;  (3)  that  Russia  should 
be  allowed  to  establish  post  stations  along  the  road 
from  Tsitishar  to  Blagovestchensk ;  (4)  that  no 
greater  duties  should  be  imposed  on  goods  brought 
into  Manchuria  by  rail  than  those  now  imposed  on 
goods  transported  by  road  or  river ;  (5)  that  after 
the  withdrawal  of  the  Russian  troops,  the  branches 
of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  should  be  protected  by 
Chinese  troops,  but  at  the  cost  of  the  Bank ;  and 
(6)  that  a  Russian  doctor  should  be  appointed  mem- 
ber of  the  Sanitary  Board  at  Niu-chwang.  On  these 
conditions,  the  Russian  forces  would  evacuate  Niu- 
chwang  and  the  rest  of  the  Sheng-king  Province  on 
October  8,  the  Kirin  Province  after  four  months, 
and  the  Hei-lung  Province  at  the  end  of  one  year.1 
Of  these,  the  first  demand  was  interpreted  to  imply 
the  prevention  of  the  establishment  of  new  foreign 
settlements  and  concessions  in  any  part  of  Manchu- 
ria. As  to  the  meaning  of  stationing  troops  along 
the  Sungari  and  building  a  post  road  from  Tsitsihar 
to  Blagovestchensk,  it  is  instructive  to  observe  that 
Prince  Ching  opined  that,  if  China  conceded  these 
demands  and  Russia  then  nominally  withdrew,  the 
1  China,  No.  2  (190Q,  Nos.  147,  148,  149,  156. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS        317 

latter  would  still  be  in  virtual  possession  of  the 
territory.1  The  British  and  Japanese  Ministers  at 
Peking  naturally  warned  China  not  to  accept  the 
Russian  propositions.2  The  Foreign  Office,  after 
some  hesitation,3  finally  refused  all  of  the  demands 
in  a  written  note,  on  September  24.4  This  refusal, 
however,  by  no  means  terminated  the  Manchurian 
negotiations  at  Peking.  As  the  Chinese  Government 
showed  inclinations,  vacillating  as  they  were,  to 
sympathize  with  Japan  in  her  efforts  to  maintain 
the  sovereign  rights  of  China  in  Manchuria,  M. 
Lessar  is  said  to  have  resorted  to  occasional  threats 
that,  if  a  war  should  occur  between  Russia  and 
Japan  and  the  latter  be  defeated,  China  would  re- 
pent her  sorry  plight  only  too  late,  for  then  Man- 
churia would  not  be  hers.  Particularly  vigorous 
was  his  obstruction  of  the  effort  of  the  United 
States  Commissioners  at  Shanghai  to  secure  the 
opening  of  new  ports  in  Manchuria  to  foreign 
trade.5  In  spite  of  all  this,  however,  on  October  8 
—  the  very  day  once  fixed  for  the  final  evacuation 
of  Manchuria  —  the  American-Chinese  treaty  was 
signed,  opening  Mukden  and  An-tung  as  treaty 
ports.  The  next  day  saw  the  conclusion  of  the 
Japanese-Chinese  treaty,  bearing  the  date  of  Octo- 
ber 8,  which   also  provided   for  the  opening  of 


1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  150. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  149,  151,  153,  160. 
8  Ibid.,  Nos.  147  and  156. 

4  Ibid.,  Nos.  150  and  160. 
6  See  pp.  252  ff.,  above. 


318  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Mukden  and  Tatung-kao.  It  was  perhaps  nothing 
more  than  a  singular  coincidence  of  circumstances 
that  Mukden  should  be,  as  it  was,  occupied  by  Rus- 
sian  soldiers  shortly  after  its  opening  had  been  se- 
cured by  the  United  States  and  Japan.  Early  in  the 
morning  of  October  28,  780  Russian  soldiers  with 
eight  cannon  suddenly,  without  warning,  rushed 
through  the  city  gate  and  took  possession  of  the 
Yamen  of  the  Tartar  General,  Tseng-chi,  holding 
him  in  custody  and  reducing  the  military  forces 
under  his  control.1  A  generally  accepted  ground  for 
this  precipitous  act  was  naught  more  than  that  a 
subordinate  Taotai  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Tartar  General  had  undertaken  to  punish  some 
recalcitrant  bandits  who  had  been  under  Russian 
employ.  The  Journal  de  Saint  Petersbourg  ex- 
plained, however,  that  the  seizure  of  Mukden  was 
owing  "  to  the  apathy  of  the  Chinese  authorities, 
to  the  non-execution  of  the  promises  made  on  their 
part,  and  to  the  agitation  which  prevailed  in  the  dis- 
trict." '  Mukden  being  the  sepulchral  city  of  the 
reigning  dynasty  of  China,  its  sudden  occupation 
by  the  Russians  appeared  to  have  aroused  a  bitter 
resentment  among  the  educated  classes  throughout 
the  Empire. 

Turning  to  the  Korean  frontier,  the  conduct  of 
the  Russians  at  Yong-am-po 2  on  the  left  side  of  the 
Yalu,  near  its  mouth,  had  now  assumed  an  unmistak- 
ably political  character.  Early  in  July  a  telegraphic 
connection  had  been  made  without  permission  with 

1  China,  No.  2  (1904),  No.  159.     2  See  pp.  289  ff.,  above. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS        319 

An-tung,  a  strategic  centre  in  Eastern  Manchuria. 
At  the  instance  of  the  Japanese  Minister,  the 
Korean  Government  succeeded  in  enforcing  the  re- 
moval of  the'  line.1  Late  in  the  same  month,  the 
Commissioner  of  Forestry  of  Korea  and  Baron 
Gunzburg  visited  Yong-am-po,  and  drafted  an  agree- 
ment leasing  the  port  to  the  Timber  Company, 
nominally  represented  by  the  Baron.  The  contract 
bore  neither  a  definite  period  of  time  for  the  lease 
nor  fixed  area  of  the  leased  territory,  in  the  Korean 
text  of  the  agreement,  but,  according  to  the  Rus- 
sian document,  the  lease  is  said  to  have  extended 
over  twenty  years  and  covered  a  space  equivalent 
to  204  acres.  The  company  also  was  granted,  in 
the  Korean  text,  judiciary  rights  over  the  residents 
within  the  leased  area.2  At  the  same  time,  exten- 
sive works  had  been  started  by  the  Russians  at 
Yong-am-po,  including  the  erection  of  large  brick 
buildings  and  the  laying  out  of  roads,  streets,  and 
light  railways,  to  be  later  increased  by  what  was 
conceded  to  be  a  fort ;  while,  beyond  the  river,  the 
military  forces  at  An-tung  and  other  centres  had 
been  in  the  process  of  augmentation.3  The  situa- 
tion had  now  become  so  grave  that  Mr.  Hayashi, 
Japanese  Minister  at  Seul,  was  obliged  to  enter 
sharp  protests  at  the  Korean  Foreign  Office  against 
the  conclusion  of  the  lease  agreement,4  and  to  urge 


1  The  Kokumin,  Seul  telegrams,  July  6,  10,  17  (1903). 

2  Ibid.,  July  23,  27;  August  2,  8,  18. 
8  Ibid.,  July  27,  etc. 

4  Ibid.,  August  12,  14,  23  (cf.  July  17,  etc.). 


320  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

again  the  opening  of  Wiju,  and  now  also  of  Yong- 
am-po,  to  foreign  trade.  Both  the  British  and 
American  Eepresentatives  also  pressed  the  Seul 
Government  to  open  these  ports.1  The  Russian 
Minister,  M.  Pavloff,  however,  was  as  strenuously 
opposed  to  the  opening  of  these  ports  as  Mr. 
Hayashi  was  to  the  conclusion  of  the  lease  agree- 
ment. The  conditions  were  almost  identical  with 
those  in  1898  under  which  Great  Britain  urged 
the  opening  of  Talien-wan,  so  as  to  counteract  the 
Russian  aggression  upon  it  and  Port  Arthur,  and 
also  with  those  in  Manchuria,  in  this  same  year, 
where  the  American  and  Japanese  Governments  de- 
manded the  opening  of  new  ports  in  order  to  pre- 
vent the  exclusion  of  foreign  trade  and  industry 
from  Manchuria  under  Russian  rule.  The  struggle 
between  the  open  and  the  exclusive  policy,  how- 
ever, continued  much  longer  in  Korea  than  in 
China,  owing  largely  to  the  extremely  unstable 
political  conditions  at  Seul,  which  enabled  the 
Russian  diplomats  oftener  and  longer  to  influ- 
ence the  Korean  court.2  As  regards  the  lease  of 
Yong-am-po,  the  Korean  Government  was  now  so 
alive  to  the  serious  nature  of  the  agreement  that 


1  The  Kokumin,  August  10,  September  2,  etc. 

2  The  opening  of  Wiju  was  once  granted  by  the  Foreign 
Office,  but  the  Emperor  refused  to  sanction  it.  —  Ibid.,  No- 
vember 21.  This  is  another  illustration  of  the  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances at  Seul,  that  there  exist  two  political  centres,  the 
Government  and  the  Court.  (The  opening  of  neither  Wiju  nor 
Yong-am-po  had  been  effected  before  the  outbreak  of  the  pre- 
sent war.) 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         321 

it  proposed  to  modify  its  terms  late  in  August.1 
M.  Pavloff,  however,  persistently  urged  the  Korean 
Government  to  ratify  the  original  agreement.  On 
August  27,  for  instance,  he  and  Baron  Gunzburg 
remained  at  the  Foreign  Office  from  one  to  six 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  requesting  the  immediate 
conclusion  of  the  contract,  until  the  Foreign  Min- 
ister escaped  out  of  the  door  and  tendered  his 
resignation.2  At  the  same  time,  the  conduct  of  the 
Russians  on  the  frontier  grew  even  more  menacing 
than  before.  The  cutting  of  timber  was  started  at 
different  points,  where  many  Koreans  were  forced 
into  unpaid  service,  and  the  bandits  in  Russian 
employ  created  disorder  among  peaceful  citizens.3 
Moreover,  according  to  the  reports  of  Korean  offi- 
cials, the  Russians  had  occupied  at  Yong-am-po  — 
now  named  Nicolas  —  a  ground  far  more  extensive 
than  the  lease-area  stipulated  in  the  yet  unratified 
agreement.4  All  this  while,  the  Russians  at  the 
Capital  exercised  a  powerful  influence  over  both  Yi 
Keun-thaik  and  Yi  Yong-ik,  two  of  the  most  noted 
politicians  at  Seul,  and  over  the  strong  party  up- 
holding the  interests  of  Lady  Om.5   It  was  through 


1  The  Kokumin,  August  29. 

2  Ibid.,  August  27,  29. 


8  Ibid.,  September  29. 

4  About  2f  by  5f  miles.  — Ibid.,  November  1.  Late  in  Decem- 
ber, a  report  reached  the  Korean  Government  from  the  frontier 
that  the  Russians  had  forbidden  all  but  their  countrymen  to 
enter  into  the  Russian  territory  at  Yong-am-po.  —  Ibid.,  De- 
cember 23. 

8  Many  stories  have  been  told  of  M.  Pavloff's  influence  over 


322  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

these  pro-Russian  people  that  the  unique  idea  of 
declaring  the  neutrality  of  Korea  before  the  out- 
break of  any  war  —  an  idea  which  had  more  than 
once  been  unsuccessfully  proposed1  —  was  again 
brought  forward,  and  finally,  early  in  1904,  carried 
into  effect  in  an  awkward  manner.2 

Russian  activity  in  Korea  and  Manchuria,  which 
has  been  briefly  described,  may  be  said  to  constitute 

the  venal  politicians  of  Seul.  Of  these,  two  are  given  below, 
which  are  not  verifiable,  but  certainly  interesting. 

Yi  Keun-thaik  is  said  to  have  told  the  Emperor,  late  in  Decem- 
ber, 1903,  that  the  following  assurance  had  been  given  by  the 
Russian  Representative :  if  the  Korean  refusal  to  open  Wiju  and 
Yong-am-po  to  foreign  trade  should  result  in  the  mobilization 
of  Japanese  forces,  Russia  would  also  dispatch  troops  against 
them;  in  1894,  Korea  erred  when  she  relied  on  China,  but  Rus- 
sia was  not  a  China,  and  might  implicitly  be  relied  upon.  — 
The  Kokumin,  telegram,  December  25. 

One  day,  it  is  said,  M.  Pavloff  remarked  in  the  presence  of  the 
Korean  Emperor  and  his  attendants:  "The  Koreans  often  rely 
upon  Japan,  or  else  are  afraid  of  her,  but  where  in  the  world  is 
Japan  ?"  Then  he  scanned  a  map  through  a  pocket  magnifier, 
and  said :  "  Oh,  I  find  a  tiny  country  called  Japan  in  a  corner  of 
the  Pacific  Ocean.  My  Russian  Empire  is  the  greatest  country 
on  the  globe,  spreading  over  two  continents.  If  Korea  relies  upon 
our  Empire,  she  will  be  as  safe  as  in  navigating  a  sea  in  a  colossal 
vessel.  Should  Japan  object  to  it,  our  Russia  would  only  have  to 
do  thus."  Here,  placing  a  few  matches  on  his  palm,  he  blew 
them  off.  —  The  Kyoiku  Jiron. 

1  In  the  latter  half  of  1900,  for  example. 

2  Korean  neutrality  is  said  to  have  been  telegraphed  to  the 
Korean  Representatives  abroad  through  the  French  channel.  It 
was  not  until  some  time  after  the  other  Powers  had  received  the 
declaration  that  it  reached  Japan.  Russia,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, told  the  world  that  Japan  infringed  the  neutrality  of 
Korea  when  the  former's  warships  had  an  encounter  with  the 
"  Variag"  and  "  Koietz  "  at  Chemulpo.  See  pp.  355  ff.,  below. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         323 

the  reverse  side  of  the  diplomacy  of  the  Czar's 
Government  at  Tokio.  The  actual  control  of  the 
Eastern  situation  having  probably  passed  from  the 
central  power  to  Port  Arthur,  it  was  now  founded, 
perhaps  not  upon  greater  practical  wisdom  than 
before,  but  apparently  upon  a  uniform  basis.  For 
the  conclusion  is  forced  upon  the  student  that 
Viceroy  Alexieff's  policy  must  have  been,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  deal  with  Japan's  overtures  lightly  and 
leisurely,  but,  on  the  other,  to  hasten  the  establish- 
ment of  Russian  control  in  Manchuria  and  upon 
the  Korean  frontier,  so  that  Japan  might  in  time 
be  compelled  to  bow  to  the  situation  and  accept 
terms  dictated  by  Russia.  The  proof  of  this  policy 
had  already  seemed  abundantly  sufficient  by  the 
time  when  the  Russian  counter-note  reached  Baron 
Komura  on  October  3.  It  is  impossible  to  tell 
whether,  in  framing  such  a  policy,  the  Viceroy  had 
taken  into  consideration  the  fact  that  the  entire 
nation  of  Japan  felt  as  one  man  that  they  had  come 
to  the  greatest  crisis  known  in  their  long  history. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS,  II 

The  Russian  counter-note  having  been  received  on 
October  3,  Baron  Komura  began  to  confer  with 
Baron  Rosen  upon  the  basis  of  both  the  Japanese 
note  and  the  Russian  reply.1  Meanwhile,  the  Japan- 
ese statesmen  again  held  deliberations  on  the  10th 
and  24th  of  October,2  and  agreed  upon  the  "  irre- 
ducible minimum/'  which  was  accordingly  commu- 
nicated to  the  Russian  Minister  on  the  30th  in  the 
form  of  the  following  note  :  — 

"1.  Mutual  engagement  to  respect  the  independence 
and  territorial  integrity  of  the  Chinese  and  Korean  Em- 
pires. 

"2.  Recognition  by  Russia  of  Japan's  preponderating 
interests  in  Korea,  and  of  the  right  of  Japan  to  give  to 
Korea  advice  and  assistance,  including  military  assistance, 
tending  to  improve  the  administration  of  the  Korean 
Empire. 

"  3.  Engagement  on  the  part  of  Russia  not  to  impede 
the  development  of  the  commercial  and  industrial  ac- 
tivities of  Japan  in  Korea,  nor  to  oppose  any  measures 
taken  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  those  interests. 

"  4.  Recognition  by  Russia  of  the  right  of  Japan  to 
send  troops  to  Korea  for  the  purpose  mentioned  in  the 
preceding  Article,  or  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing  in- 

1  N.-R.,  Nos.  18,  19,  20,  21.  2  The  Japanese  dailies. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         325 

surrection  or  disorder  calculated  to  create  international 
complications. 

"5.  Engagement  on  the  part  of  Japan  not  to  under- 
take on  the  coasts  of  Korea  any  military  works  capable 
of  menacing  the  freedom  of  navigation  in  the  Korean 
Straits. 

"6.  Mutual  engagement  to  establish  a  neutral  zone 
on  the  Korean-Manchurian  frontier  extending  fifty  kilo- 
metres on  each  side,  into  which  zone  neither  of  the  con- 
tracting parties  shall  introduce  troops  without  the  con- 
sent of  the  other. 

"7.  Recognition  by  Japan  that  Manchuria  is  outside 
her  sphere  of  special  interest,  and  recognition  by  Russia 
that  Korea  is  outside  her  sphere  of  special  interest. 

"8.  Recognition  by  Japan  of  Russia's  special  inter- 
ests in  Manchuria,  and  of  the  right  of  Russia  to  take  such 
measures  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  protection  of  those 
interests. 

"9.  Engagement  on  the  part  of  Japan  not  to  inter- 
fere with  the  commercial  and  residential  rights  and  im- 
munities belonging  to  Russia  in  virtue  of  her  treaty  en- 
gagements with  Korea,  and  engagement  on  the  part  of 
Russia  not  to  interfere  with  the  commercial  and  residen- 
tial rights  and  immunities  belonging  to  Japan  in  virtue 
of  her  treaty  engagements  with  China. 

"  10.  Mutual  engagement  not  to  impede  the  connec- 
tion of  the  Korean  Railway  and  the  Eastern  Chinese 
Railway  when  those  railways  shall  have  been  eventually 
extended  to  the  Yalu. 

"11.  This  Agreement  to  supplant  all  previous  Agree- 
ments between  Japan  and  Russia  respecting  Korea."  * 

It  will  be  seen  from  this  note  that  Japan  made 
several  important  concessions.    These  naturally  fall 
1  N.-R.,  No.  22. 


326  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

under  three  classes :  concessions  made  to  an  ex- 
pressed wish  of  Russia ;  those  in  which  desires  of 
Russia  were  changed  from  a  one-sided  into  a  recip- 
rocal form ;  and  those  made  voluntarily  on  the 
part  of  Japan.  To  the  first  class  belongs  the  free 
passage  of  the  Korean  Straits  (Article  5),  while  the 
neutralization  of  territory  on  both  sides  of  the 
northern  frontier  (Article  6),  and  the  mutual  decla- 
ration that  Korea  was  beyond  the  sphere  of  the 
"  special  "  interests  of  Russia,  and  Manchuria  of  Ja- 
pan (Article  7),  may  be  said  to  fall  under  the  second 
class.  Purely  voluntary  concessions  may  be  said  to 
consist  of  the  tenth  Article  regarding  the  Eastern 
Chinese  and  Korean  Railways  meeting  on  the  Yalu, 
and  a  part  of  the  eighth  Article,  in  which  the 
"  special "  interests  —  not  necessarily  in  the  railway 
work  alone,  as  in  the  first  Japanese  note  —  of  Rus- 
sia in  Manchuria  were  unequivocally  recognized. 
Other  Articles  are  largely  identical  with  those  of  the 
first  note,  except  the  new  ninth  Article,  which  em- 
bodied the  matter-of-fact  principle  that  the  treaty 
rights  of  Russia  in  Korea,  and  of  Japan  in  Man- 
churia, should  be  mutually  respected.  Taken  as  a 
whole  —  with  the  only  exception  regarding  the  pre- 
ponderating interests  of  Japan  in  Korea,  and  the 
natural  wishes  of  Japan  arising  from  this  peculiar 
situation,  the  former  of  which  had  been  wholly,1 
and  the  latter  partially,2  recognized  by  Russia  — 

1  In  Article  3  of  the  Nishi-Rosen  Procotol  of  1898,  and  in 
Article  2  of  the  Russian  counter-note  of  October  3. 

2  See  the  same  Article  of  the  counter-note. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   NEGOTIATIONS         327 

the  prevailing  characteristic  of  the  second  Japanese 
note  may  be  said  to  be  its  reciprocal  nature.  The 
special  interests  of  Russia 1  in  Manchuria  counter- 
balanced the  preponderant  interests  of  Japan  in 
Korea,2  and  each  other's  right  to  take  necessary 
measures  to  protect  those  interests  was  recognized.3 
At  the  same  time,  Manchuria  was  declared  as  far 
beyond  the  sphere  of  Japanese  special  interests  as 
was  Korea  of  the  Russian,4  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  treaty  rights  of  Russia  in  Korea,  and 
of  Japan  in  Manchuria,  were  to  be  respected  as  a 
matter  of  course.5  If  Russia  was  requested  not  to 
impede  the  economic  activity  of  the  Japanese  in 
Korea,6  Japan  also  agreed  not  to  fortify  the  Korean 
coast.7  The  case  of  the  neutral  zone8  need  not 
be  repeated.  In  spite,  however,  of  the  reciprocal 
nature  of  the  note,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say,  so 
long  as  the  control  of  the  Eastern  policy  of  Russia 
remained  in  the  same  hands  as  before,  she  could 
hardly  be  expected  to  acquiesce  in  the  Japanese 
proposals.9 

1  Article  8.  2  Article  2.  8  Articles  4  and  8. 

4  Article  7.  5  Article  9. 

6  Article  3,  made  necessary  from  the  past  experience  in  Korea. 

Article  5.  8  Article  6. 

■ 

Observe  the  following  passage  from  the  explanatory  note 
issued  by  the  Foreign  Office  at  St.  Petersburg  on  February  9, 
1904:  — 

"Last  year,  the  Tokio  Cabinet,  under  the  pretext  of  establish- 
ing the  balance  of  power  and  a  more  settled  order  of  things  on 
the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  submitted  to  the  Imperial  Government 
a  proposal  for  a  revision  of  the  existing  treaties  with  Korea.  Rus- 
sia consented,  and  Viceroy  Alexieff  was  charged  to  draw  up  a 


328  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

As  has  been  said,  the  second  note  was  handed 
by  Baron  Komura  to  Baron  Rosen  on  October  30. 
To  this  note,  after  a  repeated  application  from 
Japan  for  a  speedy  answer,1  Russia  replied  only  on 
December  11,  or  more  than  forty  days  after  the 
receipt  of  the  Japanese  note.  This  second  reply  of 
Russia 2  was  as  much  a  reduction  of  her  former  con- 
project  for  a  new  understanding  with  Japan  in  cooperation  with 
the  Russian  Minister  at  Tokio,  who  was  intrusted  with  the  nego- 
tiations with  the  Japanese  Government.  Although  the  exchange 
of  views  with  the  Tokio  Cabinet  on  this  subject  was  of  a  friendly 
character,  Japanese  social  circles  and  the  local  and  foreign  press 
attempted  in  every  way  to  produce  a  warlike  ferment  among  the 
Japanese,  and  to  drive  the  Government  into  an  armed  conflict 
with  Russia.  Under  the  influence  thereof,  the  Tokio  Cabinet 
began  to  formulate  greater  and  greater  demands  in  the  negotiations, 
at  the  same  time  taking  most  extensive  measures  to  make  the 
country  ready  for  war."  (The  italics  are  the  author's.) 

1  N.-R.,  Nos.  26,  27,  28,  29,  30,  32,  33. 
The  second  reply  was  as  follows :  — 

**  1.  Mutual  engagement  to  respect  the  independence  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  the  Korean  Empire. 

"2.  Recognition  by  Russia  of  Japan's  preponderating  interest 
in  Korea,  and  of  the  right  of  Japan  to  assist  Korea  with  advice 
tending  to  improve  her  civil  administration. 

"3.  Engagement  on  the  part  of  Russia  not  to  oppose  the  de- 
velopment of  the  industrial  and  commercial  activities  of  Japan 
in  Korea,  nor  the  adoption  of  measures  for  the  protection  of 
those  interests. 

"4.  Recognition  by  Russia  of  the  right  of  Japan  to  send 
troops  to  Korea  for  the  purpose  mentioned  in  the  preceding 
Article,  or  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing  insurrections  or  dis- 
orders liable  to  create  international  complications. 

"5.  Mutual  engagement  not  to  make  use  of  any  part  of  the 
Korean  territory  for  strategical  purposes,  and  not  to  undertake 
on  the  Korean  coast  any  military  works  capable  of  menacing  the 
freedom  of  navigation  in  the  Korean  Straits. 

"6.  Mutual  engagement  to  consider  the  territory  of  Korea  to 


v. 

THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         329  ~ 

cessions  as  was  the  second  note  of  Japan  an  increase 
upon  hers ;  for  Russia  was  now  entirely  silent  on 
the  subject  of  Manchuria,  and,  regarding  Korea, 
repeated  the  restrictions  proposed  in  September,  as 
if  the  second  Japanese  note  had  never  reached  her, 
besides  refusing  to  recognize  Japan's  right  to  give 
Korea  anything  beyond  mere  advice  for  the  reform 
of  her  civil  administration.  In  short,  the  second 
counter-note  was  equivalent  to  the  first  minus  the 
clauses  regarding  Manchuria  and  Japan's  right  to 
assist  Korea  in  the  latter's  reform.  The  possibility 
of  a  reconciliation  of  the  views  of  the  two  Powers 
now  appeared  remoter  than  before.  If  the  exact 
contents  of  the  reply  had  been  publicly  shown  to 
the  Japanese  people,  it  would  have  been  extremely 
difficult  for  the  Katsura  Cabinet  to  control  their 
resentment  against  what  would  have  been  regarded 
under  the  circumstances  as  a  deliberate  insult  to 
their  country. 

After  another  meeting  of  the  Cabinet  members 
and  Councilors  on  the  16th,  Baron  Komura  made 
one  more  attempt  to  appeal  to  the  friendly  sentiment 
of  the  Russian  Government.  The  nature  of  the 
third  Japanese  overture  will  be  seen  from  the  fol- 

the  north  of  the  thirty-ninth  parallel  as  a  neutral  zone,  within 
the  limits  of  which  neither  of  the  contracting  parties  shall  intro- 
duce troops. 

"7.  Mutual  engagement  not  to  impede  the  connection  of  the 
Korean  and  Eastern  Chinese  Railways,  when  those  railways 
shall  have  been  extended  to  the  Yalu. 

"8.  Abrogation  of  all  previous  agreements  between  Russia 
and  Japan  respecting  Korea."  —  N.-R.,  No.  34. 


330  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

lowing  dispatch,  telegraphed  by  the   Baron  to  Mr. 
Kurino  on  the  21st :  — 

"  In  my  interview  with  the  Russian  Minister  on  De- 
cember 21,  I  pointed  out  that,  between  our  original  pro- 
posals and  the  new  Russian  counter-proposals,  there  was 
a  fundamental  difference  concerning  the  geographical 
sphere  of  the  understanding.  After  fully  explaining  how 
the  Imperial  Government  had  come  to  consider  it  desir- 
able, in  the  general  interest,  to  include  in  the  proposed 
understanding  all  the  regions  in  the  Extreme  East  where 
the  interests  of  the  two  Empires  met,  I  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  Russian  Government  would  reconsider 
their  position  regarding  that  branch  of  the  question.  I 
also  informed  him,  in  detail,  of  the  amendments  which 
the  Imperial  Government  considered  it  necessary  to 
introduce  into  Russia's  new  counter-proposals.  Accord- 
ingly, in  order  to  remove  every  possibility  of  misunder- 
standing on  the  part  of  Russia  respecting  the  attitude 
of  the  Imperial  Government,  you  are  instructed  to 
deliver  to  Count  Lamsdorff  a  note  verbale  to  the  following 
effect : — 

"'The  Imperial  Government  have  examined  with 
great  care  the  new  Russian  counter-proposals  of  the  11th 
instant.  They  regret  that  the  Russian  Government  did 
not  agree  to  extend  the  compass  of  the  suggested  under- 
standing over  the  territory  whose  inclusion  was  deemed 
essential  by  Japan. 

"'The  Imperial  Government,  in  their  original  pro- 
position to  the  Russian  Government  in  August  last,  en- 
deavored to  make  it  entirely  clear  that  they  desired,  with 
a  view  to  remove  from  the  Japanese-Russian  relations 
every  cause  for  future  misunderstanding,  to  bring  within 
the  purview  of  the  proposed  arrangement  all  those  re- 
gions in  the  Extreme  East  where  the  interests  of  the  two 


MR.    KURINO 
Late  Japanese  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         331 

Empires  met.  They  cannot  believe  that  a  full  realization 
of  that  desire  could  be  expected  if  a  large  and  important 
section  of  those  regions  was  wholly  excluded  from  the 
understanding.  Accordingly,  the  Imperial  Government 
feel  constrained  to  ask  the  Russian  Government  to  re- 
consider their  position  on  the  subject,  and  they  hope  that 
the  Russian  Government  will  be  able  to  see  their  way 
to  arrive  at  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  question. 

" '  The  Imperial  Government  also  find  it  necessary  to 
ask  for  the  following  amendments  to  the  new  Russian 
counter-proposals :  — 

" '  a.  Article  II.  to  read :  Recognition  by  Russia  of 
Japan's  preponderating  interests  in  Korea,  and  of  the 
right  of  Japan  to  give  Korea  advice  and  assistance  tend- 
ing to  improve  the  administration  of  the  Korean  Empire ; 

" '  b.  Article  V.  to  read :  Mutual  engagement  not  to 
undertake  on  the  Korean  coast  any  military  works  capa- 
ble of  menacing  the  freedom  of  navigation  in  the  Korean 
Straits;  and 

'' '  c.   Article  VI.  to  be  suppressed. 

"'Not  only  as  the  main  points  of  these  amendments 
cannot  be  said  to  be  in  excess  of  the  modifications  which 
were  agreed  to  ad  referendum  at  Tokio,  but  also  as  the 
Imperial  Government  considered  those  changes  indis- 
pensable, it  is  believed  that  they  will  receive  the  ready 
agreement  of  the  Russian  Government.' 

"  In  presenting  the  foregoing  note  to  Count  Lamsdorff , 
you  will  say  that  I  have  spoken  to  Minister  Rosen  in  a 
similar  sense,  and  you  will  also  express  the  desire  for  a 
prompt  reply."  * 

Mr.  Kurino  carried  out  his  instructions  on  De- 
cember 23,   and  telegraphed  on  the  same  day  to 
Baron   Komura :  "  .  .  .    He    [Count   Lamsdorff] 
1  N.-R.,  No.  35. 


332  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

told  me  he  had  received  a  telegram  from  Minister 
Rosen,  stating  that  the  latter  had  had  an  interview 
with  Baron  Komura,  and  that  particulars  would 
follow ;  but  such  particulars  had  not  yet  been 
received  by  him  [the  Count.]  *  When  I  handed 
him  the  note  verbale,  he  received  it,  and  said  that 
he  would  do  his  best  to  send  the  Russian  answer 
at  the  earliest  possible  date ;  but  added  that  he 
would  have  to  communicate  with  Viceroy  Alexieff. 
In  conclusion  I  stated  to  the  Count  that,  under 
existing  circumstances,  it  might  cause  serious  diffi- 
culties, even  complications,  if  we  failed  to  come  to 
an  entente,  and  I  hoped  he  would  exercise  his  best 
influence  so  as  to  enable  us  to  reach  the  desired 
end."  2 

When  Minister  Kurino  saw  Count  Lamsdorff  on 
January  1, 1904,  the  latter,  as  he  had  been  persist- 
ently doing  during  the  past  few  days,  remarked 
that  he  saw  no  reason  why  an  entente  could  not 
be  arrived  at,  for  Minister  Rosen  would  soon  be 
instructed  to  proceed  with  the  negotiations  in  a 
friendly  and  conciliatory  spirit.3  Other  statements 
of  the  same  pacific  nature  were  frequently  made,  not 
only  by  the  Count,  but  also  by  the  Czar,  and  were 
circulated  through  the  press  and  foreign  telegra- 
phic service.    When,  however,  the  reply  of  Russia4 

1  Is  it  probable  that  Baron  Rosen  consulted  Viceroy  Alexieff 
by  telegraph  before  he  did  Count  Lamsdorff? 

2  N.-R.,  No.  36. 
8  Ibid.,  No.  38. 

4  The  Russian  counter-note  was  as  follows :  — 

"Having  no  objection  to  the  amendments  to  Article  2  of  the 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         333 

reached  Tokio  on  January  6,  it  was  found  that  here 
again,  as  in  the  first  reply  of  September  last,  the 
recognition  by  Japan  of  Manchuria  and  its  coast 
as  beyond  her  sphere  of  interest  —  the  word  "  spe- 
cial "  not  preceding  the  last  word  —  was  insisted 
upon,  while,  as  before,  no  mention  was  made  of  the 
territorial  integrity  of  China  in  Manchuria.  As 
regards  the  equal  opportunity  for  the  enterprise 
of  other  nations,  it  should  be  noted  that  Russia 
now  agreed  to  insert  a  clause  not  to  obstruct  the 
enjoyment  by  Japan  and  other  Powers  of  the  treaty 

Russian  counter-proposals  as  proposed  by  the  Imperial  Japan- 
ese Government,  the  Russian  Government  considers  it  neces- 
sary :  — 

"1.  To  maintain  the  original  wording  of  Article  5,  which  had 
already  been  agreed  to  by  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government, 
that  is  to  say,  'mutual  engagement  not  to  use  any  part  of  the  ter- 
ritory of  Korea  for  strategical  purposes,  not  to  undertake  on  the 
coasts  of  Korea  any  military  works  capable  of  menacing  the 
freedom  of  navigation  in  the  Korean  Straits.'  [The  Japanese 
Government  had,  as  was  pointed  out  by  Baron  Komura  in  the 
dispatch  No.  39,  never  agreed  to  the  first  half  of  Article  5.] 

"2.  To  maintain  Article  6  concerning  a  neutral  zone  (this  for 
the  very  purpose  which  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government  has 
likewise  in  view,  that  is  to  say,  to  eliminate  everything  that 
might  lead  to  misunderstanding  in  the  future;  a  similar  zone, 
for  example,  exists  between  the  Russian  and  British  possessions 
in  Central  Asia). 

"In  case  the  above  conditions  are  agreed  to,  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment would  be  prepared  to  include  in  the  projected  agree- 
ment an  article  of  the  following  tenor:  — 

"'Recognition  by  Japan  of  Manchuria  and  her  littoral  as 
being  outside  her  sphere  of  interests,  whilst  Russia,  within  the 
limits  of  that  province,  will  not  impede  Japan  nor  other  Powers 
in  the  enjoyment  of  the  rights  and  privileges  acquired  by  them 
under  existing  treaties  with  China,  exclusive  of  the  establish- 
ment of  settlements.'"  —  N.-R.,  No.  38. 


334  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

rights  which  they  had  acquired  from  China  in  re- 
gard to  Manchuria,  but  only  on  the  condition  of 
maintaining  the  clauses  on  the  neutral  zone  in 
Korea  and  the  non-employment  by  Japan  of  any 
part  of  Korea  for  strategical  purposes.  Moreover, 
the  treaty  rights  of  other  Powers  in  Manchuria, 
which  Russia  would  respect,  explicitly  excluded  those 
concerning  the  foreign  settlements  in  the  open 
ports,1  thus  again  evincing  her  exclusive  policy. 
Over  and  above  these  considerations,  it  should  be 
remembered  that,  as  has  been  pointed  out  by  Baron 
Komura,2  the  treaty  rights  which  China  had  accorded 
to  other  Powers  could  not  be  maintained  if  her 
sovereignty  in  Manchuria,  the  existence  of  which 
Russia  declined  to  assure  Japan  that  she  would  re- 
spect, should  cease.3 

1  See  British  Parliamentary  Papers :  China,  No.  %  {1902) ,  Nos. 
133,  136,  139,  142. 

2  His  statements  to  the  journalists  on  February  10  and  at  the 
Lower  House  on  February  23. 

8  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Russian  Representatives 
abroad  declared  to  the  Powers  about  the  same  time  as  the  third 
counter-note  was  delivered  at  Tokio,  that  Russia  "had  no  inten- 
tion whatever  of  placing  any  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  contin- 
ued enjoyment  by  foreign  Powers  of  the  rights  acquired  by  them 
[in  Manchuria]  in  virtue  of  the  treaties  now  in  force."  The  ex- 
clusion of  foreign  settlements  was  not  mentioned,  but,  judging 
from  the  counter-note  of  January  6,  was  implied. 

When  Count  Benckendorff ,  Russian  Ambassador  at  London, 
handed  the  memorandum  on  January  8  to  Lord  Lansdowne,  the 
latter  made  characteristically  blunt  remarks,  as  will  be  seen 
from  the  following  dispatch  from  him  to  Sir  C.  Scott:  "...  I 
could  not  help  regretting  that  Russia  should  have  found  it  im- 
possible to  take  even  a  single  step  in  pursuance  of  the  policy 
which  she  has  thus  prescribed  for  herself  [regarding  the  evacua- 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         335 

In  a  few  days  there  took  place  an  important 
event  which  made  the  Russian  position  untenable. 
The  Chinese-American 1  and  Chinese-Japanese2  com- 
mercial treaties  which  had  been  concluded  on  Octo- 
ber 8,  1903,3  the  date  appointed  for  the  final  evac- 
uation of  Manchuria,  were  ratified  on  January 
11,  1904,  the  former  opening  to  the  world's  trade 
Mukden  and  An-tung,  and  the  latter,  Mukden  and 
Tatung-kao,  thus  not  only  multiplying  the  treaty 
rights,  including  rights  of  foreign  settlements,  of 
Japan  and  the  United  States  in  Manchuria,  but 
also  forcibly  reinstating  the  sovereign  rights  of 
the  Chinese  Empire  in  the  territory,  and  directly 
reversing  the  exclusive  claims  of  Russia  therein. 
It  will  be  recalled  that  Russia  had  recently  seized 
Mukden,  and  had  been  strengthening  her  forces 
upon  the  Yalu,  on  which  the  other  two  new  ports 
were  situated.  The  United  States  Government, 
immediately  upon  the  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
appointed  Consuls  for  the  three  new  open  ports. 

To  return  to  the  Russo-Japanese  negotiations. 
Thus  far  notes  and  replies,  exchanged  three  times 

tion  of  Manchuria].  I  trusted  that  his  Excellency  would  forgive 
ine  for  telling  him  frankly  that,  in  this  country,  people  were 
looking  for  some  concrete  evidence  of  Russia's  intention  to  make 
good  her  promises.  An  announcement,  for  example,  that  Niu- 
chwang  was  to  be  evacuated  at  an  early  date  would  certainly 
have  a  reassuring  effect.  So  far  as  I  was  aware,  there  was  no 
local  difficulty  in  the  way."—  China,  No.  2  (i90£),Nos.  162, 163. 

1  The  text  is  found  in  the  Monthly  Summary  of  the  Commerce 
and  Finance  of  the  U.  S.  for  January,  1904. 

2  In  the  press  and  the  Kwampo  of  January  20. 

3  See  pp.  252-254  and  317-318,  above. 


336  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

within  a  period  of  five  months,  must  have  made  the 
position  of  each  negotiating  Power  perfectly  clear 
to  the  other.  No  further  discussion  could  possibly 
bring  the  two  Governments  nearer  to  a  reconcilia- 
tion of  wishes  so  diametrically  opposed.  In  the 
mean  time,  the  Japanese  people  were  suffering  from 
enormous  economic  losses.  A  large  part  of  their 
raw  materials  had  ceased  to  come,  the  shipping  and 
trade  with  Korea  and  Northern  China  had  declined, 
the  fishing  industry  had  been  paralyzed,  and,  con- 
trary to  the  tendency  at  normal  times,  the  banks 
had  been  embarrassed  with  an  over-abundance  of 
funds.1  On  the  other  hand,  Russia,  while  circulat- 
ing the  optimistic  views  of  her  Emperor  and  For- 
eign Minister,  had  continued  her  sharp  diplomacy 
at  Seul  and  Peking,  and  pushed  on  land  and  sea 
her  vast  warlike  preparations  in  the  East.2 

Even  then  the  Japanese  Government  would  not 
terminate  its  negotiations  with  Russia,  for  it  was 
well  aware  that  upon  the  conduct  of  these  negotia- 
tions the  peace  of  the  East  depended.  If  the  prin- 
ciples proposed  by  Japan  were  not  accepted,  the 
integrity  of  China  would  be  threatened,  and  the 

1  See  the  Kwampo  for  February  1  (p.  5),  5  (pp.  110-114),  18 
(p.  243),  20  (pp.  280-281);  Mr.  E.  H.  Vickers's  letter  to  the  New 
York  Evening  Post,  March  1;  Mr.  Soyeda's  address,  in  the 
Kokumin,  February  6;  ibid.,  on  the  fisheries. 

2  According  to  the  estimate  of  the  Japanese  Government,  Rus- 
sia increased  her  forces  in  the  Far  East  between  April  8,  1903, 
and  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  by  19  war-vessels  aggregating 
82,415  tons,  and  40,000  soldiers,  besides  200,000  more  who 
were  about  to  be  sent.    See  pp.  352-354,  below. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         337 

independence  of  Korea,  as  well  as  the  vital  interest 
of  Japan,  would  be  profoundly  endangered ;  thus 
the  entire  future  of  the  Far  East  would  be  plunged 
into  unknown  perils.  Under  these  circumstances, 
it  seemed  that  Japan  owed  to  the  world  as  much  of 
patience,  as  she  owed  to  herself  of  determination. 
The  situation  was  gravely  discussed  by  the  states- 
men on  the  11th,  and  before  the  Throne  again 
on  the  12th.1  On  the  next  day,  January  13,  now 
for  the  fourth  time,  and  against  the  wishes  of  the 
majority  of  the  people,  the  Government  of  Tokio 
reminded  Russia  of  the  serious  position  in  which 
the  two  Powers  found  themselves,  and  begged  her 
to  reconsider  the  situation.  Observe  the  following 
telegram  of  the  same  date  from  Baron  Komura  to 
Mr.  Kurino :  — 

"  You  are  instructed  to  deliver  to  Count  Lamsdorff  the 
following  note  verbale  in  order  to  confirm  to  him  the  views 
I  have  communicated  to  Baron  Rosen  on  the  13th  Jan- 
uary: — 

"  *  The  Imperial  Government,  with  a  view  to  arriving 
at  a  pacific  solution  of  the  pending  questions,  and  to 
firmly  establishing  for  all  time  the  basis  of  good  relations 
between  the  two  Powers,  as  well  as  to  protect  the  rights 
and  interests  of  Japan,  have,  from  this  point  of  view, 
given  most  careful  and  serious  consideration  to  the  reply 
of  the  Russian  Government  which  was  delivered  by  his 
Excellency  Baron  Rosen  on  the  26th  instant.  They  have 
finally  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  following  modifi- 
cations are  necessary,  i.  e. :  — 

"  1.  *  Suppression  of  the  first  clause  of  Article  5  of  the 

1  The  Japanese  dailies. 


338  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Russian  counter-proposals  (presented  to  the  Japanese 
Government  through  Baron  Rosen  on  December  11), 
that  is  to  say,  not  to  use  any  part  of  Korean  territory  for 
strategical  purposes. 

"  2.  '  Suppression  of  the  whole  Article  (6)  concerning 
establishment  of  a  neutral  zone. 

"3.  'The  Russian  proposal  concerning  Manchuria 
to  be  agreed  to  with  the  following  modifications :  — 

"a.  'Recognition  by  Japan  of  Manchuria  and  its  lit- 
toral as  being  outside  her  sphere  of  interest,  and  an  en- 
gagement on  the  part  of  Russia  to  respect  the  territorial 
integrity  of  China  in  Manchuria. 

"  b.  '  Russia,  within  the  limits  of  Manchuria,  will  not 
impede  Japan  nor  other  Powers  in  the  enjoyment  of  rights 
and  privileges  acquired  by  them  under  the  existing  trea- 
ties with  China. 

"  c.  '  Recognition  by  Russia  of  Korea  and  its  littoral  as 
being  outside  her  sphere  of  interest. 

"4.  'Addition  of  an  Article  to  the  following  effect: 
Recognition  by  Japan  of  Russia's  special  interests  in 
Manchuria,  and  of  the  right  of  Russia  to  take  measures 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  those  interests. 

"'The  grounds  for  these  amendments  having  been 
frequently  and  fully  explained  on  previous  occasions,  the 
Imperial  Government  do  not  think  it  necessary  to  repeat 
the  explanations,  beyond  expressing  their  earnest  hope 
for  reconsideration  by  the  Russian  Government.  It  is 
sufficient  to  say  that  the  suppression  of  the  clause  exclud- 
ing the  establishment  of  settlements  in  Manchuria  is  de- 
sired because  it  conflicts  with  stipulations  of  the  new 
commercial  treaty  between  Japan  and  China.  In  this 
respect,  however,  Japan  will  be  satisfied  if  she  receives 
equal  treatment  with  other  Powers  which  have  already 
acquired  similar  rights  in  regard  to  settlements.  .  .  . 

"'Finally,   the   above-mentioned   amendments   being 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   NEGOTIATIONS         339 

proposed  by  the  Imperial  Government  entirely  in  a  spirit 
of  conciliation,  it  is  expected  that  they  will  be  received 
with  the  same  spirit  at  the  hands  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment ;  and  the  Imperial  Government  further  hope  for  an 
early  reply  from  the  Russian  Government,  since  further 
delay  in  the  solution  of  the  question  will  be  extremely 
disadvantageous  to  the  two  countries.'  "  s 

An  early  reply  was  urged  by  Mr.  Kurino  at  least 
four  times,2  but,  even  so  late  as  February  1,  Count 
Lamsdorff  declined  even  to  name  the  date  on  which 
his  reply  would  be  given  ; 3  and,  indeed,  the  reply  4 

1  N.-R.,  No.  39. 

2  Ibid.,  Nos.  40  (January  23),  42  (January  26),  44  (January 
28),  46  (January  30).  On  January  26,  Baron  Komura  again 
instructed  Mr.  Kurino  to  remind  Count  Lamsdorff  that  "in 
the  opinion  of  the  Imperial  Japanese  Government,  a  further 
prolongation  of  the  present  state  of  things  being  calculated  to 
accentuate  the  gravity  of  the  situation,  it  was  their  earnest  hope 
that  they  would  be  honored  with  an  early  reply,  and  that  they 
wished  to  know  at  what  time  they  might  expect  to  receive  the 
reply."  —  No.  42.  The  probable  nature  of  the  forthcoming  reply 
was  also  inquired  into,  without  success,  even  so  late  as  Janu- 
ary 30. 

8  No.  47.  It  is  unnecessary  to  point  out  the  various  excuses 
Count  Lamsdorff  presented  for  the  delay.  One  of  them  was  par- 
ticularly significant,  that  is,  that  the  opinions  of  Viceroy  Alexieff 
and  of  the  Cabinet  Ministers  at  St.  Petersburg  had  to  be  harmo- 
nized. —  Ibid. 

4  Mr.  Kurino  telegraphed  to  Baron  Komura  at  5.05  a.  m., 
February  5 :  — 

"In  compliance  with  the  request  of  Count  Lamsdorff,  I 
went  to  see  him  at  8  p.  m.,  February  4.  He  told  me  that  the 
substance  of  the  Russian  answer  had  just  been  telegraphed  to 
Viceroy  Alexieff,  to  be  transmitted  by  him  to  Minister  Rosen. 
The  Viceroy  might  happen  to  introduce  some  changes  so  as  to 
meet  local  circumstances  ;   but  in  all  probability,  there  would 


340  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

which  was  being  framed  was  found  later  to  have 
contained  substantially  the  same  points  as  the  three 
previous  replies  —  points  some  of  which  had  been 
repeatedly  and  unequivocally  demonstrated  to  be 
entirely  irreconcilable  with  the  vital  interests  of 
Japan.  Just  at  this  time,  the  activity  of  the  Kus- 
sian  forces  in  the  East  seemed  to  have  been  ac- 
celerated :  on  January  21,  numbers  of  infantry  and 
artillery  left  Port  Arthur  and  Dalny  for  the  Korean 
frontier,  soon  to  be  followed  by  contingents  from 

be  no  such  changes.  The  Count  then  stated,  as  his  own  opinion, 
that  :  — 

"  '  Russia  desired  the  principle  of  the  independence  and  in- 
tegrity of  Korea,  and,  at  the  same  time,  considered  the  free  pas- 
sage of  the  Korean  Straits  necessary.  Though  Russia  was  willing 
to  make  every  possible  concession,  she  did  not  desire  to  see 
Korea  utilized  for  strategic  purposes  against  Russia.  He  also 
believed  it  profitable,  for  the  consolidation  of  good  relations 
with  Japan,  to  establish  by  common  accord  a  buffer  region  be- 
tween confines  of  direct  influence  and  action  of  the  two  Powers 
in  the  Far  East.' 

"The  above  was  expressed  by  the  Count  entirely  as  his  per- 
sonal opinion,  and,  though  I  cannot  be  positive,  I  think  that  the 
substance  of  the  Russian  reply  must  probably  be  the  same." 
—  N.-R.,  No.  50.    Cf.  p.  350,  below. 

It  should  be  noted  that  this  note  from  Mr.  Kurino  reached 
Tokio  at  5.15  p.  m.,  or  three  hours  and  a  quarter  after  the  Japan- 
ese notes  severing  relations  had  been  sent. 

Count  Cassini,  in  the  following  striking  sentence,  includes, 
among  the  contents  of  the  last  Russian  reply,  a  point  which  was 
not  in  the  least  mentioned  in  Count  Lamsdorff's  personal  opin- 
ion expressed  to  Mr.  Kurino.  M.  Cassini  says :  "  .  .  .  However, 
in  another  effort  to  bring  the  negotiations  to  a  peaceful  conclu- 
sion, my  country  did  all  that  dignity  would  permit,  and  offered 
to  give  assurances  again  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  Emperor 
of  China  in  Manchuria  would  be  recognized."  —  The  North  Amer- 
ican Review  for  May,  1904,  p.  686. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         341 

Liao-yang ;  on  the  2f8th,  Viceroy  Alexieff  ordered 
the  troops  on  the  Yalu  to  be  placed  upon  a  war 
footing  ;  on  February  1,  the  Governor  of  Vladivos- 
tok warned  the  Japanese  Commercial  Agent  at  the 
port  to  prepare  for  withdrawing  his  compatriots  to 
Habarofsk,  as  he  had  received  instructions  from 
his  Government  and  was  ready  to  proclaim  martial 
law  at  any  time ;  and,  on  the  3d,  all  the  war-ves- 
sels located  at  Port  Arthur,  excepting  one,  steamed 
out  of  the  harbor.1 

It  was  now  considered  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment that  the  critical  point  had  been  reached.   The 

1  From  the  reply  of  the  Japanese  Government  to  the  Russian 
charge  that  Japan  had  broken  peace  and  taken  Russia  by  sur- 
prise.   See  pp.  352-353,  below. 

It  should  not  be  forgotten,  at  the  same  time,  that  Japan  had 
all  the  while  been  taking  precautionary  measures  in  the  most 
careful  and  exhaustive  manner,  not  only  in  military  and  naval 
affairs,  but  also  in  other  matters  connected  therewith.  The  dif- 
ference between  the  Russian  and  Japanese  attitude  may  thus 
be  stated:  Russia  apparently  played  the  three-fold  game  of 
employing  sharp  diplomacy  at  Seul  and  Peking,  of  strengthen- 
ing her  control  over  Manchuria  and  the  Korean  frontier,  and  of 
endeavoring  at  once  to  intimidate  Japan  by  vast  warlike  mea- 
sures, and  to  evade  her  overtures  till  she  might  be  compelled  to 
acquiesce  in  the  situation  to  be  at  length  perfected  by  Russia; 
Japan  expressed  her  wishes  in  straightforward  language,  and 
relied  upon  her  negotiations  with  Russia,  which  she,  in  spite 
of  extremely  trying  circumstances,  conducted  with  the  utmost 
cordiality  and  patience,  but  at  the  same  time  prepared  for  any 
emergency  in  which  the  unconciliating  attitude  of  Russia  might 
probably  result.  It  will  perhaps  be  always  regretted  by  many 
that  the  control  of  Russian  diplomacy  throughout  the  negotia- 
tions rested  in  the  hands  of  those  who  seemed  to  fail  to  grasp 
the  exact  state  of  Japan's  mind  in  this  greatest  crisis  of  her 
national  existence. 


342  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Cabinet  members  and  Privy  Councilors  held  a  con- 
ference on  February  3,  and  again,  on  the  next  day, 
before  the  Throne.  On  February  5,  at  2  p.  m., 
two  notes  were  telegraphed  to  Mr.  Kurino,  the  one 
communicating  Japan's  decision  to  break  off  nego- 
tiations which  had  not  been  met  with  proper  consid- 
eration and  had  become  useless,  and  to  reserve  to 
herself  the  right  to  pursue  an  independent  course 
of  action,  in  order  to  safeguard  her  interests  and 
rights  and  to  protect  her  position  menaced  by  Rus- 
sia ;  and  the  other  stating  that  Japan  had  been 
obliged  to  sever  her  now  valueless  diplomatic  re- 
lations with  the  Russian  Government.  We  subjoin 
the  entire  texts  of  the  telegraphic  messages  from 
Baron  Komura  to  Mr.  Kurino  inclosing  the  above- 
mentioned  notes  :  — 

"Further  prolongation  of  the  present  situation  being 
intolerable,  the  Imperial  Government  have  decided  to 
terminate  the  pending  negotiations,  and  to  take  such  in- 
dependent action  as  they  may  deem  necessary  to  defend 
our  position  menaced  by  Russia,  and  to  protect  our  rights 
and  interests.  Accordingly  you  are  instructed,  immedi- 
ately upon  receipt  of  this  telegram,  to  address  to  Count 
Lamsdorff  the  following  signed  note :  — 

"  *  The  Undersigned,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minister 
Plenipotentiary  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan, 
has  the  honor,  in  pursuance  of  instructions  from  his  Gov- 
ernment, to  address  to  His  Excellency  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the 
Russias  the  following  communciations :  — 

"'The  Government  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of 
Japan  regard  the  independence  and  territorial  integrity 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         343 

of  Korea  as  essential  to  the  repose  and  safety  of  their  own 
country,  and  they  are  consequently  unable  to  view  with 
indifference  any  action  tending  to  render  the  position  of 
Korea  insecure. 

"'The  obstinate  rejections  by  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, by  means  of  amendments  impossible  of  agreement, 
of  Japan's  proposals  respecting  Korea,  the  adoption  of 
which  the  Imperial  Government  regard  as  indispensable 
to  assure  the  existence  of  the  Korean  Empire  and  to 
safeguard  Japan's  preponderating  interests  in  the  penin- 
sula ;  and  the  obstinate  refusals  of  Russia  to  enter  into 
an  engagement  to  respect  China's  territorial  integrity  in 
Manchuria,  which  is  seriously  menaced  by  the  continued 
occupation  of  the  province,  notwithstanding  Russia's 
treaty  engagements  with  China  and  her  repeated  assur- 
ances to  other  Powers  possessing  interests  in  those  regions 
—  have  made  it  necessary  for  the  Imperial  Government 
seriously  to  consider  what  measures  of  self-defense  they 
are  called  upon  to  take. 

** '  In  spite  of  Russia's  repeated  delays  to  reply  with- 
out intelligible  reasons,  and  of  her  naval  and  military 
activities,  irreconcilable  with  pacific  aims,  the  Imperial 
Government  have  exercised  during  the  present  negotia- 
tions a  degree  of  forbearance  which  they  believe  affords 
sufficient  proof  of  their  loyal  desire  to  remove  from  their 
relations  with  the  Russian  Government  every  cause  for 
future  misunderstanding.  But  finding  in  their  efforts 
no  prospect  of  securing  from  the  Russian  Government  an 
adhesion  either  to  Japan's  moderate  and  unselfish  pro- 
posals or  to  any  other  proposals  likely  to  establish  a  firm 
and  enduring  peace  in  the  Far  East,  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment have  no  other  alternative  than  to  terminate  the 
present  futile  negotiations. 

"'In  adopting  this  course,  the  Imperial  Government 
reserve  to  themselves  the  right  to  take  such  independent 


344  THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

action  as  they  may  deem  best  to  consolidate  and  defend 
their  menaced  position,  as  well  as  to  protect  the  acquired 
rights  and  legitimate  interests  of  the  Empire. 
'"The  Undersigned,  etc.,  etc.'"  l 

"You  are  instructed  to  address  to  Count  Lamsdorff 
a  signed  note  to  the  following  effect,  simultaneously  with 
the  note  mentioned  in  my  other  telegram :  — 

" '  The  Undersigned,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minis- 
ter Plenipotentiary  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan, 
has  the  honor,  in  pursuance  of  instructions  from  his  Gov- 
ernment, to  address  to  His  Excellency  the  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  of  his  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  all  the 
Russias  the  following  communications :  — 

"'Having  exhausted  without  effect  every  means  of 
conciliation  with  a  view  to  remove  from  their  relations 
with  the  Imperial  Russian  Government  every  cause  for 
future  complications,  and  finding  that  their  just  repre- 
sentations and  moderate  and  unselfish  proposals  made 
in  the  interest  of  a  firm  and  lasting  peace  in  the  Far  East 
are  not  receiving  due  consideration,  and  that  their  diplo- 
matic relations  with  the  Russian  Government  have  for 
these  reasons  ceased  to  possess  any  value,  the  Imperial 
Government  of  Japan  have  resolved  to  sever  those  dip- 
lomatic relations. 

'"In  the  further  fulfillment  of  the  command  of  his 
Government,  the  Undersigned  has  also  the  honor  to  an- 
nounce to  his  Excellency  Count  Lamsdorff  that  it  is  his 
intention  to  take  his  departure  from  St.  Petersburg  with 
the  staff  of  the  Imperial  Legation  on  the  .  .  .  day. 

"'The  Undersigned,  etc.,  etc.'"  2 

These  notes  were  transmitted  by  the  Japanese 
Minister  to  Count  Lamsdorff   on   February  6,  at 
1  N.-R.,  No.  48.  2  Ibid.,  No.  49. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         345 

4  p.  m.,  Baron  Rosen  having  already  been  informed 
by  Baron  Komura  of  the  severance  of  the  negotia- 
tions and  general  diplomatic  relations  between  the 
two  Powers.1  The  first  naval  engagement  occurred 
at  Chemulpo  two  days  later,  followed  by  the  naval 
battle  at  Port  Arthur  on  the  night  of  February  8- 
9,  and,  on  the  10th,  war  was  formally  declared  by 
the  Emperors  of  both  Powers.  The  Russian  Sover- 
eign's manifesto,  which  appeared  in  the  Official 
Messenger,  said  :  — 

"  We  proclaim  to  all  our  faithful  subjects  that,  in  our 
solicitude  for  the  preservation  of  that  peace  so  dear  to  our 
heart,  we  have  put  forth  every  effort  to  assure  tranquillity 
in  the  Far  East.  To  these  pacific  ends  we  declared  our 
assent  to  the  revision,  proposed  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, of  the  agreements  existing  between  the  two  Em- 
pires concerning  Korean  affairs.  The  negotiations  ini- 
tiated on  this  subject  were,  however,  not  brought  to  a 
conclusion,  and  Japan,  not  even  awaiting  the  arrival  of 
our  last  reply  and  the  proposals  of  our  Government,  in- 
formed us  of  the  rupture  of  the  negotiations  and  of  dip- 
lomatic relations  with  Russia. 

"Without  previously  notifying  us  that  the  rupture  of 
such  relations  implied  the  beginning  of  warlike  action,  the 

1  Mr.  Kurino  left  St.  Petersburg  on  the  10th,  and  the  next  day 
saw  the  departure  of  Baron  Rosen  from  Tokio.  It  was  generally 
believed  that  the  former  had  once  sincerely  desired  that  a  satis- 
factory agreement  between  Russia  and  Japan  should  be  effected. 
As  for  Baron  Rosen,  every  one  surmised  that  the  respected  gen- 
tleman was  little  responsible  for  the  conduct  of  Russian  diplo- 
macy, of  which  he  was  regarded  as  an  unfortunate  agent.  From 
a  personal  point  of  view,  the  sudden  departure  of  both  from  their 
posts  had  something  tragic  about  it,  and  Baron  Rosen's  situa- 
tion was  deeply  sympathized  with  by  the  Japanese  people. 


346  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

Japanese  Government  ordered  its  torpedo-boats  to  make 
a  sudden  attack  on  our  squadron  in  the  outer  roadstead 
of  the  fortress  of  Port  Arthur.  After  receiving  the  report 
of  our  Viceroy  on  the  subject,  we  at  once  commanded 
Japan's  challenge  to  be  replied  to  by  arms. 

"While  proclaiming  this  our  resolve,  we,  in  unshak- 
able confidence  in  the  help  of  the  Almighty,  and  firmly 
trusting  in  the  unanimous  readiness  of  all  our  faithful 
subjects  to  defend  the  Fatherland  together  with  ourselves, 
invoke  God's  blessing  on  our  glorious  forces  of  the  army 
and  navy."  1 

The  Japanese  Imperial  Rescript,  countersigned 
by  all  the  members  of  the  Cabinet,  and  declaring 
war  against  Russia,  read  as  follows  :  — 

"  We,  by  the  Grace  of  Heaven,  the  Emperor  of  Japan, 
seated  on  the  Throne  occupied  by  the  same  dynasty  from 
time  immemorial,  do  hereby  make  proclamation  to  all 
our  loyal  and  brave  subjects :  — 

"  We  hereby  declare  war  against  Russia.  We  command 
our  army  and  navy  to  carry  on  hostilities  against  her  with 
all  their  strength,  and  we  also  command  all  our  officials 
to  make  effort,  in  pursuance  of  their  duties  and  in  accord- 
ance with  their  powers,  to  attain  the  national  aim,  with 
all  the  means  within  the  limits  of  the  law  of  nations. 

"We  deem  it  essential  to  international  relations,  and 
make  it  our  constant  aim,  to  promote  the  pacific  progress 
of  our  Empire  in  civilization,  to  strengthen  our  friendly 
ties  with  other  States,  and  thereby  to  establish  a  state  of 
things  which  would  maintain  enduring  peace  in  the  East, 
and  assure  the  future  security  of  our  Empire  without 
injury  to  the  rights  and  interests  of  other  Powers.    Our 

1  From  the  English  translation  in  the  London  Times,  Febru- 
ary 11,  1904,  p.  3. 


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BARON    DE    ROSEX 
Late  Bussian  Minister  at  Tolcio 


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THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         347 

officials  also  perform  their  duties  in  obedience  to  our  will, 
so  that  our  relations  with  all  Powers  grow  steadily  in 
cordiality. 

"It  is  thus  entirely  against  our  wishes  that  we  have 
unhappily  come  to  open  hostilities  against  Russia. 

"The  integrity  of  Korea  has  long  been  a  matter  of 
the  gravest  concern  to  our  Empire,  not  only  because  of 
the  traditional  relations  between  the  two  countries,  but 
because  the  separate  existence  of  Korea  is  essential  to  the 
safety  of  our  Empire.  Nevertheless,  Russia,  despite  her 
explicit  treaty  pledges  to  China  and  her  repeated  assur- 
ances to  other  Powers,  is  still  in  occupation  of  Manchu- 
ria, and  has  consolidated  and  strengthened  her  hold 
upon  it,  and  is  bent  upon  its  final  absorption.  Since  the 
possession  of  Manchuria  by  Russia  would  render  it 
impossible  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  Korea,  and  would, 
in  addition,  compel  the  abandonment  of  all  hope  for  peace 
in  the  Far  East,  we  expected,  in  these  circumstances,  to 
settle  the  question  by  negotiations  and  secure  thereby  a 
permanent  peace.  With  this  object  in  view,  our  officials 
by  our  order  made  proposals  to  Russia,  and  frequent 
conferences  were  held  during  the  last  half  year.  Russia, 
however,  never  met  such  proposals  in  a  spirit  of  concilia- 
tion, but  by  her  prolonged  delays  put  off  the  settlement 
of  the  pending  question,  and,  by  ostensibly  advocating 
peace  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  secretly  extend- 
ing her  naval  and  military  preparations,  sought  to  bring 
about  our  acquiescence.  It  is  not  possible  in  the  least  to 
admit  that  Russia  had  from  the  first  a  sincere  desire  for 
peace.  She  has  rejected  the  proposals  of  our  Empire; 
the  safety  of  Korea  is  in  danger;  the  interests  of  our  Em- 
pire are  menaced.  At  this  crisis,  the  guarantees  for  the 
future  which  the  Empire  has  sought  to  secure  by  peace- 
ful negotiations  can  now  only  be  sought  by  an  appeal  to 
arms. 


348  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

"  It  is  our  earnest  wishes  that,  by  the  loyalty  and  valor 
of  our  faithful  subjects,  peace  may  soon  be  permanently 
restored  and  the  glory  of  our  Empire  preserved."  r 


SUPPLEMENTARY  NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  XIX 

In  view  of  the  singular  circumstances  under  which  the 
war  broke  out,  it  would  be  a  matter  of  permanent  inter- 
est to  the  student  of  international  law  to  observe  the 
difference  of  opinion  which  arose  between  the  contending 
Powers  respecting  the  legality  of  opening  hostilities  before 
war  was  formally  declared,  and  also  respecting  the  so- 
called  neutrality  of  Korea.  We  reproduce  below,  without 
comment,  the  charges  of  Russia  and  replies  of  Japan  re- 
garding these  subjects. 

On  February  18,  the  Russian  Government  issued  the 
following  official  communique :  — 

"Eight  days  have  now  elapsed  since  all  Russia  was 
shaken  with  profound  indignation  against  an  enemy 
who  suddenly  broke  off  negotiations,  and,  by  a  treach- 
erous attack,  endeavored  to  obtain  an  easy  success  in  a 
war  long  desired.  The  Russian  nation,  with  natural  im- 
patience, desires  prompt  vengeance,  and  feverishly  awaits 
news  from  the  Far  East.  The  unity  and  strength  of  the 
Russian  people  leave  no  room  for  doubt  that  Japan  will 
receive  the  chastisement  she  deserves  for  her  treachery 
and  her  provocation  of  war  at  a  time  when  our  beloved 
Sovereign  desired  to  maintain  peace  among  all  nations. 

"  The  conditions  under  which  hostilities  are  being  car- 
ried on  compel  us  to  wait  with  patience  for  news  of  the 

1  The  rescript  appeared  in  the  Kwampo,  February  10,  1904. 
extra.  An  authoritative  English  translation,  which  has  been 
slightly  altered  in  our  text  in  order  to  bring  it  nearer  to  the  ori- 
ginal language,  was  published  in  the  London  Times,  February 
12,  1904,  p.  3. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         349 

success  of  our  troops,  which  cannot  occur  before  decisive 
actions  have  been  fought  by  the  Russian  army.  The  dis- 
tance of  the  territory  now  attacked  and  the  desire  of  the 
Czar  to  maintain  peace  were  causes  of  the  impossibility 
of  preparations  for  war  being  made  a  long  time  in  ad- 
vance. Much  time  is  now  necessary  in  order  to  strike  at 
Japan  blows  worthy  of  the  dignity  and  might  of  Russia, 
and,  while  sparing  as  much  as  possible  the  shedding  of 
blood  of  her  children,  to  inflict  just  chastisement  on  the 
nation  which  has  provoked  the  struggle. 

"Russia  must  await  the  event  in  patience,  being  sure 
that  our  army  will  avenge  that  provocation  a  hundred- 
fold. Operations  on  land  must  not  be  expected  for  some 
time  yet,  and  we  cannot  obtain  early  news  from  the  theatre 
of  war.  The  useless  shedding  of  blood  is  unworthy  of  the 
greatness  and  power  of  Russia.  Our  country  displays 
such  unity  and  desire  for  self-sacrifice  on  behalf  of  the 
national  cause  that  all  true  news  from  the  scene  of  hos- 
tilities will  be  immediately  due  to  the  entire  nation.''  * 

On  February  20,  the  Official  Messenger  published  the 
following  account  of  the  termination  of  the  diplomatic 
relations  between  the  two  Powers :  — 

"On  January  16,  after  receipt  of  the  last  Japanese 
proposals,  the  Russian  Imperial  Government  at  once 
proceeded  to  examine  them.  On  January  25  Mr.  Kurino, 
the  Japanese  Minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  in  reply  to  his 
inquiry,  was  informed  that  the  Czar  had  intrusted  the 
consideration  of  these  proposals  to  a  special  conference, 
which  was  to  meet  on  January  28,  and  that  his  Majesty's 
decision  would  probably  not  be  given  before  February  2.2 

1  The  London  Times,  February  19,  1904,  p.  3. 

2  The  reports  from  Mr.  Kurino  do  not  agree  with  this  state- 
ment of  Russia.  According  to  the  former,  it  was  on  January  26, 
not  the  25th,  that  Count  Lamsdorff  referred  to  the  conference  to 
be  held  on  the  28th.  The  date  February  2  in  this  connection  does 


350  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

On  the  last-named  date  the  Czar  gave  orders  to  prepare 
a  draft  of  definite  instructions  for  the  Russian  Minister 
at  Tokio  on  the  basis  of  the  deliberations  of  the  special 
conference.  On  the  day  following,  three  telegrams  were 
dispatched  to  Viceroy  Alexieff,  containing  the  full  text  of 
a  draft  statement,  the  reasons  which  prompted  the  Rus- 
sian Government  in  making  some  modifications  in  the 
Japanese  proposals,  and  the  general  instructions  for  the 
Russian  Minister  at  Tokio  concerning  the  presentation  of 
the  reply  to  the  Japanese  Government.  In  order  to  save 
time,  identical  telegrams  were  sent  direct  to  Baron  Rosen. 
"On  February  4,  forty-eight  hours  before  the  receipt 
of  the  news  of  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  by 
Japan,  Count  Lamsdorff  notified  the  Japanese  Minister  of 
the  dispatch  to  Baron  Rosen  of  the  Russian  proposals  in 
reply  to  the  Japanese  note.1  On  February  5,  a  message 
arrived  from  the  Viceroy  stating  that  he  had  heard  from 
the  Baron  that  the  latter  had  received  the  Russian  reply. 
On  the  6th,  at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  Japanese 
Minister,  quite  unexpectedly,  handed  to  the  Russian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  two  notes,  the  first  of  which  noti- 
fied the  rupture  of  negotiations  on  the  pretext  that  Russia 
was  evading  a  reply2  to  the  Japanese  proposals,  while  the 

not  appear  till  we  reach  Mr.  Kurino's  dispatch  of  January  28. 
Moreover,  on  January  30,  the  Count  told  him  that  he  could  not 
tell  him  the  exact  date  when  the  Russian  reply  would  be  sent. 
See  N.-R.,  Nos.  43,  45,  47. 

1  This  is  evidently  an  error.  The  Count  spoke  to  Mr.  Kurino, 
at  8  p.  m.,  February  4,  about  the  probable  contents  of  the  reply 
purely  as  the  former's  personal  opinion.  It  was  not  an  official 
statement  of  the  exact  contents  of  the  reply.  — N.-R.,  No.  50. 
See  p.  340,  above. 

2  This  statement  is  incorrect  and  misleading.  Referring  to  the 
text  of  the  Japanese  note  (pp.  342-344,  above),  it  will  be  seen  that 
it  did  not  say  that  the  Japanese  Government  would  break  off  the 
negotiations  because  Russia  had  been  evading  a  reply  to  the 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         351 

second  announced  the  breaking  off  "of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions, and  added  that  the  Japanese  Minister,  with  the 
staff  of  the  Legation,  would  leave  St.  Petersburg  on  the 
10th.  These  notes  were  accompanied  by  a  private  letter 
from  the  Japanese  Minister  to  Count  Lamsdorff ,  in  which 
the  hope  was  expressed  that  the  rupture  of  diplomatic 
relations  would  be  confined  to  as  short  a  time  as  possible. 

"  On  the  same  day,  Admiral  Alexieff ,  Baron  Rosen,  and 
all  the  Russian  Representatives  in  Peking,  Tokio,  and  the 
capitals  of  the  great  Powers  were  informed  by  urgent 
telegrams  of  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations  with 
Japan  and  the  issue  of  our  Imperial  order  for  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Russian  Legation  from  Tokio.  The  said 
circular  dispatch  laid  the  responsibility  of  all  conse- 
quences that  might  ensue  on  the  Japanese  Government.1 

"  Although  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  by 
no  means  implies  the  opening  of  hostilities,  the  Japanese 
Government,  as  early  as  the  night  of  the  8th,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  9th  and  10th,  committed  a  whole  series  of 
revolting  attacks  on  Russian  warships  and  merchantmen, 
attended  by  a  violation  of  international  law.  The  decree 
of  the  Emperor  of  Japan  on  the  subject  of  the  declaration 
of  war  against  Russia  was  not  issued  until  the  1 1th  in- 
stant." 2 

The  substance  of  the  reply  of  the  Japanese  Government 
to  these  notes,  of  which  the  following  is  a  free  transla- 
tion, was  made  public  through  the  press  on  March  3 :  — 

Japanese  proposals.  A  reference  was  made  to  the  prolonged 
delays  of  Russia  before  giving  replies,  but  the  note  did  not  state 
that  the  delays  were  the  only  reason,  still  less  that  the  delay  of 
"a"  reply  —  i.  e.,  the  last  reply  —  was  the  ground,  for  the  rup- 
ture of  negotiations. 

1  See  a  vigorous  statement  of  this  charge  made  by  Count  Cas- 
sini  in  the  North  American  Review  for  May,  1904,  pp.  681-682. 

2  The  London  Times,  February  22,  1904,  p.  5. 


352  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

"  The  Russian  Government,  by  their  notes  published  on 
February  18  and  20,  charged  Japan  with  unexpectedly 
attacking,  and  gaining  a  treacherous  victory  over,  the 
forces  of  Russia,  a  Power  anxious  to  maintain  peace, 
and  stated  that  the  severance  of  diplomatic  relations  by 
no  means  implied  the  opening  of  hostilities,  and  that, 
although  Japan  declared  war  only  on  February  11,  she 
had  since  the  8th  made  revolting  attacks  upon  Russian 
war-vessels  and  merchantmen  and  conducted  herself  in 
violation  of  principles  of  international  law. 

"That,  however,  Russia  did  not  sincerely  desire 
peace  may  be  readily  seen  from  the  fact  that  she  never 
in  any  manner  met  the  negotiations  of  Japan  in  a  con- 
ciliatory spirit,  but  put  off  the  solution  of  the  pending 
question  by  prolonged  delays,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
diligently  extended  her  naval  and  military  preparations. 
Since  Russia  failed  in  April,  1903,  to  carry  out  her  pledge 
respecting  the  second  part  of  her  evacuation  of  Man- 
churia, the  facts  concerning  the  increase  of  Russian 
forces  in  the  Far  East  have  been  as  follows :  — 

"  The  following  war- vessels  were  added :  — 


3  battleships 

38,488  tons 

1  armored  cruiser 

7,726 

5  cruisers 

26,417 

7  torpedo-destroyers 

2,450 

1  gunboat 

1,334 

2  torpedo-tenders 

6,000 

Total,  19  vessels 

82,415  tons 

"Besides  these,  Russia  sent  by  rail  to  Port  Arthur 
material  for  framing  torpedo-destroyers,  of  which  seven 
had  already  been  made,  and  armed  two  volunteer  fleet 
steamboats  at  Vladivostok  and  hoisted  the  naval  flag 
upon  them. 

"Moreover,  Russia  dispatched  one  battleship,  three 
cruisers,  seven    torpedo-destroyers,   and    four    torpedo- 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         353 

boats,  aggregating  about  37,040  tons,  which  were  on  their 
way  to  the  East.  The  total  of  all  these  vessels  would  there- 
fore reach  the  tonnage  of  about  113,000  tons. 

"As  regards  the  increased  land  forces,  Russia,  begin- 
ning with  the  two  brigades  of  infantry,  two  battalions  of 
artillery,  and  certain  numbers  of  cavalry  and  of  the  com- 
missariat, which  she  sent  to  China  on  June  29,  1903, 
under  the  pretext  of  making  experiment  of  the  carrying 
capacity  of  the  Siberian  Railway,  continually  dispatched 
troops  to  the  Far  East,  until  there  were  already,  at  the 
beginning  of  February  of  this  year,  more  than  40,000 
soldiers.  Russia  was  further  preparing  to  send,  in  case 
of  necessity,  over  200,000  more  soldiers. 

"Simultaneously,  Russia  hastened  her  work  through 
day  and  night  in  building  new  forts  at  the  naval  harbors 
of  Port  Arthur  and  Vladivostok;  repaired  fortifications 
at  Kun-chun,  Liao-yang,  and  other  strategic  points;  s^nt 
to  the  Far  East  by  the  volunteer  fleet  and  the  Siberian 
Railway  large  quantities  of  arms  and  ammunition;  and, 
so  early  as  the  middle  of  October,  1903,  fourteen  trains 
carrying  field-hospital  equipment  left  Russia  in  great 
haste.  From  these  data,  one  may  conclude  that  Russia 
had  not  the  least  desire  for  conciliation,  but  sought  to 
coerce  Japan  by  force  of  arms. 

"The  military  activity  of  Russia  was  further  acceler- 
ated from  the  end  of  January.  On  the  21st  of  January, 
about  two  battalions  of  the  infantry  and  some  of  the 
artillery  were  sent  from  Port  Arthur  and  Talien  to  the 
northern  frontier  of  Korea;  on  the  28th,  Viceroy  Alexieff 
ordered  the  Russian  troops  near  the  Yalu  to  be  placed 
on  a  war  footing;  on  February  1,  the  Governor  of  Vladi- 
vostok asked  the  Japanese  Commercial  Agent  at  the  port 
to  prepare  to  withdraw  to  Habarofsk  the  Japanese  sub- 
jects residing  there,  as  the  Governor  was,  under  instruc- 
tions from  his  Government,  ready  at  any  time  to  pro- 


354  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

claim  martial  law;  all  the  capable  warships  at  Port 
Arthur,  except  one  battleship  under  repair,  steamed  out 
to  sea;  and  army  forces  were  continually  leaving  Liao- 
yang  toward  the  Yalu.  Who  can  say  that  Russia  had 
neither  desire  nor  preparation  for  war?  Under  these 
critical  circumstances,  rendering  another  day's  delay  in- 
admissible, Japan  was  compelled  to  break  off  the  useless 
negotiations  and  take  necessary  measures  of  self -protec- 
tion. The  responsibility  of  provoking  war  does  not  rest 
upon  Japan,  but,  on  the  contrary,  entirely  upon  Russia. 
"Moreover,  Japan  notified  Russia,  on  February  6, 
that  she  would  terminate  her  negotiations  with  Russia, 
and  take  such  independent  action  as  she  deemed  best  in 
order  to  defend  her  position  menaced  by  Russia  and  pro- 
tect her  interests,  as  well  as  that  the  diplomatic  relations 
with  Russia  were  severed  and  the  Japanese  Legation 
would  withdraw  from  St.  Petersburg.  An  independent 
action  implies  all,  including,  as  a  matter  of  course,  the 
opening  of  hostile  acts.  Even  if  Russia  were  unable  to 
understand  it,  Japan  had  no  reason  to  hold  herself  re- 
sponsible for  the  misunderstandings  of  Russia.  The 
students  of  the  international  law  all  agree  that  a  declara- 
tion of  war  is  not  a  necessary  condition  for  beginning 
hostilities,  and  it  has  been  customary  in  modern  warfare 
for  the  declaration  to  follow  the  opening  of  the  war.  The 
action  of  Japan  had,  therefore,  no  ground  for  censure  in 
international  law.  It  is  singular  that  the  censure  should 
come,  as  it  did,  from  Russia,  for  historical  instances  are 
not  few  in  which  she  opened  hostile  acts  without  declaring 
war.  In  1808,  she  moved  troops  to  Finland  even  before 
diplomatic  relations  were  severed."  * 

1  Translated  from  the  statement  published  in  the  Japanese 
press  on  March  3,*1904. 

Professor  Sakuye  Takahashi  enumerated  in  the  Kokumin 


THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         355 

By  far  the  most  important  document  containing  Rus- 
sian charges  against  Japan  was  the  following  circular 
addressed  by  Count  Lamsdorff,  on  February  11,  to  the 
Russian  Representatives  abroad  :  — 

"  Since  the  rupture  of  the  negotiations  between  Russia 
and  Japan,  the  attitude  of  the  Tokio  Cabinet  has  con- 
stituted an  open  violation  of  all  customary  laws  govern- 
ing the  mutual  relations  of  civilized  nations. 

"  Without  specifying  each  particular  violation  of  these 
laws  on  the  part  of  Japan,  the  Imperial  Government 
considers  it  necessary  to  draw  the  most  serious  attention 
of  the  Powers  to  the  acts  of  violence  committed  by  the 
Japanese  Government  with  respect  to  Korea. 

u  The  independence  and  integrity  of  Korea,  as  a  fully 
independent  Empire,  have  been  fully  recognized  by  all  the 
Powers,  and  the  inviolability  of  this  fundamental  prin- 
ciple was  confirmed  by  Article  1  of  the  Shimonoseki 
treaty,  and  by  the  agreement  especially  concluded  for 
this  purpose  between  Japan  and  Great  Britain  on  Jan- 
uary 30,  1902,  as  well  as  by  the  Franco-Russian  declara- 
tion of  March  16,  1902. 

"The  Emperor  of  Korea,  foreseeing  the  danger  of  a 
possible  conflict  between  Russia  and  Japan,  addressed, 
early  in  January,  1904,  a  note  to  all  the  Powers,  declar- 
ing his  determination  to  preserve  the  strictest  neutrality. 
This  declaration  was  received  with  satisfaction  by  the 
Powers,  and  it  was  ratified  by  Russia.  According  to  the 
Russian  Minister   to   Korea,    the  British  Government, 

(February  27-29,  1904)  some  of  the  modern  European  wars  in 
which  declarations  of  war  did  not  precede  the  opening  of  hostili- 
ties. He  mentioned  twelve  such  cases  between  1715  and  1863, 
besides  ten  cases  between  1700  and  1853  in  which  Russia  was 
on  the  offensive.  For  these  latter  instances,  he  refers  to  Colonel 
J.  P.  Maurice's  Hostilities  without  Declaration  of  War,  pp.  12, 
16,  22,  34,  38,  49,  50,  55f  64. 


356  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

which  had  signed  the  above-mentioned  treaty  with  Japan 
on  January  30,  1902,  charged  the  British  diplomatic 
Representative  at  Seul  to  present  an  official  note  to  the 
Emperor  of  Korea,  thanking  him  for  his  declaration  of 
neutrality.1 

"  In  disregard  of  all  these  facts,  in  spite  of  all  treaties, 
in  spite  of  its  obligations,  and  in  violation  of  the  funda- 
mental rules  of  international  law,  it  has  been  proved  by 
exact  and  fully  confirmed  facts  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, 

"  1.  Before  the  opening  of  hostilities  against  Russia, 
landed  its  troops  in  the  independent  Empire  of  Korea, 
which  had  declared  its  neutrality. 

"2.  With  a  division  of  its  fleet  made  a  sudden  at- 
tack on  February  8  —  that  is,  three  days  prior  to  the 
declaration  of  war  —  on  two  Russian  warships  in  the 
neutral  port  of  Chemulpo.  The  commanders  of  these 
ships  had  not  been  notified  of  the  severance  of  diplomatic 
relations,  as  the  Japanese  maliciously  stopped  the  de- 
livery of  Russian  telegrams  by  the  Danish  cable  and 
destroyed  the  telegraphic  communication  of  the  Korean 
Government.  The  details  of  this  dastardly  attack  are 
contained  and  published  in  an  official  telegram  from  the 
Russian  Minister  at  Seul. 

"3.  In  spite  of  the  international  laws  above  men- 
tioned, and  shortly  before  the  opening  of  hostilities,  the 
Japanese  captured  as  prizes  of  war  certain  Russian  mer- 
chant ships  in  the  neutral  ports  of  Korea. 

"  4.  Japan  declared  to  the  Emperor  of  Korea,  through 
the  Japanese  Minister  at  Seul,  that  Korea  would  hence- 
forth be  under  Japanese  administration,  and  she  warned 
the  Emperor  that  in  case  of  his  non-compliance,  Japanese 
troops  would  occupy  the  palace. 

"5.  Through  the  French  Minister  at  Seul  she  sum- 
1  See  p.  322,  above. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         357 

moned  the  Russian  Representative  at  the  Korean  Court 
to  leave  the  country,  with  the  staffs  of  the  Russian  Lega- 
tion and  Consulate. 

"Recognizing  that  all  of  the  above  facts  constitute  a 
flagrant  breach  of  international  law,  the  Imperial  Gov- 
ernment considers  it  to  be  its  duty  to  lodge  a  protest 
with  all  the  Powers  against  this  procedure  of  the  Jap- 
anese Government,  and  it  is  firmly  convinced  that  all 
the  Powers,  valuing  the  principles  which  guarantee  their 
relations,  will  agree  with  the  Russian  attitude. 

"  At  the  same  time,  the  Imperial  Government  considers 
it  necessary  to  issue  a  timely  warning  that,  owing  to 
Japan's  illegal  assumption  of  power  in  Korea,  the  Gov- 
ernment declares  all  orders  and  declarations  which  may 
be  issued  on  the  part  of  the  Korean  Government  to  be 
invalid. 

*  I  beg  you  to  communicate  this  document  to  the  Gov- 
ernment to  which  you  are  accredited. 

"'  LAMSDORFF."  1 

In  reply  to  the  above,  the  Japanese  Government  is- 
sued, on  March  9,  the  following  statement:  — 

"The  Russian  Government  are  understood  to  have 
recently  addressed  a  note  to  the  Powers,  in  which  the 
Japanese  Government  are  charged  with  having  committed 
certain  acts  in  Korea  which  are  considered  by  Russia  to 
be  in  violation  of  international  law,  and  in  which  Russia 
further  declares  all  future  orders  and  declarations  of  the 
Korean*  Government  to  be  invalid. 

"  The  Imperial  Government  do  not  find  it  necessary  in 
the  present  instance  to  concern  themselves  in  any  way 
with  views,  opinions,  or  declarations  of  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment, but  they  believe  it  to  be  their  right  and  duty 

1  The  London  Times,  February  24,  1904,  p.  7,  and  other 
papers. 


358  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

to  correct  misstatements  of  facts  which,  if  permitted 
to  remain  uncontradicted,  might  give  rise  in  the  opin- 
ion of  neutral  Powers  to  incorrect  inferences  and  con- 
clusions. 

"  Accordingly,  the  Imperial  Government  desire  to  make 
the  following  statement  respecting  the  five  acts  which  are 
declared,  in  the  Russian  note  above  referred  to,  to  be 
fully  proved  and  confirmed  facts :  — 

"  1.  The  Imperial  Government  admit  that  a  number  of 
Japanese  troops  landed  in  Korea  before  the  formal  decla- 
ration of  war  was  issued  by  Japan,  but  they  must  say 
that  such  landing  did  not  take  place  before  a  state  of  war 
actually  existed  between  Japan  and  Russia.  The  main- 
tenance of  the  independence  and  territorial  integrity  of 
Korea  is  one  of  the  objects  of  war,  and,  therefore,  the 
dispatch  of  troops  to  the  menaced  territory  was  a  matter 
of  right  and  necessity,  which,  moreover,  had  the  dis- 
tinct consent  of  the  Korean  Government.  The  Imperial 
Government,  therefore,  drew  a  sharp  distinction  be- 
tween the  landing  of  the  Japanese  troops  in  Korea  in  the 
actual  circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  sending  of 
large  bodies  of  Russian  troops  to  Manchuria  without  the 
consent  of  China  while  peaceful  negotiations  were  still  in 
progress. 

**  2.  The  Imperial  Government  declare  that  the  Rus- 
sian allegation  that  they  stopped  the  delivery  of  Russian 
telegrams  by  the  Danish  cable  and  destroyed  the  Ko- 
rean Government's  telegraphic  communication  is  wholly 
untrue.  No  such  acts  were  done  by  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment. 

"  Regarding  the  alleged  sudden  attack,  on  February  8 
last,  upon  two  Russian  men-of-war  in  the  port  of  Che- 
mulpo, it  is  only  necessary  to  say  that  a  state  of  war  then 
existed,  and  that,  Korea  having  consented  to  the  landing 
of  Japanese  troops  at  Chemulpo,  that  harbor  had  already 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS         359 

ceased  to  be  a  neutral  port,  at  least  as  between  the  belli- 
gerents. 

"3.  The  Imperial  Government  have  established  a 
Prize  Court,  with  full  authority  to  pronounce  finally  on 
the  question  of  the  legality  of  seizures  of  merchant  ves- 
sels. Accordingly,  they  deem  it  manifestly  out  of  place 
to  make  any  statement  on  their  part  regarding  the  Rus- 
sian assertion  that  they  unlawfully  captured  as  prizes  of 
war  the  Russian  merchantmen  which  were  in  the  ports 
of  Korea. 

"  4.  The  Russian  Government  allege  that  the  Japanese 
Government  declared  to  the  Emperor  of  Korea  through 
their  Minister  at  Seul  that  Korea  would  henceforth  be 
under  Japanese  administration,  and  warned  the  Em- 
peror that,  in  case  of  non-compliance,  Japanese  troops 
would  occupy  the  palace.  The  Imperial  Government 
declare  this  charge  to  be  absolutely  and  wholly  without 
foundation. 

"  5.  No  demand,  either  direct  or  indirect,  was  addressed 
by  the  Japanese  Government  to  the  Russian  Minister  at 
Seul  to  retire  from  Korea.   The  fact  is  as  follows :  — 

"On  February  10  last,  the  French  Charge  d' Affaires 
at  Seul  called  on  the  Japanese  Minister  there  and  in- 
formed him,  as  it  was  confirmed  afterwards  in  writing, 
that  it  was  the  desire  of  the  Russian  Minister  to  leave 
Korea,  and  asked  the  opinion  of  the  Japanese  Minister 
on  the  subject.  The  Japanese  Minister  replied  that,  if 
the  Russian  Minister  would  withdraw  in  a  peaceful 
manner,  taking  with  him  his  staff  and  the  Legation  guard, 
he  would  be  fully  protected  by  Japanese  troops.  So  he 
withdrew  of  his  own  free  will  on  the  12th  of  the  same 
month,  and  an  escort  of  Japanese  soldiers  was  furnished 
for  him  as  far  as  Chemulpo.1 

1  The  diplomatic  correspondence  in  connection  with  this 
affair  has  been  published,  in  the  Kwampb,  February  15,  1904, 


360  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

u  The  Russian  allegation  that  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment forwarded  a  summons  through  the  French  Repre- 
sentative in  Korea  to  the  Russian  Minister  to  leave 
Korea  is,  therefore,  not  true.  In  this  connection  it  may 
be  remarked  that  the  Russian  Consul  at  Fusan  remained 
at  his  post  as  late  as  until  February  28  last.  It  is  reported 
that  he  was  compelled  to  stay  so  long  owing  to  the  ab- 
sence of  instructions  which  the  Russian  Minister  appar- 
ently did  not  think  of  giving  to  the  Consul  before  his  own 
departure  from  Seul.  When  it  was  known  that  necessary 
instructions  had  at  last  reached  the  Russian  Consul,  and 
that  he  desired  to  leave  Fusan  as  soon  as  possible,  the 
Japanese  Consul  at  the  same  port  offered  him  every  facil- 
ity for  the  departure,  and  his  passage  to  Shanghai  via 
Japan  was  arranged  by  the  Japanese  Consul."  l 

In  reply  to  the  above,  the  Russian  Government  issued 
another  statement  justifying  its  position,  the  purport  of 
which  may  be  gathered  from  the  following  press  dis- 
patch: — 

"St.  Petersburg,  March  12  — 2:  50  p.  m.  The  fol- 
lowing reply,  inspired  by  the  Foreign  Office,  to  Japan's 
rejoinder  to  the  Russian  protest  against  the  violation  of 
Korean  neutrality  may  be  accepted  as  official :  — 

"  Japan's  argument  that  she  was  justified  in  landing 
troops  in  Korea  before  the  declaration  of  war  because  she 
had  Korea's  permission,  and  also  that  these  troops  arrived 
in  Korea  after  *  the  existence  of  a  state  of  war,'  is  without 
value,  as  Korea  in  January  promulgated  her  neutrality  to 
the  Powers,  which  received  it  warmly,  Great  Britain  even 

pp.  275-276,  which  supports  the  literal  truth  of  the  statement 
contained  in  this  paragraph. 

1  The  Kokumin  (March  9).  The  above  has  been  taken  from 
an  authoritative  English  translation,  which  was  published  in  the 
London  Times  (March  9),  p.  5. 


THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  NEGOTIATIONS  361 

officially  conveying  expressions  of  gratitude  to  the  Korean 
Government.  Therefore,  no  state  of  war  gave  the  Japan- 
ese the  right  to  violate  her  neutrality  by  landing  troops  in 
her  territory.  Even  the  consent  of  Korea,  though  extorted 
by  the  Japanese,  is  without  force,  from  the  fact  that  the 
dispatch  of  troops  was  not  only  before  the  war,  but  before 
the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations,  as  clearly  estab- 
lished and  indeed  acknowledged  by  the  Japanese  them- 
selves. 

"Japan's  contention  in  defense  of  the  attack  on  the 
Russian  ships  at  Chemulpo,  that  the  port  was  not  neutral 
on  February  9,  is  false,  again  because  Korea  had  pro- 
claimed her  neutrality. 

"  Japan's  denial  of  malicious  interference  with  the  trans- 
mission of  Russian  telegrams  over  the  Danish  cable  can- 
not be  sustained.  A  telegram  to  Baron  Rosen  (then  Rus- 
sian Minister  to  Japan),  at  Tokio,  sent  from  St.  Peters- 
burg February  4,  was  not  delivered  till  the  morning  of 
February  7.  That  delay  did  not  occur  on  the  Siberian 
line,  as  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  a  reply  to  a  telegram 
from  Viceroy  Alexieff  sent  at  the  same  time  was  received 
the  same  day.  Therefore,  it  is  conclusive  that  the  Rosen 
telegram  was  held  by  the  Japanese  and  not  delivered  for 
two  days. 

"  Communication  with  M.  Pavloff  (then  Russian  Min- 
ister to  Korea)  by  the  Korean  telegraph  ceased  in  the  mid- 
dle of  January.  As  the  Koreans  were  enjoying  friendly 
relations  with  Russia,  there  is  good  ground  for  believing 
that  the  interruption  was  due  to  the  Japanese.  There- 
after M.  Pavloff  used  a  mail  steamer  or  a  special  warship 
to  communicate  with  Port  Arthur.  The  Minister  of  Rus- 
sia at  Seul  February  8,  therefore,  knew  nothing  of  the 
diplomatic  rupture. 

"  Japan  pleads  that  the  charge  against  her  seizure  of 
Russian  merchantmen  before  the  declaration  of  war  can- 


362  THE   RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

not  lie  after  the  establishment  of  prize  courts.  Their  seiz- 
ure before  the  declaration  of  war  being  piracy  is  not  defen- 
sible by  the  establishment  of  prize  courts,  which  cannot 
exist  before  a  declaration  of  war.  The  steamer  '  Russia ' 
was  seized  in  the  waters  of  Southern  Korea  even  before 
M.  Kurino  had  presented  his  note  here. 

"The  reply  concludes:  'Our  information  regarding 
Japan's  announcement  that  in  future  Korea  would  be 
under  her  administration  came  from  M.  Pavloff  and  also 
from  the  Representative  of  a  friendly  Power  at  Seul. 
Japan's  denial,  consequently,  is  fruitless,  as  also  is  the 
attempt  to  refute  our  statement  that  the  Russian  Minister 
and  Consul  at  Seul  were  told  to  leave.  We  had  conclusive 
proof  in  St.  Petersburg  on  February  10  that  the  French 
Minister  at  Seul  had  officially  notified  our  Representa- 
tives that  the  Japanese  Government  had  intimated  that 
they  should  leave,  and  that  the  Japanese  had  occupied 
territory  in  Korea.  M.  Pavloff  was  unable  to  notify  our 
Consul  at  Fusan,  his  telegram  being  refused  at  the  tele- 
graph office.'" 


CHAPTER  XX 

CHINESE  NEUTRALITY  AND  KOREAN  INTEGRITY 

No  sooner  had  the  war  broken  out  than  the 
Japanese  Government  notified  other  Powers,  on 
February  9,  that  it  had  advised  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment to  observe  a  strict  neutrality  during  hos- 
tilities. Below  is  a  translation  of  the  identical  note 
addressed  on  that  day  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  the  Japanese  Representatives  at  London, 
Washington,  Paris,  Vienna,  and  Rome  :  — 

*  The  Imperial  Government  have  carefully  considered 
the  question  as  to  what  attitude  China  should  assume  to 
the  best  advantage,  in  case  Japan  and  Russia  should  go 
to  war.  The  conflict  between  Japan  and  Russia  would 
affect  the  interests  of  China  at  least  to  the  same  extent 
that  it  would  those  of  Japan,  and  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment also  fully  recognize  the  advantage  of  utilizing  for 
their  aims  the  resources  of  China,  so  immense  in  popu- 
lation and  material.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  they 
cannot  overlook  what  effects  would  ensue  should  China 
assume  a  hostile  attitude  [in  favor  of  Japan].  Such  an 
attitude  would  probably  plunge  the  finances  of  China  into 
a  still  greater  confusion  [than  at  present],  and,  if  it  did 
not  incapacitate  her,  it  would  render  it  difficult  for  her 
to  meet  her  obligations.  Her  foreign  trade  would  also 
suffer  unfortunate  results.  There,  however,  exists  an  even 
greater  apprehension,  namely,  that  it  is  not  unlikely  that 


364  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

thereby  an  anti-foreign  feeling  might  again  be  aroused 
in  China,  and  the  Powers  of  the  world  might  be  obliged 
to  encounter  troubles  similar  to  those  of  1900.  For 
these  reasons,  the  Imperial  Government  have  advised 
the  Chinese  Government  that,  in  case  Japan  and  Russia 
should  go  to  war,  they  should  observe  neutrality,  and 
should  take  all  possible  measures  to  maintain  order  and 
peace  within  their  Empire. 

"You  are  instructed  to  address  a  signed  communi- 
cation to  this  effect  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
the  Government  to  which  you  are  accredited,  and  also 
assure  him  that,  if  China  maintains  her  neutrality,  and 
so  long  as  Russia  respects  it,  the  Imperial  Government 
will  likewise  respect  it."  1 

Three  days  after  this  note  was  issued,  the  United 
States  Minister  at  Tokio,  Mr.  Griscom,  delivered 
the  circular  "note  of  Secretary  Hay  urging  on  the 
belligerent  Powers  the  advisability  of  respecting  the 
neutrality  and  maintaining  the  administrative  entity 
of  China,  and  of  limiting  the  zone  of  hostilities  in 
the  Chinese  territory.  The  note,  arriving  as  it  did, 
after  the  Japanese  attitude  had  been  clearly  defined, 
Baron  Komura  at  once  replied,  on  the  13th,  that 
the  Japanese  Government  were  in  perfect  accord 
with  the  United  States  Government  in  the  desires 
expressed  by  the  latter,  and  would,  so  long  as  Rus- 
sia made  the  same  pledge  and  faithfully  observed 
it,  promise  to  respect  the  neutrality  and  the  adminis- 
trative entity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  beyond  regions 
actually  in  Russian  occupation.  The  result  of  the 
correspondence  between  the  United  States  and  other 
1  The  Kivampo,  February  19  (1904),  p.  387. 


CHINESE  NEUTRALITY  365 

Powers  regarding  Mr.  Hay's  circular  further  con- 
firmed the  views  expressed  in  Japan's  reply,  for  the 
neutral  rights  of  China  could  hardly  be  enforced 
in  Manchuria,  or,  in  other  words,  the  zone  of  war 
would  be  best  limited  to  that  territory.  These  points 
were  agreed  to  by  the  Powers,  including  Germany, 
whose  Emperor  had  appealed *  to  the  Government 
of  Washington  to  take  the  initiative  in  this  general 
agreement. 

The  Japanese  note  of  February  9  and  the  gen- 
eral agreement  of  the  Powers  secured  by  the  United 
States  thus  confirmed  each  other,  the  former  estab- 
lishing the  principle  of  neutrality  and  the  latter 
defining  the  geographical  limit  of  its  application. 
The  latter  point,  however,  involved  a  debatable 
problem,  the  solution  of  which  was  left  to  China 
herself.  It  will  be  remembered  that  Japan,  in  her 
reply  of  February  13  to  the  United  States,  men- 
tioned, as  the  field  for  hostile  action,  not  all  Man- 
churia, but  only  the  territory  actually  occupied  by 
Russian  forces.  This  territory  naturally  excluded 
that  portion  of  Manchuria  lying  west  of  the  Liao 
River  which  Russian  troops  evacuated  before  Octo- 
ber 8, 1902.  The  Chinese  Government,  in  declaring 
the  neutrality  of  the  Empire  on  the  13th,  practi- 
cally confirmed  the  construction  of  the  Japanese 
Foreign  Office,  for,  in  her  declaration,  China  an- 
nounced her  intention,  which  has  since  been  carried 
out  by  Viceroy  Yuan  and  General  Ma,  of  dispatch- 

1  Ex-Secretary  of  War  Elihu  Root's  speech  at  the  Republican 
Convention  at  Chicago,  June  21,  1904. 


366  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

ing  forces  to  the  west  of  the  Liao  River  from  which 
the  Russian  forces  had  withdrawn,  in  order  to  de- 
fend it  against  the  incursion  of  troops  of  either 
belligerent.1 

All  the  essential  points  regarding  China's  neu- 
trality having  been  settled  to  the  satisfaction  of 
Japan,  the  Government  of  the  latter  was  in  a  po- 
sition to  reply  in  the  following  manner,  on  Febru- 
ary 17,  to  the  Chinese  declaration  of  the  13th :  — 

"It  being  the  desire  of  the  Imperial  Government  to 
prevent  disturbance  of  peaceful  conditions  within  the 
Chinese  Empire,  they  will,  in  all  the  Chinese  dominion 
outside  the  territory  under  Russian  occupation,  and  so 
long  as  Russia  acts  likewise,  respect  the  neutrality  of  the 
Empire.  .  .  .  Japan's  hostilities  against  Russia  having 
been  actuated,  not  by  a  desire  for  conquest,  but  solely 
by  the  necessity  of  defending  her  just  rights  and  interests, 
the  Imperial  Government  have  not  the  slightest  intention 
of  acquiring  territory,  as  a  result  of  the  war,  at  the  ex- 
pense of  China.  It  is  also  desired  that  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment will  clearly  understand  that  the  [warlike]  mea- 
sures to  be  taken  [by  Japan]  in  the  field  of  action  within 
the  Chinese  territory,  arising,  as  they  will,  purely  from 
military  necessities,  will  not  be  of  a  nature  to  infringe 
the  sovereign  rights  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  .  .  . "  2 

Ten  days  after  Japan  disavowed  aggressive  inten- 
tions in  Manchuria,  on  February  27,  was  published 
the  new  Korean-Japanese  Protocol,3  concluded  on 

1  The  Kwampo,  February  19  (1904),  pp.  387-388. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  388. 

8  Ibid.,  February  27  (1904),  pp.  586-587. 


KOREAN  INTEGRITY  367 

the  23d,  whereby  Japan  pledged  herself  to  guar- 
antee for  all  time  the  independence  and  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  the  Korean  Empire.  The  text  of 
this  remarkable  document,  in  its  English  transla- 
tion, is  as  follows  :  — 

"  Gonsuke  Hayashi,  Envoy  Extraordinary  and  Minis- 
ter Plenipotentiary  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  Japan, 
and  Major  General  Yi  Chi-yong,  Minister  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  ad  interim  of  His  Majesty  the  Emperor 
of  Korea,  being,  respectively,  duly  empowered  for  the 
purpose,  have  agreed  upon  the  following  Articles :  — 

"Article  1.  For  the  purpose  of  maintaining  a  per- 
manent and  unalterable  friendship  between  Japan  and 
Korea,  and  of  firmly  establishing  peace  in  the  East,  the 
Imperial  Government  of  Korea  shall  place  full  confidence 
in  the  Imperial  Government  of  Japan  and  adopt  the 
advice  of  the  latter  regarding  improvements  in  adminis- 
tration. 

"Article  2.  The  Imperial  Government  of  Japan  shall, 
in  a  spirit  of  firm  friendship,  insure  the  safety  and  repose 
of  the  Imperial  House  of  Korea. 

"Article  3.  The  Imperial  Government  of  Japan 
firmly  guarantee  the  independence  and  the  territorial 
integrity  of  the  Korean  Empire. 

"  Article  4.  In  case  the  welfare  of  the  Imperial  House 
of  Korea,  or  the  territorial  integrity  of  Korea,  is  endan- 
gered by  the  aggression  of  a  third  Power,  or  internal  dis- 
turbances, the  Imperial  Government  of  Japan  shall  im- 
mediately take  such  necessary  measures  as  circumstances 
require,  and  in  such  case  the  Imperial  Government  of 
Korea  shall  give  full  facilities  to  promote  the  action  of 
the  Imperial  Japanese  Government. 

"  The  Imperial  Government  of  Japan  may,  for  the  at- 
tainment of  the  above-mentioned  object,  occupy,  when 


368  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

circumstances  require  it,  such  places  as  may  be  necessary 
from  the  strategic  point  of  view. 

"Article  5.  The  Government  of  the  two  countries 
shall  not,  in  the  future,  without  mutual  consent,  con- 
clude with  a  third  Power  such  an  arrangement  as  may 
be  contrary  to  the  principles  of  the  present  Protocol,  j 

"Article  6.  Details  in  connection  with  the  present 
Protocol  shall  be  arranged  as  the  circumstances  may 
require  between  the  Representative  of  Japan  and  the 
Minister  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  Korea." 

It  is  impossible  to  imagine  in  the  history  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  conflict  a  more  striking  indication 
of  the  new  situation  it  has  opened  than  this  Pro- 
tocol of  February  23,  1904.  It  is  at  once  a  culmi- 
nation of  past  events  and  a  background  for  future 
activities.  It  sums  up  the  failures  of  the  past  expe- 
rience and  calls  forth  innumerable  new  problems 
and  difficulties.  It  will  be  seen,  in  the  first  place, 
that  the  agreement  is  limited  by  no  fixed  term  ;  it 
exists  for  all  time.  Then  the  fundamental  problem 
of  the  Japanese-Korean  relations  is  revealed  here  in 
this  Protocol  in  a  clear  outline,  and  is  solved  in  the 
most  logical  manner.  The  problem  may  be  stated 
thus  :  Japan's  interest  and  conviction  demand  that 
Korea  should  be  independent,  prosperous,  and 
powerful ;  but  Korea  neither  could  nor  would  be  so. 
One  remembers  how  Japan  had  struggled  to  solve 
this  problem,  ever  since  she  overthrew  the  feudal 
regime  of  her  own  Government  in  1868  and  entered 
upon  a  new  career  as  a  nation.  At  first,  in  1876, 
she  declared  Korea  independent,  and  opened  a  few 


KOREAN  INTEGRITY  369 

of  her  ports  to  the  world's  trade.  Korea  did  not  de- 
sire and  China  could  not  tolerate  the  independence. 
The  result  was  the  war  of  1894-5,  which  succeeded 
in  forcing  the  independence  of  Korea.  The  latter, 
however,  proved  neither  more  desirous  nor  more 
capable  of  an  independent  career  than  she  was  under 
Chinese  sovereignty,  while  at  the  time  China's  po- 
sition was  merely  replaced  by  that  of  a  more  active 
Power,  Russia.  Japan  seemed,  after  her  costly  war, 
which,  it  is  not  too  much  to  say,  alone  had  earned 
the  sovereign  rights  of  Korea,  to  acquiesce  in  the 
altered  situation  to  such  an  extent  as  to  admit 
Russia  into  a  partnership  with  herself  in  the  non- 
intervention in  Korea.1  Bitter  was  Japan's  experi- 
ence in  this  artificial  arrangement.  Korea  would 
not  strive  for  a  freer  life  any  more  than  Russia 
would  abstain  from  incessant  interference.2  Thus 
the  conviction  was  every  year  more  forcibly  and 
painfully  impressed  upon  Japan's  mind  that  the 
threatening  situation  in  the  East  arose  from  the  two 
fundamental  defects  of  the  existing  arrangement : 
first,  Korea's  independence  would  be  illusory  so 
long  as  her  administrative  system  remained,  as  it 
did,  corrupt  to  the  core,  but  no  reform  would  result 
from  a  system  of  non-interference ;  second,  no  joint 
reform  in  Korea  would  be  possible  so  long  as  one 
of  the  contracting  parties  to  the  agreements  of  1896 
and  1898  found  in  Korea's  decay  the  source  of  its 

1  See  the  three  Russo-Japanese  agreements  regarding  Korea, 
concluded  in  1896  and  1898,  pp.  263  ff.,  above. 

2  Chapter  XVII. 


370  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE  CONFLICT 

influence  over  her.  In  short,  in  order  to  guard  the 
common  interests  of  Japan  and  Korea,  the  former 
would  be  constrained  to  reform  the  latter  even 
against  her  will ;  and,  again,  in  order  to  effect  a 
thoroughgoing  reform,  Japan  would  be  obliged  to 
part  ways  with  Russia  in  Korea.  One  half  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  negotiations  in  1903-4  hinged  on 
Japan's  desire  for  a  free  hand  in  ^Korea  in  the  in- 
terest of  reform.'  The  negotiations  having  failed, 
and  Russia  having  withdrawn  from  Korea,  Japan 
suddenly  found  herself  alone  with  the  latter,  and 
hastened  to  conclude  with  her  an  agreement  which 
seemed  to  embody  the  only  possible  logical  solu- 
tion of  the  great  historic  problem  of  the  Japanese- 
Korean  relations. 

Let  us  look  this  solution  more  squarely  in  the 
face.  Japan's  ardent  desire  for  the  independence 
and  strength  of  Korea,  as  a  means  of  insuring  the 
mutual  benefit  of  the  two  Powers  and  of  establish- 
ing a  lasting  peace  in  the  East,  would  seem  to  con- 
stitute the  guiding  principle  of  the  entire  document. 
The  historic  inability  of  Korea  to  be  independent 
and  strong  is  met  in  three  different  methods,  each 
one  of  which  will  not  fail  to  bring  about  far-reach- 
ing consequences.  In  the  first  place,  the  political 
influence  of  a  third  Power  is  absolutely  excluded 
(Article  5),  for  the  latter's  interest  might  lie  in  the 
direction  of  the  dependence  and  weakness  of  Korea. 
In  the  second  place,  Japan  alone  guarantees,  for  all 
time,  the  security  and  repose  of  the  reigning  house 
of  Korea  and  the  independence  and  territorial  in- 


KOREAN  INTEGRITY  371 

tegrity  of  the  Empire  (Articles  2  and  3).  For  the 
practical  execution  of  this  principle,  Japan  further 
pledges  herself  to  defend  Korea  from  dangers,  and 
Korea  in  return  allows  to  Japan  necessary  strategic 
facilities  (Article  4).  Finally,  and  immediately  the 
most  important  of  all,  Japan  undertakes  to  institute 
reforms  in  Korea,  for  which  she  shall  be  invested 
with  the  full  confidence  of  Korea  (Article  1).  These 
three  important  methods,  it  is  needless  to  repeat, 
are  subservient  to  the  central  principle :  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  Korea.  This  large  issue 
must  always  prevail  over  minor  incidents. 

Coming  still  nearer  to  the  practical  side  of  the 
Protocol,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  that,  of  the  three 
methods  already  explained,  one  stands  out  as  the 
most  important  and  most  difficult,  —  the  reform. 
No  greater  burden  and  no  more  delicate  work  for 
a  nation  can  be  imagined  than  that  of  regenerating 
another  whose  nobility  has  grown  powerful  under 
corruption,  and  whose  lower  classes  do  not  desire 
a  higher  existence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  inertia 
and  resistance  of  Korea  would  be  tremendous,  in 
which  her  "  full  confidence  "  would  give  place  to 
hatred  and  rancor.  The  proverbial  machinations  of 
the  peninsular  politicians  would  be  set  in  motion  in 
all  their  speed  and  confusion.  It  would  not  be  sur- 
prising if,  under  the  circumstances,  even  a  military 
control  of  Korea  of  a  temporary  and  mild  nature 
should  become  necessary  in  order  to  cure  her  malady 
and  set  her  house  in  order.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  the  necessary  reform  should  be  so  deep  and 


372  THE  RUSSO-JAPANESE   CONFLICT 

wide  as  is  required  in  the  present  instance,  the 
temptation  of  the  reformer  would  be  great,  and  the 
suspicion  of  the  reformed  even  greater,  where  politi- 
cal reformatory  enterprises  border  upon  the  eco- 
nomic.1 Here  and  everywhere,  Japan  would  save 
herself  from  the  gravest  of  errors,  in  spite  of  her 
best  intention  in  the  large  issue,  only  by  the  severest 
self-control  and  consummate  tact.  Great  is  the  pen- 
alty of  Japan  that  arises  from  her  peculiar  position. 
She  has  never  encountered  in  her  long  history  a 
greater  trial  of  her  moral  force  as  a  nation  than  in 
the  new  situation  opened  by  the  Protocol.  As  to 
the  world  at  large,  it  will  look  forward  to  an  in- 
tensely interesting  experiment  of  human  history. 

1  See  the  virulent  opposition  of  certain  reactionaries  of  Korea 
against  the  railroad,  shipping,  and  other  economic  enterprises  of 
the  Japanese  in  the  peninsula,  as  expressed  in  a  circular  letter 
issued  by  them  in  June,  1904,  and  published  in  the  Ddbun-kwai> 
No.  56  (July,  1904),  pp.  57-62.  Here,  as  everywhere,  the  stu- 
dent should  carefully  observe  the  nature  of  the  opposition,  its 
agents,  and  their  motives.  Cf.  the  latest  issues  of  the  Korea 
Review,  edited  by  Mr.  H.  B.  Hulbert,  Seul. 


INDEX 


INDEX 


Agriculture  of  Japan,  2;  produc- 
tion, 3-4 ;  in  finance,  4-5  ;  arable 
land,  5-6  and  notes;  improve- 
ments, 6 ;  domestic  animals,  6  n. 
4  ;  wages  and  profits,  6-7 ;  sub- 
sidiary occupation,  7 ;  owners  and 
tenants,  7  and  n.  2. 

Agriculture  of  Korea,  26-28  ;  for- 
estry, 28  ;  waste  land,  27-28  n.  1. 

Alexieff,  Admiral,  and  TsSng-ebi, 
166-172  ;  at  conference  at  Port 
Arthur,  301, 312-313 ;  made  Vice- 
roy of  the  Far  East,  301 ;  position 
in  the  negotiations,  307, 312-313, 
323,  332,  339  n.  3,  n.  4. 

Alexieff,  Kir,  269,  278. 

American,  trade  at  Niu-chwang,  16 
n.  3, 17, 165 ;  kerosene,  40 ;  cotton 
goods  in  Manchuria,  41  ;  trade  in 
Manchuria  under  Chinese  and 
Russian  rule,  41-42 ;  Chinese 
treaty,  317,  335.  (Also  see  the 
United  States.) 

Amur,  the,  144,  145. 

Anglo-German  Agreement,  157  ff. ; 
leading  to  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Agreement,  199  ;  differs  from  the 
latter,  207-208.  (Also  see  Eng- 
land and  Germany.) 

Anglo-Japanese  Agreement,  202- 
208,  315  n.  1,  355 ;  events  lead- 
ing up  to,  197-202  ;  includes  Man- 
churia, 207 ;  compared  with  the 
Anglo-German  Agreement,  207- 
208.  (Also  see  England  and 
Japan.) 

Antuug,  155  ;  in  Russian  occupation, 
239;  strengthened,  292,  319;  as 
a  timber  port,  290 ;  as  an  open 
port,  255,  317,  318,  335. 

Artillery,  of  Chinese  police  in  Man- 
churia, 175,  192. 

Austria,  159. 

Balance  of  power  in  China,  108,  127 
and  n.  1,  159,  208. 


Bank-notes  in  Korea,  23,  281. 

Barley  in  Japan,  4. 

Beans,  4,  9,  13-14,  18. 

Benckendorff,  313,  314,  334  n.  3. 

Bezobrazoff,  291  n.  3,  313. 

Blagovestchensk,  144,  155,  316. 

Boxer  trouble,  the,  139;  cost  for 
Russia,  33.  (Also  see  China, 
Manchuria.) 

Brown,  McLeavy,  269,  278. 

Biilow,  von,  on  Kiao-chau,  102, 106 ; 
on  the  Anglo -German  Agree- 
ment, 161 ;  on  the  Anglo-Japan- 
ese alliance,  199  n.  1.  (Also  see 
Germany.) 

Cable  at  Chemulpo,  356,  358,  361. 

Cannon,  in  Chinese  police  in  Man- 
churia, 175,  192. 

Cassini,  Count,  on  the  development 
of  Manchuria,  43-44 ;  at  Peking, 
87, 94 ;  the  "  Cassini  Convention," 
87-95,  98,  224-225;  on  Russian 
soldiers  in  Manchuria,  237  n.  1 ; 
on  Lessar's  demands,  248  ff. ;  on 
new  ports,  253  ;  on  the  contents 
of  the  last  Russian  reply  to  Japan, 
340  n. ;  on  the  responsibility  of 
the  war,  351  n.  1. 

Cazalis,  279. 

Chang  Chi-tung,  176,  177, 178,  189, 
191. 

Chemulpo,  trade  at,  15,  19-20; 
Seul  Railway,  24  and  n.  1 ;  kero- 
sene at,  40  and  n.  3  ;  Admiral 
Starck  at,  293  ;  cable  at,  356, 358, 
361 ;  naval  war  at,  345,  356,  358, 
361. 

Chili,  Province  of,  179,  218,  243. 

China,  merchants  of,  in  Korea,  14 
n.  2,  15 ;  ceding  Primorsk  to  Rus- 
sia, 66 ;  suzerain  over  Korea,  257  ; 
war  with  Japan,  257,  369;  loan 
guaranteed  by  Russia,  83-84 ;  alli- 
ance with  Russia,  85,  93,  94  n.  2 ; 
envoy  at  the  Czar's  coronation, 


376 


INDEX 


87;  contribution  to  the  Russo- 
Chinese  Bank,  84;  to  the  Man- 
churian  Railway,  96;  railway- 
agreement  with  Russia,  96-99; 
Anglo-German  loan,  107,  113, 
117-118;  proposed  Russian  loan, 
112;  balance  of  power,  108,  127 
and  n.  1,  159,  20S ;  Russian  con- 
vention of  evacuation,  93;  trea- 
ties with  Japan  and  the  U.  S., 
317-318,  335. 

China,  independence  of,  203, 205, 208, 
209;  integrity  of,  203,  205,  208, 
297,  303,  305,  310-311,  324,  329, 
333, 336, 338, 340  n.,  343, 347;  neu- 
trality of,  advised  by  Japan,  363- 
364,  declared,  365-366 ;  the  open 
door  in,  202,  203,  205,  208, 21 1. 

(Also  see   Boxer,   Court,   Em- 
peror, Manchuria,  and  Russia.) 

Ching,  Prince,  94,  162  and  n.  2,  177, 
182,  191,  192,  193,  196,  214,  228 
n.  2,  229,  234,  245,  251,  254,  316. 

Chinnampo,  19. 

Ghishima  (the  Ku riles),  66  and  n.  1, 
67. 

Conger,  191,  193,  196,  245,  252. 

Cotton  and  cotton  goods,  9,  10-11, 
41. 

Court,  the  Chinese,  leaving  for  Si- 
ngan,  161,  n.  1 ;  returning  to  Pe- 
king, 214. 

Dalny,  as  Russia's  Manchurian  port, 
37-43  ;  Cassini  on,  44 ;  organiza- 
tion and  administration,  133-134 ; 
as  a  free  port,  42,  45  n.  1,  117, 
137;  troops  leaving  for  the  Ko- 
rean frontier,  340,  353  ;  demand 
for  timber,  290. 

"  Depots  "  in  Manchuria,  44-45, 235 ; 
not  to  be  opened,  315. 

Dobun-kwai  =  the  To- A  Dobun-kwai 
Hokoku,  monthly  reports  of  the 
To- A  Dobun  Association. 

East  Asia,  its  extent,  8  n.  3 ;  trade 
with  Japan,  8  and  notes  ;  imports 
into  Japan,  9 ;  importance  to 
Japan,  9-10.  (Also  see  Korea  and 
Manchuria.) 

Eastern  Chinese  Railway,  32-33, 
134,  325  ;  Company,  96-99,  174, 
176,  182,  230.  (Also  see  Man- 
churia and  Railway.) 


Education  in  Japan  and  Russia,  56 
n.  2. 

Emperor,  Chinese,  176,  177,  182, 
183. 

Empress  Dowager,  219,  245. 

England,  mediating  for  China,  68 ; 
declining  to  join  in  coercion,  72, 
74 ;  advising  Japan  to  retrocede 
all  Liao-tung,  76 ;  increasing 
common  interest  with  Japan  and 
the  U.  S.,  76,  78 ;  attitude  toward 
the  Kiao-chau  affair,  106-109; 
policy  about  Talien-wan,  113, 
about  Port  Arthur,  119  ffT,  127 
n.  2;  at  Wei-hai-wei,  107  n.  1, 
125rl26,  128-129 ;  reply  to  Hay, 
136 ;  in  South  and  Middle  China, 
141-142 ;  agreement  with  Ger- 
many, 156-161 ;  interests  in  Man- 
churia, 165;  on  the  Alexieff-Tsgng 
Agreement,  169;  appealed  to  by 
China,  182,  183-184;  on  the 
Lamsdorff-Yang-yu  Agreement, 
177,  184-185;  on  Russian  de- 
mands, 193,  196 ;  interests  in 
China,  203,  206,  208;  relations 
with  Japan,  197-199,  205 ;  agree- 
ment with  her,  199-208 ;  protest 
against  Russian  demands  of  1903, 
245,  246,  254;  on  Korean  neu- 
trality, 255,  360-361. 

Equal  opportunity,  the  principle  of 
(definition),  10  and  n.  1,  106,  135- 
138,  139,  159,  165,  202, 205,  208, 
211,  297,  303,  305. 

Evacuation,  the  convention  of,  93, 
196,  214  ff.;  conditions  for,  225, 
227  ff.;  from  the  west  of  Liao, 
233  ff.,  365-366;  nominal  nature 
of,  234  ff. ;  the  last  day  set  for, 
311 ;  a  new  arrangement  for,  pro- 
posed, 311.    (Also  see  Manchuria, ) 

Far  East,  vice-royalty  of  the,  301- 

302. 
Feng-hwang-Chgng,  155,  239,  292. 
Fgng-tien,     Province    of     (Sheng- 

king),  166.   (Also  see  Sheng-king.) 
Finance,  Japanese,   agriculture   in, 

4,  5  ;  army  and  navy,  and  total 

revenue    and    expenditures,     80, 

n.  1. 
First  Bank  of  Japan,  in  Korea,  23, 

28L 
Fisheries  in  Korean  waters,  26. 


INDEX 


377 


Flour,  40. 

Food-stuffs.     See  Agriculture. 

Formosa,  2,  5,  22,  70. 

France,  joining-  Russia  in  1895,  71- 
77 ;  sympathies  with  Russia,  78  ; 
reply  to  Hay,  136 ;  on  the 
Anglo-German  Agreement,  159 ; 
peace  terms  after  the  Boxer  trou- 
ble, 163 ;  Declaration  with  Rus- 
sia, 207-213, 355. 

Frontier  guards,  98,  230-232. 

Fusan,  trade  at,  15,  19;  Japanese 
in,  23 ;  Seul  Railway,  24  and  n.  2, 
n.  3,  286  and  n. ;  Seul  telegraph, 
265 ;  Japanese  gendarmes,  265  ; 
troops  in,  266  ;  Russian  Consul  at, 
360,  362. 

Gensan  (Wonsan),  25,  n.  1 ;  Japan- 
ese troops  in,  266. 

Germany,  not  joining  in  interven- 
tion, 68  ;  advising  Japan,  69  ; 
cooperating  with  Russia  and 
France,  71-77 ;  as  a  free  lance, 
78 ;  service  to  China,  101  and  n. 
2  ;  leasing  Kiao-chau,  101-109  ; 
attitude  toward  Wei-hai-Wei,  107 
n.  1  ;  reply  to  Hay,  136 ;  agree- 
ment with  England,  156-161  ;  at 
peace  conferences  at  Peking, 
162  ;  the  Ketteler  murder,  164 ; 
on  the  Alexieff-Tsgng  Agreement, 
169  and  n.  3 ;  on  the  Lamsdorff- 
Yang-yu  Agreement,  178  ;  on  the 
Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  199-n. 
1 ;  the  Kaiser  on  China's  neu- 
trality, 365. 

Giers,  M.  de,  in  Peking,  141,  152, 
179,  181  and  n.  1,  190. 

Ginseng,  in  Korea,  25. 

Great  Britain.    See  England. 

Gribsky,  General,  144,  155. 

Griscom,  in  Tokio,  364. 

Groderkoff,  General,  145. 

Gubbins,  in  Seul,  278. 

Gunzburg,  Baron,  25  and  n.  3,  279, 
280,  288,  319,  321. 

Habarofsk,  341,  353. 

Harbin,  retaken,  144  ;  development, 

43-54 ;    telegraphic     connections 

with  Wiju  and  Port  Arthur,  285  ; 

as  open    port,   255 ;    not   to  be 

opened,  45,  314. 
Hardinge,  at  St.  Petersburg,  231. 


Harris,  Townsend,  56. 

Hart,  Sir  Robert,  112. 

Hay,  Secretary  John,  circular  note 
of,  in  1899,  135-138;  on  Russia's 
propositions,  150  n.  1 ;  circular  of, 
July  3, 1900, 150  n.  1 ;  on  Russian 
demands,  194  ;  making  inquiries 
at  St.  Petersburg,  246  ;  negotiat- 
ing for  opening  Manchurian  ports, 
252-254 ;  on  China's  neutrality, 
364-365. 

Hayashi,  Gonsuke,  in  Korea,  con- 
trasted with  Pavloff,  273  ;  regard- 
ing Masampo,  275,  277 ;  about 
McLeavy  Brown,  278  ;  about  Rus- 
sian loan,  279 ;  about  Yong-am-po, 
319,  320  ;  signed  the  Korean  Pro- 
tocol, 367. 

Hayashi,  Baron  H.,  in  London,  204. 

Hei-lung,  Province  of,  221, 241, 316. 

Herbert,  Sir  Michael,  252. 

Henry,  Prince,  of  Germany,  104. 

Heyking,  Baron  von,  104-105,  105 
n.  4. 

Hilidebrand,  Admiral,  276. 

Hill,  J.  J.,  on  freight  to  the  East, 
42  n. 

Hong-kong,  8  n.  3,  16  n.  3. 

Hoshi,  Toru,  258. 

Hosie,  Alexander,  228  n.  1,  231. 

Ignatieff,  66. 

Indemnity,  Chinese,  to  Japan,  70, 

84 ;  to  the  Powers,  233. 
Independence,  of  Korea,  257,  266, 

271 ;  of  Korea  and   China,  202, 

203,  205,  208,  209. 
Integrity    of   China,    forgotten    in 

1898,  139 ;  in  the  Anglo-German 

Agreement,   159;   in   1900,  139, 

165  ;  of  China  and  Korea,   105— 

106,  203,  205,  208,  211. 
Inoiie\  Count,  at  Seul,  258,  259,  260 ; 

as  Privy  Councilor,  296,  324,  329, 

337,  342. 
Issues  of  the  conflict :  (1)  economic, 

Japan's   side,    transition,     1-10 ; 

community  of  interest  with  Korea 

and  Manchuria,   10-32 ;  Russia's 

side,  32-47 ;  comparison,  47-48 ; 

(2)  political,    48-51  ;    summary, 

51-53;  conclusion,  53-61;  issues 

not  causes,  65. 
Italy,  159. 
Ito,  Marquis  H.,  as  Peace  Commis- 


378 


INDEX 


sioner  at  Shimonoseki,  69 ;  on 
agreements  with  Russia  and  Great 
Britain,  200  and  n.  1,  263  n.  5  ;  as 
Privy  Councilor,  296,  324,  329, 
337,  342. 

Japan,  alleged  disregard  of  life  of 
the  Japanese,  82  ;  the  samurai's 
ethical  code,  82  n.  1 ;  patriotism, 
81,  82  n.  1 ;  past  training,  81, 
82  n.  1 ;  as  representing  new  civ- 
ilization, 53-64 ;  fundamental 
policy,  81. 

,  agriculture,  2-7 ;  capitaliza- 
tion, 80  n.  2 ;  education,  56  n.  2 ; 
finance,  4-5,  80  notes;  manufac- 
ture, 2-3,  3  and  note  2 ;  popula- 
tion, 1-2,  8,  80  n.  2 ;  trade,  2  ff. ; 
trade  with  Korea  and  Manchuria, 
10-21;  interests  in  China,  203, 
206,  208 ;  economic  interests  in 
Manchuria,  10-18,  30-31,  165; 
political  interests  in  Manchuria, 
49-50  ;  special  interests  in  Korea, 
10-16,  19-30,  203,  207,  298,  303, 
305-307,  308-309,  324,  326,  328, 
331, 338,  367  ff. ;  soldiers  in  Korea, 
265,  266  and  n.  2  ;  political  policy 
in  Korea,  52  and  n.  2;  common 
interest  with  other  Powers  in 
Korea  and  Manchuria,  32,  76,  78, 
81. 

,  war  with  China,  68469,  267  ; 

treaty  of  Shimonoseki,  70 ;  retro- 
cession of  Liao-tung,  71-78,  its 
effects,  78-82 ;  army  and  navy  ex- 
penses, 80  n.  1 ;  inquiries  at  St. 
Petersburg,  85  ;  attitude  toward 
the  Russian  lease  of  Port  Arthur,* 
128,  toward  the  British  lease  of 
Wei-hai-Wei,  128-129,  128  n.  3, 
129  n.  1 ;  reply  to  Hay,  136  ;  sig- 
natory to  the  Anglo-German 
Agreement,  159 ;  at  peace  confer- 
ences, 164 ;  warning  to  China,  169 ; 
on  the  Yang-yu  Agreement,  178, 
186-187 ;  on  the  question  of  official 
punishment,  181 ;  on  Russian  de- 
mands, 193,  196 ;  relations  with 
England,  197-199,  205;  negotia- 
tions for  alliance,  199-202 ;  the 
Anglo-Japanese  Agreement,  202- 
208  ;  on  Plancon's  demands,  245, 
246,  254,  256. 

,  negotiations  with  Russia :  in- 


vitation to  negotiate,  296-299 ;  the 
first  note,  3T)2^307  ;  transfers  ne- 
gotiations to  St.  Petersburg,  307- 
308  ;  the  first  Russian  reply,  308- 
311;  the  second  note,  324-327; 
the  second  Russian  reply,  328  n. 
2 ;  the  third  note,  329-331 ;  the 
third  Russian  reply,  332-334; 
economic  losses,  336 ;  the  fourth 
note,  337-339  ;  the  probable  con- 
tents of  the  reply,  339  n.  4 ;  war- 
like preparations,  341  n.  1 ;  ne- 
gotiations broken,  342-344;  all 
relations  severed,  344 ;  Russian 
views  of  the  negotiations,  349- 
351 ;  treaty  with  China,  317-318, 
335 ;  declaration  of  war,  346-348. 

Japan,  advises  China  to  be  neutral, 
363-364;  upholds  China's  neutral- 
ity, 466 ;  Korean  relations,  356, 
359  ;  the  Protocol,  366  ff. ;  reform 
in  Korea,  257-260,  366  ff. 

Jordan,  in  Seul,  269,  282. 

Ka-heung,  265. 

Kato,  Masuo,  280  n.  3. 

Kato,  T.,  ex-Foreign  Minister,  198 

n.  3. 
Katsu,  Awa,  late  Count,  51  n.  1. 
Katsura,  Taro,  Viscount,  Premier, 

200,  296,  324,  329,  337,  342. 
Kerosene  oil,  at  Vladivostok,   40; 

at  Chemulpo,  40. 
Ketteler,  Baron  von,  164. 
Keyserling,  whaling  concession,  46 

n.  3,  283  and  n.  2. 
Kiakhta,  38. 
Kiao-chau,  use  by  Russia  promised, 

86  ;  in  the  "  Cassini  Convention," 

89;    desired   by   Germany,    101- 

102 ;  seized,  104;  leased,  105. 
Kin-chow,  131,  175,  182. 
Kinder,  C.  W.,  91,156. 
Kion-song,  285. 
Kiong-hung,  284. 
Kirin,  Province  of,  221,  241,  316. 
Kojedo,  Island,  276. 
Koku  a  4.9629     bushels    (dry)   or 

39.7033  gallons  (liquid). 
Kokumin  =  the   Kokumin   Shimbun 

(National  News),  a  daily  journal 

edited    by    Hon.     I.    Tokutomi, 

Tokio. 
Komura,  Baron,  J.,  212  ;  at  Seul, 

261,  265  ;  the  K.-Waeber  Memo- 


INDEX 


379 


randum,  265-266;  before  the 
Throne,  296,  324,  329,  337,  342, 
etc. ;  invites  Russia  to  negotiate, 
296-299 ;  desires  an  understand- 
ing with  Russia,  300;  sends  the 
first  note,  302  ;  receives  the  first 
reply,  308 ;  confers  with  Rosen, 
324,  etc. ;  sends  the  third  note, 
329-331 ;  corrects  Russia's  error, 

333  n. ;  points  out  Russian  fallacy, 

334  ;  sends  the  fourth  note,  337- 
339 ;  sends  the  final  notes  to  Ku- 
rino,  342  ;  on  Chinese  neutrality, 
363-364;  on  Hay's  note,  364. 
(Also  see  Japan.) 

Korea,  population  of,  27-28  n.  1 ; 
fairs  in,  24  n.  3 ;  currency  of,  23 
and  n.  3 ;  railways  in,  24  and  n. 
1,  303, 325  ;  official  corruption  in, 
20,  27 ;  trade,  10-16,  17,  19-20, 
21 ;  Japanese  in,  21-26 ;  land- 
purchase  in,  23  n.  1 ;  land-rent  in, 
29  n.  1 ;  connected  with  Manchu- 
ria, 49-50;  Russian  interests  in, 
46-48 ;  Japanese  and  Russian  in- 
terests in,  compared,  47-48,  51- 
53. 

,    dependent    on    China,    257, 

267  ;  China's  place  in,  replaced 
by  Russia,  77 ;  the  Queen  of, 
258-261;  the  King  (Emperor 
since  October,  1897)  of,  261,262- 
263,  265,  269,  273  n.  1,  at  the  Rus- 
sian Legation,  284,  289,  flexible 
will  of,  273-274,  interested  in  tim- 
ber work,  290  n.  2,  E.  and  Gov- 
ernment, 320  n.  2,  Pavloff  before 
E.,  322  n.,  E-  neutral,  355,  Russia 
claims  E.  was  coerced,  356,  359 ; 
the  Imperial  House  guaranteed 
by  Japan,  367  ;  timber  conces- 
sions, 46  and  n.  2  ;  whaling  con- 
cessions, 46  and  n.  3  ;  bank-notes, 
23  and  n.  2,  281;  the  Korean 
Straits,  309,  325,  326,  328,  331, 
333,  340  n. 

,  independence  of,  52  and  n.  2, 

60, 70, 71, 73, 75, 128, 202,  203, 208, 
209,  257,  266,  271,  297,  303,  305- 
307,  308,  324,  328,  337,  342-343, 
347,  355, 367  ff. ;  integrity  of,  203, 
208,  211;  "opendoor"in,202,203, 
205,  208,  211 ;  neutrality  of,  322 
and  n.  2,  355-357,  357-360,  360- 
362. 


Korea,  Japan's  interests  in  and  re- 
form of  (see  Issues  and  Japan), 
257-260,  298,  303,  304,  305-307, 
308-309,  324,  326,  328,  331,  338, 
356,  359,  366  ff.;  the  new  treaty 
with  Japan,  366  ff. 

Korea  Beview,  the,  372  n.  1,  etc. 

"  Korietz,"  the,  281. 

Kun-chun,  353. 

Kurile  Islands,  the  (Chishima),  66 
and  n.  1,  67. 

Kurino,  S.,  at  St.  Petersburg,  receives 
the  first  note,  296-299 ;  reports 
Russia's  assent,  299  ;  hands  in  the 
note,  302  ;  hears  of  the  first  reply, 
308 ;  hands  in  the  third  note,  331 ; 
hears  from  Komura,  337 ;  urges 
an  early  reply,  339 ;  delivers  the 
last  notes,  345 ;  leaves  Russia, 
345  n.  1 ;  349  and  n.  2  ;  350  and  n. 
1.  (Also  see  Japan  and  Komura.) 

Kuropatkin,  General,  300. 

Kwampo  =  the  Kwampo,  Official 
Gazette  of  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment, issued  daily. 

Kwan-tung,  the,  132-134,  301. 

Lamsdorff,  succeeds  Muravieff  as 
Foreign  Minister,  143;  on  Man- 
churian  conquest,  146 ;  on  the 
Alexieff-Tsgng  Agreement,  169- 
170, 171-172 ;  deprecates  punitive 
expeditions,  179  ;  on  official  pun- 
ishment, 180 ;  presses  Yang-yu, 
182  ;  on  the  agreement  with  him, 
185-186;  replies  to  Hay,  194-196 ; 
ignorant  of  soldiers  near  Korea, 
239 ;  disclaimer,  246  ff. 

,  agrees  to  negotiate,  299  and 

n.  2, 300 ;  probably  overshadowed, 
301-302;  receives  the  first  note, 
302 ;  insists  on  negotiating  at  St. 
Petersburg,  307 ;  receives  the 
third  note,  331-332;  delays  reply, 
339  ;  intimates  reply,  339  n. ;  re- 
ceives the  final  notes,  344;  mis- 
statement, 349  n.  2,  350  n.  2; 
blames  Japan  for  breaking  peace, 
349-351,  for  violating  interna- 
tional law,  355-357,  360-362. 
(Also  see  Manchuria  and  Bussia.) 

Land  trade  with  the  East,  55,  61-64. 

Lansdowne,  the  Marquess  of,  on 
the  Anglo  -  German  Agreement, 
161 ;  on   the  Lamsdorff -Yang-yu 


380 


INDEX 


Agreement,  185;  warns  China, 
189;  signs  the  Anglo-Japanese 
Agreement,  204  ;  on  the  alliance, 
205-207 ;  on  the  convention  of 
evacuation,  229  ;  on  British  pol- 
icy in  China,  246 ;  on  Russian 
policy  in  Manchuria,  315  n.  1 ;  on 
evacuation,  334  n.  3.  (Also  see 
England.) 

Lascelles,  Sir  Frank,  in  Berlin,  108. 

Lessar,  Paul,  new  Russian  Minister 
at  Peking,  190 ;  presents  demands, 
190 ;  signs  convention  of  evacua- 
tion, 220  ;  his  accompanying  note, 
224  ;  on  number  of  Chinese  troops 
in  Manchuria,  228  n.  2  ;  on  bar- 
racks, 236  n. ;  on  evacuation  of 
Niu-chwang,  237-238 ;  on  China's 
breach  of  faith,  252  n.  2  ;  on  sick 
leave,  247 ;  renews  Plancon's  de- 
mands, 254 ;  at  Port  Arthur,  301 ; 
diplomacy  in  Peking,  312,  315- 
316,  336.  (Also  see  Manchuria 
and  Bussia.) 

Li  Ching-fang,  69. 

Li  Hung  -  chang,  peace  envoy  to 
Japan,  69-71 ;  envoy  to  Russia, 
87,  90,  268  ;  signs  the  Port  Arthur 
lease,  129 ;  on  the  Boxer  affair, 
142 ;  desires  withdrawal  of  allied 
troops,  153  and  n.  2  ;  as  plenipo- 
tentiary, 162  and  n.  2 ;  inclined 
to  accept  Russian  demand  early 
in  1901,  181  n.  1,  184;  again 
later  in  1901,  191  and  n. 

Li  Ping-hing,  104. 

Liao  River,  the,  as  trade  artery,  39 ; 
as  boundary  of  neutral  territory, 

m.  4 

Liao-tung  Peninsula,  the,  ceded,  70 ; 
retroceded,  70  -  77  ;  its  signifi- 
cance, 77-78;  effects  on  Japan, 
78-82;  on  Korea,  259. 

Liao-yang,  Boxers  in,  144  ;  retaken, 
155 ;  troops  from,  292,  340,  353  ; 
barracks  in,  235  ;  soldiers  in,  235 
n.  4,  240  ;  fortification  of,  353. 

Liu  Kun-yi,  176,  177,  178,  189. 

Lobanoff-Yamagata  Protocol,  the, 
264. 

Lofeng-luh,  182-183. 

Long  White  Mountains,  the,  290. 

Ma  tseh  (mounted  bandits),  227-229, 
291  and  n.  2. 


MacCormack,  in  St.  Petersburg,  246, 
253. 

MacDonald,  Sir  Claude,  in  Peking, 
90,  92,  107,  113-114,  121,  129, 
131 ;  in  Tokio,  205. 

Makaroff ,  Admiral,  274. 

Manchuria,  people,  31  n.  3  ;  popu- 
lation, 37  n.  1 ;  resources,  36-37 ; 
wheat,  17;  flour,  40;  millet,  17- 
18;  beans,  18;  trade  with  Japan, 
10-16,  17,  20,  21,  26  ff.;  trade 
with  Russia,  33-36,  41 ;  mining, 
90 ;  Russian  interests,  32-33  and 
notes,  303,  305,  325,  326 ;  politi- 
cal interests,  48-49. 

,  railway  granted,  88, 96-99, 120, 

130;  political,  48-49 ;  commercial, 
32-33:  37-45;  134;  174,  176, 
182,  230 ;  325. 

,  campaign,  143-146,  154-155 ; 

M.  and  North  China,  140,  151- 
155,  163-165, 165  n.  1;  the  Tsgng 
Agreement,  165  ff . ;  the  Yang- 
yu  Agreement,  173  ff. ;  the  Les- 
sar demands,  190  ff . ;  the  conven- 
tion of  evacuation,  93, 196, 214  ff.; 
in  the  Anglo-German  Agreement, 
160-161,  161  n.  2,  in  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Agreement,  207;  condi- 
tions for  evacuation,  152,  etc. ; 
protection  of  M.,  226  ff.;  new  de- 
mands, 242 ;  Lansdowne  on  evacu- 
ation, 334  n.  3. 

(Also  see  Japan  and  Bussia.) 

Masampo,  50-51  n.  2,  274-278. 

Matsukata,  Count  M.,  296, 324,  329, 
337,  342. 

Matunine,  270. 

Miller,  H.  B.,  41,  145  n.  1. 

Millet,  17. 

Min  Yong-hwan,  267-268. 

Mining,  in  Korea,  287;  in  Manchu- 
ria, 90;  in  Shantung,  105,  109; 
on  the  Tumen,  284. 

Mitsui  Produce  Co.,  the,  25. 

Miura,  Lieut.-Gen.  Goro,  260-261. 

Modus  vivendi,  a,  169-171. 

Mokpo,  15,  19. 

Mongol  invasion,  80. 

Mongolia,  railway  in,  49 ;  Russian 
troops  in,  234  ;  status  quo  in,  242, 
251-252. 

Morrison,  Dr.,  94, 166,  167  n.  1, 168, 
173, 174, 181  n.  1,  235  n.  1. 

Morse,  J.  R.,  286. 


INDEX 


381 


Most-frvored-nation  clause,  the,  115, 
245. 

Mounted  bandits,  227-229,  291  and 
n.  2. 

Mugi,  4. 

Mukden,  as  trade  mart,  40  n.  2 ; 
railway,  88 ;  Boxers  in,  144 ;  re- 
taken, 155  ;  as  capital  of  Man- 
churia, 167  ;  barracks  in,  235 ; 
troops  in,  244 ;  seized,  318 ;  as 
open  port,  255 ;  opened,  317,  318, 
335. 

Mukden,  Province  of  (Sheng-king), 
221  234. 

Muravieff  "  Amurski,"  66,  155. 

Muravieff,  late  Count,  on  Talien- 
wan,  116 ;  on  Port  Arthur,  92, 
111-112,  119,  120,  121  n.  2,  122, 
123, 125, 126  ;  on  the  Boxer  affair, 
141,  149  ;  his  death,  143. 

Musan,  289. 

Mutsu,  late  Count,  69. 

Nampo,  276. 

Neutral  territory  in  the  Liao-tung, 
131,  175. 

Neutral  zone  in  Korea,  309, 310  and 
n.  1,  325,  328  n.  2,  331,  333  n., 
338,  340  n. 

Neutrality  of  Great  Britain,  203  ;  of 
Korea,  322  and  n.  2,  355-357, 
357-360,  360-362. 

Nicolaiefsk,  67. 

Nicolas  (Yong-am-po),  321. 

Nikolsk,  234. 

Nishi,  Baron  T.,  on  Wei-hai-Wei, 
128  n.  3  ;  the  N-Rosen  Memoran- 
dum, 270  ff.,  282,  294. 

JNiu-chwang,  opened,  17 ;  trade,  16- 
JIN7 ;  N.  vs.  Dalny,  37,  39 ;  the 
Ruj'so-Chinese  Bank  in,  84  n.  4 ; 
railway  to  the  Yalu,  130 ;  seized 
by  Russians,  144-145,  157,  158 
n.  2 ;  in  Russian  demands,  167, 
242,  243,  244-  316;  restoration 
promised,  224 ;  evacuation  de- 
layed, 237-238,  334  n.  3. 

Northern  Railway,  the,  38,  39,  88, 
91,  92,  113,  121  n.  2,  i31,  156, 
158  n.  2,  176,  192,  222-223,  503. 

O'Conor,  Sir  N.,  121,  123, 124. 
Odessa,  38,  39  n.  1. 
Oil  cakes,  4,  9  and  n.  1,  13-14. 
6m,  Lady,  281,  321. 


"  Open  door,"  defined,  10  and  n.  1 ; 

106 ;  135-138 ;  139, 159, 165,  202, 

205,  208,  211,  297,  303,  305. 
Open  ports  in  Manchuria,  243,  247, 

250-251,  253,  255,  314,  317. 
Oyama,  Marquis  I.,  296,  324,  329, 

337,  342. 

Pak  Che-sun,  284-285. 

Pak  Yong-hio,  259. 

Pavloff,  Paul,  Chargi  at  Peking,  90, 
93,  113,  120,  125,  127  n.  2,  129 ; 
Minister  at  Seul,  compared  with 
Hayashi,  273;  desires  Masampo, 
274-278 ;  regarding  whaling  con- 
cession, 283,  telegraph,  284-285, 
Yong-am-po,  293 ;  at  Port  Arthur, 
301 ;  against  opening  Yong-am-po, 
321 ;  before  the  Emperor,  322  n. ; 
diplomacy,  336  j  leaves  Korea, 
356-357,  359-360,  361. 

Pechili.     See  Chili. 

Perry,  "Commodore  M.  C,  56  and 
n.  1. 

Pescadores,  the,  70. 

Peteropavlof  sk,  67. 

Petuna.  88. 

Picul  =  133£  lbs.  avoirdupois. 

Ping-yang,  287. 

Plancon,  240,  242,  247  n.  1, 251, 252. 

Plehve,  late  von,  313. 

Pokotiloff,  301. 

Pood  =  36.112  lbs. 

Port  Arthur,  as  naval  port,  49, 
50 ;  its  use  promised,  86,  89,  of- 
fered, 92  ;  Russian  war  vessels  at, 
111 ;  selected  as  naval  port,  122, 
123  ff. ;  as  trade  port,  39  n.  1  ; 
demand  and  lease,  119-126,  130, 
234, 235, 237, 290 ;  compared  with 
Yong-am-po,  240,  320;  troops 
to  Korean  border,  340,  353 ;  new 
forts,  353 ;  warships  leave,  354 ; 
naval  war  at,  345,  346. 

Porto  Franco,  117,  118.  (Also  see 
Talien-wan.) 

Ports,  in  Manchuria,  247,  250-251, 
253,  255. 

Primorsk,  66. 

Prize  of  war,  356,  359,  361-362. 

Punishment  of  local  officers,  179- 
181. 

Ral«fall?  in  Japan,  6,  n.  1. 
Railways>  German  in  Shantung,  105, 


INDEX 


109  and  n.  2  ;  Seul-Chemulpo,  24 
and  n.  1 ;  Seul-Wiju,  25  and  n.  1, 
n.  3 ;  Seul-Fusan,  24  n.  2,  n.  3 ; 
Seul-Wonsan,  25  n.  1.  (Also  see 
Eastern  Chinese  Railway,  Korea, 
Manchuria,  Mongolia,  and  North- 
ern Railway.) 

Railway  guards,  98,  230-232,  235. 

Rice,  in  Japan,  crop,  3  and  n.  3 ; 
consumption  and  importation,  4, 
9,  13 ;  in  Manchuria,  12 ;  in 
Korea,  28,  29. 

Richthofen,  Fr.  von,  101. 

Rondon,  288. 

Root,  Elihu,  365  n.  1. 

Rosen,  Baron,  Nishi-R.  Memo- 
randum, 270  ff. :  R.  at  Port 
Arthur,  301  ;  conferences  with 
Komura,  324,  332,  etc. ;  leaves 
Tokio,  345  and  n.,  350,  351. 

Ruble  =  51.5  cents. 

Russia,  declines  to  coerce  Japan,  68 ; 
leads  in  coercion,  70-77  ;  favors 
China,  83,  85, 88, 128 ;  guarantees 
Chinese  loan,  83-84;  allies  with 
China,  85,  93,  94  n.  2 ;  the  "  Cas 
sini  Convention,"  87-95,  98 ;  the 
railway  agreement,  96-99 ;  leases 
Talien-wan  and  Port  Arthur,  110- 
134 ;  replies  to  Hay,  137-138 ;  the 
Boxer  affair,  142  and  notes,  149- 
150  and  notes ;  circular  of  August 
25,  151-154;  features  of  diplo- 
macy, 140, 147-148, 151-155, 163- 
165,  165,  n.  1 ;  on  the  Anglo- 
German  Agreement,  159-160 ;  the 
declaration  with  France,  78,  207- 
213  ;  the  convention  of  evacuation, 
93,  214  ff. 

,    investments    in    Manchuria, 

32-33  and  notes;  colonization  in 
Manchuria,  43  ;  interests  in  Man- 
churia, 33-35,  47-48,  325,  326 ; 
economics  of  Russia,  36,  54-55 ; 
commercial  policy,  36-43,  48-45, 
45-46,  57-58 ;  economics  and  poli- 
tics, 56-57  ;  representing  old  civ- 
ilization, 53-64,  56  n.  % 

,  in  Korea,  takes  China's  place, 

77  ;  influence  after  the  Chinese 
war,  259,  261-272,  chapter  xvii. ; 
economic  interests,  46-47 ;  tele- 
graph, 284;  bank,  267,  27»  J 
policy,  48-53. 

,  negotiations  with  Jar"*11   (see 


Japan)  ;  Russian  interpretation, 

327  n.  9,  349-351;  manifesto  of 

war,  345-346. 

(Also  see  Issues,  Japan,  Korea, 

and  Manchuria.) 
Russo-Chinese    Bank,   the,   84-85, 

192,  201,  238,  243,  279,  290  n.  2, 

316. 
Russo-Korean  Bank,  the,  269,  270. 
Rye,  4. 

St.  Petersburg,  politics  in,  301. 
Saito,  Shuichiro,  258. 
Sakhalien,  66-67. 
Salisbury,   the   Marquess    of,    108, 

113,  115,  117,  123-125,  149  n.  2, 

158  n.  2. 
Sands,  280  n.  3. 
Satow,  Sir  Ernest,  at  Peking,  91, 

166,  173,  177,  179,  189,  191,  229, 

234. 
Scott,  Sir  Charles,  142  n.  1,  143  n. 

3,  166  rt.  1,  180. 
Settlements,  foreign,  in  Manchuria, 

45,  314,  333-334  and  n.  3,  338. 
Seul,  trade  at,  15 ;  Japanese  troops 

in,   266;   S.-Chemulpo  Railway, 

24  and  n.  1,  286;  S.-Fusan  Rail- 
way, 24  and  n.  2,  n.  3,  286  and  n. ; 

S.-Fusan     telegraph,     265 ;     S.- 

Wiju  Railway,  25  and  n.  1,  n.  3, 

285-288  ;  S.-Wonsan  Railway,  25 

n.  1.     (Also  see  Korea.) 
Seymour,  Admiral,  141. 
Shan-hai-kwan.  See  Northern  Rail 

way. 
Shan-tung,  Province     *,   101;  106, 

107  n.  1,  109. 
Sheng-king,  Province  of  221, 233  ff., 

239,  283,  316. 
Shimonoseki,  the  treaty  of,  70/,  355. 
Siberi  .  Eastern,  40,  46. 
Siberian  Railway,  as  carrier,  41,  55, 

61-64 ;  projected,  PR 
Skrydloff,  Rear  Admiral,  284. 
tio-shi  (political,  bravoes),  261-262, 

265. 
Sonntag,  MAss,  25  and  n.  3,  280. 
Sovereignty,    105-106.     (Also    see 

Balance,  Independence,  and  Inteq- 

rify). 
6peyer,  A.  de,  269-270. 
Staal,  de,  115,  116,  118,  122,229- 

230. 
Starck,  Admiral,  293. 


f 


INDEX 


383 


Statutes,  the  Railway,  230. 
Stein,  274,  275,  288,  291,  292. 
Sugar,  4  n.  2. 
Sugiyama,  141,  164. 
Sungari  River,  the,  316. 

Tai-ku,  265. 
Tai-wen-kun,  260,  261. 
Talien-wan,  87,  89,  114,  122,  130. 
Tatung-kao,    240,    255,    291,  318, 

335. 
Tea,  from  China  to  Russia,  35,  38- 

39,  39  n.  1. 
Telegraph  lines,  in  Korea,  266, 267, 
284-285  ;  in  Manchuria,  243,  247. 
Terauchi,  296,  324,  329,  337,  342. 
Three  Eastern   Provinces,  the,  96. 

See  Manchuria. 
Tieh-ling,  155. 
Tien-tsin,  156,  157,  163,  233. 
Timber  concessions,  in   Korea,  46, 

and  n.  2,  240,  263,  289  ff. 
Tja-pok,  276. 

Tokushu  Joyaku  =  the  To- A  Kwan- 
kei  Tokushu  Joyaku  Isan  (a  col- 
lection of  special  treaties  relating 
to  Eastern  Asia),  compiled  by  the 
To-A  Dobun  Association,  Tokio, 
1904. 
Townley,  245, 254. 
Treaty  rights,  325,  326-327,  333  n., 
,       884  and  n.  3;  338. 
Triple  Alliance,  the,  210  n.  1. 

?-chi,  166,  168  n.  3,  228  n.  1, 

318. 
Jbar,  316. 

>>  \nd  n.  1,  67. 
'  an,  the.  Tapanese  Consular 
,  ,;;«ued  six  times  a  month, 
nonuMy  supplements, 
>epartm  ent  of  Foreign 
<>kio.  ./;. 

Prince,  140, 162. 
River,  the,  263,  283,   284. 

Ukhtomsky,  Prince,  84. 
Uinung  Island,  203,  289-29& 
United  States,  the,  trade  with  J? pan, 
iid  n.  1 ;  cordial  relations  with 
Japan     and    England,     76,     78, 
198;  warns  China,  169;  against 
the  Plancon  demands,  245  ff .,  253 ; 
on    China's  neutrality,    864-886. 
(Also  see  American  and  Hay.) 


Vladivostok,  founded,  67 ;  as  naval 
port,  50, 112 ;  234  ;  overshadowed 
by  Dalny,  37,  38  and  n.  2; 
American  kerosene  at,  49  and  n. 
3  ;  Governor  of,  341 ;  new  forts 
at,  353. 

Waeber,  at  Seul,  259;  the  Ko- 
mura-W.  Memorandum,  265-266 ; 
leaves  Korea,  269  ;  special  envoy 
at  Seul,  280. 

Waeber,  Madame,  259,  280. 

Waldersee,  Count  von,  157. 

Wang  Tsz-chun,  87. 

War,  the  Chinese-Japanese,  369 ; 
the  Russo-Japanese,  responsibility 
of,  349-351,  352-354 ;  probable 
effects  of,  59-60. 

Wei-hai-Wei,  leased  to  England, 
125-126;  Japan's  attitude,  120, 
128-129 ;  Germany's  attitude,  107. 

Wheat,  4,  9,  12. 

Wiju,  railway  to  Seul,  25  and  n.  1 , 
n.  3,  285-288 ;  telegraph  to  Port 
Arthur  and  Harbin,  285 ;  opening 
of,  320. 

Wonsan  (Gensan),  railway  to  Seul, 
25  n.  1 ;  Japanese  troops  in,  266. 

Witte,  36,  173,  239,  300,  301. 

Wu  Ting-fang,  153  n.  2. 

Yalu  River,  the,  navigation  and 
policing  of,  86-87;  Russian  troops 
upon,  239,  335 ;  as  boundary, 
283 ;  timber  work  on,  289  ff. 
(Also  see  Yong-am-po.) 
Yamagata,  Marquis,  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, 253;  the  Y.-Lobanoff 
Protocol,  264,  279 ;  against  loan, 
279-280;  as  Privy  Councilor,  296, 
324,  329,  337,  342. 
Yamamoto,  G.,  295,  324,  329,  337, 
342. 

.  u,  173,  182. 

sze  Provinces,  the,  120,  121 
n.  ifcl60f  315  n.  1. 
Yen  =  49.8  cents. 
Fi  Chi-yong_3G7. 
Yi.Keun-thaix..  281,  321,  322  n. 
Yi  Vong-ik,  281  ff.,  287,  321. 
Yin-sa.u,  287. 

Yong-anr-po,  240,  289-295,  318  ff. 
Yuan  Shi-Afti 
Yun-san,  28.7. 


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